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Who disciplines bank managers?

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Who disciplines bank managers? / Schaeck, Klaus; Cihak, Martin; Maechler, Andrea et al.
In: Review of Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1, 01.01.2012, p. 197-243.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Schaeck, K, Cihak, M, Maechler, A & Stolz, S 2012, 'Who disciplines bank managers?', Review of Finance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 197-243. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfr010

APA

Schaeck, K., Cihak, M., Maechler, A., & Stolz, S. (2012). Who disciplines bank managers? Review of Finance, 16(1), 197-243. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfr010

Vancouver

Schaeck K, Cihak M, Maechler A, Stolz S. Who disciplines bank managers? Review of Finance. 2012 Jan 1;16(1):197-243. Epub 2011 May 27. doi: 10.1093/rof/rfr010

Author

Schaeck, Klaus ; Cihak, Martin ; Maechler, Andrea et al. / Who disciplines bank managers?. In: Review of Finance. 2012 ; Vol. 16, No. 1. pp. 197-243.

Bibtex

@article{f8b489111f6c454fa1a7b169728fe4fc,
title = "Who disciplines bank managers?",
abstract = "We exploit a unique data set of executive turnovers in community banks to test the micro-mechanisms of discipline by examining the monitoring and influencing role of different stakeholders. We find executives are more likely to be dismissed in risky institutions. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. When we analyze risk, losses, and profitability following turnovers, we obtain no evidence that replacing executives improves performance. ",
author = "Klaus Schaeck and Martin Cihak and Andrea Maechler and Stephanie Stolz",
year = "2012",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/rof/rfr010",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "197--243",
journal = "Review of Finance",
issn = "1572-3097",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Who disciplines bank managers?

AU - Schaeck, Klaus

AU - Cihak, Martin

AU - Maechler, Andrea

AU - Stolz, Stephanie

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - We exploit a unique data set of executive turnovers in community banks to test the micro-mechanisms of discipline by examining the monitoring and influencing role of different stakeholders. We find executives are more likely to be dismissed in risky institutions. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. When we analyze risk, losses, and profitability following turnovers, we obtain no evidence that replacing executives improves performance.

AB - We exploit a unique data set of executive turnovers in community banks to test the micro-mechanisms of discipline by examining the monitoring and influencing role of different stakeholders. We find executives are more likely to be dismissed in risky institutions. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. When we analyze risk, losses, and profitability following turnovers, we obtain no evidence that replacing executives improves performance.

U2 - 10.1093/rof/rfr010

DO - 10.1093/rof/rfr010

M3 - Journal article

VL - 16

SP - 197

EP - 243

JO - Review of Finance

JF - Review of Finance

SN - 1572-3097

IS - 1

ER -