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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Macleod, C. (2013), Was Mill a Noncognitivist?. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51: 206–223. doi: 10.1111/sjp.12011 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12011/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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Was Mill a non-cognitivist?

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Was Mill a non-cognitivist? / Macleod, Christopher.

In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 2, 06.2013, p. 206-223.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Macleod, C 2013, 'Was Mill a non-cognitivist?', The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 206-223. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12011

APA

Macleod, C. (2013). Was Mill a non-cognitivist? The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51(2), 206-223. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12011

Vancouver

Macleod C. Was Mill a non-cognitivist? The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2013 Jun;51(2):206-223. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12011

Author

Macleod, Christopher. / Was Mill a non-cognitivist?. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2013 ; Vol. 51, No. 2. pp. 206-223.

Bibtex

@article{c3b997ab3bf849b39b49083332ab5a7a,
title = "Was Mill a non-cognitivist?",
abstract = "In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical non-cognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing, and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin, in Section I, by laying out the ‘received view’ of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. There is, I claim in Sections II and III, no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his remarks on ‘art’ and ‘science’ do not show the metaethical commitments they have been taken to. Neither is there firm textual evidence for a cognitivist reading. However, I suggest in Section IV, a non-cognitivist interpretation suffers from the fault of anachronism, and is difficult to reconcile with a clear commitment in Utilitarianism IV.3 to the possibility of evidence being given for the desirability of pleasure. A cognitivist reading would not suffer from these faults, and on that basis, I conclude that we should think further about what a cognitivist reading of Mill might amount to.",
author = "Christopher Macleod",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Macleod, C. (2013), Was Mill a Noncognitivist?. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51: 206–223. doi: 10.1111/sjp.12011 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12011/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.",
year = "2013",
month = "6",
doi = "10.1111/sjp.12011",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "206--223",
journal = "The Southern Journal of Philosophy",
issn = "0038-4283",
publisher = "University of Memphis, Department of Philosophy",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Was Mill a non-cognitivist?

AU - Macleod, Christopher

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Macleod, C. (2013), Was Mill a Noncognitivist?. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51: 206–223. doi: 10.1111/sjp.12011 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12011/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2013/6

Y1 - 2013/6

N2 - In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical non-cognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing, and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin, in Section I, by laying out the ‘received view’ of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. There is, I claim in Sections II and III, no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his remarks on ‘art’ and ‘science’ do not show the metaethical commitments they have been taken to. Neither is there firm textual evidence for a cognitivist reading. However, I suggest in Section IV, a non-cognitivist interpretation suffers from the fault of anachronism, and is difficult to reconcile with a clear commitment in Utilitarianism IV.3 to the possibility of evidence being given for the desirability of pleasure. A cognitivist reading would not suffer from these faults, and on that basis, I conclude that we should think further about what a cognitivist reading of Mill might amount to.

AB - In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical non-cognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing, and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin, in Section I, by laying out the ‘received view’ of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. There is, I claim in Sections II and III, no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his remarks on ‘art’ and ‘science’ do not show the metaethical commitments they have been taken to. Neither is there firm textual evidence for a cognitivist reading. However, I suggest in Section IV, a non-cognitivist interpretation suffers from the fault of anachronism, and is difficult to reconcile with a clear commitment in Utilitarianism IV.3 to the possibility of evidence being given for the desirability of pleasure. A cognitivist reading would not suffer from these faults, and on that basis, I conclude that we should think further about what a cognitivist reading of Mill might amount to.

U2 - 10.1111/sjp.12011

DO - 10.1111/sjp.12011

M3 - Journal article

VL - 51

SP - 206

EP - 223

JO - The Southern Journal of Philosophy

JF - The Southern Journal of Philosophy

SN - 0038-4283

IS - 2

ER -