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Introduction

Although subject to various initiatives and management labels the desire to provide a quality service to the public has been a fundamental aspect of policing since 1829 (Critchley, 1967). A 'quality service' approach aims to deliver a police service that the public want (Waters, 1996). Indeed as society becomes more conscious of its rights and expectations increase, citizens are likely to require increased services of higher quality (Butler, 2000). Further, providing a quality service is critically important to the concept of *policing by consent* in democratic countries. However, whilst its importance to policing is well established, embedding this approach has been notoriously difficult to achieve. This study will initially provide a brief history of this policing style within the Peel, Thatcher and Blair governments to show how a wider political environment can influence implementation. The study will then concentrate on the role of police leadership, and using a case study will examine how senior police leaders in an English city police force attempted to implement the 'citizen focus' agenda introduced by the New Labour government. Using semi structured interviews and focus groups it examines the impact of leadership behaviours, skills and styles used to implement systems, processes and practitioner commitment.

Literature Review

The terms, 'quality service', and citizen focus are interchangeable and can be associated to a specific time in history, with the latter emerging in the early 2000s. The Home Office (2006:1) defines citizen-focused policing as:

“Reflecting the needs and expectations of individuals and local communities in decision-making, service delivery and practice. The objectives of citizen-focused policing are to improve public confidence, to increase satisfaction of service users and to increase public involvement in policing.”

Delivering such an approach requires both a strategic and tactical methodology. At a macro level the concept involves the use of community oriented policing models, whereas at a micro level it seeks to provide a more responsive individual service to those who interact with the police. In recent years a number of community-oriented approaches have been implemented across the UK and USA and have become associated with improving confidence and reducing crime (see accounts by Kim & Skogan 2003; Tuffin et al. 2006). At an individual level numerous studies illustrate how more responsive, respectful and empathetic police-public interactions make the police more legitimate, a critical element that allows *policing with consent* (Rogers, 2014). As such a citizen focussed approach can make police work ‘easier and more effective’ (Skogan 1998:183), a finding that holds across all ethnic groups and issues (MacCoun, 2005). Indeed Tyler et al. (2010:368) found American-Muslim citizens were more willing to report terror related risks if they viewed the police as legitimate. However a customer centred approach is said to require a paradigm shift, which necessitates cultural change, a notoriously difficult thing to achieve in the police environment (Loftus, 2010). Police practitioners are said to perceive ‘crime fighting’ as real police work with softer skills, such as customer service, to be less important (Kirby, 2013). Indeed McLean & Hillier (2011) found police officers did not view positive public interactions as key to their effectiveness. It is therefore useful to briefly track the history of citizen focused policing to tease out its importance as well as the factors that influence implementation.

The importance of a citizen focused approach was highlighted as far back as 1829, when Peel established the ‘new police’ in England. To facilitate cooperation with the public the police appeared on the streets unarmed and in uniform, distancing

themselves from the military (Critchley 1977). This desire to appear non oppressive was endorsed by Police Commissioner Rowan, who wrote:

“He will be civil and obliging to all people of every rank and class. He must be particularly cautious not to interfere idly or unnecessarily in order to make a display of his authority.”

(Ascoli 1979:86).

Indeed a lack of civility and unbecoming behavior would often result in dismissal, a factor that was commented upon by Commissioners Rowan and Mayne who admitted to a Parliamentary Select Committee that of the 2,800 constables serving in May 1830 only 562 remained in the force by 1834 (Elmsley, 2008).

Unsurprisingly a century later the British policing environment had changed dramatically. By the early 1980's the Thatcher government presided over a period of increased public spending, large-scale public disorder and high profile miscarriages of justice. In response to these challenges senior police leaders (supported by Her Majesties Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) and independent reviews, i.e. Scarman), argued the need for a more community and citizen based approach to re-gain legitimacy. A national survey, known as the Operational Policing Review (OPR), generated 36 recommendations, and introduced the *Statement of Common Purpose and Values* which sought to introduce a new style of policing based on 'quality service' (Brain, 2013).

