

1 **Algorithmic Reproductive Justice**

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5 Reproductive justice is an intersectional feminist framework and movement which argues all people have the right to have a child, to
6 not have a child, to parent in safe and healthy environments, and to own their bodies and control their futures. We identify increasing
7 surveillance, assessing worth, datafication of bodies, monetising inequality and misinformation, and decimating planetary health
8 as forms of structural violence associated with emerging digital technologies. These trends are implicated in the (re)production of
9 inequities, creating barriers to the realisation of reproductive justice. We call for algorithmic reproductive justice, and highlight the
10 potential for both acts of resistance and industry reform to advance that aim.
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12 CCS Concepts: • **Human-centered computing** → **HCI theory, concepts and models**; • **Social and professional topics** →
13 *Computing profession*.
14

15 Additional Key Words and Phrases: Artificial intelligence, AI, fairness, human rights, reproductive rights, reproductive justice, social
16 justice, reproductive coercion, eugenics, algorithmic violence, structural violence
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22 **1 INTRODUCTION**

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24 The proliferation of AI technologies as solutions to social problems has required that ethical constructs such as fairness be
25 formally specified in the creation of system rules. Abebe et al. [2] noted this as one of computing’s important roles in social
26 change, that is as a ‘formalizer’: it opens up new opportunities to explore and challenge not just the systems themselves
27 but the premises upon which they are built. This opening up has led to a flourishing technical literature on fairness
28 metrics/implementations [97, 112, 115] and the ensuing critique of such metrics/implementations (e.g. [54, 144, 147]).
29 Notably, there has been a thorough examination of the philosophical underpinnings of varied approaches to AI fairness
30 [69, 97, 99, 103], with a growing concern for the dominance of fairness construed as (distinctly Western [15, 121])
31 distributive justice [2, 55, 61, 71, 126]. Approaches rooted in social justice [14, 15, 34, 37, 57, 66, 111, 131, 137] have
32 been proposed to sensitise algorithmic fairness to structural inequity. Such work tends to overlap significantly with
33 AI critiques situated within critical theories of race and gender [13, 15, 58, 82, 87] arguing that the operationalisation
34 of such socially constructed categories erases information needed to understand the patterns of difference the AI
35 is rendering as objective fact; and, relatedly, with the growing body of work adopting a feminist approach to AI
36 ethics [38, 58, 71, 75, 87, 121, 126, 127, 135]. Emerging from these epistemological developments is a greater focus
37 on intersectionality¹ in discourses of AI harm [109], a deeper examination of power dynamics within which AI is
38 implicated [8, 106], and a call to engage more/meaningfully with marginalised people and their perspectives [79].
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43 ¹A term coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw [31] to capture the multiplicative effects of experiencing multiple forms of marginalisation. This approach centres
44 the ways other forms of marginalisation intersect with gender to compound inequities, and seeks to empower marginalised people.

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53 This paper builds on and contributes to these efforts, while also attending to the comparative lack of theorisation
 54 on the fairness of (non-AI) digital technologies and their infrastructuralisation of data-driven decision-making. We
 55 build from work on how structural violence is being (re)produced in the digital sphere (e.g. [150]), and draw explicit
 56 attention to the important (but generally overlooked) implications for *reproductive justice* (hereafter RJ). While there is
 57 an emerging literature on the utilisation of digital technology as a tool for economic empowerment and activism in the
 58 RJ movement (e.g. [62, 146]), there has been a dearth of attention to emerging technologies and the realisation of rights
 59 outlined in the RJ framework (discussed in the following section); this invisibility of *digital* reproductive injustices in
 60 the RJ community is matched by a neglect in the computing community of the ways emerging digital technologies
 61 can and do (re)create reproductive injustices. There is an urgent need for dialogue between these communities. Our
 62 aim here is to bring multiple, disparate bodies of research together to show how closely they are related, to highlight
 63 how ubiquitous and consequential digital threats to RJ are, and to bring AI ethics and RJ thinkers and activists into
 64 more direct conversation. We begin by briefly introducing RJ, followed by an illustrative exploration of how emerging
 65 technologies impede RJ. We then discuss the value of adopting a RJ lens above and beyond a broader social justice lens,
 66 and we briefly touch on what could be done to address these issues.
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72 2 DIGITAL REPRODUCTIVE INJUSTICES

73 Conceived in the US in 1994 by Black women, the RJ movement arose in part to address the neglect of intersectional
 74 feminist issues in the reproductive rights movement [90, 119, 120]. The reproductive rights movement, focused primarily
 75 on access to contraception and abortion, failed to act in solidarity to address the broader range of reproductive coercion
 76 faced by marginalised people. The RJ movement, by contrast, focused on this wider spectrum of coercion: Particularly
 77 since the turn of the 20th century,² the underpinning eugenicist principles of reproductive health governance in the US
 78 have sought simultaneously, and often forcibly, to increase the fertility of white, cisgendered, heterosexual, middle-class
 79 women without disabilities while reducing the fertility of marginalised groups falling outside of this narrow population
 80 [9, 116, 119, 120]. While this differential pattern of structural reproductive pressures on more privileged people (towards
 81 fertility) and more marginalised people (against fertility) may appear to be two separate forms of reproductive coercion,
 82 in fact they are linked—flipsides of the same eugenic coin.³ As a framework and a movement, RJ aims to unveil and
 83 counteract reproductive inequities to create a world in which all people can realise their core rights as outlined in this
 84 framework, *viz.*: the right to have a child, the right to not have a child, the right to parent children with dignity in safe
 85 and healthy environments, and the right to own their bodies and control their futures [119, 128].
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90 Repeated acts of structural violence have resulted in the systematic violation of RJ for marginalised people. The
 91 most egregious examples include forced sterilisation, systematic abrogation of social protection, selective divestment
 92 in institutions (e.g. schools, hospitals) serving marginalised people, child removals, mass incarceration, and barriers
 93 to access to contraception and abortion. While a large literature on RJ focuses on the US given its geospatial and
 94 historical roots, the movement was purposely grounded in an *international* human rights framework [119]. As founding
 95 activist and scholar Loretta Ross [120] explains, the Black women who founded the movement learned from the human
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 98 ²Under slavery, the fertility of Black women was economically valuable to enslavers [73, 119]. The economic benefits of the rape and forced marriage of
 99 Black women were structurally reinforced when, in 1662, Virginia overturned the practice of defining the status of a child as free versus enslaved based on
 100 the father's status. Children's status thereafter followed that of their mothers. Enslavers using sexual violence to father children could then legally enslave
 101 their children [119]. Once the fertility of Black women was no longer profitable for white men, the focus became repression of Black women's fertility.

