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Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game

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Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game. / Dokka, Trivikram; Moulin, Hervé; Ray, Indrajit et al.
In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 27, No. 2, 30.06.2023, p. 419-438.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Dokka, T, Moulin, H, Ray, I & SenGupta, S 2023, 'Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game', Review of Economic Design, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 419-438. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2

APA

Dokka, T., Moulin, H., Ray, I., & SenGupta, S. (2023). Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game. Review of Economic Design, 27(2), 419-438. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2

Vancouver

Dokka T, Moulin H, Ray I, SenGupta S. Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game. Review of Economic Design. 2023 Jun 30;27(2):419-438. Epub 2022 Apr 4. doi: 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2

Author

Dokka, Trivikram ; Moulin, Hervé ; Ray, Indrajit et al. / Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game. In: Review of Economic Design. 2023 ; Vol. 27, No. 2. pp. 419-438.

Bibtex

@article{159482f0287f467da4aed554f4834ed8,
title = "Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game",
abstract = "As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.",
keywords = "Quadratic game, Coarse correlated equilibrium, Abatement level, Efficiency gain",
author = "Trivikram Dokka and Herv{\'e} Moulin and Indrajit Ray and Sonali SenGupta",
year = "2023",
month = jun,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = "419--438",
journal = "Review of Economic Design",
issn = "1434-4742",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game

AU - Dokka, Trivikram

AU - Moulin, Hervé

AU - Ray, Indrajit

AU - SenGupta, Sonali

PY - 2023/6/30

Y1 - 2023/6/30

N2 - As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.

AB - As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.

KW - Quadratic game

KW - Coarse correlated equilibrium

KW - Abatement level

KW - Efficiency gain

U2 - 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2

DO - 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2

M3 - Journal article

VL - 27

SP - 419

EP - 438

JO - Review of Economic Design

JF - Review of Economic Design

SN - 1434-4742

IS - 2

ER -