- LancasterWP2017_006
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**Contests on Networks.** / Matros, Alexander; Rietzke, David Michael.

Research output: Working paper

Matros, A & Rietzke, DM 2017 'Contests on Networks' Economics Working Paper Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

Matros, A., & Rietzke, D. M. (2017). *Contests on Networks*. (Economics Working Paper Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Matros A, Rietzke DM. Contests on Networks. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2017 Feb. (Economics Working Paper Series).

@techreport{23e44cab081945c7ac6ff006647652a4,

title = "Contests on Networks",

abstract = "We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is {"}connected{"} toa set of contests, and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under both the Tullock and all-pay auction contest success functions (CSFs), and show that many well-known results from the contest literature can be obtained by varying the structure of the network. We also obtain a new exclusion result: We show that, under both CSFs, equilibrium total effort may be higher when one player is excluded from the network. This finding contrasts the existing literature, which limits findings of this sort to the all-pay auction CSF. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.",

keywords = "Network Games, Contests, Bipartite Graph, Tullock Contest, All-pay Auction",

author = "Alexander Matros and Rietzke, {David Michael}",

year = "2017",

month = feb,

language = "English",

series = "Economics Working Paper Series",

publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Contests on Networks

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Rietzke, David Michael

PY - 2017/2

Y1 - 2017/2

N2 - We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is "connected" toa set of contests, and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under both the Tullock and all-pay auction contest success functions (CSFs), and show that many well-known results from the contest literature can be obtained by varying the structure of the network. We also obtain a new exclusion result: We show that, under both CSFs, equilibrium total effort may be higher when one player is excluded from the network. This finding contrasts the existing literature, which limits findings of this sort to the all-pay auction CSF. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.

AB - We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is "connected" toa set of contests, and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under both the Tullock and all-pay auction contest success functions (CSFs), and show that many well-known results from the contest literature can be obtained by varying the structure of the network. We also obtain a new exclusion result: We show that, under both CSFs, equilibrium total effort may be higher when one player is excluded from the network. This finding contrasts the existing literature, which limits findings of this sort to the all-pay auction CSF. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.

KW - Network Games

KW - Contests

KW - Bipartite Graph

KW - Tullock Contest

KW - All-pay Auction

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Contests on Networks

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -