EXPLANING THE DYNAMICS OF ISLAM AND CONFLICT:
THE CASE OF NORTHERN NIGERIA

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I declare that the work presented in this thesis is the author's own and has not been previously

submitted for the award of a higher degree at any university

Signed..........................

Abstract

Nigeria has a complex ethno-religious profile. Thanks to the British colonial administration, a myriad of individual groups professing various faiths and belonging to different ethnicities have found themselves in a tense, unsettled and competitive political system. Unsurprisingly, there have been several attempts to undermine the profile of the state. In spite of these consistent challenges, what is striking, however, is that the Nigerian state has not disintegrated. What explains the persistence of the Nigerian state on the face of these assaults?

Traditionally, critics have suggested that the federal structure in Nigeria is responsible for deflating some of the attacks against the state. I, however, propose that the success of the Nigerian state is not only due to the prevalence of a federal structure of governance but also due to the inclusive identity provided by religion. In particular, I explore the role of Islam in an ethnically charged context such as northern Nigeria.

While making a cross-regional study of conflict behaviour spanning over the past 60 years in northern Nigeria, I underscore that while primordial identities are key factors responsible for violent upsurge, in those areas where people are bound together by Islam the conflict is less likely to occur. Furthermore, this study showcases that Islam in northern Nigeria acts as a double edged sword as it unites and divides in equal measures.

From this particular standpoint, this thesis explains and evaluates the symbiotic relationship between Islam and conflict-prevention. This study argues that the variant of Islam in northern Nigeria is unique as it has become a source for communal unity rather than a source for conflict amongst Muslims in northern Nigeria. In particular, it analyses the conflict behaviour of Muslims and their pursuance of the concept of religious nationalism within a deeply divided and (dis-)united society. This thesis attempts to explore the position of Islam in the conflict dynamics in northern Nigeria.

The backbone of this thesis is derived mainly from primary sources through extensive field work, sample questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, participant observation,

focus group discussions (FGDs) and interaction with the actual actors in the research arena.

Dedicated to my wife

Folake

For her love, forbearance and understanding

And to our Children

'Tara & 'Tola

Hoping that their tomorrow will

Be bright and filled with

Success

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Most of all, I want to thank my wife Folake for her love, support, forbearance and companionship. And of course, my little angels, Tara & Tola, who patiently waited for me to finish this project.

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Acronyms

AD	Alliance for Democracy
AG	Action Group
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
ATR	African Traditional Religion
CA	Constituent Assembly
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COCIN	Church of Christ in Nigeria
EPZ	Export Promotion Zone
ERD	Extensive Research Design
FCS	Federation of Christian Students
FGD	Focus Group Discussion(s)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRA	Government Reserved Area
HDI	Human Development Index
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
ICR	Interactive Conflict Resolution
IRD	Intensive Research Design
JDA	Jasawa Development Association
JNI	Jama'atu Nasr Islam
JUTH	Jos University Teaching Hospital
KSNIPAN	Kaduna State Network of Indigenous Pastors
LICUS	Low-Income Country Under Stress
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MACBAN	Miyetti Allah Cattle Association of Nigeria
MSS	Muslim Students Society
NAOWA	Army Officer's Wives Association
NAPEP	National Poverty Eradication Programme
NCNC	National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NEPU	Northern Elements Progressive Union
NDA	Nigerian Defense Academy
NTREC	Nigeria Inter-Religious Council
IDJP	Institute for Development, Justice and Peace
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRA	National Resistance Army
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NML	Non-Muslim League of Northern Nigeria
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NPF	Northern Progressive Front
NRC	National Republican Convention
NSO	Nigerian Security Organization
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PRP	Peoples Redemption Party
PLASIEC	Plateau State Independent Election Commission
PYC	Plateau Youth Council
PYF	Plateau Youth Forum
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program

SDP	Social Democratic Party
SNP	Scottish National Party
SSS	State Security Service
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria, Africa's largest state in terms of population (about 140 million people), has had an uneasy nation-building process ever since its independence in 1960. Shortly after its independence it encountered a bloody civil war that led to thousands of civilian deaths and a yet-to-heal division in the federal structure. Amongst its uneasy national process, the state has witnessed the collapse of 3 republics, 6 military coups and a tense political system.

Nigeria consists of diverse ethnic groups, cultures and religious affiliations with multi-dimensional interests. However, the main ethnic groups in the state are the Igbo, the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba. It is important to stress that in Nigeria, ethnic and religious division provides some sort of geographical convergence. The Hausa-Fulani in the north are primarily Muslims; the Igbos in the south are generally Christians; and the Yoruba in the west are divided into both Muslims and Christians.

Most multi-national states in the non-western context are political inventions (Anderson, 1991). Given this political inheritance, many states such as Nigeria have fallen prey to forms of violence originating in sectarian, religious, regional, cultural and economic differences. In terms of violence, religious division appears to be the foremost and greatest cause of conflict in Nigeria.

Map of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Its Major Cities

Map 0.1

Source: http://www.sphereinfo.com/map/nigeria

The Problem-Religious Conflicts

The distinctiveness and the uniqueness of religious conflict is that it has no formal beginning and no formal or ceremonial ending. There is no declaration of war nor is there any treaty of peace (Faris, 1935:208). This makes the study of religious conflicts exigent and problematic.[1] From 1945 to 1960 ethnic and religious conflicts constituted more than half of the world's civil wars. From 1960 to 1990, this increased to three quarters and has further accelerated since the end of the Cold War (Appleby, 2000).

Perhaps a fundamental observation is that, with the dawn of modernity, it was envisaged that religious conflicts would wither away. However, the impact of modernity has failed to curtail this quagmire. Conceivably, with this in mind, Eagleton

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[1] For instance, the age long conflict in Northern Ireland between 1974 until 1994, there were seven attempts to reach a political and constitutional settlement. All foundered in the face of local opposition. See Barnes, (2005).

(2005:11) perceives that: "If civilization and barbarism are near neighbours as well as sworn antagonists, it is partly because the evolution of humanity brings with it more sophisticated techniques of savagery." What this suggests is that the ushering in of modernity has brought an increased amount of religious warfare and conflict in the world (see table below). The intensification of conflict, predominantly religious in nature, is evidently prevalent in northern Nigeria. This has clearly hampered Nigeria's prospects for nation-building.

Table 0.1: Religious Warfare & Conflict in the World

Century	Number of Wars	Deaths (millions)
Sixteenth	66	1.6
Seventeenth	36	6.1
Eighteenth	55	7.0
Nineteenth	211	19.4
Twentieth	227	107.8

Source: Sivard (1991:20)

Perhaps even more fundamental, theories on conflicts are usually confusing and all together complex. Traditionally, conflicts have generally been explained on one or a mélange of political theories such as: clashes of political ideologies; communism and capitalism, on the struggle between class systems; the bourgeois and the proletariat, identity conflicts; ethnic groups competing for dominance and amongst others economic conflicts, such as the competition for economic resources and petrol dollars. However, it seems that modern theoretical and political explanations have avoided religions conflicts.

However, beyond the scope of the aforementioned problems associated with understanding religious conflicts, there is a limited knowledge of the peace dynamics of religion within multi-cultural societies. This, then, is my theory: That from the foregoing, religion has conflict-generating potential (Gurr, 1993; Smith, 1991; Huntington, 1996; Juergensmeyer 1993). However, in those societies that are divided along ethnic lines, religion may act as a social-bonding and conflict-reduction mechanism. In particular, I examine the role of Islam in an ethnically charged society such as northern Nigeria and show this to be the case.

Advent of Islam in Nigeria

Mazrui (1985: 819) correctly notes that: "religious explosions in Nigeria tend to be located in the North among the Hausa and their neighbours, rather than in the South among the Yoruba." Thus, there is no doubt, therefore, that politics in the north are walking on a 'delicate tightrope' between secularism and religion (Miles, 1989: 326). The point to bear in mind, is that a non-western state, such as Nigeria, is a secular state constitutionally, but this ideology is rejected due to divisions in religious identities and the primordial attachment to religion by the individuals, especially Muslims from northern Nigeria. It will readily be seen that Nigeria is divided along religious lines by 50% Muslim, 40% Christian and 10% animist of African Traditional Religion (ATR). These divisions have made it seemingly difficulty to find a balance between religious identities.

Nigeria is arguably the most populous Islamic state in Africa. It has more Muslims than any Arab state (Ahmed, 2007:107). Beyond its demographic prominence, the nation's abundance in oil and gas reserves makes her a player of strategic importance

in global political institutions. Since it gained independence from British colonial rule, Nigeria has experienced monumental social, economic and political problems that have made the dreams of the nation's founding fathers, and the hopes pinned on the nation by black people globally, unrealizable. It is no exaggeration that Nigeria represents a typical example of a troubled state.

The first record of Islam in Nigeria was in the Bornu region (the oldest Islamic community in Nigeria), situated in northern Nigeria in 1096 before the arrival of the colonialists. The spread here was attributed to the mass trading and commercial activities during the reign of Mai Idris Alooma (1570-1603), the king of the Kanem-Bornu Empire. Islam became more widespread amongst the natives due to Alooma's political reforms, based on Islamic traditions and the introduction of Sharia. Islam emerged into main Hausa land during the reign of Ali Yaji (1349-1385), ruler of the Kano Empire. It became institutionalized in 1500. However, it was not generally accepted by the Hausa people during this period. Islam was introduced to Yoruba land by commercial activities during the reign of Mansa Musa (1312-1337) of the Mali Empire. Islam was introduced in Igbo land in the 1930s, notably in Nsukka.

Islam in northern Nigeria is characterized mainly by the Sunni (orthodox Islam) tradition of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. Sunnis are also referred to as Ahl ul-Sunna wa-l-Jama'ah, which is the largest sect in Nigeria. The other Islamic sect, the Shi'a,[2] adhere to what they consider to be the teachings of the Muhammad and the

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[2] The Shi'ite, (Yan Shia) otherwise known as the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), was founded by Mu'allim Ibrahim Al-Zakzaky, an Islamic fascist. Al-Zakzaky started his radical ideologies whilst a student at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. He was a leader of the radical Muslim Students Society (MSS). It is through the MSS that the Islamic ideologies of Al-Zakzaky become prominent among Muslim students in the Northern universities of Bayero University in Kano, the Uthman dan Fodio University, Sokoto and Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. Al-Zakzaky acquired his Islamic sectarian and religious motivation from the Iranian revolution of 1979 and from the Mujahidin

religious guidance of his family, whom they refer to as the Ahlul Bayt (people of the House of the Prophet). Nigeria has a small Shi'a population in the north of the country. Shi'a gained popularity in Nigeria in the 1970s after the Iranian revolution. The main difference between the Shi'a Muslim and the Sunni Muslim is that to the former, leadership (Imam) is vested in the direct descendant of Muhammad, whilst to the latter leadership is vested in the elected selector of the prophet Muhammad, thus Imam verses Caliphate (Esposito, 1998:21).

The advent of Islam to northern Nigeria, mainly in the Hausa Kingdoms, was initiated by Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio, a celebrated Fulani Islamic teacher and established 'Sufi.' Fodio instigated the Jihad in his hometown of Gobir, located in the northwestern part of Nigeria. In 1804 Shaikh Uthman, a Sunni Muslim, launched a successful holy crusade in present-day northern Nigeria. Fodio's justification for the war was the vast charges of oppression and corrupt practices levied against the people by the Habe (Hausa rulers) (Markovitz, 1977:44). Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio, in his manifesto known as the 'Wathiqat ahl al-Sudan wan an sha' Allah min al-ikhwan' (a letter to the people of Sudan and who so ever Allah wished among the brothers), incited a Jihad on the grounds that it is justifiable for a Muslim to take over the reins of power from a government that practices an adulterated form of Islam – even by a Muslim.

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resistance in Afghanistan. An act of notoriety committed by the sect was in December 1994, when the 'Shiites' beheaded an Igbo Christian trader named Gideon Akaluka[2] for desecrating a page from the Holy Qur'an. The Shi'ites broke into prison to carry out this horrific act. Gideon Akaluka had been detained for his safety and for the prevention of another round of religious conflict in the state. Gideon Akaluka's severed head was carried around on a spike through the streets with the jubilant Shi'ite crowd chanting religious songs. Although the culprits were never brought to justice, extra-judicial killings of the suspected culprits were carried out by the Kano state government. Although no conflict occurred, this incident created religious tensions in Kano.

Muslims in Nigeria and West Africa embrace Middle Eastern types of Islamic education associated with Sufism. The Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya Islamic sects are the only important Sufi brotherhoods in Nigeria (Loimeier, 1997:19). The Sokoto Caliphate, due to the influence of Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio, was responsible for the rise of Sufism in the region. The Qadiriyya brotherhood, which had its spiritual origins in Iraq and spread into northern Nigeria through the Wangarawa group from Mali. The Tijaniyya brotherhood, founded by Sheikh Ahmad Tijani in the eighteenth century (originated in North Africa), has a large followership in Kano. The Tijaniyya brotherhood had a radical character as it was more accessible to membership by the common masses.

Why Northern Nigeria?

Nigeria is an enormous country. Northern Nigeria is particularly vast in landmass and demographic constitution with geopolitical importance. It has a large grouping of ethnic and religious groups with an overlapping history than other parts of Nigeria and Africa. Interestingly, it has over 50% of Nigeria's population. Northern Nigeria is also famously known as "the Giant in the Sun" and as "an awaking Giant" due to its multi-cultural diversity and multi-cultural identities, a diversity of individual identity groups, human resources and vast potential (Farrington, 1963). There are about 250 distinct ethno-linguistic groups in northern Nigeria (Whitaker, 1970:17). As a result of the plurality of ethnic and religious groups, Islam is seen as being conflictive with other cultures. In the core northern states, Muslim identity groups are dominant whilst the lower part of the north, the Middle Belt, has a majority of non-Muslim identity groups.

