

1 **Bridging the Gap between Climate Change and Maritime Security: Towards a**
2 **Comprehensive Framework for Planning**

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14 **Abstract**

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16 For the past two decades, the need to shield strategic maritime interests, to tackle criminality
17 and terrorism at or from the sea and to conserve valuable marine resources has been
18 recognized at the highest political level. Acknowledging and accounting for the interplay
19 between climate change, the vulnerability of coastal populations and the occurrence of
20 maritime criminality should be part of any ocean governance process. Still, given the complex
21 interactions between climate change and socio-economic components of the marine realm, it
22 has become urgent to establish a solid methodological framework, which could lead to sound
23 and effective decisions. We propose that any such framework should not be built from
24 scratch. The adaptation of well tested, existing uncertainty-management tools, such as
25 Cumulative Effect Assessments, could serve as a solid basis to account for the magnitude and
26 directionality of the dependencies between the impacts of climate change and the occurrence
27 of maritime criminality, offering spatial explicit risk evaluations. Multi-Criteria Decision
28 Making could then be employed to better and faster inform decision-makers. These
29 mechanisms could provide a framework for comparison of alternative mitigation and
30 adaptation actions and are essential in assessing responses to tackle maritime crime in the
31 context of climate change.

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33 *Keywords:* global environmental change, maritime security, cumulative risk assessment,
34 method standardization

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1. Environmental and social complexities in marine and coastal systems

Coastal and marine systems provide critical environmental and social values, supporting the maintenance of human health and welfare (Costanza et al. 1997; Martínez et al. 2007). Still, coastal zones and the marine sites out to the continental shelf break are listed within the most heavily used and vulnerable systems of the planet, with climate change recognized as a major threat (Grebmeier 2011; Harley et al. 2006; Wise et al. 2014). Ample evidence is now available demonstrating that climate change alters ecosystem functionality and structure, biotic community composition and fisheries (Cheung et al. 2010; Hoegh-Guldberg and Bruno 2010; Pinsky et al. 2013). At the same time, it is acknowledged that the response mechanisms of natural and social systems could be eroded by the magnitude of global climate change, threatening societal stability and even triggering violent conflicts and criminal behaviors at national, regional and global scales (Barnett 2003; Gemenne et al. 2014; Gleditsch 2012; Hsiang and Burke 2014; Scheffran et al. 2012).

Security issues (e.g. illegal fishing, piracy, drug and arms smuggling, illegal immigration and human trafficking) in the sensitive maritime domain have recently received considerable attention at higher political levels (Bueger 2015; Germond 2015). Still, the magnitude and directionality of the links and dependencies between maritime criminality and alternative stressors, such as the impacts of climate change on marine ecosystems and down the line on human systems, have not yet systematically been analyzed. Consequently, the methodological framework that could offer the basis for a systematic management and spatial mitigation planning is missing even though this need has somewhat been recognized by states and supranational actors (e.g. Council of the EU 2014; HM Government 2014).

Social vulnerabilities, criminality and environmental components are linked through multiple pathways altering safety and good governance within the maritime domain (Cochrane et al. 2009; Pomeroy et al. 2016). A critical step for effective long-term planning and adaptive management of coastal and marine systems is to incorporate this complexity into decision-making processes and governance mechanisms (Stelzenmüller et al. 2018). Still, the successful application of any assessment method would require reliable information on the distribution of security components and on the expected impacts from multiple

69 sources/activities, which is not always available. An additional challenge consists in finding
70 how to incorporate impacts which are not easily predictable (e.g. stochastic extreme weather
71 events) and/or could emerge as a complex network of relationships (e.g. extreme weather
72 events that impact upon poverty or food security), whose magnitude and directionality are still
73 uncertain (Jones et al. 2016; Judd et al. 2015; Scheffran et al. 2012). For example, direct
74 evaluations of the links between climate change and violent conflicts or criminal activities are
75 often complicated due to uncertainties in the quantitative data used to establish the
76 associations (Gleditsch 2012). Similarly, methodological difficulties in distinguishing whether
77 identified impacts are related to climate or to short term weather fluctuations, or the ability to
78 delineate various other variables that can explain the occurrence of violence, highlight the
79 uncertainties associated with this field of research (Baldwin 2014; Barnett 2003; Barnett and
80 Adger 2007; Gemenne et al. 2014; Gleditsch 2012).