102 ³The same social valuations which determine whose fertility is valued also shape who is assigned dangerous or undesirable work. Where blanket
 103 pronatalist mechanisms (e.g. abortion bans) are paired with selectively enforced systems of fertility restriction (e.g. forced sterilisation of marginalised
 104 people, removal of marginalised children), the sum result is a eugenic fertility regime. Relegating some people to the most dangerous and/or undesirable
 socially necessary tasks goes hand in hand with assigning value in a social hierarchy (see [80] for more on the structural functions of marginalisation).

105 rights claims advanced by women in Global Majority countries. Recent literature [45–47, 67, 89, 92, 134] reflects that
106 reproductive oppression, marginalisation, and violation of the rights articulated by RJ activists and scholars are global
107 phenomena. Below, we outline several ways emerging technologies are compounding social inequities globally, and we
108 consider the implications of this for RJ. We consider not just the current state of development, but also the direction of
109 travel for these technologies. This is not an exhaustive list of potential harms and implications for RJ, but rather an
110 illustrative framing of some of the pressing but under-researched issues at the intersection of digital innovation and RJ.
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114 115 **2.1 Increasing surveillance**

116 From scraping social media to facial recognition software to algorithmic monitoring, emerging digital technologies are
117 being widely used to surveil populations around the world. The supposed benefits of increasing surveillance (e.g. public
118 safety, increased productivity) are used to justify the collection and analysis of big data underpinning these new forms
119 of surveillance. Yet a growing literature has highlighted the significant harms these technologies produce. We add to
120 this literature by considering some of the ways digital technology is creating and perpetuating structural barriers to RJ.
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123 One harm of digital surveillance is in monitoring and detention of immigrants and asylum seekers. In 2009 the UK
124 Border Agency’s Human Provenance Pilot Project (now defunct) used DNA testing to make highly dubious claims
125 about the ancestry and origin of asylum seekers to assess whether asylum claims were legitimate [13]. Participation
126 was ‘voluntary’, but power dynamics between an asylum seeker and a government agency effectively made opting out
127 a non-option. In the US, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has used external company Vigilant to sidestep
128 privacy regulations preventing collecting data from sensitive locations; purchasing information from Vigilant enables
129 ICE to act on information which is illegal for them to harvest directly [30]. ICE also offers highly profitable contracts to
130 companies that widen their systems of surveillance, including electronic ankle monitoring systems to surveil people
131 released from detention facilities who remain under state custody [13]. Being scrutinised at borders and detained within
132 them obstructs RJ. For example, Fleming et al. [48] show Latinx people in the US who experienced an immigration
133 raid may delay childbearing due to the financial and psychological impacts of detention, impeding their right to have
134 a child. Family separation and detention also clearly impedes the ability to raise children with dignity in safe and
135 healthy environments, as does hypervigilant monitoring of released detainees through ankle monitoring. For people
136 who can become pregnant who live in areas with limited/no abortion care legally available following the upending of
137 the Roe v. Wade in 2022, any form of monitoring technology creates a unique barrier to the right to not have a child
138 (importantly, incarcerated people who have been released subject to ankle monitoring also experience this barrier to
139 RJ). Nor is state surveillance the only digital surveillance threat to RJ. For instance, people in abusive partnerships have
140 reported abusers using apps for monitoring mobile phones [141] and cars [64] to surveil private communications and
141 whereabouts. RJ activism and scholarship has long highlighted multitudinous harms the monitoring and detention of
142 migrant populations causes (see e.g. [98]), and the structural inequities which ensure that these violations of human
143 rights are disproportionately inflicted upon (multiply) marginalised people (see [48, 119]). What a critical computing
144 perspective adds is how emerging technologies can increase the scope of monitoring, sidestep regulatory barriers, and
145 redefine the very ways that we understand heritage and borders in order to detain and exclude marginalised people.
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148 Discourses on AI ethics have raised concerns regarding the use of emerging technologies to increase the ‘objectivity’
149 and efficiency of the criminal justice system in ways that disproportionately negatively impact marginalised people—
150 particularly racially marginalised and migrant populations—through a combination of racially patterned predictive
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157 policing [124], misidentification (e.g. as ‘criminals’) by facial recognition [20, 65, 85],⁴ and the use of biased criminal risk
 158 assessment algorithms for bail and sentencing determinations [13, 17, 39, 53, 59]. To our knowledge, however, these
 159 discourses have not made explicit how these trends threaten RJ, particularly for (multiply) marginalised people, who
 160 are more efficiently targeted and drawn into the carceral net [41].
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162 Incarceration has long been used to restrict the freedom and rights of Black people [5, 73]. As Dorothy Roberts [116]
 163 has shown, this includes active measures to restrict reproductive freedom. Beginning in the 1980’s, she explains, US
 164 states criminalised reproduction by prosecuting illicit drug use while pregnant. These laws particularly targeted poor
 165 Black women, largely through the legal system’s selective focus on specific kinds of drugs.⁵ Black women’s ‘associations
 166 with public hospitals, welfare agencies, and probation officers’ meant ‘their drug use is more likely to be detected
 167 and reported. These women are already enmeshed in a social welfare structure that makes them vulnerable to state
 168 monitoring of every aspect of their lives...’ [116, p. 173]. Nor are efforts to criminalise reproduction unique to the US.
 169 For example, in El Salvador, an especially restrictive abortion law has meant marginalised women have been prosecuted
 170 and imprisoned for seeking abortion care, and also for obstetric emergencies [24]. Healthcare providers, treated as state
 171 monitoring agents, are an essential source of data for law enforcement [152]. This surveillance and incarceration of
 172 marginalised women has chilling implications in the context of data-driven technologies which pool information from
 173 varied sources—frequently without the knowledge of the data’s subjects. This is enabled by the expansion of carceral
 174 technologies into new spheres of life [12], including digital monitoring of employees. There is disturbing potential for
 175 such intimate monitoring (e.g. the number of bathroom breaks taken) to generate data that can feed algorithms that
 176 predict pregnancy. Not only are data from these different sources being pooled, enabling different institutions to access
 177 a wider array of personal information than they might otherwise have been able to, but they are also being used to make
 178 judgments about highly value laden concepts, such as ‘risk’⁶ [13, 17, 86], moving the needle of what surveillance can
 179 accomplish from response to prediction. Predictions about criminalised behaviour such as drug use during pregnancy
 180 and seeking abortion care can easily be used to apply racist, classist, and otherwise deeply problematic, structurally
 181 violent assumptions to prevent marginalised people from accessing RJ-related services, and to quickly and efficiently
 182 punish them for daring to make (often choiceless)⁷ choices about their own lives.
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184 We also note the worrying use of criminal risk prediction algorithms on minors, as in Pasco County, Florida’s
 185 ‘intelligence-led policing’ [132]. Structural inequities are hard-coded into these models through selection of model
 186 features such as parental divorce, prior encounters with police, and mental distress, which are purportedly experienced
 187 disproportionately by racially marginalised people and people facing socioeconomic pressures, effectively serving as
 188 marginalisation markers. The predicted risk of ‘criminality’ also tends to be self-fulfilling: it catalyses heightened police
 189 scrutiny of children with some low-level (likely spurious) signal of ‘criminality’, increasing the chances of evidence of
 190 criminality being found. The ‘at risk’ child is ensnared in the carceral net, as are cohabitating family members, who face
 191 a higher number of emotionally charged interactions with police—encounters which can be quite literally deadly. The
 192 result is lengthy, and reproductively consequential, incarceration of individuals identified as in need of intervention to
 193 ‘break the cycle’ that leads to ‘criminal’ behaviour.
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201 ⁴There is growing resistance to these technologies in marginalised communities. For example, Newham Council in London recently voted to ban the use
 202 of facial recognition for police surveillance on the grounds that it violated anti-discrimination laws [129].