The link between Islam and politics and the effects of the colonial indirect rule make this study conducive to seek the relevance of Islam and identity groups within a pluralistic society. The foregoing factors and funding imposed serious limitations on obtaining representative sample for the research. In order to overcome these problems three major locations known for their histories of religious conflicts and have a high-density of diverse ethnic populations: Kano, Kaduna, and Jos were selected for this study.

Consequently in the last three decades of Nigeria's national life, the harvest of religious conflicts has become a constant decimal in the northern parts of the country.[3] Given the pervasiveness and recurrence of these religious conflicts in this region, life in the area can be likened to the Hobbesian state where life is nasty, brutish and short. The complexity of these conflicts in parts of northern Nigeria, such as Kano, Kaduna and Jos, which, as a result of their cosmopolitan nature, were hitherto considered to be havens of peace and tranquility, have been violated severally by the volcano of religious conflicts.

Often times there were reprisal attacks on northerners in other parts of Nigeria following the incorrigible carnage and death of people from other parts of the country by their kin. These conflicts have a serious multiplier effect throughout Nigeria creating a state that is usually at war with itself. The most disturbing outcome of this, aside from loss of life and property, are that people are displaced from their homes,

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[3] In northern Nigeria, there are intra religious conflicts as well as inter-religious conflicts. However, inter-religious conflicts are more reoccurring than intra-religious conflicts. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between conflicts that arise exclusively on inter or intra religious grounds; otherwise it will be difficult to determine the causality of the conflict. In Nigeria, religion exists independently from ethnicity. A conflict that arises out of ethnic grounds is not a religious conflict per se, but it must be noted that intense religious conflict is interwoven with ethnicity because there is a convergence of both ethnicity and religion in Nigeria.

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students are absent from schools and the wheel of commercial activities are usually grounded to a halt.

Drawing from the work of Weber (1947), all societies are built on a religious foundation. This study intends to illustrate that northern Nigeria is built upon an Islamic foundation. However, the endemic spates of religious conflicts are dividing the north and weakening its Muslim and non-Muslim partnership. To add to a cautious cautionary note, these endemic religious conflicts have become serious problems for social, political and economic harmonization. Given the serious vast implications of social harmony, economic development, political stability and the international standing of Nigeria in the comity of states, the records of religious conflicts in northern Nigeria commend it as a serious concern for a study as this.

Ethnic & Religious Composition of Northern Nigeria

The Muslim faith is largely practiced in the northern region of Nigeria in 16 states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gombe, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Jigawa, Nassarawa, Niger, Sokoto, Zamfara and Yobe. Three states, Benue, Plateau and Taraba, have a Muslim minority. Other non-Muslims are found on the boundaries between the major Islamic emirates of Sokoto and Katsina, Katsina and Kano, Kano and Zaria. Furthermore, Kano, Kastina and Sokoto are historically centers of Islamic education and missionary activities.

Map 0.2

MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS, LANGUAGES & RELIGION

Key

Ethnic Groups		Religions	
Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri	40,600,000	Christianity	●
Yoruba	29,400,000		
Igbo	25,200,000	Islam	☆
Ijaw	14,000,000		
Ibibio	4,000,000		
Tiv	3,500,000		
Others	22,400,000		

Sources. *Atlas of Nigeria,*
LES ÉDITIONS J.A.

It is important to note that commercial activities and the existence of profitable opportunities in agriculture and trade, including the railway system and the establishment of federal institutions across the north, especially during the military rule that favours the north above other parts of the country, led to the increased influx of other ethnic groups from other parts of Nigeria in to the north. However, the separate settlements of the immigrants in Sabon Gari quarters (strange quarters)[4] across the North were by no means a sufficient protection for the clash of identities between the indigenous Muslim population and the immigrant populations, especially those that belong to non-Islamic faiths.

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[4] Similarly, in southern Nigeria Muslims from the north mainly reside in designated areas known as Sabo. These areas are carved out by Northern Muslims to create a distinctive socio-political and religious identity. These residential and commercial areas are used as a distinguishing mark of identity between Northern Muslims and other religious groups. The head of such quarters is known as the Sarkin Hausawa.

Aims and Objectives

The core of this thesis is to enquire into the following: Firstly, to analyze the capacity and function of Islam as a basis of an overarching solidarity and unity amongst different ethnic groups professing Islam in northern Nigeria. Secondly, to examine the role of Islamic identity as a credible factor for engendering unity amongst Muslims of different ethnic groups in northern Nigeria. Thirdly, to determine the potential of Islam as a mechanism for political mobilization in the northern parts of Nigeria. Fourthly, to determine if most conflicts that arise in northern Nigeria involve individuals who belong to a non-Islamic faith. And lastly, to explicate how religious tolerance and peaceful co-existence amongst the different religious and ethnic components of northern Nigeria can be engendered among its people.

Research Questions

Given the above aims and objectives, the research questions that will be examined in this thesis are: Under what conditions are ethnic/tribal/regional identities subsumed under the banner of a common religion? Secondly, is Islam a credible factor for engendering unity between Muslims of different ethnic origins in northern Nigeria? Thirdly, why and how is Islam deployed as a mechanism for political mobilization in the northern parts of Nigeria? Fourthly, in northern Nigeria do most conflicts arise when an individual belongs to a non-Islamic faith? Finally, how can harmonious and peaceful existence between different Nigerian nationals of different faiths be engendered in northern Nigeria?

Research Hypothesis/Propositions

Underlying the thesis aims, its objectives and the research questions, it is in order, therefore to raise the following research propositions:-

1. Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, it acts as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises.

2. Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in northern Nigeria.

3. In those instances, where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe.

4. Religion when used for ethnic and political manipulations tends to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria.

5. The more politicized Islam is the greater the tendency it has to feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for personal and group interests.

Research Constraints

Before delving into research constraints, it is necessary to explore` what motivated the researcher to embark on this study. The motivation for this study is two-fold. Firstly, I am concerned about the plight of religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. This enquiry started when I coordinated a National Seminar entitled 'Programme for a Peaceful Nigeria: Making Ethnicity and Interfaith Harmony Work', which took place in Abuja, Nigeria from the 27th – 29th October 2004.[5] The Seminar revealed gaps in the

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[5] A Seminar organised by the African Centre for Contemporary Studies (ACCS). See
http://www.accs.org.uk/past.html. I have my educational in Law. I was called to the Nigerian bar as an advocate

knowledge about conflict in northern Nigeria, which had not been researched into by academics. The crucial dormant factor was the tendency for Islam in northern Nigeria to act as a social glue to different cultural groups.

Secondly, I am desirous of acquiring a better understanding of conflicts within the region, as a prerequisite for seeking conflict resolutions. Perhaps, this can only be achieved by critically observing inter-religious, inter-ethnic relations and conflict in northern Nigeria to establish 'truths'.

The use of two methodologies to establish 'truths' was indeed a daunting challenge, as it required greater effort and time consuming experience. However, this knowledge gained by the researcher at qualitative and quantitative course modules at Lancaster University proved to be advantageous. Limitations encountered in this study were mainly centered on communication problems and the fear of persecution. However, the use of an interpreter assisted in resolving the former problem to a large extent, but the latter problem was a recurring decimal all through the field research with people refusing to volunteer opinions despite repeated assurances of confidentiality. There were situations in which the research team faced actual danger to their persons, in the sense of hostile reactions from individuals.

Another major constraint all through the research was that of paucity of funds to prosecute the research. The research was funded through the limited personal finances available to the researcher. With better funding, much more in-depth research on this all-important problem would have been done. That being said, this did not in any way

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& solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. After some years of practice, I founded a research organisation called the African Centre for Contemporary Studies.

affect the outcome of the research negatively. The only difference is that with more funding, more samples would have been obtained for the research and the possibilities of generalization of the result enhanced. Perhaps, another major limitation in this study was the lack of data from government parastatals.

It was a daunting task collating information from the field. There were all sorts of nuances either cautioning respondents or restraining them altogether. Depending on their levels of belief, the issue of discourse could be volatile and occasionally tempers flared. When this occurred, we (research assistants and myself) were susceptible to attack, either in defense of a northern political philosophy or in defense of the provisions of Islam.

I also observed that due to the cultural restriction placed on women, either as a result of domestic norms or Islamic interpretations, it was not easy to get women to express their views and a few who we were able to talk declined our invitation rather sharply. While on some occasions the Muslims or indigenes (males) could easily be approached to participate in the discourse, especially in Kano and Jos, the non-indigenes were careful not to be seen talking about the issues or heard. In a few instances they politely declined as if under some unforeseen warning. Only two non-Muslim women (Kaduna) were interviewed and this was achieved once they were reassured that we were researchers. However, they answered the questions in a distant and cautious manner. This is in contrast with the women who volunteered to answer the sample questionnaire. However, women were eager to fill out the sample questionnaire than to be interviewed on tape/participate in Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

It is necessary to mention that we were easily noticed as visitors by our clothing, which was largely European, and easily put people on guard as we went about seeking respondents. Once we were able to win one, it became easy to get the others.

The main challenge on the field was organizing the FGDs. I had to approach an agency to assist in interviewing and selecting participants for the discussion. These tasks proved too difficult as individuals were sensitive about religious issues because these locations (Kano, Kaduna, & Jos) were hot beds for religious conflicts. Because of this, I had to organize the FGDs when we arrived at these locations.

It took a few attempts to organize a FGD in Kano. Earlier on, I had met with some Muslims and non-Muslims in Sabon Gari in Kano to convene in an open space. A local non-Muslim religious leader offered his place of worship to us; however, the Muslims we approached refused to meet in this venue. The Muslims also refused to meet in our make-shift hotel in Sabon Gari, given the fact that alcoholic beverages were sold there. It took us one week to convene for discussion. On the appointed day, the participants gathered at the appointed venue – a derelict building, which I gathered was destroyed in one of the riots. We requested all participants to introduce themselves. After these somewhat solemn formalities, a non-Muslim chanted: 'Praise the Lord.' As soon this was recited, the Muslims left immediately. It took a week to organize another discussion. This time I approached and interviewed individuals randomly. I collated contact details of those who agreed to participate and streamlined potential participants, on grounds of a libertine, objective and

unbiased outlook towards religious conflicts. Eventually, 10 proactive participants and two women were readily available.

Jos in Plateau State was under curfew as a result of the November 28, 2008 religious riot. (See the table & narrative in Chapter 5). Due to this tense atmosphere, people were not willing to express their views to us and we were treated with suspicion. Some people thought we were agents of the state. This state of mind is evident in the first FGD, where participants were not willing to discuss openly among each other. The discussion was centered amongst three members out of a group of 12 (one woman and two men). In such a situation, adequate data may not be forthcoming. In addition, the proactive participants were likely to sway the course of the study to suit their own reasoning and sentiments. I observed that in such a state, it was best to formally discontinue the discussion. With the kind assistance of a local NGO, I was able to gather 12 participants for the second FGD. This group was proactive and fostered open conversation and explored arguments amongst the participants.

As we explored the neighborhoods in Jos conducting interviews with people willing to converse with us, we (research assistants and myself) were accosted and arrested by the State Security Service (SSS). The SSS was desirous of establishing our intention for conducting these interviews. We were scrutinized and after explaining our purpose and providing adequate identification we were released.

By this point, I had learned a few lessons in organizing FGDs. In Kaduna, under the auspices of local NGOs, a FGD was organized consisting of 13 participants, including one woman who was very observant but did not contribute in the discussion. The FGD

was quite stimulating as it unearthed many unforeseen factors. It also reflected the diversity of not only Kaduna State but also of different ethnic groups residing in Kaduna. Overall, the FGD provided an 'overheard every day talk' that was essential for validating the research.

Basic Theoretical Parameters: Group Theory, Invented Tradition, Grievance & Primordialism

To understand the significance of the problem and analyses of this study, I need to anchor my study on group theory, invented tradition, grievance and primordialism. These theories that I have highlighted are crucial in terms of understanding inter-group conflict in northern Nigeria.

Group Theory

This thesis examines group behaviour within a civilization. It studies the causal links between northern Nigerian Muslims and conflict behaviour. The group theory explicates the dynamics of human relations in society. It argues that given the gregarious nature of man, his actions are better understood in the context of the group relations in which people are involved.

According to this perspective, what underscores every society is the organic interest that binds people together in groups and conditions the pressures, stress and dynamism of social life. Individuals within the group consider themselves as having a 'we' awareness of belonging (Smith, 1979:1). Society is a pluralist social configuration oriented towards the achievement of diverse interests. According to Macridis (1964:139), it is the organic interests amongst group membership that act as

the binding element of group relationship and thus provides the power of a group as a deterministic social construct either for good or evil. Clearly, an individual must be accepted in a social group before he is deemed a member. Notably, acceptance which may be an imagined consciousness is about sharing in a common identity, such as ethnicity or religion. Thus, striking questions which this study addresses is how is a group constituted for mobilization? How does an individual choose a group identity? Does group accord identity to individuals or otherwise?

One may safely suggest that religion as the primordial identity of an individual is formed by the construction of his/her group's identity. This being so, it may be clear that in northern Nigeria, that Islamic identity is shared symbolically, but aggregates differences when individuals are not part of the community of Islam. This acceptance of common interests and identity provides the sentiments of a 'we-group.' Inherent in the explication of the different group interests is the desire of groups to gain advantage over others and to institute their group hegemony in state affairs through the domination of political structures. This is often met with resistance and counter-resistant which usually engenders conflicts.