However, whilst the intention was laudable it failed to materialize in practice. The Conservative government, ignoring police and public opinion, focused the police on enforcement and crime reduction through the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) (Wolff Olins, 1988; ACPO, 1990). The government emphasis remained on harder quantitative measures (crime reduction and crime detection), which were supported by unambiguous national systems that constantly diverted the police from a 'quality service' approach (Weatheritt, 1993). Although a 'Citizens Charter' later introduced 45 'quality standard' indicators in an attempt to sensitize

the police to the needs of the public (Brain, 2013; 52), these made little impact. The ability to achieve 'quality' targets was marginalized as police forces introduced disparate systems of data collection, analysis and comparison (Weatheritt, 1993; Waters, 2000). Further, the operational independence of Chief Constables led to inconsistent compliance (Waters, 1996; Williamson, 2000), whilst a lack of commitment from middle managers (Brown & Campbell, 1994), meant a 'quality' approach could not be embedded.

A new political landscape emerged with the New Labour government led by Prime Minister Blair. This unequivocally supported a citizen focus style of policing with strong rhetoric, policy, finances and a defined structure in the shape of the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA). Further the appointment of dedicated chief officers to lead implementation in individual Police Forces was supplemented by more sophisticated performance targets, monitored through various means, such as: 'baseline assessments'; 'Police Performance Assessment Framework' (PPAF); 'Assessments of Policing and Community Safety' (APACS) and the analytical package 'iQuanta'. Other innovations included new methods to evaluate the citizen focus approach (Grose, 2011), which included a series of nationally set statutory performance indicators (SPIs). These focused on quality and included approximately 100 questions, agreed by the Home Office, that enquired about the satisfaction of victims of violence, domestic burglary, road traffic collisions and hate crime in each BCU. This data, monitored by the Home Office, allowed the comparison of performance across the Country. Similarly the levels of satisfaction for each BCU were often presented at internal monthly performance meetings at Force level. The British Crime Survey also collected confidence data for each police force (Myhill & Beak, 2008). When examined by HMIC (2008) all 43 forces in England and Wales had internal systems in place to measure quality. As such the Blair government had, for the first time, created an infrastructure to support a citizen focused approach, where political support and a sophisticated performance management regime were present.

As a result the remaining critical factor, connecting national policy to practitioner practice, was police leadership, and it is to this that the review now turns. Although citizen focused policing has been an area of academic interest the method in which police leaders implemented this approach has not been researched. This is particularly important, as people are often the largest and most challenging resource to manage in an organisation (Coombs et al., 2006); and the way people are led significantly affects their performance (Pfeffer, 2007). So, whilst the government can create political policy and introduce systems of measurement, the operational independence of police leaders allows them to determine how the policy should be interpreted and introduced (Reiner, 2000: Golding & Savage, 2008). Indeed as Dobby *et al.*, (2004: 5) observe:

“Leadership is generally regarded as the key to performance, and improving police leadership is a central plank in the police reform agenda.”

Police leadership is an area saturated with academic exploration as the service has tried to adapt to a rapidly changing and increasingly complex environment. In a recent systematic review of academic studies Pearson and Herrington (2013) harvested 66 studies from the USA, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand and established the core tasks for leaders included: problem solving; creating a shared vision; engendering organizational commitment; providing care for subordinates; as well as driving and managing change. However the effectiveness a leader to deliver these activities is obviously based upon their personal characteristics, skills, and leadership style. In their review Pearson and Herrington (2013) found most studies viewed good leaders as: ethical; a role model; good communicators; critical and creative thinkers; decision makers; as well as being trustworthy and legitimate.

Katz (1955) explores leadership skills under three headings: technical, human and conceptual. Technical skills are viewed as knowledge or proficiency in a specific type of work or activity, and the ability to work with systems, processes and structures. Secondly, human skill surrounds the ability to work with peers, subordinates and superiors in order to accomplish organizational goals. Finally conceptual skills are

described as the ability to work with ideas and concepts which are central to creating a vision and strategic plan for an organization. As such senior leaders require greater levels of human and conceptual skills with high levels of creativity, especially linked to problem solving (Mumford et al., 2002). Those who can display a balance of technical, human and conceptual skills are likely to demonstrate high levels of accomplishment.

House (1976) extends the 'human skills' discussion by defining 'charismatic leaders' who are able to build a positive relationship with their followers and achieve much higher standards. This approach is mirrored in the distinction between agentic and communal attributes to describe leadership styles. Agentic leadership behavior includes focus on tasks and problems, assertive speech, influence attempts, and calling attention to oneself. Communal behaviors include focus on relationship and interpersonal problems, tentative speech, supporting others, taking direction from others, and not seeking attention (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001).

