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Was Adam Smith right?: evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay?

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Was Adam Smith right? evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay? / Homroy, Swarnodeep.
In: Manchester School, Vol. 84, No. 1, 01.2016, p. 1-24.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Homroy S. Was Adam Smith right? evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay? Manchester School. 2016 Jan;84(1):1-24. Epub 2014 Sept 17. doi: 10.1111/manc.12086

Author

Homroy, Swarnodeep. / Was Adam Smith right? evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay?. In: Manchester School. 2016 ; Vol. 84, No. 1. pp. 1-24.

Bibtex

@article{8696538e14b9489c9a450025f7aba562,
title = "Was Adam Smith right?: evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay?",
abstract = "This paper estimates the compensating differential in CEO pay for the increasing risk of dismissal using contracted severance pay eligibility of the CEO as the main instrument. US CEOs receive a 3 per cent premium in pay for each percentage point increase in the risk of dismissal. In pointing to the dismissal risk as a determinant of CEO pay, these findings contribute to the debate on the recent growth in CEO pay and the potential impacts of governance reforms.",
author = "Swarnodeep Homroy",
year = "2016",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1111/manc.12086",
language = "English",
volume = "84",
pages = "1--24",
journal = "Manchester School",
issn = "1463-6786",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Was Adam Smith right?

T2 - evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay?

AU - Homroy, Swarnodeep

PY - 2016/1

Y1 - 2016/1

N2 - This paper estimates the compensating differential in CEO pay for the increasing risk of dismissal using contracted severance pay eligibility of the CEO as the main instrument. US CEOs receive a 3 per cent premium in pay for each percentage point increase in the risk of dismissal. In pointing to the dismissal risk as a determinant of CEO pay, these findings contribute to the debate on the recent growth in CEO pay and the potential impacts of governance reforms.

AB - This paper estimates the compensating differential in CEO pay for the increasing risk of dismissal using contracted severance pay eligibility of the CEO as the main instrument. US CEOs receive a 3 per cent premium in pay for each percentage point increase in the risk of dismissal. In pointing to the dismissal risk as a determinant of CEO pay, these findings contribute to the debate on the recent growth in CEO pay and the potential impacts of governance reforms.

U2 - 10.1111/manc.12086

DO - 10.1111/manc.12086

M3 - Journal article

VL - 84

SP - 1

EP - 24

JO - Manchester School

JF - Manchester School

SN - 1463-6786

IS - 1

ER -