Bentley (1908) laid the intellectual foundation for the group theory. Rather than a collection of individuals, Bentley asserted that a group is a mass of activity (Varma, 2001:163). Thus, all groups must have an interest. He also affirmed, that "when the group is adequately stated, everything is stated. When I say everything I mean everything" (Bentley, 1908:209). Contrary to Bentley's obsession with procedures in his conceptualization of groups, Truman (1951:37) notes that "an interest group is a share-attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in society. If and

when it makes its claims through or upon any of the institutions of government, it becomes a political interests group." This conceptualizes groups to include those stable social groups, which do not necessarily have continuing policy goals, but can suddenly intervene in policy process (Greenstone, 1975:265).

It is worth stressing at this point that a major critique of the group theory is its loose definition of groups, implying that the theory may not be a rigorous theory for social analysis. Group theory admits the possibilities of multiple group membership but it fails to inform us of the contextual implications of this criss-crossing group membership on the dynamics of social relations. A major shortcoming of the theory is its dissolution of individuals in the acidic current of group relations. This denies the reality that each member of a group is first and foremost a private individual and can exercise the freedom to exist in any group whenever they deemed fit to do so.

In spite of the above limitations, one might argue that an individual's sociological make-up favours group existence. The importance of groups could be understood as the foundation of the formation of the personality and opinions of people. Thus, an individual removed from its group relations would be ill-at-ease and less efficacious. Within the context of my research questions and the political dynamics of northern Nigeria, the failure to engender Nigerian nationalist sentiments in the citizens has made group associations such as ethnic associations and religious loyalties the primary defining elements of social existence and, consequently, the root of ethnic, religious and political violence. To adequately understand the dynamics of groups in Nigeria, social formations is a veritable tool for the analysis and explication of the

problems of nationhood, ethnic and religious conflicts and the desire to promote social harmony, peaceful co-existence and national development.

Invented Tradition

To guide the research study, I draw on the concept of 'invented tradition' to explain and determine the link between Nigeria's historical trajectories of nationhood and the emergence of a tense and competitive political system. More important still, the invented tradition seeks to elucidate the dynamics of the formation of nationalism in non-western states. Hobsbawm (1983), persuasively and significantly shows that nationalism is based on invented traditions that are either forced by the intellectuals or developed within the ambits of social construction. Hobsbawm strongly affirms that 'national cultures', especially in non-western states, are recent inventions by the elites. Hobsbawm argues that invented tradition is a set of practices normally governed by clearly accepted rules and of a custom or representative nature, which connects with continuity with the past.

Notwithstanding the above definition, the analytical significance of invented tradition theory within this study is based on Anderson's (1991) arguments in his acclaimed book 'Imagined Communities.' Nations, according to Anderson, are 'imagined communities.' Anderson's theory, based on a modernist perception, suggests that the nation is a recent creation and, therefore, is a political invention constructed by print technologies with the emergence of modernity. To Anderson, nationalism invents nations where they have not previously existed. He further points out that people within a nation did not accede to be part of the nation, but only found themselves within the nation as a result of a metamorphosis of historical and political trajectories.

The historic and political trajectories, in most cases, lie within the colonial invention of nations.

In the context of this thesis, Anderson's concept of nationhood may be suitable as an approach for explaining Nigeria's history of nationhood and the formation of new political identities. The image of a united northern Nigeria may be explained as political project rather than an act of history. It could be argued that colonialism was a strong factor that formed Islamic identity in northern Nigeria by the system of indirect rule in the region. These formations by the colonialists created a flaccid coalition of communities and ethnic groups, which had little or nothing in common, with a hopeful reverie of creating nationhood. Perhaps, this is largely why there is a conceived perception of people viewing one another as belonging to a larger family and viewing outsiders as separate and distinct from perceived historical affiliations. This political invention offers a satisfactory rationalization of the problems associated with pre-colonial institutionalism, the myriad of individual groups, deep divisions among the people, people of multiple identities professing various faiths and individuals belonging to different ethnic groups.

In examining the origin of Nigeria, its historical trajectories cannot be overlooked due to its formative history. Nigeria's well-defined geographical framework, in regards to the inherited and invented traditions of the colonialists, poses several problems. These problems are connected to the plethora of communities that have differentiating culture and national identities, which were fused as a result of Nigeria's colonial past. A feature of Anderson's study relevant to this thesis is that communities in the 'geographical expression' of Nigeria were fabricated into a nation. The creation of the

nation-state Nigeria was part of the invention of the British colonialists who wanted to create a family of nations in the modern world. Notably, the artificial partitioning of land and merging of different communities, all with different cultures, gave rise to 'Nigeria', a geo-political label that was suggested by Dame Flora Louisa Shaw.[6] Hence, it could be argued that individuals are capable of imagining themselves as part of wider national group (Anderson, 1991).

It is trite to reiterate that the main political identities in Nigeria consist of the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba. These political identities were conceived under the notion that a balance of political power would be distributed amongst these groups. I will illustrate and argue that the Hausa-Fulani ethnie[7] has, over the years, attained a supra-political national identity in Nigeria through the channel of a religious identity (Islam), wherein its people imagine that they are an exclusive nation within the state.

What this amounts to is that there is a strong understanding that there exist imagined identities, such as northern Nigerian Muslims, whom are bound together as an identity group due to a common religious identity. The concept of identity is a complicated construction in northern Nigeria due to the fact that there are different ethnic groups within the region. My intention in this thesis is to illustrate that the construction of these differences is imagined or, in other words, a mental impression due to the fact that different people grew up in similar communities and partake in community activities together but are imagined differently due to an exclusive religious identity.

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[6] She became the wife of Lord Frederick Lugard (Nigeria's first Governor-General) in 1902, and suggested the name in *The Times* on the 8th of January 1897. However, the polity known as Nigeria came in existence into 1914 after the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern territories.

[7] This term habitually used by A.D. Smith, captures a broader meaning. Ethnies connote a wider structure of groups and extends into a wider context.

However, Anderson's definition of nations could be criticized for connoting that nations are not real. Assuming this, but not conceding that they are non-existent or are in a state of apparition, then, it may be argued that nations exist only in a state of utopianism and are mere illusory or are 'Alice in Wonderland' fairy tales. Anderson's socially constructed world may be seen as viewing nations not as they are but how we want nations to be seen. However, Anderson's theory of invented traditions remains a useful guide in understanding the trajectories of Nigeria's complex history and explaining how and why individuals and groups see the other as being different.

Grievance

This thesis provides evidence that most inter-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria are caused by collective grievance between groups. Gurr (1970) argues that increased expectations when equaled with increased frustrations, due to the failure in expectation realizations, are responsible for the instigation of social conflicts. The condition of rising expectation and rising frustration is directly related to relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is used to explain the social and psychological generative mechanisms that lead to political violence. Gurr's theory is relevant to this thesis because it attributes aggression to behaviourist constructions in conflict in northern Nigeria. In this sense, any grievance by perceived by a religious group in the region may lead to the use of religion by that group as a tool for conflict or for stoking ethnic hatred.

It is possible to speculate that a causal explanation of religious conflicts is due to perceptions of deprivation in terms of socio-economic, psychological needs and resource control. However, the study and understanding of grievance is based on

Gurr's (1970:13) definition of relative deprivation. Gurr defines relative deprivation as a "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities." In other words, relative deprivation is connected with the individual or a group to perceived social injustices such as racism or discrimination. It can be seen in a contrast of what an individual needs and what the individual gets. These perceived social inequalities and injustices are the causal links to individuals or groups experiencing relative deprivation. Therefore, it becomes easy to understand that "the frustration-aggression mechanism is in this sense analogous to the law of gravity: Men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in proportion to the intensity of their frustration" (Gurr, 1970: 37).

An important aspect of this thesis is that groups are predisposed to recognize that their group's identity is threatened by or suffers from deprivation of socio-economic conditions. Socio-economic conditions such as the dearth of basic needs, resource distribution, economic wealth, social well-being and education are connected to the realization of the suffering of an individual from the group. These sentiments of suffering lead to the sense of frustration amongst the group and may be the causal link to violent conflict. Perhaps, this theory is best suited to explain religious conflicts in northern Nigeria due to the dearth of socio-economic development in the region.

Gurr's seminal work is subject to limitations in analyzing the psychological dimension to conflicts. His work rests on a single foundation: Frustration-aggression. Some of the ambiguity stems from the tenuous methods in measuring psychological variables in the context of conflicts and others from the non-linear relationship between conflict and violence. One may argue that frustration is not always the causal link to violence.

Certainly, not all grievances lead to violence in order to engender a change in value capabilities and or value expectations (Gupta, 1990). One objection to the grievance theory in explaining the causal link of conflicts is the deterministic factors of financial potentials of instigating the conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). However, groups are very unlikely to admit economic factors or greed as the cause of conflict. Usually, groups attribute the causal link to sentiments of grievance (Collier, 2000:92). Notwithstanding its limitations, certainly Misra (2008:11) is precise when he suggests that it is a "useful framework to explain the dynamics of internal violence in some societies" and indeed, northern Nigeria is a worthy illustration.

Primordialism

Primordialism is based on a permanent and essential condition, a trait that lays emphasis on history for the reason that existing notions of ethnicity, culture, national identity and religious beliefs are constructed by past memories, myths and common cultural backgrounds in northern Nigeria. This implies that a common history is the foundation of a common identity.

Primordialism contends that nations are pre-modern ethnic identities. The emphasis on primordialism is a distinctive and definitive characteristic of establishing national identity in Nigeria, as perhaps in most non-western societies. This thesis argues that the concept of religion is primordial mainly in some non-western societies. Although, the primordial attachment to religion may be argued to be a sufficient causal explanation of religion's significant cultural marker to the individual, this may not be conclusive as one may wonder if the type of society plays a role in explaining religion's primordial identity to the individual.

More to the point, Haugaard (2006:351) boldly observes that primordialism is "the naturalness of nations by indefinite extension into past." Smith (1998:152) brings us closer to the viewpoint of primordialism by citing Clifford Geertz's persuasive definition of primordialism:

> Primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens'-or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'gives'-of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them 'givenness' that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices.

From the above excerpt, primordialism differentiates an individual and a group from the other just as nationality, language and race and, therefore, connects to the origins and history of an individual/group.

Before delving further, let me put forward Smith's (1991) approach. Smith (1991:40) suggests that a nation is "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common and common legal rights and duties for all members." This definition and approach is relevant to this study because it focuses on the construction of an identity on primordialism. Smith's (1991:14) examination is significant to this thesis because Smith lists primordial features of national identity as "a historic territory or homeland; common myths and historic memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties for all members; and a common economy with territorial mobility for members." Smith also recognizes clearly that "nations exist from time immemorial" (Smith, 1999:19). It is important to note that Smith (1991:6) states that religious identity is distinct from national identity and suggests that a religious identity

originates from 'communication and socialization' based on values, symbols, myths and traditions. In this sense, it is acceptable that "religion then may preserve a sense of common ethnicity as if in chrysalis" (Smith, 1991:35). In this study, I illustrate that the Hausa-Fulani ethnie and other ethnic groups professing Islam in northern Nigeria merged under a common religious identity due to 'communication and socialization' of Islam in the region.

Furthermore, Smith (1991:7) argues that the "twin circles of religious and ethnic identity have been very close, if not identical" and one may add that the construction of religion as a discursive link to the concept of a nation is pivotal in this study. In this sense, I underscore Smith's (1981:64) argument that religion may be a distinctive cultural characteristic and an attribute of a nation. I argue that national identity connects with a past and shared cultural values through a process of socialization. Clearly, this suggests that an individual has a sentiment of belonging and ties of kinship to an extended family or a group.

Furthermore, I succor to Smith's (1991:21) explicit and succinct definition of an ethnic group as a "a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories and that is recognized by one or more cultural difference like religion, customs, language or institutions." Smith divides ethnic groups into two: Ethnic categories and ethnic communities. Ethnic categories are a wider term for ethnic groups, as it signifies a 'separate cultural and historical grouping' (Smith, 1991:20-21) that possesses different national identities. An illustration of this group is the Yoruba ethnic group in Nigeria, which is also found in

the neighbouring state of the Republic of Benin. The two, however, do not share in a common national heritage.

Ethnic communities (ethnie), on the other hand, according to Smith, possess a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific homeland and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. This aptly describes the Hausa-Fulani. Thus, it may now be clear that religious identity and ethnicity are closely related as both identities are culturally determined, possess common characteristics and are building blocks for each other. Accordingly, it could be safely suggested that for Smith, religion is a significant building block for both national identities and ethnicity.

The conceptualization of primordialism is useful in understanding the construction of religion as the main identity marker of northern Nigerian Muslims as opposed to ethnicity. I argue that this identity describes the bond and overarching solidarity of northern Nigerian Muslims, which is based on historical trajectories. Although, it has been argued that primordial attachments will wither with modernity (Connor, 1994), in societies such as Nigeria, and mostly in non-western societies, primordial life styles and ideology form the basis of their national identity. The argument supporting primordialism in northern Nigeria is due to the fact that primordial attachment to ethnicity, the nation and religion preceded the formation of state organization (Smith, 1986:12). Moreover, I contend that for Muslims, in northern Nigeria, Islam acts as an identity and spiritual status of culture and values.

Critics of the primordialism theory assert that identities are socially constructed (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Anderson, 1991). Arguments against primordialism suggest that individuals are considered as the agents who socially construct identities (Fearon & Latin, 2000). It is argued by Fearon & Latin (2000) that identities are socially constructed by the way and manner individuals categorize/label other individuals. This categorization/label according to Fearon & Latin is the product of human action and communication.