Perhaps the most commonly used framework to analyse leadership has been outlined in a transformational / transactional model (Bass, 1985). The transformational style of leadership tends to focus on a people-centred approach (Rogers, 2008), resulting in followers performing beyond expected levels of performance as a consequence of leader influence. This type of leader is said to stimulate, develop and inspire followers to transcend their own self interests for a collective purpose, mission or vision. Bryman (1992) and Bass (1995) argued transformational leaders have followers who report greater satisfaction and often exert extra effort. However Cockcroft (2014) argues it is not clear when it is appropriate to apply transformational leadership to the police context as it was primarily introduced to respond to the needs of the private sector. In contrast transactional leadership concentrates upon explicit and implicit contractual relationships (Bass, 1995). Job assignments are often given in writing and accompanied with rules, regulations and statements concerning the disciplinary code. Work is traded for rewards and the avoidance of disciplinary actions (Owen, 2005). Giampeto-Meyer (1998) questions the ethics of a transactional leadership

style as followers tend to do what the leader asks in order to 'get the job done' sometimes ignoring their own moral relativism. Of course police leaders do not exist solely in a binary world of transformational or transactional leadership, nor should one be seen as effective in all situations (Cockcroft, 2014). Leadership style varies according to context and situation, as Neyroud (2011:33) sets out:

'The main findings support the now common notion that transformational leadership has positive effects. However, studies suggest that the ability to apply different leadership styles, including transactional, to suit different contexts is the key to great police leadership'.

Having set out the importance of citizen focused policing and the importance of senior leadership in the complex arena of implementation, this paper explores the behaviours of police leaders in an English city force between 2006 and 2010. Superficially the elements were in place to initiate practitioner support to embed a 'quality' approach - there was both political support, and a tailored performance management system in place. Further, all police forces in England & Wales had an implementation team in place, overseen by a chief officer. The study specifically explores senior police leadership approaches in delivering the 'citizen focused' agenda and examines whether particular styles have a significant impact.

Methodology

To connect strategy with tactical delivery Police forces use a hierarchical management framework. Chief Constables are in overall command and they attempt to achieve their Force objectives by assigning specific responsibility to those below them. As such Chief Constables delegate responsibility to other Chief Officers (Deputy / Assistant Chief Constables). Assistant Chief Constables (ACCs) will then continue the process by directing and delegating authority to Chief Superintendents (NB those who command geographic areas, known as Basic Command Units, are

referred to as BCU or Area Commanders). The process continues to middle managers (Inspectors) and supervisors (Sergeants), before resting with practitioners (Constables and civilian support staff). To examine the effectiveness of this approach this study uses qualitative data, generated from semi-structured interviews and focus groups using employees based in a UK city based police force, over a four year period. Altogether data was collected from 25 respondents. Individual interviews took place with 17 individuals, specifically: Chief Constable (2), Deputy Chief Constable (1), Assistant Chief Constable (4), Chief Superintendent (3), Chief Inspector (1), Inspector (3), Sergeant (1), Police Support staff (2) from the police force engaged with the research. Further, two focus groups were held, one with an Inspector (1) and Sergeants (2), and the second with a Police Inspector (1) and support staff (4). Interviews and focus groups provide two different methods of gathering information. With semi-structured interviews the researcher can direct respondents to answer specific questions, allowing the flexibility to probe and clarify answers using supplementary questions. This generates levels of information that cannot be gathered from other methods, such as questionnaires (Wengraf, 2001; Finch & Fafinski, 2012), and allows for an “understanding of the people and cultures in which they live and work” (Gubrium & Holstein, 1995:2001). These interviews were supplemented by focus groups, which produce data rarely found in an individual setting. Although harder to control and direct than interviews, they have significant benefits as the group can create a shared experience in which individuals are reassured to explore delicate issues. From these group discussions, commonalities and broad insights can be found (Savin-Baden & Howell Major, 2013)

Another issue relevant to the methodology is that both authors have been senior police officers. Murji (2001) and Brown (1996) explore the role of ‘insiders’ engaged in research. The advantage is it allows the researcher to overcome difficulties often experienced by other academics, such as access to police information or key personnel (Sheptycki, 1994; Brown, 1996). A further advantage is the additional knowledge that allows the researcher to understand and analyse the working culture and occupational practices of police officers (Brogden, 1995). Conversely the negative elements surrounding this relationship includes researcher or confirmation

bias, were an academic consciously or subconsciously impose their own views on the respondents.

