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Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications. / Aretz, K; Bartram, S; Dufey, G.

Lancaster University : The Department of Accounting and Finance, 2007. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Aretz, K, Bartram, S & Dufey, G 2007 'Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications' Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series, The Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University.

APA

Aretz, K., Bartram, S., & Dufey, G. (2007). Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series). The Department of Accounting and Finance.

Vancouver

Aretz K, Bartram S, Dufey G. Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications. Lancaster University: The Department of Accounting and Finance. 2007. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Author

Aretz, K ; Bartram, S ; Dufey, G. / Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications. Lancaster University : The Department of Accounting and Finance, 2007. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{c9b12475d20248e09f31c1abb057aac4,
title = "Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications",
abstract = "In the presence of capital market imperfections, risk management at the enterprise level is apt to increase the firm{\textquoteright}s value to shareholders by reducing costs associated with agency conflicts, ex-ternal financing, financial distress, and taxes. This paper provides an accessible and comprehensive account of these rationales for corporate risk management and gives a short overview of the empirical support found in the literature. More specifically, corporate hedging can alleviate un-derinvestment and asset substitution problems by reducing the volatility of cash flows, and it can accommodate the risk aversion of undiversified managers and increase the effectiveness of managerial incentive structures through eliminating unsystematic risk. Lower volatility of cash flows also leads to lower bankruptcy costs. Moreover, corporate hedging can also align the availability of internal resources with the need for investment funds, helping firms to avoid costly external financing. Finally, corporate risk management can reduce the corporate tax burden in the presence of convex tax schedules. While there is empirical support for these rationales of hedging at the firm level, the evidence is only modestly supportive, suggesting alternative explanations.",
keywords = "Corporate finance, risk management, exposure, foreign exchange rates, derivatives",
author = "K Aretz and S Bartram and G Dufey",
year = "2007",
language = "English",
series = "Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series",
publisher = "The Department of Accounting and Finance",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Accounting and Finance",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications

AU - Aretz, K

AU - Bartram, S

AU - Dufey, G

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - In the presence of capital market imperfections, risk management at the enterprise level is apt to increase the firm’s value to shareholders by reducing costs associated with agency conflicts, ex-ternal financing, financial distress, and taxes. This paper provides an accessible and comprehensive account of these rationales for corporate risk management and gives a short overview of the empirical support found in the literature. More specifically, corporate hedging can alleviate un-derinvestment and asset substitution problems by reducing the volatility of cash flows, and it can accommodate the risk aversion of undiversified managers and increase the effectiveness of managerial incentive structures through eliminating unsystematic risk. Lower volatility of cash flows also leads to lower bankruptcy costs. Moreover, corporate hedging can also align the availability of internal resources with the need for investment funds, helping firms to avoid costly external financing. Finally, corporate risk management can reduce the corporate tax burden in the presence of convex tax schedules. While there is empirical support for these rationales of hedging at the firm level, the evidence is only modestly supportive, suggesting alternative explanations.

AB - In the presence of capital market imperfections, risk management at the enterprise level is apt to increase the firm’s value to shareholders by reducing costs associated with agency conflicts, ex-ternal financing, financial distress, and taxes. This paper provides an accessible and comprehensive account of these rationales for corporate risk management and gives a short overview of the empirical support found in the literature. More specifically, corporate hedging can alleviate un-derinvestment and asset substitution problems by reducing the volatility of cash flows, and it can accommodate the risk aversion of undiversified managers and increase the effectiveness of managerial incentive structures through eliminating unsystematic risk. Lower volatility of cash flows also leads to lower bankruptcy costs. Moreover, corporate hedging can also align the availability of internal resources with the need for investment funds, helping firms to avoid costly external financing. Finally, corporate risk management can reduce the corporate tax burden in the presence of convex tax schedules. While there is empirical support for these rationales of hedging at the firm level, the evidence is only modestly supportive, suggesting alternative explanations.

KW - Corporate finance

KW - risk management

KW - exposure

KW - foreign exchange rates

KW - derivatives

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series

BT - Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value implications

PB - The Department of Accounting and Finance

CY - Lancaster University

ER -