In support of an ideal description of how society is viewed in the eyes of a social constructionist, perhaps the words of Schutz are a point of reference: "The vernacular of everyday life is primarily a language of named things and events, and any name includes typification and generalization referring to the relevance system prevailing in the linguistic in-group which found the named thing significant enough to provide a separate term for it" (Embree, 2009:133). This would infer that all structures in society cannot be defined by historical determinism. In this sense, society is determined by the way people see the world and not by deeds of the past. It is argued that the world cannot be observed entirely from social prisms as most societies are constructed by historical trajectories. Thus, social constructionism removes the adequacy of past memories in understanding society. It is in this light that Motyl (2010:63) notes that: "People may believe all sorts of things about their beliefs and behaviours, but there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that they are self-consciously engaging in "social construction."" But, the question remains against what categorizations/labels are identities considered? Why do some societies have a certain peculiar attribute? One cannot pretend that the social construction of an individual's

identity in some societies is culturally and historically determined. It is determined by how the individual makes sense of his/her past.

However, in spite of Smith's emphasis on primordial arguments, Smith is caught in two minds. Smith argues that nations are modern but their origins are prehistoric. Balancing the two concepts, the key to understanding Smith's arguments lies in what he considers as ethno-symbolism (Smith, 1998).

Having discussed the different theoretical frameworks that are relevant to this study, the theory that rigorously fits best in explaining the conflict dynamics in northern Nigeria is the primordialism theory. Islam in northern Nigeria has a strong connection to the past. The essence of historical and cultural determinism is strong factor that explains the identity of Muslims in northern Nigeria and illustrates the power of Islam in northern Nigeria. It may then have an overarching attribute by its power to collectively invoke people from different ethnic groups together under a similar cultural and identity marker.

Chapter Scheme

The need to facilitate a logical and clear argument in the spirit of fairness and integrity[8] is what informs the structure and depth of this thesis. Thus, the plan and argument of this thesis is structured on the following basis:

Chapter 1 provides a framework for explaining the primordial identity of religion in society. It explores why religion is a strong primordial identity in a non-western

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[8] The researcher is a non-Muslim.

society and to some extent in a western society. It also explores religion's link with the concepts of ethnicity, the nation, *ethno*-nationalism[9] and secularization. Furthermore, the chapter explores the concept of religious identity before narrowing down to northern Nigeria.

Chapter 2 is central to understanding conflicts generally. This chapter is a comprehensive review of the literature on conflicts. It overviews the literature where religion is a variable in explaining conflict and where ethnic conflicts are inextricably interwoven with religion. It also explores other significant theories on conflicts. The essence of this Chapter is to provide an understanding of clashes of identities. A crucial dimension to this chapter is that it explores political Islam in the global sense. It argues that different cultures are modeled and impacted in varying degrees by Islam.

Chapter 3 rationalizes on whether Islam is a positive and/or negative force in northern Nigeria. It closely examines how Islam has evolved and is exploited as a basis for political mobilization. It explores the politicization of Islam in northern Nigeria from the colonial era to the present time. It also examines the symbiotic relationship between religion and politics, whilst shedding light on the quest for Sharia in the region.

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[9] Ethno-nationalism means one and the same thing as nationalism. Nationalism has been used wrongly to refer to the state. I prefer to use this term which was formed by Walker Connor, (1994). The term *ethno*-nationalism is best suited as a term for nationalism as ethno (ethnic) is not "defined by their exoticism or marginality, but rather by characteristics (i.e. popular name, myth of shared ancestry, concept of homeland, ethno-history)..." See Eric Kaufmann & Oliver Zimmer, (2004: 65). In addition, ethno-nationalism is used as aptly put by Walker Connor in S.A. Giannakos, ed., (2002:24) "to make certain that that what is being referred to is not loyalty to the state but to the extended family."

Chapter 4 closely outlines the methodology used in collating data from the field. The main concern of the chapter is that it seeks to explain the qualitative and quantitative data used to explore and evaluate the research questions.

Chapter 5 is central to understanding conflicts in Nigeria in general and in northern Nigeria in particular. It highlights generally Nigeria's obstacles of nation-building before narrowing down more specifically the problem of religious division in northern Nigeria. The chapter also charts and analyses the major religious crises in northern Nigeria from 1945-2010.

Chapter 6 exclusively examines and analyses the field work. It informs the reader on the data derived from the qualitative strand of investigation used in this study.

Chapter 7 focuses on recommendations for peace and conflict resolutions which are drawn from the fieldwork. The chapter draws on policy issues for consideration at the central, state and local governments in Nigeria in order to bridge the divide on religious divisions.

By way of conclusion, the chapter draws a summary and links all the arguments presented in preceding chapters and makes a few remarks on the research questions and infers a few conclusions from the various chapters. Finally, it unearths the phenomenology of religious conflicts and re-evaluates religion in northern Nigeria.

CHAPTER 1

THEORIZING PRIMORDILALISM

WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF RELIGION

> Both state and religion are models of authority, imaginations of an ordering power, and understandings of how one should relate to those who control forces upon which one depends, but over which one does not exercise control.

Roger Friedland (2001: 127)[10]

1.1: Introduction

Most developing and non-western societies have a form of identity that can be described as primordial in contrast to the secular heterogeneous identity that marks the ideology and way of life in the western world. The primordial factors such as religion, race, nation, language and ethnicity in non-western societies are greatly associated with nationalistic orientation within developing and non-western societies. Why are these societies committed to forms of primordial lifestyles and ideology, as opposed to a secular or liberal view or lifestyle?

In this chapter, I explore that the basis of identity of northern Nigeria or a non-western society is based on primordial factors and that the various dimensions that constitute and form the basis of northern Nigeria's overall identity are based on several

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[10] Friedland. Roger, 2001. Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27: 125-152.

primordial markers such as ethnicity, language, clan, inheritance, but most importantly, religion.

I demonstrate that religion is the main identity marker of Muslims in northern Nigeria. I argue that Islam is a critical characteristic in identity politics and a strong determinant in conflict. Northern Nigeria is not unique in terms of its people's overwhelming dependence on religion to carve out a place in their society. I illustrate that religion has assumed a center stage in defining individual identity in various other non-western societies and to some extent in western societies.

1.2: Meaning and Nature of Religion

The word 'religion' originates from the Latin word 're-' (back) and 'ligare-' (to bind) meaning backing to bind people to a common belief. However, any attempt to define religion would definitely have gaps. Different definitions have been formulated by historians, religious scholars, sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists. Yinger (Batson et al., 1993:6) rightly asserts that "any definition of religion is likely to be satisfactory only to its author."

Some societies are organized upon religious beliefs, making it possible for society to be administered, organized, developed and transformed in the context of religious foundations. In this sense, Namier (Breuilly, 1993:81) argues that religion is a sixteenth-century word for *ethno*-nationalism. In short, one cannot deny the fact that religion, politics, empire building and state power are historically related and in some sense inseparable. Consequently, the politicization of religion and the religionization of politics are serious issues that cannot be ignored, especially given their implications

and destructive potentials for human co-existence between and within national boundaries.

1.3: Religion and Society

A discourse on religion and society will be inadequate without referring to the Durkheimian view on the subject. To Durkheim (1915), religion is a reflection of man's representation of society. What is important to observe in the work of Durkheim is that all forms of thought and the structure of a social commonality falls in the existence of religion. Durkheim argues that religion is a foundation for individual identification within society and without religion a social system cannot function. These views are supported by modern scholars on the subject (Wilson, 1982). Social harmony, according to Durkheim, is rooted in man's religion and religious obligations to God and the human community of which he is a part.

There is little doubt that no phenomenon is caused by nothing. The aim in studying social phenomenon is to determine its primary cause. This first cause is not usually identifiable by empirical evidence but by careful causal analysis. An insight into religion and society is central in explaining the primordial nature of religion in non-western societies and to some extent in western societies. An individual acquires an identity as a result of his society. In a broader explanation, society is dependent on the social construction of reality. A social construction of reality, as observed in the introduction of this study is the accumulation of past events. What is real in one society is different in other societies. This is aptly captured by Berger & Luckman (1966:26): "The sociology of knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes for 'knowledge' in society." This perception in explaining the social

constructionism of society is what makes religion to be perceived differently in western and non-western societies. Thus, for Berger & Luckman (1966:1) "reality is socially constructed." Therefore, one may safely assume that religion in society is culturally determined. Therefore, an individual or group with the same or with similar capacities and potentials can have different views of themselves and life when placed in different societies (Mellor, 2004:4). In this way, the identity of an individual within a group is a reaction of the social experience an individual shares with other individuals in his society.

Now, it might be understood from the suggestion of Berger & Luckman that the individual is a product of society and society is a product of history and customs. It is argued that since society is based on historical determinism, then, the foundation of society may lie in primordial markers. Thus, the way individuals' construct society would depend on how such a society has been constructed by past memories. It explains that social world is understood by individual perception. It is suggested that individual perceptions of society cannot stand in isolation – it should connect to an evolving history. Nevertheless, the individual is a product of society because society pre-exists the individual (Bhaskar, 1998). As aptly put by Archer (2000:86) "society itself is the aggregate consequence of the actions of these instrumentally rational individuals." From this passage it can be induced that the individual accumulates his/her perceptions and experience about life from his/her society. This experience lies in the differences in cultural, historical and ethnological make-up of the individual.

Society may be observed from an ontological dualism, achieved through focusing and analyzing different and opposing ideologies in order to find an explanation. There is

perhaps no more befitting illustration, in respect of this study, to focus and analyze how and why Islam in northern Nigeria unites different cultural groups and at the same time is prone to conflict. Ontological dualism, also referred to as analytical dualism,[11] states that individual and society are separate social entities but neither can exist in seclusion from the other. Carter (1998:6), in explaining analytical dualism, refers to Lockwood's argument on the subject "how the parts of a social system gelled together (system integration) was analytically distinct from how agents and actors living within that system made sense of it (social integration)." Simply put, analytical dualism separates social structures (society) from culture and agency (the individual) (Porpora, 2001:265).

The ontological dualism of religion is that religion is associated with existence as the primary requisite of the individual is to live and exist. To enjoy life there is the need to exist (Ward, 1898:188). The core of the matter is that religion to the individual is identical to existence. Using the words of Tregenza (2003:155) "what religion offers is not a set of timeless truths, the knowledge of which leads to salvation, but a language of self-enactment through which salvation is worked out in the present." In this sense, religion can be an element that foments aesthetic happiness within groups and in society. Consequently, religion has been described as coming into existence due to an individual's ability to reason. In seeking an answer to these questions, Fox & Sandler (2003:561) capture Andreas Osiander's argument where he suggests that religion acts as a "political and psychological cement that binds society together."

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[11] Analytical Dualism', is a term formed by Archer. See Archer, Margaret Scotford, 2000. *Being Human: The Problem of Agency*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Perhaps the attachment to religious beliefs is higher in societies where development in terms of economic and social rewards is low. This suggests that an individual's social condition determines his personal religion (Batson et al., 1993). Therefore, it may be widely accepted that the social background of the individual determines an individual and his groups' identity as a result of his social experience (Batson et al., 1993). A fitting illustration of this observation is found in America where African-Americans are considered to feel stronger about their religious beliefs than other Americans. The foundation of their strong belief in religion lies in history, in the era of slavery where African-Americans were allowed to attend meetings if and only if such meetings were religious and based on Christian Fellowships (Batson et al., 1993:38). This explains religion as an avenue for comfort and communal interaction. The experience here shows that slavery contributed or was an independent structure that contributed to this social conditioning.

It might be assumed that individual experience and perception arise from individual experience within their environment (Swanson, 1960). The environment or society determines the religion which an individual adopts. The adaptation of the religion in an individual's environment or society is explained as the internalization of religion (Johnstone, 2007:106-107). It is internalized, given that it is integrated in the interaction of all actors in the society and provides the individual with an identity. Religion has the propensity to influence the culture, habits, ideology and perceptions of the individual. This perception is shared by Allawi, (2009:69) when he cites Bennabi: "All civilizations arise as a result of a religious principle which articulates the contours of the civilization."

The view then is that since society pre-exists the individual, the individual is attached to a religious identity group by being brought up in that society. As a result, he acquires a religious identity through society. This acquired identity is perhaps based on primordialism. In some sense, Dawkins (2006:3) explains the primordialism of religion by noting that someone born in Arkansas who thinks that Christianity is true and Islam false would think otherwise if he were born in Afghanistan. Dawkins tries to argue, perhaps based on Sigmund Freud's psychoanalyst approach that the root of religion lies in the child brain. The child's brain, to Dawkins (2006:177), is a receptacle to religious beliefs due to its vulnerable nature and as such other religious beliefs seem bizarre to people not brought up in them. In short, it might be argued that society is the root of religion and religious identity groups. Therefore, society feeds the child's brain with its victuals for social conditioning. The brain child is, therefore, perpetual in existence as it reverberates from one generation to the other. Is this where the search for primordialism of religion is to be found?

1.4: Religion and Ethnicity

To begin with, it has recently become common to argue that a common attribute between ethnicity and religion is that both are identity frames for individual and collective differentiation. Perhaps a useful starting point can be found in the words of Baker (2003:250) where he suggests that "the formation of 'ethnic groups" relies on shared cultural signifiers that have developed under specific historical, social and political contexts. They encourage a sense of belonging based, at least in part, on a common mythological ancestry. Religious orientation is one of the distinctive characteristics of every ethnic group; therefore, it may be assumed that every ethnic group has its own religious orientation.

