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When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

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When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model. / Stupple, Edward J. N.; Ball, Linden J.; Evans, Jonathan St B. T.; Kamal-Smith, Emily.

In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 8, 2011, p. 931-941.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Stupple, EJN, Ball, LJ, Evans, JSBT & Kamal-Smith, E 2011, 'When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model', Journal of Cognitive Psychology, vol. 23, no. 8, pp. 931-941. https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2011.589381

APA

Stupple, E. J. N., Ball, L. J., Evans, J. S. B. T., & Kamal-Smith, E. (2011). When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 23(8), 931-941. https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2011.589381

Vancouver

Author

Stupple, Edward J. N. ; Ball, Linden J. ; Evans, Jonathan St B. T. ; Kamal-Smith, Emily. / When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model. In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 2011 ; Vol. 23, No. 8. pp. 931-941.

Bibtex

@article{2824cacb32a84d67b6988042efe12124,
title = "When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model",
abstract = "When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.",
keywords = "Belief bias, Deduction, Dual process theory, Individual differences, Reasoning, WORKING-MEMORY, CONFLICT, BIAS, THINKING",
author = "Stupple, {Edward J. N.} and Ball, {Linden J.} and Evans, {Jonathan St B. T.} and Emily Kamal-Smith",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1080/20445911.2011.589381",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "931--941",
journal = "Journal of Cognitive Psychology",
issn = "2044-5911",
publisher = "Psychology Press Ltd",
number = "8",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

AU - Stupple, Edward J. N.

AU - Ball, Linden J.

AU - Evans, Jonathan St B. T.

AU - Kamal-Smith, Emily

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.

AB - When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.

KW - Belief bias

KW - Deduction

KW - Dual process theory

KW - Individual differences

KW - Reasoning

KW - WORKING-MEMORY

KW - CONFLICT

KW - BIAS

KW - THINKING

U2 - 10.1080/20445911.2011.589381

DO - 10.1080/20445911.2011.589381

M3 - Journal article

VL - 23

SP - 931

EP - 941

JO - Journal of Cognitive Psychology

JF - Journal of Cognitive Psychology

SN - 2044-5911

IS - 8

ER -