This research specifically concentrates on the impact of police leadership, tracking the approach of three chief police officers. These include two Assistant Chief Constables (ACC) who led the citizen focus initiative between the period of 2006 to 2010 (referred to as SO3 and SO10) and a third ACC who had responsibility for general day to day operational issues (SO9). This latter officer was of particular interest as although the officer had no particular responsibility for implementation of the citizen focused approach; they had ownership of the operational police staff who were being asked to implement it. SO3 was the initial ACC tasked with the implementation of citizen focused policing and after a two-year period this officer was replaced by SO10. All respondents provided informed consent and communications were recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions were then subjected to content analysis, to identify particular trends. All quotes and references to individuals have been redacted so as not to reveal the name or gender of any person involved in the study.

Results

During the lengthy interview and focus group process there appeared significant consensus across those interviewed when explaining the leadership styles of the chief officers involved. From the outset the interviews with SO3's subordinates demonstrated an emotional attachment that often manifested itself as affection. One respondent commented:

"I feel that as [SO3] had such a passion about it [citizen focus]. Now that enthusiasm kind of came down through the chain of command so we felt that,... we felt like we really wanted to work for [SO3] [SO3] knew your name and was personable; [SO3] knew the business and was passionate about it. How could you not want to work for [SO3]?"

The level of knowledge gained by SO3 was clearly a key factor in developing a relationship with followers. One respondent described this level of specialist knowledge as:

“Scary. Highly immense considering the complexity of the portfolio in terms of the variety of things it covered, from statistical information through to...I suppose... calls and contacts on what they were doing, down to the nuances of media relations. [SO3] seemed to have a very broad knowledge and in-depth overview of every function.”

Other respondents endorsed this finding, describing both the level of expert knowledge and the passion SO3 appeared to have for the subject. When interviewed, SO3 showed a personal awareness of the officers’ self leadership style, highlighting the importance of empowering others and being creative to generate innovation in others. SO3 explained this as follows:

“To make a difference sometimes you have to do things differently, you have to be creative, use different learning styles. I used pictures for Area Commanders away days - this is a risk. You must be confident that people will take part. The value in it is about having fun and learning at the same time.”

The officer further stated that this approach instilled a team ethos where people voluntarily moved in a joint purpose. The officer also used individual knowledge and influence to focus Area Commanders on citizen focus performance targets. Specifically they used the ubiquitous performance information as a catalyst to try and change the culture of the organisation. The officer stated:

“I knew that holding people accountable on monthly data was wrong but the red/green performance culture fitted with the way that we worked. In some ways this may be inconsistent with our customer service values but we needed to use compliance...That made me

wonder whether using compliance in this way would be counterproductive especially as we were seeking to change culture. I realised this was not ideal; but it created a better balance and I needed to make senior managers to push on the different PI's."

Using Katz's typology, SO3 exhibited good human and conceptual skills, developing the technical skills quickly. From a wider analysis of the interview it appears the officer undertook a series of visits to the Basic Command Units (BCU) and spoke to staff about the importance of citizen focus. The importance of this in relation to changing behaviours and attitudes toward the citizen focus agenda is identified by Schein (2004) who states the key factor in changing attitude is for a leader to use engagement, negotiation, motivation and involvement rather than coercion, which results in a lack of commitment. As SO3 admitted during an interview:

"Then I realised early on we would have to undergo a huge education process in order to make people understand their role in improving levels of satisfaction and confidence. No one understood the data or the drivers involved. How could the leaders lead if they did not understand it all?"

Although SO3 was clearly popular and was seen to be progressing the citizen focus approach, as often occurs, chief officers move portfolio (Winsor, 2012). This happened to SO3 therefore responsibility for implementation of the citizen focus approach portfolio was transferred to SO10; however after a short period it became apparent that relationships, systems and processes had started to break down. The interview with SO10 provided an early explanation why this was the case as the officer stated the citizen focus portfolio was not a first choice and explicitly questioned why this particular agenda needed to be led by a chief officer. Members of staff whose job it was to support the chief officer deliver this portfolio soon picked up this view. One commented:

"the rumour was [SO10] didn't want this department so [the officer] doesn't want us [and consequently] is not going to care about us."