The loyalty to religion in primordial societies is due to the cultural construction of the ethnic group. Ethnic groups that have strong foundations in religion will have a similar strong belief in another religion, if and when converted to that religion. Before the introduction of Christianity and Islam to the individual in most African cultures, there existed strong attachments towards their varied religious beliefs. The worship of ancestors, spirituality and animism are the earliest known religion to Africa and perhaps the oldest religion known to mankind. Although most Africans are converted to Christianity or Islam, Africans still believe in the existence of spirits and unforeseen forces. This is readily noticed even in entertainment videos, where the mysteries of the spirit world are used to convey moral messages to its audience (Ellis & Haar, 2004: 40-41). Africans who do not possess this belief in the spirit world are negligible.

The basis of identifying an individual to an ethnic group, according to Gurr (1993:3), is "groups whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on cultural traits and lifeways that matter to them and to others with whom they interact. People have many possible bases for communal identity: Shared historical experiences or myths,[12] religious beliefs, language, ethnicity, region of residence, and, in caste-like systems, customary occupations." Religion is a part of that relevant attribute that determines a primordial identity of the individual as ethnic identities are dependent on religion, language and culture. An important observation is that religion may be the exclusive factor that defines ethnic identity (Fox, 1999b:296). However, in certain circumstances, social constructionism may be used as a deviation to describe a religious identity. For instance, a religious identity can refer to a political ideology rather than to a religious affiliation. For instance, being an 'Islamist' *(Islamiyya)* in

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[12] As an illustration the Jewish nation shares the common myths of Abraham as their ancestral Patriarch as well as the exodus from Israel. The Yoruba nation in Nigeria shares a common myth that Oduduwa is their ancestral Patriarch.

Sudan is different from being a Muslim. An Islamist refers to the Northern Sudanese ethnic group's determination to control the state (O'Fahey, 1996). Also, it is interesting to note that in the Balkans the term 'Muslim' refers to ethnicity rather than to a religious identity. These attributes indicate membership of a closely knit group with common loyalties.

Horowitz (1985:52) argues that "ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate." It may well be that religion, to ethnic groups (such as the Yoruba), provides a belief in a common descent. Smith (1986:124) rightly argues that religious factors are central in "crystallizing and maintaining ethnic identity." This perhaps informed Gordon's (1964) and Suad's (1982) definition of ethnicity to include race, religion or national origin. Ethnic groups have a common history, ancestral linkage, common religious beliefs and the communal affiliation. This commonality fosters a religious identity group. The awareness of an ethnic identity is 'consciously fostered' (Epstein, 1978: xiv) as it evolves out of childhood into adulthood. Therefore, ethnicity can be understood to be a prominent identifier of collectiveness as it is based on a 'myth of collective ancestry' (Horowitz, 1985). Ethnicity signifies that groups and identities have developed within a shared and common environment differentiating between 'us' and 'them' rather than in isolation (Eriksen, 1993:10).

1.5: Religion and the Nation

Given the fact that a nation and an ethnic group may share similar features, difficulties arise in defining what a nation is, just as there is some confusion in distinguishing between a nation and a state. A concise definition of a nation is provided by Connor

(2004:37): "The nation is the largest group that shares a sense of common ancestry." Another precise definition is given by Renan (Berberoglu, 2004: 4): "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle." One is in the past the other is in the present. Another useful definition of 'nation' is noted from Stalin (1972:60) as a "historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."

From these definitions what these scholars largely agree on is that a common history is closely linked to the concept of a nation. Therefore, a nation exists by the collective will of its individuals. In a similar trend, ethno-nationalism is closely interwoven with the ideals of a nation as the awareness of a past produces a national identity. "Nations must have a measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas that bind the population together in their homeland" (Smith, 1991:11). An important appendage to the above definition, noted in the introduction, is provided by Smith (1981:64) who observes that religion is a feature of a nation as it attaches to the history of its people. Therefore, one may suggest that religion may have the capacity to bind a nation.

A primordialist views the nation as "the natural units of history and integral elements of human experience" (Smith, 1986:12). As Smith (1986:26) views it, a primordial structure of a nation is based on a historical assumption of a commonality in cultural identify, language and religion with the most common trait being the similarity in language and religion. Thus, what separates one nation from another is the difference in culture. In Ryan's (1995:4) view, these cultural differences arise due to important

factors such as language, religion, historical experience, geographical isolation, race and kinship.

Most non-western societies are usually products of colonialization, with their borders structured without cognizance to ethnic and cultural affiliations. In order to determine a primordial culture or society it is necessary to look at the indigenous culture. Indigenous culture refers to the pre-colonial culture or traditional culture of the society. This implies the intrusion of another culture over a traditional culture that identifies with the identity and reality of a people before the intrusion (Long, 2004). It is crucial to note that most traditional cultures considered religion as the foundation of their society. In this sense, it is suggested that the variant of Islam in northern Nigeria is borrowed from non-Islamic faiths. It could be argued that these indigenous faiths (animism) were exclusive as it welcomed those who were different (people from different indigenous cultures). Therefore, it seems likely that the consolidation of Islamic identity amongst different ethnic groups could be explained in terms of historical determinism.

Attention must now be drawn on how nations come to existence. Anderson's (1991) explanation lays emphasize on how a nation comes to be. Anderson states that the nations of old came into existence through the dynamics of "sacred imagined communities" tied together by a religious belief. The illustrations of Anderson's view can be found amongst nations such as the Jews and their religion Judaism; the Indians with the religion of Hinduism; the Yoruba with the religion of Olódùmarè and the Arabs as well as Hausa-Fulani with Islam.

However, Andersons' theorization of nations suggests that pre-colonial nations are political inventions. This definition aptly describes mainly non-western societies, which came into existence by the merging of communities, ethnic groups and tribes by the colonial institutions. After its amalgamation, these new supra-communities were labeled as states and the habitants had the ability to imagine that they belonged to a nation. Anderson's definition of pre-colonial nations criticizes the primordialism construction of nations. However, it is strongly argued that in the context of pre-colonial nations, primordialism cannot be wished away for the reason that such societies are boldly constructed by tribal and ethnic identities.

1.6: Between Nation and Ethnicity

Weber (1968:922) claims the term 'nation' is not identical with the "people of a state." He illustrates that the nation is centered on "prestige" interests of a group (Weber, 1968:922). He states that "the significance of the 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority or at least the irreplaceability of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group" (Weber, 1968:925).

Weber views the nation as being superior to ethnicity due to the sentiments of 'prestige' that is attached to the nation. This sentiment is referred to as *ethno-nationalism*. Weber aptly describes this as "the human group that nurtures a subjective belief in the commonality of its ancestry because of similarities of habits or customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of communal relationship; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists" (Weber, 1968:387).

It is highly probable for a nation and an ethnic group to share similar features. However, Kellas (1991), in distinguishing ethnic groups from nations, argues that ethnic groups are smaller and are based on a common ancestral origin that has peculiar characteristics. For example, the Irish Americans or Jewish Americans may be termed as an ethnic group in America but they fall short of being described as a nation.

To simplify what ethnicity and nations are, Nodia (1999:445) provides useful and pragmatic assumptions. According to Nodia, there are four differences: (1) Ethnicity is primordial (ahistorical), while that nation is modern (historical). (2) Ethnicity is natural while nationhood is man-made. (3) Ethnicity is impersonal, nationhood is personal. (4) Ethnicity is pluralistic, nationhood is universalistic. A more critical observation on Nodia's assumption is that religion is interwoven into the ambits of both ethnicity and the nation, as it possesses all the characteristics of the above assumptions. Religion is both primeval and contemporary in nature. Religion relates to nature and it conditions society. Religion lacks human traits (it is divine/spiritual) and at the same time individualistic, it is plural in nature and universalistic in practice.

1.7: Religion and Identity

Individuation is what makes a society exist. It makes the individual distinct and separate from another. Turner (1991:163) renders a practical definition of individuation as "a set of practices by which individuals are identified and separated by marks, numbers, signs and codes." Individuals are divided on sentiments such as ethnicity, linguistic and religious affiliations, which are all products of perception and identity formations. It then appears that "the constitution of identity is an elaborate and deadly serious game of mirrors. It is a complex temporal interaction of multiple

practices of identification external and internal to a subject or population" (Friedman, 1992: 853).

The term 'identity' has been considered ambiguous in nature (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). However, identity has been used by political scientists to refer to race and ethno-nationality. Identity relates to a sense of a community based on history and culture (Smith, 1986:14). If viewed as such, religion could be considered a part of an idiosyncratic stamp of a social system. It may be right to assert that primordial identity to the individual constitutes a loyalty that is based on blood, race, language, locality, religion or tradition (Miller, 1974:537).

As we have seen, a common culture tends to promote a shared identity with a common awareness. Religion has been viewed as an identity trait, which provides a common culture to both national identities (Smith, 2000), ethnic identities (Gurr, 1993) and to group identities (Voye, 1999). But the issue here is that religious identity separates an individual from another. It comprises distinguishable characteristics that are not prevalent in another individual or group. In this sense, a religious identity can be synonymous to a national identity. However, it is important to note that a national identity centers on a political community within a bordered terrain (Smith, 1991:9).

The other point to make here is that as an identity frame, religion, apart from having an overarching capacity across ethnic classifications, can separate people of similar ethnic origins. This underscores the dynamic nature of religion, which provokes its power to divide and integrate people within and across other types of identities, is evident in the fact that there is a subconscious and conscious importance attached to

religion by people. This explains why religion is a phenomenon that people are ready to die and kill for. It mirrors the notion of 'why men and women are willing to die for their nation' (Smith, 1986). Put by Connor (1994: 206) "people do not die for things that are rational." Religion is not a rational thing; it is a human phenomenon which is mystical in nature (Momen, 1999).

Arguing in this direction, West (1995:16) defines identity as "desire and death" – a desire to die for one's identity. The significance of religion to the individual's identity as observed by Juergensmeyer (2005:142) is that the smallest are families and clans followed by ethnic groups and nations. The largest and implicitly most important are religions. Religions, Juergensmeyer continues, are not only the doctrines of groups of believers but are common worldviews and cultural values.

The underlying significance of religion to the individual is that, in some societies, it may be the most important cultural marker within an ethnic community or to the nation. Smith (1981:45-52), following Herder and Gellner, argues that language is the most significant cultural marker. Gellner argues that "linguistic culture is the chief bond between human beings" Smith (1981:48). Kedourie (1966:64) tells us that "language is the external and visible badge of those differences which distinguish one nation from another; it is the most important criterion by which a nation is recognized to exist, and have the right to form a state on its own." Horowitz, (1985:222), though stressing that language is a potent symbol in linking elite and the grass root people in a state, concedes that religion can serve the same purpose. In another dimension, Reicher & Hopkins (2001:8), in arguing that language is the most important feature of

a nation, quoted Moldavian Dabija noting that "language is the soul of the people. It resembles those who speak it."

Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2001) argue that religion has a stronger identity marker than social cleavages such as language, as it has the tendency to produce intense conflict. But, one recalls that the Bangladesh war of 1971 is a contrary example of Montalvo & Reynal-Querol's argument, here language created a conflict among people who shared the same religion (Islam). However, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol in arguing religions crucial identity marker note that the individual may speak more than one language but can have only one religion. An individual can have dual nationalities but not dual religions. Hence "you can be multicultural but you cannot be a multi-religious person. Because religion is different than culture, the faith is a deep sense that is difficult to internalize" (Abu-Nimer, 2001:701). One may not pretend to deny that the search of the soul of the people must be sought not in language but in religion, as it reflects the soul of the individual, people, groups and nationhood. Moreover, religion has the propensity to be personal unlike language where verbal communication must be recognized by at least two individuals.

Furthermore, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2001) note that religion can be used as a symbol of identity, as an individual can be excluded or included from a religion. It is then true that religion is considered by the individual to be indivisible, absolute and predestined. Secondly, they aver that religion gives the individual different ways of 'looking' at life. It regulates social relationships and promotes social bonding. In addition, Hanf (1999:392) notes that religion is considerably rooted in the "socialisation processes of early childhood" and it shapes and creates an emotional

bond between individual within the group. Hanf further illustrates his argument by showing that when minorities are given the option to choose between language and religion, they have opted for their religious beliefs.

A clearer perspective, illustrating the important cultural marker of religion, is provided by Joseph (2004:173) where he notes that religion functioned as a "linguistically unifying force." Joseph further notes that Christianity linked Latin to Europe whilst Islam linked Arabic to the Islamic world. Another useful comparison is found in northern Nigeria where the Hausa language, which has metamorphosed as the lingua franca of diverse ethnic groups in the north, "causes speakers to refer to themselves and others within the context of an Islamic cosmology" (Anthony, 2002:104). One may agree that the basic precepts of the Hausa society are Islamic (Adamu, 1978:9).

In line with these arguments, Abeysekara (2002: 68) cites Prakash's useful observation that "the intermingling of religion and politics characterizes not only the 'backward' Third World but also the 'advanced' First World." This may not be surprising due to the fact that the individual searches for the meaning of life through religion. It is suggested that Identity is more deeply rooted in religion[13] than in history. It seems reasonable to agree with this when one listens to Pope John Paul II: "...the European identity is not understandable without Christianity and it is precisely in Christianity that are found these common roots by which the continent has seen its civilization mature..." (Forrester, 2005: 26).

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[13] The fundamental origin of religion's importance in the western society could be traced to the Papacy in the medieval age. History recalls the 'investiture contest', where in 1076, the German King; Henry IV came to seek favour to save his throne and re-establish favour from Pope Gregory VII on account of the latter excommunicating him.