203 ⁵This is *not* a statement that Black women disproportionately use drugs; numerous studies have shown that notion is false (see e.g. [145]). Rather,
 204 group disparities in *type* of drug being used have been systematically leveraged to target racially marginalised people. However, we also note that the
 205 criminalisation of and moral posturing about illicit drug use is a marginalising act of structural violence regardless of who is using what, and when.

206 ⁶We identify ‘risk’ as a value-laden logic that invites greater surveillance and penalties rather than protection.

207 ⁷Ross and Solinger [119] note popular rhetoric about reproduction assumes people are empowered agents, choosing from a ‘marketplace’ of reproductive
 208 options to enact personal preferences. This assumption, they explain, does not align with the reality: People who experience structural barriers do not
 have the same choices available, and often must make ‘choiceless choices’—decisions based on severely structurally constrained options.

209 Incarceration limits one's ability to control their own body and future, and is a barrier to the rights to have a child
210 and to not have a child. It restricts one's sexual relationships (potentially for the duration of one's reproductive lifespan)
211 and ability to access adequate reproductive healthcare [60]. Coercive contraception and sterilisation programmes have
212 been used both to prevent women from having children once they leave prison and as part of plea deals of women
213 brought up on charges but not sentenced to prison time [60, 116]. Incarcerated people cannot raise children with dignity
214 in safe and healthy environments because they separated from their children and, in many cases, children are placed
215 into the social (foster) care system, or even incarcerated themselves. And, for people released from prison, stigma and
216 discrimination can strongly impact their ability to access basic needs such as housing and employment, which further
217 structurally impairs their ability to provide a safe and healthy environment [60].
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221 2.2 Assessing worth

222 The highly subjective, value-laden notion of 'worthiness' has long been deployed to ameliorate moral qualms about the
223 stratified distribution of valued resources; the very notion of 'worthiness' is a tool of structural violence. Sometimes this
224 is obvious, such as in the language of 'creditworthiness', and sometimes it is slightly more subtle, buried in narratives
225 around 'deservingness' [80], such as when states decide who should (and who should not) be eligible for social protection
226 schemes [26]. Emerging digital technology is increasingly being used to assess worth [25, 36, 78] and, linked to this, to
227 shape the distribution of resources, with implications for the realisation of RJ.
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230 Digital technology is being used in the context of migration to assess worth. The aforementioned Human Provenance
231 Pilot Project, for example, pushed asylum seekers to subject themselves to genetic surveillance, but it also sought to label
232 them as 'worthy' or 'unworthy' of legal migrant status based on faulty assumptions about ancestry. Digital technology
233 is also implicated at the US border, where the Customs and Border Protection mobile application (CBP One) serves the
234 manifest function of scheduling application appointments to enter the country for migrants waiting in Mexico [32]. A
235 latent function is to effectively create a digital border around the US by using digital technology to restrict access to
236 appointments and screen out individuals assumed to be lacking the basic technological and linguistic proficiency to
237 contribute to the 'productive' economy. Among other concerns, CBP One has been widely criticised for supporting
238 limited languages and requiring a phone and a wifi connection to use [118]. Fluency in preferred languages, ownership
239 of a suitable phone for running the app, relevant technological skills, and access to wifi are all markers of privilege/social
240 status. These factors represent a *relative, context-specific* privilege, but one used as a marker of worthiness for who
241 gets a chance not even at citizenship, but simply at the appointment lottery. This situation is a matter of RJ because it
242 has left large groups of people living liminal and precarious lives on the border, unable to provide a safe and healthy
243 environment for their families, with limited control over their futures, and with limited access to healthcare.
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248 AI's deployment has been critiqued for reinforcing racist, sexist, classist, and otherwise structurally violent forms of
249 employment discrimination in screening job applicants [13, 30, 93]. We argue that these new forms of employment
250 discrimination—forms which are hidden from view, enforcing patterns of discrimination at scale yet claiming to resolve
251 human bias in hiring [114, 122]—have implications for RJ. In an economy that ties the capacity to access basic necessities
252 such as food and housing to participation in waged labour, the inability to access employment due to (algorithmically
253 compounded) discrimination makes it difficult to provide for a child's needs [26, 46]. This is a threat to the right to
254 parent with dignity and the right to have a child; decisions about, if and when to reproduce can be strongly influenced
255 by financial precarity. Because the discrimination embedded in AI employment screening follows the well-worn lines
256 of discrimination seen prior to the use of AI, (multiply) marginalised people are particularly subject to this form of
257 bureaucratic violence. And, linking to the structural violence associated with increasing AI surveillance, AI systems
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261 may be especially efficient at discriminating against people who have experienced the violence of the widening carceral
262 net, further compounding the reproductive injustices associated with mass incarceration.

