Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10 (7), 2019, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2019 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the Feminist Theory page: http://fty.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/
Accepted author manuscript, 1.82 MB, PDF document
Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Which appraisals are foundational to moral judgment?
T2 - Harm, injustice, and beyond
AU - Piazza, Jared Raymond
AU - Sousa, Paulo
AU - Rottman, Joshua
AU - Syropoulos, Stylianos
N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10 (7), 2019, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2019 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the Feminist Theory page: http://fty.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/
PY - 2019/9/1
Y1 - 2019/9/1
N2 - Harm-centric accounts of judgments of moral wrongdoing argue that moral judgments are fundamentally based on appraisals of harm. However, past research has failed to operationally discriminate harm appraisals from appraisals related to injustice. Four studies carefully discriminated harm qua pain/suffering from injustice, alongside appraisals related to impurity, authority, and disloyalty. Appraisals of injustice outperformed appraisals of harm as independent predictors of the judged wrongness of recalled offenses (Study 1). Studies 2a, 2b, and 3 extended these findings using a diverse range of wrongful acts and two different cultural samples—the United States and Greece. In addition to the strong relevance of injustice appraisals, these latter studies uncovered substantial contributions of impurity and authority appraisals. The results inform debates on moral pluralism and the foundations of moral cognition.
AB - Harm-centric accounts of judgments of moral wrongdoing argue that moral judgments are fundamentally based on appraisals of harm. However, past research has failed to operationally discriminate harm appraisals from appraisals related to injustice. Four studies carefully discriminated harm qua pain/suffering from injustice, alongside appraisals related to impurity, authority, and disloyalty. Appraisals of injustice outperformed appraisals of harm as independent predictors of the judged wrongness of recalled offenses (Study 1). Studies 2a, 2b, and 3 extended these findings using a diverse range of wrongful acts and two different cultural samples—the United States and Greece. In addition to the strong relevance of injustice appraisals, these latter studies uncovered substantial contributions of impurity and authority appraisals. The results inform debates on moral pluralism and the foundations of moral cognition.
KW - moral judgment
KW - harm
KW - injustice
KW - moral foundations theory
KW - moral pluralism
U2 - 10.1177/1948550618801326
DO - 10.1177/1948550618801326
M3 - Journal article
VL - 10
SP - 903
EP - 913
JO - Social Psychological and Personality Science
JF - Social Psychological and Personality Science
SN - 1948-5506
IS - 7
ER -