Perhaps even more fundamental, religious identities "are based on the alignments of culture and its elements-values, symbols, myths and traditions, often codified in custom and ritual" (Smith, 1991:6). As such, religion provides ethno-nationalism with a greater sense of collective identity. Ethno-nationalism based on a religious foundation provides a new construction within a state. In such a state religion becomes a strong primordial marker, given that it has the tendency to construct the individual under an umbrella of 'we' against 'them' awareness.

Interestingly enough, it is suggested that the reason for this construction is that ethno-nationalism, based on religion, is a product of our thoughts or subconscious. This reasoning perhaps informs Greenfeld (2005:333) to suggest that "ethno-nationalism inhibits the formation and normal functioning of the human mind." This suggestion is demonstrated when an individual views another individual, though of the same culture and linguistic identity, as an outsider due to differences in religion. This sentiment is rightly noted to be a psychological condition of belief (Rejai & Enloe, 1969:142). To a large extent, a religious belief affects the mind, which further extends to the subliminal state of the individual. This concept is somewhat similar to an 'imagined community' wherein the individual finds himself tied to the loyalty of a nation.

With these few observations, it is worthy to note that in some contemporary western societies, religion is still a very influential identity marker. In America, a Gallup Poll conducted a survey in 2006 discovered that 57% of Americans viewed religion as very important in their life; 27% viewed religion as fairly important whilst 16% viewed religion as not very important.[14] The importance of religion in American politics is

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[14] This is illustrated by the fact that a presidential candidate, John Kerry, a catholic, as result of his support of abortion rights lost the catholic vote in the Ohio state elections which eventually cost him the Presidential election.

illustrated when President George Bush Sr. regularly consulted controversial preacher Billy Graham during the Gulf War, especially on the day he ordered the bombing of Baghdad (Harding, 1994:58). In addition, at a meeting with the Palestinian leader, Abu Mazen on June 4, 2003, George Bush Jr. explained a religious sanction for the war on terror.[15] Let me emphasize that it is not the intention to suggest that religion is a strong identity marker in western societies but to illustrate the influence of religion in the western world.

1.8: The Formation of National Identity

If national identities are formed unlike ethnicity, the intriguing question then is when and how are they formed? Now an important point, is that Rejai & Enloe (1969) suggest that in developed countries (western societies), national identity evolved prior to the crystallization or mobilization of the structures of state and sovereignty. This spontaneous process gave rise to nation-states. However, in most of the underdeveloped countries (non-western societies), this sequence is reversed: Sovereignty and the state existed before national identity and cultural integration developed. This gave rise to state-nations (Rejai & Enloe 1969:140). State-nations evolve through the process of colonialization. At the period of their colonialization, "they had no sovereignty, no autonomy, no embedding in society and remained appendages to powerful European military and administrative complexes" (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001:12). Clearly, it would appear that the actualization of a nation-state or a state-nation depends on whether political coercion is used to form the state.

See Amy Sullivan, in an article, 'finding Their Faith' Time, February 25th, 2008, p20-21. And a recent illustration in American politics was the debate about President Barak Obama's association with Reverend Wright over the latter's, anti-patriotic comments that nearly prejudiced Obama's Presidential campaign.
[15] "God told me to strike at al Qaeda and I struck them, and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did, and now I am determined to solve the problem in the Middle East. If you help me I will act, and if not, the elections will come and I will have to focus on them."http://delawareliberal.wordpress.com/2007/07/23/god-told-bush-to-attack-iraq/, accessed on the 22nd of September 2008.

There is then, an underlying question of concern: When does a nation have the awareness of a common identity? The main difference is that in a nation-state there is an absence of a forceful crystallization of a national identity into a state as is the case in most African and Asian states. The state-nation is crystallized by political intervention and different identities were forced to co-habit in the invented state. These identities formed along pre-existing structures, such as tribal, ethnic or religious identities – forms of identities that can be described as primordial markers. In the state-nation, ethno-nationalism is configured from a top-to-bottom approach to procure state loyalty as opposed to a bottom-to-top approach in the nation-state.

A crucial factor of significant note is that in a state-nation, the awareness of a national identity, religion, language and ethnicity are the most important primordial features of the individual, unlike a nation-state. It is within this paradigm that in the Nigerian context primordialism is ubiquitous due to its pluralistic nature of ethnic and religious groups and the affiliation of different loyalties to these groups. Therefore, it is argued that there is a clear-eyed logic that the colonialists did not form nations to organize its society. What they formed were identities based on ethnic and tribal lines (Davidson, 1992:10-11). It is argued that this is where the essence of primordialism can be found.

1.9: Constructing Religious and National Identities

Now an important observation is that religion is closely attached to a nation's identity because it existed before the emergence of the nation. It is this unity of faith that propounded religion and was a pre-cursor to the awareness of a national identity. It is suggested that national identity consequently evolved by reason of ethno-nationalism (Bruce, 2003:79). National identity could be comparable with religious identity due to

the fact that they both exhibit an awareness of a common cultural heritage. This constructs religion as a cohesive caliber to promote national unity. It is then safe to agree with the suggestion that "ethno-nationalism, like religion, is a set of beliefs of common origins, specialness and destiny, and rituals, patriotic pledges, songs, anthems and celebrations that unite a 'people' into an identity granting 'imagines (political) community' that creates 'citizens'" (Langman, 2006: 72).

It may now be apparent that ethno-nationalism is a vast, broad and huge concept. The complexity arises due to the fact that scholars define a nation, either from a modernist or primordialist perspective. Nations (nation-states) based in western societies comprise modernist structures. These structures are simply the development of traditional institutions into complex systems of modernity (Leftwich, 2000:33). Whilst in non-western societies, nations (state-nations) have primordial structures. However, some nations may have a blend of both modernist and primordialist structures. In determining whether a state consists of primordialist or modernized structures, it is necessary to look at the state in question and decipher their geographical make up. States with ethnic communities are primordial in nature. States such as India and Nigeria are contemporary examples (Smith, 1986).

In simpler terms, Rejai & Enloe (1969:141) suggest that ethno-nationalism is "an awareness of membership in a nation (potential or actual), together with a desire to achieve, maintain, and perpetuate the identity, integrity, and prosperity of that nation." In a different outlook "the nation (ethno-nationalism) may be in people unconsciously and may need to be brought forth or willed into consciousness" (Suny, 2001:870). Following this, it could be argued that one of the striking and unique features of

people having a primordial religious identity is that it can create an awareness of ethno-nationalism.

Yet it is important to emphasize that, Gellner (1983) made an effort to expand the concept of ethno-nationalism. He argues that ethno-nationalism engenders the nation to exist. Earlier, Gellner (1966:81) provided a functionalist definition of ethno-nationalism. He argued that ethno-nationalism is an indispensable sociological building block of the modern society (industrial society). However, Gellner (1997:7) later adopts an all-embracing approach – ethno-nationalism is all about people wishing to live with their own kind and, therefore, they are unwilling to live with people of a different culture and they abhor being governed by them. People who are desirous of living together have 'things' in common. One of the 'things' they have in common is religion. In this sense, as noted in the introduction of this study, those having a primordial identity in religion may set boundaries to those professing other faiths.

According to Kedourie (1966:81), ethno-nationalism is concerned with the right of self determination. It is "a method of teaching the right determination of the will." The right of self determination connotes the will to be a separate sovereign state. But do the English or Scottish nations desire to be a separate state? The English and Scottish have sentimental attachment to their respective nations.

Kohn (1965:9) views ethno-nationalism as being a psychosomatic "...state of mind in the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state." This definition is complex because there are no methods of measuring this state of mind in

the individual. Individual's born and bred in their nation-states have sometimes exhibited disloyalty to their nation. However, a clearer definition can be attributed to Smith's (1991:73) definition: "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation.'" The thrust of Smith's definition illustrates an embracing concept, which can accommodate both national and religious loyalties.

One thing that is certain is that there is an overriding recognition that the concept of ethno-nationalism within a nation-state or state-nation has not been considered wholly by scholars on the subject. Clearly, this is because they view ethno-nationalism as a simple concept and regard many states as homogenous (Connor, 1994:29). In addition, some scholars have viewed ethno-nationalism with a modernist/constructionist approach (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1996; Breuilly, 1993). Following these lines of argument, it seems safe to define ethno-nationalism as a people united by common language, history, culture and religious ties, with a political conscience, competing for international recognition and economic resources. Ethno-nationalism may consist of a blend of both traditional and modernists' definition therefore leaning towards Smith's (1999), theory of ethno-symbolism, as seen in the introduction. Smith suggests that the ethnic composition of a nation consists of both ethnic categories and ethnic communities (ethnies). The former consisting of a 'shared cultural element' and the latter focuses on a history of a common myths and memories, and provides an understanding of the dynamics between primordialistic and modernistic views on ethno-nationalism.

As earlier noted, Anderson (1991), in his contribution to the meaning of ethno-nationalism, does not consider the concept within the framework of primordialism. According to Anderson, the social construction of an identity evolved as a result of social changes. To Anderson, ethno-nationalism evolved with new technology. Anderson makes it clear, that Information Technology played a significant role in embracing social and cultural communication for national identification. In addition, Anderson argues that the emergence of ethno-nationalism depends on 'capitalism and print technology' and on the diversity of a people's language. Anderson further argues that print capitalism was a tool, which contributes to social mobilization.

A distinguished scholar on ethno-nationalism, Deutsch (1953:104), views ethno-nationalism as "people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over its members." Deutsch further argues that a fundamental characteristic of a nation is the existence of social communication – communicative symbols or a system of communication of a group with a similar culture within a shared space facilitating *ethno*-nationalism.

For Deutsch, the modes of effective communication within a group enable nation formation. The Deutschian treatise considers economic communication as a means of social mobilization as it braces the common identification of a people to form a nation. Most importantly he perceives that the gradual process of 'social mobilization' of people overtime would constitute a social and national assimilation of people into one nation, thereby ending the cleavages of ethnicity and ambits of national and ethnic identities.

However, Deutsch contends that in Africa 'social mobilization' is difficult to be most effectively activated because of the rapid political change from colonial rule to independence. Moreover, these new states consist of 'variegated tribal groups' (Deutsch, 1969:73) who still owe allegiance to their tribal origins. This allegiance impedes the integration of African states. One may agree to a large extent with the thesis of Deutsch. Although, not founded totally on a primordial explanation, it is based on the cultural behaviour of individuals and groups. When there is an allegiance to religion, tribal groups tend to assimilate and integrate into a common identity.

There is, of course, in some sense an illustration of the Deutschian theory in a non-western society. Social mobilization through sharing a common religion merged two major separate ethnic groups, the Hausa and Fulani, and other minority ethnic groups in northern Nigeria. What is suggested is that the Hausa and Fulani were two separate ethnic groups. However, they are now regarded as having a common ethnic and religious identity. Religion (Islam) was the vehicle that provided social mobilization between these separate groups and merged them not only as an ethnie but also as a nation.

Aligned with this argument, Adamu (1978:2-3) observes that "...the Hausa ethnic unit has shown itself as an assimilating ethnic entity and the Hausa language a colonizing one to the extent that many people who were not originally Hausa and did not use the Hausa language as their first language later became Hausa through assimilation..." It deserves emphasis that this observation shows that most minority ethnic groups in northern Nigeria have assimilated into Hausa ethnicity. Individuals of other minority

groups accept Hausa as their ethnicity but may still lay claim to another ethnic group (Adamu, 1978:3).

At this point, it is important to note that the Deutschian theory is similar to the reasoning of Connor (1972) where he suggests that with the ushering in of modernity, the individual becomes more aware of his ethnic heritage. Similarly, Horowitz (1985) suggests that as society becomes more modernized the sentiments of national or ethnic identities become more structured and strengthened.

On a deeper level, religion and ethno-nationalism are features of nation-building as they both generate a sense of loyalty to a nation. Accordingly, one may argue that national identity is analogous with religious identity. Appleby (2000:59) succinctly notes that "like religion, ethnicity is a notoriously open-ended concept and lends itself more readily to the amassing of nationalistic fervour than to the more disciplined and precise task of building a state." Furthermore, Smith (2000:792) views ethno-nationalism as form of 'political religion' "whose tensions with traditional religions have led to a growing politicisation of religion, as well as the messianisation of politics and the elevation of the people". Smith therefore views the nation as a 'sacred communion of citizens.' But the crucial point, as Smith (1971:56-57) sees it, is that religion reinforces nationality and even preserves it and provides the sociological framework for ethno-nationalism to function with.

1.10: Religious Ethno-Nationalism

Let me start by suggesting most ethnic groups can trace their origins to a religious belief or a mythical order. While the practice of religion is largely a reflection of

peoples' past, it expresses the identification of an individual and society. It is argued that society evolved as a result of religion. Even Europe had its foundations on religious ethno-nationalism. Hastings (1997:4) argues that religion provided the original 'model of the nation' to the western world. Therefore, when France became the first European republic, it was understood as a usurpation of God's sovereignty (Friedland, 2001:127).

Clearly, in some ways an individual may have more sentiments towards his religion than his nation. This is probably due to the fact that fundamentalism and ethno-nationalism are ideological opponents (Ruthven, 2004:132). The meeting point of this link is where religious ethno-nationalism begins. To a large extent, religious ethno-nationalism seeks to establish the religion practiced by a nation as its foremost identity in the state.