A short time later this apathy was reported as having a tangible negative impact. When asked about SO10's impact, adjectives such as "... dreadful", "disaster" and "diabolical" were used. The main reasons for this appeared to be the officers' lack of technical, human or conceptual skills in relation to the citizen focus portfolio. Other subordinate (but senior) officers soon became aware of the situation and the impact it had. One respondent said:

"That is why the whole change in ACPO [Chief Officers] was just such a mockery because they [BCU Commanders] knew [SO10] didn't understand it and because they [BCU Commanders] understood it by then and they knew what needed to be done and how it needed to be done and they knew [SO10] didn't. [SO10] couldn't engage on an intellectual level about it at all."

Whereas both SO3 and SO10 had an initial lack of technical knowledge, as opposed to SO3, SO10 failed to show any great enthusiasm to learn. This was illustrated by a number of interviewees, indeed one referred to the officers' technical knowledge as scant even though opportunities to learn were offered. A further quote indicates SO10's emphasis on quantitative indicators rather than the qualitative indicators that related to citizen focus:

"... on the Tuesday morning meetings we used to get into different kinds of things. [SO10] was more interested in budget, sickness, and issues about satisfaction and confidence had gone. They just weren't on the agenda. With the Criminal Justice Department it was more about how many warrants were getting done. So we were starting to get back into what gets counted gets done".

SO10 was aware of this particular leadership style, stating:

"When I first came to the portfolio I think that I was probably very transactional as I focused on housekeeping and focused on detail".

This transactional style, coupled with a lack of knowledge regarding technical systems and processes, began to manifest itself in a number of ways. First, there was a diminishing impetus in relation to implementing the citizen focus agenda. One middle ranking officer stated:

“... the impetus that [SO3] got going and had maintained was just lost, because the message to people was a) [SO10] wasn't interested and b) [SO10] didn't understand it. I can't tell you how many Command Teams said to me [SO10] doesn't even know what [the officer] is talking about. And I couldn't defend [SO10] because it was obvious [SO10] didn't know what [SO10] was talking when [the officer] carried on the inspections.”

Respondents universally identified the importance of good leadership in relationship to the development of citizen focus. One said:

“...it [Citizen Focus performance] only had teeth once you had a certain ACC [Assistant Chief Constable] in place and then the other ACC came in, and didn't do the buy in, it lost its edge then. The BCUs started dropping away, you had [SO3] driving it, but when we changed ACC, inspections were getting cancelled... it didn't get the buy in. So naturally they [BCU staff] have got other things to do and they thought if the Chief Officers aren't that bothered why should I be?”

There was one further dynamic in the implementation of citizen focused policing. Another Assistant Chief Constable (SO9) led day-to-day police operations and was annually assessed across quantifiable targets such as the reduction and detection of crime and disorder. SO9 had managerial control of the operational officers that SO3 (and then later SO10) required to improve public satisfaction and confidence. This meant the officer played an indirect, but key role in implementing the citizen focus agenda (a fact identified by SO3). Perhaps unsurprisingly SO9 focused on the issues this officer was individually measured against, as the officer said:

“When I took over there was no clear understanding of the crime problem relating to increases in crime. I had to sort out my own world and I didn't know [SO3] that well. My job was to get the [crime] figures down.”

This lack of complimentary working between SO9 and SO3 was identified by a number of those interviewed, illustrated by the following representative comment:

“[SO9] and [SO3] were not working together and this was noticeable. [SO9] would say one thing and [SO3] would say the opposite. It came down to who has the most clout, and that was [SO9]”.

As such, although the citizen focus agenda was raised as an item in corporate meetings SO9 had a clear focus on other priorities. As one respondent said

“...[SO9] is mainly interested in what [the officer] is measured on so crime reduction and getting a grip of burglary is [the officers'] priority. That means it is my priority.”

This was accepted by SO9 who stated:

“I had to keep the pressure on in order to keep performance high.... This didn't give much time for supporting other portfolios or examining my leadership style. ”

In essence as BCU commanders were under the management of SO9 they placed more emphasis on the issues this ACC was measured on, which was crime and disorder reduction and detection. In fact those spoken to all highlighted that the performance indicators regarding crime reduction and detection were the most prominent. It was reported whenever SO3 or SO10 were absent from corporate performance meetings the majority of the time would be spent examining the

performance targets in SO9s area of business. This was acknowledged by SO3 and commented upon by a number of those interviewed.