263 AI is also being deployed in many US states to make decisions about child welfare and removals [19, 41, 72, 123]. A 2018
264 national child welfare system reform bill expanded data collection in the system, in part with the aim of constructing
265 predictive tools to address systemic problems [35]. Instead, the deployment of AI in this context simultaneously
266 reproduces (and amplifies) biases in the existing decision-making procedures, while also alleviating the moral burden of
267 child welfare decision-making. In a simulation study, Du et al. [35] show (hypothetical) implementation of an automated
268 risk assessment tool *increases* both racial inequities in long-term care and the total number of young people in foster
269 care, directly contradicting reform goals. Utilising AI in child welfare decision-making is also linked to increasing
270 surveillance, as (multiply) marginalised parents are those most likely to be under digital surveillance and to have
271 their children removed from them [41]. The sterilised language of algorithmic risk assessment belies the underlying
272 judgement about the worthiness of parents that underpins the decision to remove a child from their natal home (see
273 for example [50]). The way children's 'vulnerability' and the 'risks' associated with different home environments and
274 parental characteristics are defined are inherently moral judgements developed within the sociocultural value system
275 of a specific, self-preserving social hierarchy; contrary to intentionally reassuring messaging about AI, shifting from a
276 human decision-maker to an algorithm does not suddenly render these judgements neutral. And, where algorithms
277 define risks as 'ever being involved in the criminal legal system' or 'receiving social welfare'—as in the infamous
278 Allegheny Family Screening Tool [41, 50]—some families are 'marked in perpetuity' as 'risky' [50], i.e. as perpetually
279 unworthy of parenthood. Technological decision-making processes in social work assessments can remove social
280 workers' capacity to engage with contextual considerations and operate professional judgement [18]. Even if we accept
281 the (false) premise of 'objectivity' of AI risk assessment, it is still problematic to assume that rigid systems of algorithmic
282 categorisation and mandated action will reduce harm in a system where human traits such as empathy (inherently
283 lacking in AI [36]) are essential for identifying and dismantling harmful practices and structures. While not all human
284 decision-makers are motivated to effect positive change and keep families together, there is a greater likelihood of
285 human decision-makers with this motivation than of AI built to optimise in this way. The system of child removals has
286 been constructed on racist, colonialist, classist, ableist, and otherwise inherently discriminatory assumptions (for more,
287 see [102, 116, 119]). The underpinning assumption of AI risk assessment in this context is that some people are unworthy
288 of parenthood. In strong contrast, RJ asserts that all people are worthy of parenthood, but some people—particularly
289 (multiply) marginalised people—face myriad structural barriers that can prevent them from having children and from
290 parenting those children in safe and healthy environments. Parents cannot raise their children in safe and healthy
291 environments when their children are taken from them, and the deployment of automated decision-making compounds
292 rather than negates this problem.

300 AI is also being used is to assess financial worthiness. Financial worthiness is often treated as a moral judgement, with
301 credit scores being used as a particularly quick, easy, and ostensibly objective indicator of someone's worthiness and
302 character [78]. Credit scoring algorithms are significantly less accurate for individuals with limited credit histories (or
303 'thin data') [16], a situation more common for (multiply) marginalised people; so, too, are such individuals' scores more
304 susceptible to the impacts of any single negative datapoint [16]. People experiencing financial precarity, often reflecting
305 complex histories of marginalisation, are less resourced for buffering the instabilities this precarity creates (e.g. ill
306 health, job inflexibility, lack of access to child care and transportation), thus increasing the likelihood of credit-reducing
307 incidents on their record. Additionally, 'fringe alternative data' [136] from people's online behaviours, used for online
308 consumer-credit marketing, creates a trove of intimate data that can be sold to companies to optimise their predictions.
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313 As these operate outside of financial regulations on non-discrimination, highly problematic proxies are frequently used
314 to profile people in ways tantamount to ‘digital redlining’ [136] (see also [104]), leading to concrete—but frequently
315 unrecognised—harms such as psychological distress and loss of autonomy [150]. Cruelly, advertising algorithms use
316 these detailed profiles to microtarget the poor [106, 136] with payday lending, subprime mortgages, and other forms of
317 predation, then seize upon their algorithmically optimised ‘failure’ to wipe out their wealth (Cathy O’Neil and Safiya
318 Umoja Nobel in [65]). These structural pressures mean people’s scores follow them from one automated decision system
319 after the other, reducing life opportunities on the basis of ‘objectively’ determined moral ‘inferiority’ [78]. Perversely,
320 difficult-to-repay debt, which further harms credit, can become the only option for survival—a choiceless financial
321 choice. Drawing on interviews in Argentina and Brazil, Cavallero and Gago [21, p. 44] explain ‘Debt only comes in to
322 “save us” because we have been violently impoverished, to the point of an induced precarity. Debt becomes unpayable
323 because first there was looting and dispossession.’ Creditors actively target marginalised people for whom debt has
324 become necessary for survival. Identifying financially ‘unworthy’ people *creates* a market of consumers for a product
325 which is has no value except to reinforce the label, creating a feedback loop of demand. For someone whose financial
326 options have been restricted by harmful ‘worthiness’ labels, the ‘right’ time to have a child may never arrive, creating a
327 barrier to the right to have a child. The costs of reproductive healthcare (and, even where this is free at the point of
328 care, care-seeking trajectory costs such as transport, child care, and missed work (see [27, 46])) are a significant barrier
329 to the right to not have a child. And, it is difficult to control one’s future and provide a safe and healthy environment
330 when ‘creditworthiness’ and linked spirals of predatory debt render meeting basic needs impossible.

335 The use of AI to assess financial worthiness can have a particularly chilling effect for people with abusive partners.
336 Leaving an abusive partner can be nearly impossible for people experiencing financial precarity and debt (see for
337 example [21]). While this is not unique to the digital era, AI facilitates information sharing between institutions over a
338 long duration in a way that can be unknown to individuals whose financial records are being impacted and, related to
339 this, can be shared and applied without the benefit of context. For example, a woman in London defaulted on payments
340 for a student overdraft in 2016 because her abusive partner exerted control over her finances, leaving her with no
341 money and severely restricted knowledge of outstanding bills [56]. After she left her partner, he received her statutory
342 maternity pay, creating further financial problems for her. As she established a life away from him, she became aware
343 of the payment she owed and took immediate action, fully settling the debt within three years. However, this left a
344 mark against her credit report which she could not have removed (despite her circumstances), leaving her unable to
345 purchase a home and provide for her son as she wished. AI was used to assess her worth in a way that ignored the
346 structural violence informing her circumstances, with lasting consequences for her right to parent with dignity in a
347 safe and healthy environment. While credit scores pre-dated algorithms, AI has made it easier than ever for different
348 systems to share information; creditworthiness has increasingly become an all-encompassing, inescapable metric for
349 general ‘worthiness’.