Again, one must stress that the attachment to religious beliefs is an overwhelming sentiment and is perhaps influential more than ethnic sentiments. It seems quite possible; however, that religion could be intertwined with the ideal of a nation. An illustration of this notion is the call for a separate state in India in the 1930s. At the time, India consisted of two nations, Muslims and Hindus, living in one state. As Nigam (2006:176-215) argues that Indian ethno-nationalism was impossible in India because it was impossible to have a common history. The separate religious identities of the Hindus and the Muslims in India gave rise to much religious violence that gave rise to the carnage of partition in India in 1947. Furthermore, Pakistan emerged as an independent state from India in 1947, not on grounds of cultural, linguistic or ethnic commonalities, but due to religious primordialism (Islam, 1981). What can be readily

observed here is that religion has the capacity to create solidarity among people to form a nation at the same time as having the capacity to set a strong boundary amongst people belonging to another religious faith, which tends to generate religious conflicts.

Now an important observation is that people are more sentimentally attached to the national consciousness within their state than towards a similar ethnic and religious affiliation of another state. Miles & Rochefort (1991) observe that Hausa communities in the frontiers of the Nigerian and Niger borders place greater sentiments of their identity towards their own state than to members of the same Hausa ethnic group and similar religious identity across the border. This is also illustrated in sports, where members of the same state recognize their common identity and bond to each other and do not exhibit transnational sentiments towards identical ethnic groups and similar religious identities across its border (King, 2006). The emphasis here is that the awareness of a national identity is confined within a state – it is not trans-national.

It must be understood that religious ethno-nationalism is interwoven with cultural and social factors which constitute a collective representation defending identity rather than interests (Friedland, 2001). A religious faith is comparable with ethno-nationalism (Kramer, 1997). Both are ideals which individuals possess strong sentimental attachment to as "the mysteries of a nation thus resemble the mysteries of a religion" (Kramer, 1997:532). The ethno-nationalism of religion exists in view of the nation having its roots in sacred mysteries, which have been a cohesive structure in the history of the nation. Renan (Kramer, 1997:532-533) explains that the historical ties to a nation cement a mystifying attachment to the religious beliefs of that nation.

Both are dependent on each other. Using these arguments, one can see that the individual has primordial ties to both his nation and religion, as his religion is a part of the commemoration of his nation.[16]

1.11: Religion and Secularization

John Lennon's dream for an imagined united world with no nations and religions exist only in utopianism or, better still, as an allegory. The argument for religion is that it is natural and not supernatural (i.e. that it grew out of the nature of the individual and was not given to the individual). In this light, it seems altogether probable that religion is mainly a product of reason (Ward, 1898:180). Religion as a product of reason is significant in culture, political thought and in explaining society. Moreover, with great technological advancement in the world, scientific reasoning of thought has not replaced the dominance of religion (Vyas & Vyas, 2000:20). The significance of this is that religion and politics are both analytically and empirically related (Levine, 1979:6). Scholars have argued that religion would wither away and be placed in the private sphere of human relations.[17]

In the age of modernity, religion was presumed to wither away from the ambit of the state and politics. However, this assumption has been proven to be fallible. The reason for this fallible speculation is that the political thinkers failed to realize that modernity is a label while religion is a practice (McInerny, 1994: ix). This is evident from the fact that even legislation cannot make religion. On the other hand, most laws are based

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[16] Turner (2006:208) defines commemoration as "all those devices through which a nation recalls, marks, embodies, discusses or argues about its past, and all those devices which are intended to create or sustain a sense of belonging or 'we feeling' in individuals who belong to it."

[17] Dobbelaere, (1999), argues that secularisation asserts that religion ceases to be significant in the working of the social system. Lambert, (1999: 308), states that no new world religion is spreading on a wide scale and that the most obvious modern symbolic issues relate to secular thoughts based on science, ideologies, ethics, human rights etc.

on religious codes. Religion has not withered away with secular modernity; rather it has taken a center stage in world politics.

It is important to note that prior to 9/11/2001, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) proposal for the adequate study of religion was vetoed as "mere sociology" (Micklethwait, 2007). With the increasing acceleration of globalization, religion has gone beyond mere sociology. Is religion the hottest debate in political science since the fall of communism? The pronged ideologies of secularism and communism are quite analogous. To the former religion withers away, to the latter the state withers away. Indeed, they are both share similarities, as both theories have withered away and have not stood the test of modernity. It was clearly erroneous for political scientists to posit in the 1950s and 1960s that the ideals of ethnicity and religion would wither away with the inception of modernity (Fox, 2001a). Others have argued that the resurgence of religion would establish the era of post-modernity, which is a rejection of westernization (Hunt, 2002:37). From the point of view of secularists, religion was viewed as a "theological set of issues rather than as a profoundly political influence in public life" (Rubin 1994:20).

On a crucial level Stark (1999) voices skepticism about the advent of secularization. He notes that the 'prophets of secularization' erred when they predicted the decline in religion at the onset of modernity in the Western world. To such a degree, just as there is now greater attachment to ethnicity than in the past, (Smith, 1981) similar attachment has been attached with religion. One may argue that religious legitimacy is an important factor in politics, despite the overture of modernity and the dawn of post modernity (Williamson, 1990). An explanation for this revived attachment to both

ethnicity and religion is that the individual tends not to forget his history, myths and memories.

For Lee & Ackerman (2002:5) secular society encapsulates the "retreat of religion from all spheres of society." It is as noted by Bryan Wilson as "the sense of the sacred, the sense of the sanctity of life, and deep religiosity are...absent" (Pratt, 1970:3). It seems clear that the main characteristic of a secular society is that it curtails religion in the domain of the individual. However, where the western world has precepts based on secular ethno-nationalism, there has been argument that secular ethno-nationalism has been an instrument in the collapse of morality in the western states. Juergensmeyer (1993) argues that secularism has failed western society due to its inability to prevent a moral decay thus enabling the birth of a 'new cold war.' Juergensmeyer argues that the loss of faith in secular nationalism is as a result of the breakdown of social order in society. Juergensmeyer explains that this would lead to a religious nationalism emerging in the western world. However, Chaves (1994) tells us that secularization may be viewed in social theory as a decline in religious authority and not in the decline of religion, while Bruce (2002:3) says that secularization may be viewed as the decline of the importance of religion for the function of non-religious institutions.

It is argued that secularization does not imply that religion has withered away. It implies that the individual has greater freedoms – freedom of expression, freedom of behaviour and religious tolerance, which exist in liberal democracies. Perhaps a befitting example is that a Gay parade would be tolerated in a liberal democratic

society (secular society), but not in a non-western society, especially where religion is its first mark of identity.

An intriguing question is: When do we determine whether or not religion is a primordial identity in non-western society? Some useful illustrations may provide adequate answers to this. Firstly, the planned hosting of a Miss World beauty pageant in November 2002 in Kaduna, northern Nigeria resulted in a catastrophic religious riot, which left 220 people dead. This can be explained by the fact that religion (Islam) in the region is positioned differently in a non-western society. Secondly, a beauty contest in Turkey, which predominantly has a Muslim population, did not generate religious conflicts. [18] This can be explained from the perception that Turkey to some extent is a liberalized western society. Moreover, "Kemalist secularism...firmly subordinated religion to Turkish nationalism" (Zubaida, 2004:413). It may be helpful, at this point, to note an important angle to this phenomenon provided by Steinglass (2002), who commenting on the Kaduna riots:

> Sokode, a Muslim city in Togo, 500 miles southeast of here, was host in August to a round of the Miss Togo contest, swimsuits and all. But there was no protest. ... But only Nigeria struggles with a strong radical Islamist movement, and only Nigeria has Shariah, the strict rule of law based on the Koran, in certain states.

He then asks the intriguing question: What makes northern Nigeria so different? Clearly, to this question, there can be only one answer – to Muslims in northern Nigeria, religion, not ethnicity, is their first and foremost identity. The integrative dilemma of post colonialism in most non-western societies and the absence of a gradual social mobilization of people (Deutsch, 1953) are factors that engender

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[18] Miss Turkey pageant started on the 22nd of September 1929. Ironically, Miss Turkey, Azra Akin, won the Miss World 2002 contest after the beauty pageant was moved from Nigeria to London, England.

primordialism in non-western states. Geertz (1963) identifies the fact that primordial ties exist mainly in the 'new states' of Africa and Asia. Similarly, Horowitz (1985) argues that in plural societies such as in Africa, Asia and the West Indies, political parties tend to be organized along ethnic lines.

The question then arises: Has the wind of modernity changed the individuals' and societies' outlook to religion in western societies? In answering this question, Armstrong (2000:369) argues that religiosity has not disappeared in western societies. Armstrong suggests that religious fundamentalism plays a vital role in American politics. In addition she tells us that religion has assisted people to adjust to modernity and perceptively notes that "fundamentalism is just one of these modern religious experiences, and ... it has enjoyed a certain success in putting religion squarely back on the international agenda..." (Armstrong, 2000:366).

1.12: Conflict Potential of Religion

It certainly needs to be emphasized that religious primordialism may create a tendency in the individual to place excessive emphasis and loyalty on religious beliefs and religious identity. This form of loyalty could be understood as an attempt at protecting one's identity, which is imagined to be threatened by other religious identities. This imagined threat produces a personalized religious identity. Personalization of religion augments ethno-nationalism for the reason that they both convey an identity to the individual.

Another equally important point is that religiosity transcends territorial borders. All religions are prone to exhibit traits of fundamentalism. However, the religious

fundamentalist is common in non-western societies because ethnicity and religion play dominant roles in the individual's primordial identity. The fundamentalist views one's own religious identity as the only pure truth (McGuire, 1992: 190). Juergensmeyer (1993:4) adopts an excellent definition of fundamentalism. Juergensmeyer views it as "an intolerant, self-righteous, and narrowly dogmatic religious literalism." Furthermore, another exemplary definition is provided by Lee & Ackerman, (2002:51) who adopt Giddens' 'doctrinal purity' of fundamentalism as "...nothing other than tradition defended in the traditional way-but where that mode of defense has become widely called into question...." But the question about what is wrong in being fundamentalist remains unanswered. To abide by the laws of any profession or trade, an individual must abide by its fundamental doctrines, rules or guidelines. Thus, being fundamentalist about a religious belief may be insinuated to mean the correct doctrinal practices of that religion. Clearly then, one may assert that a Muslim fundamentalist, abiding by Islam's fundamental doctrines, would not profane the religions of others (Qur'an 6:108).

Yet as one might expect, an underlying key problem in being fundamentalist in respect of religion is that the fundamentalist believes that his own religion is the only right way whilst others are unfounded. Fundamentalism, then, can be described as a rebellion against conservative ecclesiastic authority. Kimball (2002:27) suggests that many devout people see religion as the problem; the religions of others are considered false. Therefore, the love for one's religion facilitates the dislike of another, just as the love for one's nation means a dislike for another nation. Fundamentalism empowers the individual to connect himself to the myth of a "divine election" (Cauthen, 2004).

At this point one must emphasize that religious fundamentalism has given rise to groups, such as the Hamas suicide bombers. The antecedent of these thoughts may be found in religion. For instance, the Bible and Qur'an base their foundations on victorious warfare. The wandering tribe of Israel had to utterly destroy desert tribes on their journey to the Promised Land. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Dawkins (2006:31) in his book titled 'The God Delusion', views the God of the Old Testament as "arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction, jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, capriciously malevolent bully." However, Dawkins prevaricated the definition of religion, avoided explaining its complex nature and ignored what it means to the individual. Perhaps, if Dawkins attempted to explain the multifaceted nature of religion, he would understand why religion may generate solidarity among people. This conceivably informed McGrath (McGrath & McGrath, 2007: xi) to note that "religion to Dawkins is like a red rag to a bull-evoking not merely an aggressive response, but one that throws normal scholarly conventions about scrupulous accuracy and fairness to the winds."

1.13: Constructing Identities in Northern Nigeria

The construction of an identity is taking a new dimension in Nigeria. An individual may be identified first by his religion then by his nation. In a research conducted by Micklethwait (2007), individuals in Nigeria primarily identify themselves by their religion and secondly as Nigerians. However, it is argued that this finding is contrary to the reality of Nigeria as a whole. Nigeria is constituted of many nations and, as such, 'identity' has different meanings to different ethnic groups. In a diverging analysis, O'Connell (1989:197) suggests that religion has not been a serious factor in

Nigerian politics; rather the dominant factor is attributed to ethnicity. Perhaps, his argument is based on the assumption that ethnic boundaries create conditions for group conflict. Indeed, ethnicity plays a dominant role in the socio-political constitution of Nigeria.

However, the affectation of religion cannot be sidelined. Both are necessary compliments in Nigerian politics. Where there exists a coincidence of ethnic identities between political contestants, religion is given primacy especially in the north, unlike in the south-west Yoruba land and the eastern Igbo land (an overwhelming majority are non-Muslims), where ethnic consideration takes precedence as a basis for political mobilization. In northern Nigeria, religion serves as the purveyor of popular consciousness amongst different ethnic groups from northern Nigeria professing Islam. Islam is an important political instrument amongst the Yoruba, but is not considered a hegemonic political institution (Kukah & Falola, 1996:2). Similarly, Aguwa (1997:336) echoes that the Yoruba ethnic group accommodates African Traditional Religion, Christianity and Islam. Notably, Mazrui (1985:819) influentially illustrates this analysis by stating:

> The links between religion and politics among the Muslims of northern Nigeria are deeper and more durable than such links among the Muslim Yoruba of southern Nigeria....Yoruba Muslims have sometimes been regarded as Yoruba first and Muslim second - while Hausa Muslims have been perceived as the reverse.

In order to forge a path, and to shed more light on the above, I encountered a similar illustration by Norimitsu (2000):

In Lagos, the commercial capital in the Yoruba southwest, deadly clashes between Yoruba and Hausa have occurred in recent months. But in the recent riots in the northern city of Kaduna, some Yoruba seemed to have escaped injury because of their religion or ethnicity. Suraj Najimu, an 18-year-old student and a Yoruba Muslim, said he was surrounded by a group of Hausa youths ready to assault him 'But after I recited some Koranic passages, they let me go', he said...On a Muslim street in the predominantly Christian slum of Kaduna, Christians destroyed all the houses except a few belonging to Yoruba. Most of the Yoruba were Christian. But even one who is Muslim, Shehu Garba, was spared, apparently because in this particular instance, ethnicity was more important than religion.

