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What have labels ever done for us?: The linguistic shortcut in conceptual processing

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What have labels ever done for us? The linguistic shortcut in conceptual processing. / Connell, Louise Mary.
In: Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 11.05.2018.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Connell LM. What have labels ever done for us? The linguistic shortcut in conceptual processing. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience. 2018 May 11. Epub 2018 May 11. doi: 10.1080/23273798.2018.1471512

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@article{61d5a35f6fa746ba898ed279bd70fc78,
title = "What have labels ever done for us?: The linguistic shortcut in conceptual processing",
abstract = "How does language affect cognition? Is it important that most of our concepts come with linguistic labels, such as car or number? The statistical distributions of how such labels co-occur in language offers a rich medium of associative information that can support conceptual processing in a number of ways. In this article, I argue that the role of language in conceptual processing goes far beyond mere support, and that language is as fundamental and intrinsic a part of conceptual processing as sensorimotor-affective simulations. In particular, because linguistic association tends to be computationally cheaper than simulation (i.e. faster, less effortful, but still information-rich), it enables an heuristic mechanism that can provide adequate conceptual representation without the need to develop a detailed simulation. I review the evidence for this key mechanism – the linguistic shortcut – and propose that it allows labels to sometimes carry the burden of conceptual processing by acting in place of simulated referent meanings, according to context, available resources, and processing goals.",
author = "Connell, {Louise Mary}",
year = "2018",
month = may,
day = "11",
doi = "10.1080/23273798.2018.1471512",
language = "English",
journal = "Language, Cognition and Neuroscience",
issn = "2327-3798",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - What have labels ever done for us?

T2 - The linguistic shortcut in conceptual processing

AU - Connell, Louise Mary

PY - 2018/5/11

Y1 - 2018/5/11

N2 - How does language affect cognition? Is it important that most of our concepts come with linguistic labels, such as car or number? The statistical distributions of how such labels co-occur in language offers a rich medium of associative information that can support conceptual processing in a number of ways. In this article, I argue that the role of language in conceptual processing goes far beyond mere support, and that language is as fundamental and intrinsic a part of conceptual processing as sensorimotor-affective simulations. In particular, because linguistic association tends to be computationally cheaper than simulation (i.e. faster, less effortful, but still information-rich), it enables an heuristic mechanism that can provide adequate conceptual representation without the need to develop a detailed simulation. I review the evidence for this key mechanism – the linguistic shortcut – and propose that it allows labels to sometimes carry the burden of conceptual processing by acting in place of simulated referent meanings, according to context, available resources, and processing goals.

AB - How does language affect cognition? Is it important that most of our concepts come with linguistic labels, such as car or number? The statistical distributions of how such labels co-occur in language offers a rich medium of associative information that can support conceptual processing in a number of ways. In this article, I argue that the role of language in conceptual processing goes far beyond mere support, and that language is as fundamental and intrinsic a part of conceptual processing as sensorimotor-affective simulations. In particular, because linguistic association tends to be computationally cheaper than simulation (i.e. faster, less effortful, but still information-rich), it enables an heuristic mechanism that can provide adequate conceptual representation without the need to develop a detailed simulation. I review the evidence for this key mechanism – the linguistic shortcut – and propose that it allows labels to sometimes carry the burden of conceptual processing by acting in place of simulated referent meanings, according to context, available resources, and processing goals.

U2 - 10.1080/23273798.2018.1471512

DO - 10.1080/23273798.2018.1471512

M3 - Journal article

JO - Language, Cognition and Neuroscience

JF - Language, Cognition and Neuroscience

SN - 2327-3798

ER -