354 Another example comes from China’s social credit system, which tracks activities such as time use and purchasing
355 history and gives a citizen score ranking that can determine people’s access to social resources, including housing and
356 transportation [13]. Given the importance of social and financial resources for being able to raise a child in a safe and
357 healthy environment, a system designed to restrict access to e.g. housing through automated behaviour monitoring is a
358 threat to RJ. Systematically excluding people from basic necessities is also a structurally violent act of reproductive
359 coercion which can lead people to defer childbearing, possibly indefinitely. And, a long global history of reproductive
360 coercion against marginalised people, up to and including forced sterilisation, highlights the very dark potential for
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365 such a system to be used to impede the right to have a child by providing technological cover for enforcing harmful
366 notions of who 'should' reproduce.

367 The very act of assessing worthiness is a form of structural violence which systematically restricts some people's
368 access to basic goods. It is nonsensical to claim that enforcing a social hierarchy in this way is an objective act free
369 from human bias. Nonetheless, this is the widely-touted claim for why AI is better suited for assessing worthiness in a
370 wide variety of systems. Decisions involved in compiling and coding data that are necessary for creating algorithms in
371 the first place are strongly influenced by the human biases of those developing and deploying the systems (e.g. their
372 beliefs regarding the relative trustworthiness of certain groups of people [78]). AI is being used to make assessments
373 about worthiness in a variety of contexts that have far-reaching implications for the realisation of RJ.
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377 2.3 Datafication of bodies

378 While the collection and analysis of data is certainly nothing new (indeed, datafication has been used historically, for
379 example, to racialise people to legitimise the eugenics movement [140]), *digital datafication* has emerged from the
380 capacity to rapidly collect, store, and analyse a previously unthinkable volume of data through technological advances
381 [94]. The very notion of what counts as data has expanded as technology has evolved to capture an ever growing range
382 of activities in our lives. It is 'the process of translating the flux of life into discrete machine-readable data points' [63].
383 At the same time, personal control over whether or how one's own data are collected and analysed is often very limited
384 [25, 34], and important context and nuance is lost through the process of abstraction necessary to collect and analyse
385 data at this scale. Increasingly, data are being marketised to facilitate surveillance capitalism, with serious consequences
386 for life chances [29, 150, 151], particularly for marginalised people. While datafication and its nefarious manifestations
387 are nothing new [140], emerging digital technology has dramatically increased the pace and scale of this process.

391 A range of apps that rely on AI to process and analyse data have emerged with the manifest aim of helping people
392 improve their health. However, their latent function is datafication. Users enter personal details alongside a stream of
393 information specific to the app's aim, directly contributing to their own datafication. Period trackers are one example,
394 offering users the ability to track their menstrual cycles to increase their knowledge of their bodies, plan for menstruation,
395 and even monitor ovulation, with implications for (not) becoming pregnant. Reproductive health experts have raised
396 serious scientific concerns about the data underlying some AI-based fertility trackers (for example [113]), raising
397 questions about efficacy and safety for conception and pregnancy prevention. Where abortion is criminalised, these
398 data can be used to predict potential pregnancies, placing app users in danger if the data (and particularly predictions
399 based on the data) are shared with law enforcement. Following the overturn of *Roe v. Wade* in the US, experts have
400 warned that apps are not subject to the same data privacy laws as medical providers [10], highlighting a threat to the
401 right to not have a child that this form of datafication can pose. Women who seek criminalised abortion care may be at
402 risk of incarceration (and associated barriers to RJ, as in §2.1). There is also a serious risk that women who seek care for
403 obstetric emergencies could experience accusations of foetal harm [116], possibly up to and including formal charges
404 conflating miscarriage and abortion as seen elsewhere in the world [88]. In short, this form of datafication incentivises
405 and creates efficient pathways for people to share private data, simultaneously placing themselves at risk of greater
406 surveillance while also generating profit for companies that use data as capital.
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411 Extractive AI tools are fueling opportunities across Global Majority countries, from gig economies to prenatal care,
412 for populations previously excluded from technological benefits. One crucial consideration is the implications for RJ in
413 an ostensible zero sum scenario where people are either excluded from AI benefits (like AI assisted prenatal care) or
414 left to the mercies of AI's rampant, uninhibited data gathering potential. In a context where digital technology can
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417 serve as bridging capital, including benefits like greater RJ in prenatal care, how can cautions about ethical concerns
418 enhance access to equitable outcomes instead of (re)creating inequity? Scholarship [4, 42] adducing the entrenched role
419 of colonialism nuances these concerns. According to decolonial logics [130], a key starting point for understanding
420 conflicts between the benefits and burdens of AI is the role of deep-rooted inequality [91]. Lutz's [91] characterisation of
421 tensions between exclusion and inclusion emphasises AI as a resource with the potential to bridge existing capital gaps.
422 However, AI exposes how entrenched inequalities reproduce themselves if particular attention is not given to ensure
423 transparency and accountability. Decolonial logics show inequality is historically defined, and AI merely exemplifies a
424 novel way to understand the profile of the usual beneficiaries and the typically neglected (see for example [1]). Prenatal
425 care presents a useful example of this argument, especially in the context of algorithmic RJ: technologies for prenatal
426 care can reach far and wide because they overcome some longstanding structural concerns—for instance ensuring
427 inclusivity for rural dwellers who typically face isolation from material structures and urban dwellers for whom costs
428 of medicines and care are pose barriers. Often the minoritised people for whom such modes of care is presented as
429 inclusive are also those who earn their living through the gig economy, again with AI enabling more access to markets
430 that can be classed as inclusive [142]. However, the scholarship adducing inequality in the distribution of benefits and
431 burdens demands consideration of the unique ways digital benefits can also be burdens [142], pinpointing overt costs
432 of membership for those technologies offering greater equality and the more covert cost of datafication [29]. When
433 the benefits of using AI to, for example, improve birth outcomes are weighed against the harms of datafication, the
434 implications for the realisation of RJ are complex.