Finally although this study is not sophisticated enough to show a causal relationship it is interesting to note that at the end of 2009, SO3's leadership had come to an end with the force reaching all but one of its quantifiable victim satisfaction targets. At this early stage the emphasis of the citizen focus agenda rested on victim satisfaction. This was a deliberate ploy of SO3 who accepted that using performance measurement in relation to victim satisfaction was a catalyst to enable the agenda to be developed and understood. Systems, structures and processes were developed to educate, inform and test compliance throughout the force area. Respondents constantly referred to the systems, processes and structures generated by SO3 which, coupled with the officers knowledge, enthusiasm and passion for the citizen focus were thought to be critical in the improved performance. However within a short length of time of SO10 taking over the portfolio the level of performance in relation to levels of victim satisfaction began to dip. Respondents believed that this was due to a lack of knowledge and passion for the citizen focus work that resulted in less of a challenge to those attending corporate performance meetings. At the end of SO10's tenure in this role, a review of the performance indicators showed only one was on target. Whilst the analysis is insufficiently sophisticated to provide a causal explanation it is indicative of the impact such leadership approaches can have.

Discussion

Although a relatively small study the data has highlighted a number of issues regarding police leadership in relation to the citizen focused agenda. It is evident that this approach required a paradigm shift from those involved, therefore implementation and the role of senior leaders was particularly important.

The first finding surrounds the association between quantitative performance management and leadership. The police force studied here used government accountability systems, supplemented with robust internal monthly and quarterly audits and inspections, to monitor all aspects of police performance. In these systems, performance information assumed a central role in holding senior officers to account, on achieving individual targets. In this context systems such as PPAF, APACS and iQuanta provided a series of 'reds' (failing to reach targets) and 'green' signals (achieving targets). The spread of managerialism under recent British Prime Ministers has meant hierarchical position and institutional power have become increasingly associated with efficient leadership (Dobby *et al.*, 2004; Silvestri, 2007; Flanagan, 2008). This phenomena has been observed increasingly across the world, especially in the USA with the introduction of Compstat. The study also showed that quantitative performance information could be utilized in different ways, dependent on the management style of the Chief Officer. All three of the chief officers were driven by the NPM requirement to achieve targets within their own portfolio. All three used the same weekly examination of quantitative corporate performance systems, supported by BCU based inspection. However, that is where the similarity ends as each of the three leaders utilized this information in different ways according to their varied leaderships styles.

Secondly, with so many areas of performance being monitored there is an inevitable, albeit informal, prioritization of targets. Each Chief Officer pursued the targets they were accountable for, making cross portfolio working difficult. In this way the Chief Officer with the most resources could informally prioritise his/ her particular targets, which worked against the citizen focus agenda. It also appeared that there was further informal prioritization between the senior leaders themselves. When one of the Chief Officers (SO9) did not see this as a particularly important activity their apathy was quickly identified by subordinates and cascaded through the ranks of operational officers. This is similar to previous findings that show the police institution generally see quality of service approaches as less desirable, when compared with tough crime-fighting approaches. Under the traditional model of policing, crime fighting, and physical aspects of policing are favored even though in

reality felony arrests and the use of force are relatively rare events (Herbert, 2001). The police, it is said, have an exaggerated sense of mission and crave work that is crime oriented and promises excitement, internally referred to as 'real policing' (Van Maanen 1978; Reiner, 2000). Ironically the OPR survey identified that public wanted a more 'welfare' oriented style of policing rather than the 'real' policing valued by the police themselves (Waters, 1996; Savage, 2007). Savage (2007) identified that while strategic leaders acknowledged the requirement to introduce a service ethos, research has identified that the street level police culture is vested in the action and crime fighting orientation, or 'real policing' as referred to earlier.

The third and perhaps most critical point relates to individual leadership styles. In the case of SO3 the officer demonstrated a charismatic leadership style (House, 1976), using a communal approach (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). A transformational approach was apparent with personal relationships, empowerment, innovation, trust and confidence seen as critical. SO3 also displayed a desire to learn the facets of citizen focus policing, resulting in an intimate knowledge that generated a confidence to challenge performance and innovate.

In contrast, SO10 lacked the intimate knowledge that would result in effective leadership of the portfolio (Katz, 1955; Dobby et al., 2004). The lack of a desire to learn about the citizen focus agenda meant that the officer was unable to challenge performance issues within corporate performance meetings. The phrases used to describe the leadership style of this officer are closely related to a transactional style, and coupled with a perceived lack of commitment resulted in the emphasis on citizen focus systems and processes waning.

