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Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds.

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Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds. / Cooper, R.V.
In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 55, No. 1, 03.2004, p. 73-85.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Cooper, RV 2004, 'Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds.', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 73-85. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.1.73

APA

Cooper, R. V. (2004). Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(1), 73-85. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.1.73

Vancouver

Cooper RV. Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2004 Mar;55(1):73-85. doi: 10.1093/bjps/55.1.73

Author

Cooper, R.V. / Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds. In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2004 ; Vol. 55, No. 1. pp. 73-85.

Bibtex

@article{939b5a31c1d145c5bc219974e75957f9,
title = "Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds.",
abstract = "{\^a}��Human kind{\^a}�� is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people{\^a}��child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed{\^a}��studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and describing human kinds results in feedback, which alters the very kinds under study. This feedback results in human kinds having histories totally unlike those of natural kinds (such as copper, tigers and dandelions) leading Hacking to conclude that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds. Here I argue that Hacking{\^a}��s argument fails and that he has not demonstrated that human kinds cannot be natural kinds.",
author = "R.V. Cooper",
note = "This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Cooper, Rachel Why Hacking is Wrong about Human Kinds British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2004 55: 73-85 is available online at: http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/1/73",
year = "2004",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1093/bjps/55.1.73",
language = "English",
volume = "55",
pages = "73--85",
journal = "British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
issn = "0007-0882",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds.

AU - Cooper, R.V.

N1 - This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Cooper, Rachel Why Hacking is Wrong about Human Kinds British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2004 55: 73-85 is available online at: http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/1/73

PY - 2004/3

Y1 - 2004/3

N2 - �Human kind� is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people�child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed�studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and describing human kinds results in feedback, which alters the very kinds under study. This feedback results in human kinds having histories totally unlike those of natural kinds (such as copper, tigers and dandelions) leading Hacking to conclude that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds. Here I argue that Hacking�s argument fails and that he has not demonstrated that human kinds cannot be natural kinds.

AB - �Human kind� is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people�child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed�studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and describing human kinds results in feedback, which alters the very kinds under study. This feedback results in human kinds having histories totally unlike those of natural kinds (such as copper, tigers and dandelions) leading Hacking to conclude that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds. Here I argue that Hacking�s argument fails and that he has not demonstrated that human kinds cannot be natural kinds.

U2 - 10.1093/bjps/55.1.73

DO - 10.1093/bjps/55.1.73

M3 - Journal article

VL - 55

SP - 73

EP - 85

JO - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

JF - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

SN - 0007-0882

IS - 1

ER -