439 As Ruja Benjamin notes [13], AI datafication is being used to compile and analyse genetic data, with the aim of
440 providing a genetic blueprint for intelligence and other socially valued traits for AI-assisted reproductive decision-
441 making. She cites the documentary *DNA Dreams*, a film about how scientists in China are working to identify alleged
442 'intelligence' alleles. Benjamin explains the scientific team rebutted criticism that this is a eugenic agenda, arguing that
443 rather than selectively promoting the fertility of 'highly intelligent' people and discouraging the fertility of others,
444 the team's goal is simply to enable everyone to have the 'best kids' possible. Benjamin labels this 'Equal Opportunity
445 Eugenics', explaining the very notion of 'best kids' and indeed of 'intelligence' itself are socially defined, highly subjective
446 ideas; the choices scientists are making to define intelligence and correlate this with genetic markers is, contrary to the
447 scientific team's rhetoric, neither a neutral nor an inclusive act. Ultimately, whether selectively encouraging fertility on
448 the basis of a value-laden characteristic or encouraging everyone to make fertility decisions to maximise a specific
449 characteristic, the result is still eugenics. The datafication of intelligence (and other subjective, selectively valued
450 traits) and efforts to select on these traits are rooted in 'a belief that more humans can be like those already deemed
451 superior' [13, p. 117]. The history of eugenics highlights how socially defined and deeply biased ideas about which
452 traits are/should be valued, packaged as objective scientific insight, can be a powerful tool of structural violence used to
453 restrict the right to have a child, to not have a child, and to control one's own body and future.

459 2.4 Monetising inequality and misinformation

460 As with the other trends we have highlighted, monetising inequality and misinformation is not new. However, AI is
461 facilitating the spread of misinformation in ways that make it more rapid, voluminous, and targeted, while simultaneously
462 increasing the potential for financial gain from spreading misinformation and stoking inequalities [104].

464 Inequities in access to assisted reproductive technology (ART) have long been a barrier to the right to have a child,
465 with the most marginalised people both within and across national boundaries having the least access [7, 9, 44, 51, 138].
466 AI is now being developed in the selection and analysis of sperm cells and oocytes, the evaluation of embryo quality for
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469 decisions about transfer and implantation, and predictions of the probability of success for in vitro fertilisation (IVF)
 470 [117]. As Rolfes et al. explain, the application of AI in this context has introduced a strong potential for compounding
 471 disparities by charging a premium for AI-assisted ART, which could provide more effective ART treatments and more
 472 successful outcomes with less need for repeated invasive procedures. This is likely to be particularly the case when
 473 AI-assisted ART is not widely available, potentially leading to a widening of the care gap between privileged and
 474 marginalised people who experience infertility and even raising costs across the sector, creating further barriers to the
 475 right to have a child for marginalised people.
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478 We have already touched upon one of the mechanisms by which search algorithms monetise inequality, namely
 479 through targeted advertising that bets on people's failure (§2.2). To this we add the following: An analysis from February
 480 2023 has shown that nearly half of adverts returned by Google UK when users were searching for abortion-related
 481 phrases such as 'NHS abortion advice' (National Health Service) were advertisements for anti-abortion groups [33].
 482 For users who see the search platform as a tool for efficiently navigating the Internet (rather than as a business that
 483 makes its money from advertising revenue), the relevance and accuracy of results returned and the relationship of these
 484 characteristics to the potential for revenue generation may be extremely opaque.⁸
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487 2.5 Decimating planetary health

489 Since the term was coined in 2013, a growing body of work has focused on planetary health—that is, how human activity
 490 has impacted complex and interconnected ecological systems, and how the devastating effects of natural resource
 491 depletion and the climate crisis in turn threaten human health around the globe [149]. While popular excitement
 492 over possible technosolutions to the climate crisis abound, significantly less attention is given to the planetary harms
 493 inherent in the profligacy and extractive ethos of emerging digital technologies. Linked to these planetary costs are
 494 very real human costs, both in terms of harms to the people who depend on effected ecosystems and harms to the
 495 people who are doing the dangerous extractive labour.
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498 For example, minerals such as lithium, dysprosium, and cobalt are essential for manufacturing processor chips,
 499 computer displays, batteries, and other technology components [30, 40]. Both the physical activity of mining itself
 500 and the environmental degradation linked to it carry serious health consequences for miners and for communities
 501 surrounding mines—disproportionately for marginalised people and communities in Global Majority countries. The
 502 high demand for minerals underpinning the industry, and the structural violence linked to the extraction of these
 503 resources, is a threat to RJ. Where child labour is used, mining is a direct threat to the ability to raise children in safe
 504 and healthy environments; mining poses both short-and long-term threats to children's health [107].⁹ The pollution
 505 from nearby mining activities can also create health hazards such as mercury and lead contamination, which negatively
 506 impacts human health and child development [52, 110]. And, the ill health of parents who work in mines can also pose
 507 a risk to children, e.g. by reducing household income when wage earners become ill and through health risks such as
 508 transmission of tuberculosis, which is a common health problem in mining communities [108]. Because mining also
 509 carries a high risk of death, people who are undertaking this dangerous form of labour experience a risk to all of their
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515 ⁸This is despite Google's protestations that this is not an issue because the word 'Ad' appears in bold before the links in question; links to valid, regulated
 516 abortion providers were also labelled as adverts [33]; simply labelling an advert as such is not a sufficient cue as to the validity of the linked information.

517 ⁹Although risks of injury and toxic exposures are very real in extractive industries, children can, as empowered actors, choose to work to contribute
 518 to their household economy. Simply withdrawing an important source of income without attending to broader structural constraints and investing in
 519 livelihood alternatives is not a useful solution [101, 105]. Viewed through a RJ lens, uptake of precarious and/or dangerous work may be considered in
 520 many circumstances a choiceless choice, and removing (rather than broadening) already constrained choices is an inadequate solution.

521 rights under the RJ framework. Moreover, where demand for natural resources increases conflict, communities face an
522 increased risk of food and water insecurity, displacement, injury, and death, all of which are barriers to RJ [43, 46].

523 More broadly, despite the key role of digitalisation in (inter-)governmental climate strategy (e.g. [28]), at present
524 digital technologies pose a material threat to the realisation of climate targets [76]. While often mistaken as directly
525 reducing carbon emissions, the efficiencies emerging digital technologies deliver instead promote the desire to do more
526 (for cheaper), creating rebound effects that offset efficiency gains; meanwhile, the impulse to find new ways to capitalise
527 on datafication further drives the growth of emissions by data centres that store these limitless troves, and by the
528 computational intensity of AI processing this data [49, 81]. In short, the AI industry is a massive contributor to the
529 climate crisis and its sequelae. Because of the inextricable links between climate justice and RJ, the substantial and
530 direct role digital technologies play in compounding the climate crisis is a pressing matter for RJ. Put simply, no one
531 can live in a safe and healthy environment, no one can have the children that they want to have, and no one can have
532 control over their future on a planet that cannot sustain life.
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536 3 DISCUSSION

537 3.1 Why Reproductive Justice?