81
82 What is currently lacking is the science that integrates the multiple links between climate
83 change and the occurrence of maritime criminality, while considering the assumptions
84 underlying the role, estimation, quantification and sensitivity of background factors
85 structuring these links (Scheffran et al. 2012). In this paper, we suggest that the means to
86 conceptualize, quantify and evaluate the magnitude and directionality of the links and
87 dependencies between climate change and the occurrence of maritime criminality can be
88 found in well-established cross-disciplinary research achievements. As a first step toward
89 building an adequate framework for analysis and planning, we propose to adapt existing and
90 comprehensive methodologies and tools commonly used for evaluating environmental risks.
91 These tools are widely used for informing conservation planning and guiding management
92 decisions; we propose that they could also be used to inform how maritime security as a social
93 risk could interact with, and be exacerbated by, climate change at local, national, regional and
94 global scales.

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97 **2. Climate change dimensions in maritime security**

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99 Climate change alters maritime security without causing violent conflicts and threatening the
100 integrity of states directly. Floods, changes in the ocean biophysical conditions, expansion of
101 invasive species, changes in production of marine fish and shellfish species are all linked to
102 climate change causing serious degradations of the functionality, structure and services of

103 coastal and marine systems (Cheung et al. 2009; Hoegh-Guldberg and Bruno 2010;
104 McGranahan et al. 2007). Shipping hazards and damage to maritime infrastructure as
105 outcomes of extreme weather events, fish stock reduction and the redistribution of marine
106 biodiversity could negatively impact livelihoods, incomes and health, leading to social,
107 political and economic collapse. Eventually, such conditions could create incentives to engage
108 in various forms of criminal behavior.

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110 Poor management strategies and loose surveillance are often attributed to poverty, economic
111 collapse and environmental degradation, which coexist with climate risks (Allison et al. 2009;
112 Cinner et al. 2012). Ineffective management sets the stage for cascading effects such as
113 overexploitation of marine resources, food scarcity or water pollution by domestic and
114 industrial wastes. Climate-driven changes in people's living and working environments, could
115 also influence displacement and migration patterns, increase health risk, strengthen
116 competition for resources and alter geopolitical stability (McMichael et al. 2012). In turn,
117 these dimensions of social instability activate factors of maritime insecurity such as illegal
118 fishing, piracy, drug trafficking and arms smuggling, as well as illegal immigration and
119 human trafficking. For example, Jaspardo and Taylor (2008) have highlighted the link
120 between climate change, degradation of fisheries and socio-economic conditions, and the
121 occurrence of piracy in South-East Asia. The importance of socio-economic components, in
122 addition to physical and ecological ones, towards assessing the complex impacts of climate
123 change upon fishery has also been acknowledged (Cochrane et al. 2009). Similarly, the need
124 to put in relation climate change impacts and bad governance has been highlighted to explain
125 the occurrence or strengthening of illegal practices regarding fishery (Allison and Kelling
126 2009).

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128 Crucially, the dependencies between climate change and maritime security are not
129 unidirectional (Fig. 1). Indeed, the sustainable development of coastal communities may be
130 undermined by illegal activities performed at or from the sea (Malcolm 2017), feeding back
131 the loop. For example, maritime crime threatens marine ecosystem integrity through illegal
132 fishing (Agnew et al. 2009) or jeopardize conservation efforts through piracy or redirection of
133 financial aid (Mazaris 2017; Mazaris et al. 2016). Illegal fishing activities result from
134 pressures likely to increasingly originate in climate change (such as scarcity of fish resources)
135 and then in turn affect fisheries resources (Pomeroy et al. 2016). Ultimately, further such
136 pressures on sensitive ecosystems and challenges to the blue economy (i.e. sustainability and

137 economic development in the marine and maritime sectors) can in turn trigger additional
138 motivations to engage in maritime crime. This is a synergistic process, which results in an
139 exponential loop of environmental issues, structural pressures on the social, political and
140 economic systems, and maritime crimes.

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142 In sum, the magnitude of social and economic sectors relying upon the marine realm
143 contributes to a complex array of receptors but also constitutes an additional source of
144 pressures for the sensitive marine ecosystems (Atkins et al. 2011). Overexploitation of marine
145 resources, illegal migration and human trafficking, are all vectors of instability which could
146 be intensified under social, political or economic unrest (McMichael et al. 2012). An
147 inadequate consideration of the interactions, the underlying drivers and the cumulative
148 impacts of pressures and activities, along with the multidimensional impacts of climate
149 change, could downgrade the efficiency of policy measures targeting a sustainable use of the
150 oceans.

