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"Who are we to judge?": on the proportionment of happiness to virtue

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"Who are we to judge?": on the proportionment of happiness to virtue. / Williams, Garrath.
In: Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 1, 01.2010, p. 47-66.

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Williams G. "Who are we to judge?": on the proportionment of happiness to virtue. Philosophy. 2010 Jan;85(1):47-66. doi: 10.1017/S003181910999043X

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@article{4c5ee8bd6439477684e08eebe371187a,
title = "{"}Who are we to judge?{"}: on the proportionment of happiness to virtue",
abstract = "The claim that happiness and virtue ought to be proportionate to one another has often been expressed in the idea of a future world of divine justice, despite many moral difficulties with this idea. This paper argues that human efforts to enact such a proportionment are, ironically, justified by the same reasons that make the idea of divine justice seem so problematic. Moralists have often regarded our frailty and fallibility as reasons for abstaining from the judgment of others; and doubts about our deserving some proportionment of happiness or unhappiness often arise insofar as virtue and vice may be explained on a causal basis. This paper argues that our fallibility and our susceptibility to social influence render judgment and response indispensable, because - given these characteristics - our actions and responses decide the morality that we actually share with one another. In this situation, to 'judge not' is to abandon the field to those with no such scruples.",
keywords = "responsibility, desert, mutual accountability, judgment, divine judgment",
author = "Garrath Williams",
note = "http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PHI The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Philosophy, 85 (1), pp 47-66 2010, {\textcopyright} 2010 Cambridge University Press.",
year = "2010",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1017/S003181910999043X",
language = "English",
volume = "85",
pages = "47--66",
journal = "Philosophy",
issn = "1469-817X",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - "Who are we to judge?"

T2 - on the proportionment of happiness to virtue

AU - Williams, Garrath

N1 - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PHI The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Philosophy, 85 (1), pp 47-66 2010, © 2010 Cambridge University Press.

PY - 2010/1

Y1 - 2010/1

N2 - The claim that happiness and virtue ought to be proportionate to one another has often been expressed in the idea of a future world of divine justice, despite many moral difficulties with this idea. This paper argues that human efforts to enact such a proportionment are, ironically, justified by the same reasons that make the idea of divine justice seem so problematic. Moralists have often regarded our frailty and fallibility as reasons for abstaining from the judgment of others; and doubts about our deserving some proportionment of happiness or unhappiness often arise insofar as virtue and vice may be explained on a causal basis. This paper argues that our fallibility and our susceptibility to social influence render judgment and response indispensable, because - given these characteristics - our actions and responses decide the morality that we actually share with one another. In this situation, to 'judge not' is to abandon the field to those with no such scruples.

AB - The claim that happiness and virtue ought to be proportionate to one another has often been expressed in the idea of a future world of divine justice, despite many moral difficulties with this idea. This paper argues that human efforts to enact such a proportionment are, ironically, justified by the same reasons that make the idea of divine justice seem so problematic. Moralists have often regarded our frailty and fallibility as reasons for abstaining from the judgment of others; and doubts about our deserving some proportionment of happiness or unhappiness often arise insofar as virtue and vice may be explained on a causal basis. This paper argues that our fallibility and our susceptibility to social influence render judgment and response indispensable, because - given these characteristics - our actions and responses decide the morality that we actually share with one another. In this situation, to 'judge not' is to abandon the field to those with no such scruples.

KW - responsibility

KW - desert

KW - mutual accountability

KW - judgment

KW - divine judgment

U2 - 10.1017/S003181910999043X

DO - 10.1017/S003181910999043X

M3 - Journal article

VL - 85

SP - 47

EP - 66

JO - Philosophy

JF - Philosophy

SN - 1469-817X

IS - 1

ER -