538 The issues outlined above have been raised by scholars applying a social justice lens to critique AI. So what is gained
539 by exploring these issues through a RJ lens? First, this lens lifts the veil on additional dimensions of systemic harms.
540 In 2004, cardiologist Nanette Wenger critiqued medical science for taking a ‘bikini approach’ [148]—a narrow focus
541 of women’s health as being about breasts and reproductive systems, neglecting the rest of the body. By framing the
542 reproductive harms of emerging digital technology as stemming mainly (or solely) from technologies focusing on
543 women’s reproductive systems (e.g. menstrual trackers), computing risks a similarly problematic approach. RJ offers a
544 useful lens for seeing the reproductive coercion embedded in a broader, more subtle range of emerging technologies.
545 Applying the explicitly intersectional feminist lens of RJ reveals the potential, and already realised, forms of reproductive
546 coercion being fostered by digital technologies. Explicit attention to algorithmic RJ is essential for achieving ‘strong
547 intersectional fairness in AI’ [83]. Our paper seeks to be a bridge for bringing AI ethics and RJ activists and scholars
548 into conversation; visiting the intersection of these two fields highlights how digital technologies are putting a thumb
549 on the RJ scale—a form of digital gatekeeping that enforces broader sociocultural notions of who can and ‘should’
550 reproduce. The specific harms of RJ are linked to but *not subsumed by* broader forces of marginalisation, yet people
551 with a particular stake in RJ are not brought into discussions about fairness, accountability, and transparency. RJ
552 principles align well with an Ubuntu-inspired relational ethics model which extends beyond principles of fairness and
553 trust, requiring AI ethics to contend with community good, respect for others, and safeguarding humanity as well [6].
554 Examining emerging social justice issues in AI and related digital technologies through the RJ lens will help to give the
555 reproductive implications of these technologies the attention that they deserve. Second, and relatedly, being rooted
556 in international human rights, a RJ framing may afford strategic advantage in terms of global solidarity. It grounds
557 discussions of AI harm within international fora such as the United Nations, which is in the early stages of grappling
558 with the threat AI poses to human rights and what unified international action against these threats might look like.
559 Critiquing digital technology through RJ opens the door to cooperation with groups fighting for RJ around the globe.

560 Third, this lens clarifies AI’s disturbing potential for alignment with eugenics. Extant critiques have identified
561 similarities between AI classifications and the physiognomy/phrenology historically used to legitimise eugenics [30, 58],
562 but we suggest the connection to eugenics is also more direct. Dan McQuillan is perhaps most bold in calling out the
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573 eugenic tendencies of AI. He warns [96] AI is entangled with a) problematic notions of intelligence that have always
574 legitimised racialised social hierarchies, and b) the instinct to optimise intelligence, which led to overt eugenics; but he
575 also argues AI is deployed in ways that grant/deny opportunities to individuals in ways that racially stratify mortality.
576 As we have noted, premature deaths related to deployment of AI technologies have implications for people's freedom
577 to reproduce. But whereas McQuillan writes, 'It wouldn't be necessary for AI-driven eugenics to be implemented by
578 anything as crude as forced sterilization: it could simply operate as infrastructural filtering at scale' [96, p.92], we assert
579 eugenic pressures exerted by emerging technologies go beyond filtering of opportunity (distributive injustice).
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582 Fourth, our discussion of implications for RJ has revealed the interconnected nature of digital reproductive harm,
583 with multiple violent processes converging on the most marginalised people around the globe. For example, as Cavallero
584 and Gago [21] point out, the debt crisis that is disproportionately affecting families and marginalised people in
585 Argentina and Brazil is rooted in transnational processes of structural adjustment: Global Majority countries that have
586 experienced centuries of colonial extraction to generate capital for Global Minority countries are now experiencing
587 another wave of extraction in which social protection systems are being dismantled to pay for state debt. This is an act
588 of neocolonialism, with structural adjustment effectively asking countries to foot the bill for their own exploitation.
589 Families and marginalised people being forced into debt and precarity to line the pockets of financiers in Global Minority
590 countries. Thus seemingly local experiences of debt and its sequelae are rooted in global processes of extraction. We add
591 to their incisive analysis that the opaque introduction of AI and its quiet ubiquity can supercharge harmful processes,
592 including the structural violence of debt, by providing a veneer of objectivity while breaking down boundaries between
593 systems of oppression.
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596 Finally, because RJ draws attention to how history animates current inequities, algorithmic RJ elucidates the role of
597 (neo)colonialism in creating the infrastructure for our deeply inequitable digital world. Digital technologies did not
598 spring forth from nowhere; a tendency to look towards exciting new directions without considering historical context
599 can mask the underpinning analog inequities on which the foundations of our digital world are built. Indeed, the Silicon
600 Valley motto of 'move fast and break things' misses the myriad ways things are, in fact, already broken. Consideration
601 of the historical context of technological advances at a global scale highlights how historical harms are replicated by this
602 ethos. RJ invites us to consider the historical roots of inequities, how inequities are maintained in the current system,
603 and how they can be best redressed. For instance, we noted the duality between AI's potential for bridging capital, with
604 the potential to combat socioeconomic inequity globally, and the probabilities for merely reproducing said inequities
605 [96]. Indeed, this view of AI as actual (rather than mere abstract) technologies offering real-life capital for populations
606 historically marginalised and systematically excluded from the benefits of emerging technology globally allows insight
607 through the concrete lens of RJ. We are particularly concerned about algorithmic harm landing disproportionately in
608 parts of the world where digital technology represents significant bridging capital, and therefore the choice to push
609 back against technology's more insidious effects can ultimately be a choiceless choice between the very real harms
610 of using versus not using a given technology. What can be regarded as an 'uncritical' welcome of these technologies
611 can also be understood in regards to how historically structured inequitable arrangements, including access to digital
612 technologies, distorts rather than actualises agency. Concerns with uncritical acceptance cannot be divorced from
613 the representation of AI as a social good [143]. This insight adds renewed urgency to calls to develop AI ethics that
614 transcends a narrow, privileged, colonialist perspective [125, 139]. There is a clear need for research that expands our
615 (currently woefully inadequate) understanding of lived experiences of digitally-implicated harm and the barriers they
616 pose to reproductive (and other forms of) justice; RJ provides a toolkit for informing this research, and links discussions
617 about digital inequities to an activist community with extensive expertise in addressing inequities.
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3.2 Doing better