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153 **3. Promoting standardized planning tools**

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155 The question of how to identify the magnitude and directionality of various factors and
156 processes, and also how to quantify and evaluate their cumulative, incompatible or
157 multiplicative effects upon various receptors, is not novel (Borja et al. 2016; Korpinen and
158 Andersen 2016). This is also the case for the complex role of the continuous and dynamic
159 threat of climate change (Costanza et al. 1997). Understanding how climate change triggers
160 responses and poses alterations to natural and socio-economic systems and how this could
161 accelerate, interact and feed upon existing pressures represents a major scientific challenge
162 (Barnett and Adger 2007; Gemenne et al. 2014).

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164 Methodologies endorsed within the wider context of Cumulative Effect Assessment (CEA)
165 allow identifying causalities of multiple pressures operating at various temporal and spatial
166 scales, offering the means for systematic, spatially explicit action planning (Borja et al. 2016;
167 Crain et al. 2008). The basic aim of CEAs is to cover the wide vector of anthropogenic
168 pressures and estimate their additive, multiplicative, synergistic and antagonistic impacts
169 upon selected ecosystem components (e.g. habitats, populations). Depending on the scope of
170 the assessment and action planning (e.g. reserve selection, evaluation of environmental status,

171 prioritization of management and mitigation measures), CEAs could be applied at local,
172 national, regional or even continental scales (Judd et al 2015). Even if initiated from a
173 scientific, political or legal perspective, the basic rationale behind CEA is to spatially overlay
174 multiple pressures and assess their impact on ecosystem components (e.g. species,
175 communities, ecosystem functions). The impact of a pressure upon the target ecosystem's
176 features is assessed either through numeric evidence (e.g. spatial extent of degradation,
177 species population reduction) or categorically as the outputs of expert consultations (Korpinen
178 and Andersen 2016). Under this context, once the impacts of climate change and interactions
179 with other pressures are conceptualized, they become part of the assessment process (Therivel
180 and Ross 2007).

181
182 Drawing from the theory behind CEAs, we could distill a set of opportunities offered to
183 address challenges in managing maritime security risks in the context of climate change. A
184 major challenge in assessing risks within complex systems consists in the limited quantitative
185 evidence on the combination or interaction between social, economic and environmental
186 stressors; one way that CEAs could overcome this limitation is by applying impact weighting
187 factors for any combination between specific pressure and ecosystem component (Korpinen
188 and Andersen 2016). This weighting scheme reflects “vulnerabilities” to pressures and could
189 be fed by expert opinion, while multiple interactions (i.e. weighting schemes) could be
190 applied and progressively analyzed. Under the context of CEA, an analysis of maritime
191 security could be done once a series of environmental or social components, which reflect the
192 concern of stakeholders, have been selected so as to capture a holistic picture of the
193 phenomena under evaluation. For example, when there is a need to prioritize actions towards
194 mitigating and managing regional maritime insecurity issues, weighting indicators of selected
195 components could serve as a first step to assess the relative effects of these potential actions
196 (Mitchell and Parkins 2011). In this case one could ask how climate change might alter well-
197 functioning governance (i.e. social component) by considering and weighting a set of
198 alternative indicators (e.g. quality of the civil service, cultural support, control of corruption);
199 similarly, expansion of criminal activities could be reflected by a set of economic and social
200 indicators (e.g. altered conditions of the business environment, increased access to some
201 technologies, etc.).

202
203 Often, quantitative evidence to support a direct link between climate change and the extent of
204 a security issue (e.g. initiation of violent conflict) are not available (Baldwin, 2014; Barnett

205 2003; Barnett and Adger 2007). An additional principle that is often adopted by marine CEAs
206 towards informing conservation and management planning is the validation of applied impact
207 scores, which can even operate under a lack of information on links and dependencies
208 between different drivers, components or actors. For example, the objective of a regional
209 study might be to inform decision-makers and generate a spatially explicit risk assessment on
210 activities against mariners and shipping by considering multiple stressors including climate
211 change. In this case, uncertainty analyses could be run in order to generate sets of results
212 under alternative assumptions of the type of interactions and data inputs; similarly,
213 simulation-based sensitivity analyses could determine the relative importance of each stressor,
214 including climate change, upon overall assessment (Stock and Micheli 2016). Uncertainty and
215 sensitivity analyses would allow delineating which are the most critical stressors (e.g. food
216 scarcity) and how they could be accelerated by the secondary impacts of climate change (e.g.
217 pressure upon population health). At the same time, they could exemplify the information
218 gaps and bridge them to generate a spatially explicit assessment output.

