Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Where’s the problem?

Electronic data

  • finalversion

    Rights statement: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-017-9413-0

    Accepted author manuscript, 278 KB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY-NC: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Where’s the problem?: considering Laing and Esterson’s account of schizophrenia, social models of disability, and extended mental disorder

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published

Standard

Where’s the problem? considering Laing and Esterson’s account of schizophrenia, social models of disability, and extended mental disorder. / Cooper, Rachel Valerie.

In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, Vol. 38, No. 4, 08.2017, p. 295-305.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Bibtex

@article{d3ab8b26f4a7453aaa25b9605841597d,
title = "Where’s the problem?: considering Laing and Esterson’s account of schizophrenia, social models of disability, and extended mental disorder",
abstract = "In this paper I compare and evaluate Laing and Esterson’s account of schizophrenia as developed in Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964), social models of disability, and accounts of extended mental disorder. These accounts claim that some putative disorders (schizophrenia, disability, certain mental disorders) should not be thought of as reflecting biological or psychological dysfunction within the afflicted individual, but are instead external problems (to be located in the family, or in the material and social environment). In this paper I consider the grounds on which such claims might be supported. I argue that problems should not be located within an individual putative patient in cases where there is some acceptable test environment in which there is no problem. A number of cases where such an argument can show that there is no internal disorder are discussed. I argue, however, that Laing and Esterson’s argument, that schizophrenia is not within diagnosed patients, does not work. The problem with their argument is that they fail to show that the diagnosed women in their study function adequately in any environment.",
keywords = "social model of disability, R. D. Laing , Schizophrenia , Extended mind, Internal location",
author = "Cooper, {Rachel Valerie}",
note = "The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-017-9413-0",
year = "2017",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1007/s11017-017-9413-0",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "295--305",
journal = "Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics",
issn = "1386-7415",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Where’s the problem?

T2 - considering Laing and Esterson’s account of schizophrenia, social models of disability, and extended mental disorder

AU - Cooper, Rachel Valerie

N1 - The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-017-9413-0

PY - 2017/8

Y1 - 2017/8

N2 - In this paper I compare and evaluate Laing and Esterson’s account of schizophrenia as developed in Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964), social models of disability, and accounts of extended mental disorder. These accounts claim that some putative disorders (schizophrenia, disability, certain mental disorders) should not be thought of as reflecting biological or psychological dysfunction within the afflicted individual, but are instead external problems (to be located in the family, or in the material and social environment). In this paper I consider the grounds on which such claims might be supported. I argue that problems should not be located within an individual putative patient in cases where there is some acceptable test environment in which there is no problem. A number of cases where such an argument can show that there is no internal disorder are discussed. I argue, however, that Laing and Esterson’s argument, that schizophrenia is not within diagnosed patients, does not work. The problem with their argument is that they fail to show that the diagnosed women in their study function adequately in any environment.

AB - In this paper I compare and evaluate Laing and Esterson’s account of schizophrenia as developed in Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964), social models of disability, and accounts of extended mental disorder. These accounts claim that some putative disorders (schizophrenia, disability, certain mental disorders) should not be thought of as reflecting biological or psychological dysfunction within the afflicted individual, but are instead external problems (to be located in the family, or in the material and social environment). In this paper I consider the grounds on which such claims might be supported. I argue that problems should not be located within an individual putative patient in cases where there is some acceptable test environment in which there is no problem. A number of cases where such an argument can show that there is no internal disorder are discussed. I argue, however, that Laing and Esterson’s argument, that schizophrenia is not within diagnosed patients, does not work. The problem with their argument is that they fail to show that the diagnosed women in their study function adequately in any environment.

KW - social model of disability

KW - R. D. Laing

KW - Schizophrenia

KW - Extended mind

KW - Internal location

U2 - 10.1007/s11017-017-9413-0

DO - 10.1007/s11017-017-9413-0

M3 - Journal article

VL - 38

SP - 295

EP - 305

JO - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

JF - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

SN - 1386-7415

IS - 4

ER -