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What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness.

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What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness. / Manson, Neil C.
In: Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2002, p. 221-238.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Manson, NC 2002, 'What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness.', Philosophical Psychology, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 221-238. https://doi.org/10.1080/0951508021000006076

APA

Manson, N. C. (2002). What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 15(3), 221-238. https://doi.org/10.1080/0951508021000006076

Vancouver

Manson NC. What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology. 2002;15(3):221-238. doi: 10.1080/0951508021000006076

Author

Manson, Neil C. / What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness. In: Philosophical Psychology. 2002 ; Vol. 15, No. 3. pp. 221-238.

Bibtex

@article{10d6388d46434c1a814178cdfb637728,
title = "What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness.",
abstract = "The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal{\^a}��s argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for {\^a}��p{\^a}�� and {\^a}��I think that p{\^a}�� differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars {\^a}��I think{\^a}�� from playing one of its (expressive) roles and thus is not a good test for what is asserted when {\^a}��I think{\^a}�� is employed in making an assertoric utterance. The critique of Rosenthal{\^a}��s argument allows us to make explicit the intuitions which shape higher-order representation theories of consciousness in general. Consciousness and first-person mental discourse seem to be connected primarily because consciousness is (and was) an epistemic term, used to denote first-person knowledge of minds. Higher-order thought theories of consciousness draw upon this epistemic notion of consciousness, and because self-knowledge seems to involve higher-order representation, the higher-order theorist can deploy what is in effect an {\^a}��error theory{\^a}�� about conscious experience disguised as a kind of conceptual analysis of our ordinary concept of a conscious mental state. The conclusion reached is that there is unlikely to be a simple or direct path from considerations about mental discourse to conclusions about the nature of consciousness.",
keywords = "consciousness, higher-order thought, Moore's paradox, Rosenthal, David M, epistemic consciousness",
author = "Manson, {Neil C.}",
year = "2002",
doi = "10.1080/0951508021000006076",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "221--238",
journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
issn = "1465-394X",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness.

AU - Manson, Neil C.

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal�s argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for �p� and �I think that p� differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars �I think� from playing one of its (expressive) roles and thus is not a good test for what is asserted when �I think� is employed in making an assertoric utterance. The critique of Rosenthal�s argument allows us to make explicit the intuitions which shape higher-order representation theories of consciousness in general. Consciousness and first-person mental discourse seem to be connected primarily because consciousness is (and was) an epistemic term, used to denote first-person knowledge of minds. Higher-order thought theories of consciousness draw upon this epistemic notion of consciousness, and because self-knowledge seems to involve higher-order representation, the higher-order theorist can deploy what is in effect an �error theory� about conscious experience disguised as a kind of conceptual analysis of our ordinary concept of a conscious mental state. The conclusion reached is that there is unlikely to be a simple or direct path from considerations about mental discourse to conclusions about the nature of consciousness.

AB - The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal�s argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for �p� and �I think that p� differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars �I think� from playing one of its (expressive) roles and thus is not a good test for what is asserted when �I think� is employed in making an assertoric utterance. The critique of Rosenthal�s argument allows us to make explicit the intuitions which shape higher-order representation theories of consciousness in general. Consciousness and first-person mental discourse seem to be connected primarily because consciousness is (and was) an epistemic term, used to denote first-person knowledge of minds. Higher-order thought theories of consciousness draw upon this epistemic notion of consciousness, and because self-knowledge seems to involve higher-order representation, the higher-order theorist can deploy what is in effect an �error theory� about conscious experience disguised as a kind of conceptual analysis of our ordinary concept of a conscious mental state. The conclusion reached is that there is unlikely to be a simple or direct path from considerations about mental discourse to conclusions about the nature of consciousness.

KW - consciousness

KW - higher-order thought

KW - Moore's paradox

KW - Rosenthal

KW - David M

KW - epistemic consciousness

U2 - 10.1080/0951508021000006076

DO - 10.1080/0951508021000006076

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

SP - 221

EP - 238

JO - Philosophical Psychology

JF - Philosophical Psychology

SN - 1465-394X

IS - 3

ER -