Although SO9 (the operations ACC), demonstrated an intimate knowledge of performance issues in relation to crime this officers' leadership style could be described as bullish and transactional, mirroring the agentic style described by Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt (2001). SO9 freely admitted being held to account for the reduction of crime and focused on this without reflecting on the leadership style used to achieve this. The impact on subordinates was 'fear' with the style described

by respondents as *'brutal'*, *'destructive'* and *'humiliating'*. These descriptors have previously been associated with the robust approach often surrounding Compstat models that concentrate on traditional quantitative statistics revolving around crime fighting (Willis et al. 2004). This leader utilised hierarchy and control, a Panoptical style where one person examines and drives the performance of many (Dore, 2010). However an over-reliance on this approach was insufficient to change 'hearts and minds', and was reflective of a 'low trust' organisation with a low degree of social trust, high levels of power, distance and hierarchy, which is likely to result from an authoritarian, compliance-based, and centralising style of leadership (Fukuyama, 1995). Schein (2008) casts doubt that this style of leadership is likely to result in long term commitment. The negative impact of SO9s leadership style and behaviour on the citizen focus portfolio was not lost on SO3, who was also aware that subordinates recognised the two officers worked separately.

So what are the implications for implementation and further research? At the outset it should be stressed that this is a case study and involved only one police force. However if these results can be replicated by further research it highlights important findings for a policing environment that is increasingly trying to become 'evidence based', in an effort to increase effectiveness and efficiency. Evidence based policing approaches are becoming increasingly aware that context is a critical variable influencing successful implementation. More commentators are "interested in specifying the conditions under which particular outcomes are observed" (Rosenbaum, 1988: 382). The evidence here suggests certain police leadership skills, style and behavior have a significant impact on the implementation of 'quality service.' This case study has demonstrated that the citizen focus agenda under a supportive political regime had greater success when led by a police leader who demonstrated a transformational approach, having a charismatic leadership style linked with strong technical, human and conceptual skills (Katz, 1955; House, 1976; Mumford *et al*, 2002). When the leadership was passed to an individual with a transactional leadership style and lower levels of technical, human and conceptual skills, and who relied upon hierarchical systems of control, staff started to lose their motivation and commitment. Therefore, although both SO3 and SO10 utilised

‘disciplinary technology’ through performance regimes to drive performance, they demonstrated leadership behaviours that can be described as ‘polar opposite.’ These leadership nuances should be central to the understanding of those whose responsibility it is to move policy into practice. Although leadership styles (and their impact) is clearly observed and felt by subordinates, they are less visible to Chief Constable’s, politicians and wider stakeholders (i.e. College of Policing; HMIC; Police & Crime Commissioners), who receive ‘top down’ information from a hierarchical system. As such, more sophisticated qualitative assessment is critical if stakeholders are to deliver successful qualitative approaches.

The cultural and contextual nuances associated with police leadership also generate a wider question. If it can be successfully argued that Chief Police Officers are more comfortable when engaged in traditional methods of policing, focusing on objectives such as crime fighting, they are more likely to embrace hierarchical and transactional management approaches. Therefore, to implement more qualitatively challenging approaches, valued less by the prevailing organizational culture (i.e. preventative, partnership and citizen focused based approaches) a different management approach is required. The fact that some of these more adaptive and culturally challenging approaches have failed to reach their potential over many years may reflect the approach of senior police leadership in the UK, and no doubt add support for direct entry into supervisory ranks.

Conclusion

This study questioned why a citizen-focused style of policing had been difficult to implement. The literature review argued that three elements were central to its acceptance: political will, performance management, and police leadership. In England, between 2006 and 2010, a period associated with the New Labour government, all three of these variables became aligned. Not only was the political will present but sophisticated systems of performance were introduced nationally

and locally in order to ascertain levels of success across the 43 police forces of England and Wales. However this case study demonstrates that although the environment can be conducive to implementation, individual leadership ability has a critical impact on the delivery of this approach. Specifically it appears that staff respond more positively to a specific blend of leadership skills and behavior, associated with a transformational approach. This leadership style is more likely to generate the paradigm shift necessary to implementing a 'quality service' approach within policing.

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