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220 Once CEA has allowed better grasping the way climate change and maritime criminality
221 variables interact, then multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) frameworks represent
222 reasonable variety of approaches to assess the interactions of physical, biological and human
223 systems, and address the consequences of actions and decisions upon policies and planning
224 (Huang et al. 2011; McGranahan et al. 2007; McMichael et al. 2012). Similar to the case of
225 maritime security issues, the intensity and reciprocity of the interactions inherent to decisions
226 on many environmental and energy issues are not always straightforward and thus subroutines
227 must be developed to account for the uncertainty of the inputs and the variation in sensitivity
228 of the outputs. For example, in order to tackle maritime crime at a national scale, key
229 vulnerable groups should be identified and the basis for cooperation (e.g. though financial
230 support, small-scale infrastructure) could be recognized.

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232 The same concerns apply to climate change, which, considered as a major driver of change
233 and/or as a source of uncertainty in decision-making, is incorporated into multi-criteria,
234 integrative assessments aiming to guide effective management (Bell et al. 2003; Pinsky et al.
235 2013). Decision-makers operating in the field of maritime security and risk mitigation could
236 benefit from MCDM tools towards setting an action plan while accounting for social and
237 behavioral patterns, legislation, governance and risk factors, irreversible impacts, as well as
238 prevention and adaptation costs. For instance, decisions based on series of available options

239 could be informed by the need to maximize the adequacy of international financial
240 investments to support safety, health and economic development of communities that are
241 considered at risk from the point of view of the interaction between climate change and
242 maritime security. Similarly, under conditions of severe maritime crime, a prioritization
243 should be made on whether irreversible impacts for the community would be driven by the
244 exposure to extreme weather events or any other factors such as illegal fishing.

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247 **4. Building consensus and capacity**

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249 The outputs of any risk assessment and thus of any decision-making processes should be
250 accompanied by a detailed description of the methodological choices and their potential
251 limitations (Judd et al. 2015). Tools based upon the concept of CEA could offer the means to
252 spatially define risk *hotspots* in respect to selected and predictable indicators that are relevant
253 to policy level developments. On the other hand, MCDM contributes to a better management
254 of the risks by improving decision-making. The two tools could further complement each
255 other, as CEAs could generate spatially explicit assessments recognizing critical locations or
256 components for intervention (e.g. spotting communities that are under higher pressure due to
257 criminality) while MCDM could build upon such background to devise optimal decisions on
258 actions over a set of alternatives.

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260 To further add clarity, the improvement of data quality, the application of standardized
261 monitoring schemes and the careful interpretation of the outputs are critical steps for the
262 success of any assessment. Apart from enhancing parameterization of uncertainty-
263 management tools, the identification of simple pathways over complex networks of
264 interacting drivers (e.g. human activities, societal attitudes) could help to translate outputs
265 into prioritization of governance initiatives and policies (Martínez et al. 2007). Often, a first
266 step to standardize assessment processes is to achieve a consensus on the terminology
267 commonly employed to describe components, indicators and impacts (Judd et al. 2015;
268 Stelzenmüller et al. 2018).

269

270 The mitigation of the effects of climate change on natural and human marine systems requires
271 interactive decision-making and management processes, grouping various state and non-state
272 stakeholders and spanning across multiple dimensions and scales. Therefore, making the

273 outputs of the maritime security assessment tools useful for governance requires a science-
274 policy dialogue towards co-designing questions, inputs and indicators. Once the alignment
275 between available scientific information and policy-makers' needs is achieved, regulations,
276 policies, strategies and commitments need to be formed.

277

278 Acknowledging the uncertainty inherent to any decision-making process, centers for
279 integrated research where background information, existing tools and datasets could be
280 synthesized, can provide answers and technical solutions. We urge scholars, research
281 institutions and think tanks to start building the foundations for such integrated centers of
282 excellence as the only way to offer ground solutions for an increasingly challenging issue.

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
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384 **Figure 1:** The multidirectional dependencies between climate change and maritime security
 385 proceed from the complex interplay between the effects of climate change on natural and
 386 human systems and actors' responses to impacts. In turn, these responses, including criminal
 387 behaviors, feed the loop back, since actors are both objects and agents of impacts. Cumulative
 388 Effect Assessments (CEA) and Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM) could be adopted to
 389 better inform actors and gradually drive mitigation, adaptation and management planning.

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