We have raised significant concerns regarding the application of AI in domains including criminal justice, social care, and AI-assisted reproductive decision-making. That said, our critique is not so much of particular emergent/AI system(s) as it is of the extractive ethos driving various interlinked technologies [29] which, *in combination*, obstruct RJ. Meaningfully controlling one's future requires meaningful control of one's data, including real opportunities to reject data-driven systems. Consent regimes are demonstrably inadequate protections for almost everyone [68, 77], but (multiply) marginalised people have even less power to exert choice under heightened surveillance, and often face strong incentives to demonstrate compliance with agencies demanding their data [41]. Moreover, the consequences of the failures of consent regimes is far from evenly distributed across society. Our analysis underscores the importance of real solutions to the perennial challenge of privacy in the age of surveillance capitalism [150, 151]—solutions which are anticipatory (see [23] for more) rather than exclusively, and glacially, reactive. Echoing Ruha Benjamin, we propose that solutions in this space focus on the power dynamics of *visibility*, i.e. empowering people to make the choice of when and to whom to be visible—a stark contrast to the way digital technologies currently make marginalised people visible when they want to avoid the gaze and invisible when they want to be seen [13, p. 68]. Focusing on the two sides of this visibility problem should help curtail structurally violent surveillance, consumer profiling, and datafication while also revealing people's real experiences of all forms of injustice.

Relatedly, our analysis emphasises meaningfully engaging with marginalised people throughout the entire design pipeline. A growing literature emphasises the importance of methodologies that support genuine dialogue [74, 96], *actually listening* to marginalised voices [13, 34, 58, 80, 84, 95]. However, involving marginalised people does not necessarily constitute meaningful engagement unless their participation is both genuinely valued and *on their own terms*; there is important work to be done in co-design of the engagement methodologies themselves [79] to avoid repeating patterns of harmful extractivism within participatory approaches to AI ethics (see [70]). Concern with epistemic inclusivity is identified in decolonial scholarship as indicative of both Eurocentric and androcentric control of knowledge development, rationalising the marginalisation of colonised communities from power [4]. Fannon [42], for instance, draws a parallel between the ability to control one's narrative and access to resources key to one's transformation. Epistemic colonialism applies not only to methodologies, but also to the Eurocentric and individualistic ethical principles used in AI decision-making [6]. Scholars assess such concerns from a decolonial perspective, citing the need for greater epistemic inclusion [3, 29, 100]. Cave's [22] exploration of AI as constitutive of a value laden history draws attention to the role of knowledge development processes in how inequity is reproduced. This includes historic shaping of 'scientific' knowledge like eugenics as legitimate; Cave exhorts the need to resist AI's capacity to reproduce and rationalise such harms with critical analyses adducing ethics. Couldry and Mejias [29] meanwhile, in defining data colonialism as 'the predatory extractive practices of historical colonialism with the abstract quantification methods of computing' also encourage epistemic equality. This is likely to ensure that the way technologies are conceptualised include the voices and values systems of those historically marginalised from knowledge development and resources.

Finally, given the wide-ranging corrosive effects of data profiteering, realising RJ will require a radical culture change in our relationship with data. The continuously growing carbon footprint of the world's data-driven systems threatens all of our rights. This demands computing respond proportionally to the existential threat of the climate crisis [81]. Efforts to incorporate renewable energy, offset emissions, and increase efficiency are not enough; we must also seriously constrain consumption. This means limiting data collection, even deleting existing data, and resisting the temptation to throw computing—particularly AI—at every problem. The climate impacts of AI have been underappreciated within

AI ethics policy and research, with little to no attention to this matter at preminent conferences in the field (notable exception: [11]), and this urgently needs to change.

We have outlined some of the (potential) barriers to the realisation of rights that emerging technology presents. It is also essential to recognise the potential for technologies to be reshaped, co-opted, and reimaged as tools for liberation. For example, when asked about predictive models in child welfare systems, stakeholders (e.g. care leavers, parents) identified the potential for digital technologies to be used in solidarity with families to prevent child removals and counteract child welfare agencies [133]. We caution against viewing people who are marginalised by technology as passive and powerless. Waiting for industry and regulators to resolve the structural violence embedded in emerging technology promises to be too little, too late. History has shown that social progress is often driven not by unprompted acts of benevolence at the top of the social hierarchy, but by the active unveiling of obfuscated structural violence and resistance to this violence. Scholars and activists with expertise in and toolkits for resistance of forms of structural violence embedded in emerging technology can both gain momentum from and add momentum to the RJ movement.

4 CONCLUSION

Our aim is not to claim digital technologies can only result in reproductive coercion and harm; there are many ways that AI can be deployed to improve lives if designed and deployed equitably, with the voices of marginalised non/users being centred in this process. Nor was our aim to give a comprehensive accounting of all of the multitudinous harms caused by migrant detention, incarceration, employment discrimination, child removals, and the many other structurally violent processes that we have mentioned as examples in this paper; RJ activists and scholars have already done this with far greater breadth and depth than we can hope to achieve here. We have merely skimmed the surface. Rather, we wish to add four complementary points to the already rich RJ literature. First, the barriers to RJ we've explored are not unique to the digital realm. However, emerging digital technologies are reproducing and amplifying existing barriers in ways that need explicit scrutiny. Second, that false narratives of objectivity are sometimes deployed to obfuscate the structural violent ways technology is being developed and deployed is one reason links between technology and RJ merit further attention. While technology itself does not inherently aim to reproduce and amplify structural violence, it is created for and by human beings, and is therefore subject to the same potential biases of any other human-created system. Claims that technology will be a panacea for biased social systems because technology is free from human bias are, simply put, false. Third, digital technologies are not a substitute for strong and equitable social systems. AI may be useful in many contexts for improving efficiency and cutting costs. However, the gaping holes in the social safety net created by decades of neoliberal divestment in systems that support people to have and raise families cannot be patched with a technological quick fix (see [26] for more). Fourth, there are some highly concerning trends in emerging technologies which have important implications for RJ. These include (but are not limited to) increasing surveillance, assessing worth, datafication of bodies, monetising inequality and misinformation, and decimating planetary health. Both because of the harms (potentially) amplified by emerging digital technologies, and because of the power of activism that seeks to resist this harm, we have sought to highlight the potential for mutual learning and solidarity RJ and computing scholars and activists.

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