From the above excerpt, it can readily be seen that Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity to create solidarity among cultural groups in northern Nigeria. Furthermore, to demonstrate that to the Igbo ethnic group ethnicity, as opposed to religion, is regarded as a mark of identity, Akinwumi (2004:153) notes that in 1949, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe expressed that "the God of Africa has specifically created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa..." and in a similar statement, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa comments that the northerners had to realize their mission of "dipping the Quran in the sea,"[19] in other words, demonstrating that religion rather than ethnicity is the mark of identity in the North. This is clearly, affirmed by Liman Ciroma, when he states that: "What the Sardauna and his colleagues tried to do was to create a new tribe of 'the Northerner" (Anthony, 2002:64).

Furthermore, Miles (2000: 230) notes that the expression 'Nigerian Islam' is understood to refer to the religious practices and political solidarity of northern Nigeria. Thus, one may suggest that Islam has developed into a civilizational social structure, which consists of socio-political, economic and religious facets (Kimball, 2002:19). From a populist view, southern Islam is not the same as Islam practiced in

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[19] This precept literary means spreading Islam to Southern Nigeria which is adjoined by the Atlantic Ocean.

the North. However, the impact of the Islamization of northern Nigeria has a reverberative effect on other dominant ethnic groups such as the Yoruba. This is illustrated in the northern town of Yoruba land, Ilorin, where the Emir of Ilorin, who is considered to be part of the royal house of the Fulani Caliphate, refuses to address his Yoruba subjects in Yoruba language but in Hausa. Furthermore, a Yoruba-Muslim from Ilorin is considered to be Hausa-Fulani. This identity is attributed to the conquering of Ilorin by the Jihadists led by Uthman dan Fodio in 1804.

These perceptions are noted by Tukur (Bugage, 1986) where he argues: "The basis of solidarity or identity in the caliphate was, therefore, brotherhood in Islam. It had nothing to do with ethnicity or territorial nationalism." Bugaje (1986) further claims that because the northern region is based on an Islamic ideological platform to the exception of ethnicity, to attain recognition of the state, the acceptance of the belief system (Islam) and its ideological foundation is a prerequisite for individual to claim group membership. It is not uncommon that even enlightened commentators to refer to Hausa-Fulani as if they are natural and organic social entity.

At first glance the distinguishing feature of the Hausa-Fulani ethnie, which is different to the other ethnic groups, is "a deep and diffuse faith in Islam, and a tradition of large-scale rule through centralized authoritarian states" (Diamond, 1988: 21). Arguing in a similar vein, Harnischfeger (2004:452), notes that Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences, when he cites a Sheik from the north:

> The idolatrous tribes to the south (northern tribes) ...are vastly
> superior in numbers to the Muslims, and it is surprising that they do
> not overwhelm them. The explanation may be found in the spirit of

brotherhood which unites the Muslims...

1.14: Conclusion

The significance of this chapter is that it shows the dynamics of religious identity in both western and non-western societies, with particular reference to northern Nigeria. Four precise conclusions can be observed. Firstly, is to provide a clear picture of religion as a strong identity marker to the individual; a second, closely connected observation, is to understand that religion is a strong and critical characteristic in primordial identity; a third point is that religion has a overarching solidarity among people divided on ethnic grounds; a final pivotal observation is the exploration of the rationale behind how religion has assumed the center stage of the modern world. We have seen that religion affects everyday life and political legitimacy of governments in non-western societies and, to some extent, in western societies.

In short, the crux of this chapter is that it provides a well-informed foundation on the complexity of religion in society and, in particular, searches in some ways, religion's role as an unsolved element in political thought in northern Nigeria. The chapter explores universal issues from a new dimension and gives serious attention to religion in the social context. It is contended that religion is a decisive variant in the primordial construction of northern Nigeria and it may continue to be a critical part of a continuous process in everyday life in the region. Perhaps one needs to state that, given the crucial role of religion amongst Muslims in northern Nigeria, it may be crucially difficult to maintain a society entirely free from religious conflicts, especially when perceptions of threats to identities are imagined. But who can adequately predict a continuous clash of faiths in the future?

In order to understand literature pertaining to clash of faiths and threats to identities, the following chapter discusses the cultural, sociological, psychological, biological, economic and historico-political as factors influencing conflict. In addition, the chapter will explore the phenomenon of Islam as constructed in western societies in an attempt to connect it with emerging misconceptions in scholarly literature.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

And do not dispute with the followers of the Book except by what is best, except those of them who act unjustly, and say: We believe in that which has been revealed to us and revealed to you, and our Allah and your Allah is One, and to Him do we submit.

The Qur'an 29:46

(Shakir's Translation)

2.1: Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored the primordial aspect of religion in non-western societies, and to some extent in western societies. I argued that religion subsumes all other forms of division and assumes the centre stage with particular emphasis with northern Nigeria as my case in point. It was noted that aside from the bonding potentials of religion, religious identities and collective differentiation is a cause-effect for conflict behaviour.

A significant body of literature has been developed over the last several years explaining sources of conflict behaviour. I propose to limit this review on the gargantuan collection of literature dealing exclusively with ethnic and political conflicts. I confine the review to useful classical and contemporary theories explaining conflict. And, I attempt to review the literature where religion is a variable in explaining conflict and where ethnic conflicts are inextricably interwoven with religion, as the most common form of religious conflict is ethno-religious (Fox, 2004b).

In determining the causal factors advanced for the explication of conflicts in societies in the literature review are categorized under the following headings: Cultural, sociological, psychological, biological, economic and historico-political. After this, it explicates specifically to conflicts in northern Nigeria. It must be noted that no single factor can explain any and every conflict. In addition, this chapter explores political Islam in the global context. It also seeks to clear some misunderstandings of Islam as perceived by western literature. The essence of this concern is to analytically determine the place and position of Islam in the socio-political society in the global context before assessing political Islam in northern Nigeria in the subsequent chapter.

Quite clearly, while some of these factors may be dominant causal links of a particular conflict, a whole lot of other factors often combine to facilitate the breakout of conflict and provide it with the destructive sustenance. The theories of conflict below are inexhaustible; however, popular theories rest on the following broad assumptions. Although these theories are contrasting they are nevertheless complementary in nature and, to some extent, overlap.

2.2: Cultural Factors: Clash of Civilizations' Theory

It is a paradox that religious conflicts have not been adequately addressed in politics and international relations. Well-known scholars, such as Geertz (1966), rejected religion in international debates, political thought and conflict analyses. This rejectionism was due to the international debates and the attention on the Cold War (Fox, 2001c). However, secularization theorists are now turning a new leaf. They suggest that there is a religious resurgence (Berger, 1999; Cox, 1984). At the collapse of bipolarism, the revival of religion in politics and international relations precipitated

with Lewis (1990). Lewis was the first to highlight and identify the conflict potential of religion as the 'clash of civilizations.' Lewis suggests that this clash would be between Islam and the West. Again, Lewis (1995) notes that during the medieval ages, Christian Europe and Islam set the distant foundation in identifying each other as rivals. Similarly, a renowned journalist, Pipes (1990) in an article entitled 'The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!' notes that "the fear of Islam has some basis in reality" and consequently Pipes envisioned a clash between the West and Islam.

Well-known scholars Huntington (1996) and Juergensmeyer (1993) provide a key reference point for an elaboration of the 'clash of civilizations' and the purported rivalry between secularization and religious secularization. They argue that religion would take a confrontational stage in world politics and that post-Cold War conflict would occur most frequently and violently along cultural lines as opposed to ideological lines.

At this point, while concurring with the imperative of religion occupying a central place in international politics, it must be emphasized that religion preceded political theories as a platform for human identity and consciousness. Particularly, Huntington's thesis has stirred several scholarly debates by political scientists (Ajami, 1993; Heilbrunn, 1997; Hessner, 1997; Tariq; Anwar, 1998) in determining whether religion can lead to a new civilizational conflict after the Cold War.

Two major implications of Huntington's position especially within the parameter of his civilization clash thesis between Islamic worldview and the western worldview are

(i) the existence of an homogenous Islamism and (ii) the idea that Islam in totality is a negation of peace and democracy; the political and market rooted project of neoliberal globalization. These assertions are so weighty and have serious implications for my research problematic such that they need to be contextualized and problematized historically and empirically in the light of contemporary realities.[20]

Notable critics of Huntington's theory are Senghaas (1998) and Tusicisny (2004). Senghaas observes that Huntington, in explaining the concept of a clash of civilizations at the macro level, focuses mainly on western civilization and does not provide any useful insights into what is understood as Islamic civilization. One might insist, at this point, that the weakness of Huntington's suggestion is his account that Islam is a threat to western civilization. In other words, Huntington associates Islam with terrorism. Huntington's argument is similar to an incomprehensible argument that suggests that western civilization is a threat to world peace, due to the fact that it instigated two catastrophic World Wars, which left 55 million people dead. Constructively criticizing Huntington's theory, Tusicisny (2004) observes that Huntington uses civilization as an umbrella for religion, ethnicity and language. Huntington does not differentiate between religion, ethnicity and language as well as explain why he terms them within the context of a civilization.

Perhaps the most serious objection to Huntington's hypothesis is that he is indirectly labeling Muslims as Islamic terrorists. Perhaps, Huntington's thoughts may have been influenced by the misconceived speculation that not all Muslims are terrorists but all

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[20] Samuel Huntington, (1997:141) responding to the criticisms pertaining to his 'clash of civilizations' theory, argues that people are now identifying their identity in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. He further argues that countries possessing similar identities are rallying together due to notions of trust and understanding.

terrorists are Muslims. More to the point, Huntington does not distinguish Islamic fundamentalists from Islamic civilization.

Another critic of Huntington's theory is Fox (2000d), who used qualitative analyses of 105 ethno-religious minorities with data from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 (MAR3) dataset.[21] Fox discovered that Islamic ethno-religious groups were not more conflict prone than other religious groups during the 1990s. However, he notes that religion is an important factor in conflicts within Islamic groups. In addition, Fox (2002) discovered that civilizational conflicts represent a minority of ethnic conflicts that occurred during and after the Cold War. Fox (2007) demonstrates that Huntington's prediction of a civilizational conflict has not come to pass as of 2004 (after 9/11). Fox further demonstrates that there has been a greater tendency for religious conflicts (Islamic) to occur within a religion (intra-religious) in a state and not with other civilizations. Consequently, most conflicts by Muslims were with Muslims and most conflicts by non-Muslims were with non-Muslims (Fox, 2007:365).

It is possible to suggest that the assumption that Islamic groups are more prone to violence than other religious groups poses particular problems and confusion. However, an insight provided by Fox (2007) is that the reason for this misleading assumption is due to the separation of religion from the state. An ostensibly compelling study provided by Fox (2001c), which he provides evidence through a quantitative study, is that since 1945 until the end of the Cold War, there has been a

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[21] This dataset was formed by Gurr (1993).

rise in ethnic conflicts. But, there has not been any significant change in the types of ethnic conflict.

Arguments similar to Fox's have been noted by Russett, et al. (2000: 585), who argue that Huntington's theory of a clash of civilizations does not offer a sound guide to the future and that the measure for positioning states to civilizations are obscure. Another equally important observation, showing difficulties in Huntington's theory observed by Russett et al. (2000), is that intra-civilizational conflicts are more common than inter-civilizational conflicts and those inter-civilizational conflicts have reduced since the demise of the Cold War. A further line of criticism stems from Rösel (1999:65), who notes that most protracted conflicts involve parties, nations and ethnic groups who belong to the same civilization. Similarly, Gurr (1994) observes that there is a lack of evidence to assert that inter-civilizational conflicts are not more intense than other ethno-political conflicts. Arguing along similar lines, Gartzke & Gleditsch, (2006) observe that conflicts are more frequent *within* civilizations than conflicts *between* civilizations. Roeder (2003), in line with the Gartzke & Gleditsch, note that inter-civilizational conflicts often occur in states with minorities.

From the above, what is perceptively clear in the 'clash of civilizations' theory is that it may be at best be described as hyperbolic in concurrence with Sen's (2008:6) remarks:

> What is perhaps the most limiting feature of the civilizational approach...is the mind-boggling shortcut it takes in trying to understand our sense of identity. Ignoring the immense richness of the multiple identities that human beings have, given their diversity of affiliations, attachments and affinities the civilizational approach attempts to put

each of us into a little box of a single sense of belonging, to wit, our alleged perception of oneness with our respective 'civilization.'

It is, however, important not to underemphasize Huntington's theory. Fox and Sandler (2004:132), in their use of quantitative analyses, show Huntington was correct in suggesting that Islamic civilization would experience more violent conflicts after the Cold War but was wrong in forecasting that this violence would involve Islam and other civilizations. It is important to note, however, that the clash of civilizations (West and Islam), is prevalent and interwoven in the conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. Although, this study notes the importance of the clash of civilizations, the study has deliberately adopted the social bonding of religion within a society for a more concise focus.

2.3: Sociological Factors

Weber (1947) makes it clear that conflict is part of society. He views conflict within the paradigm of power and authority. Weber further notes that peace occurs when there is a change in the form of conflict. To Weber, man is a social being, hence his associational existence. Although Weber is clear about the interrelatedness of society and conflict, Weber plainly states that conflict is a societal characteristic. A missing link is that his explanation neglects causation of conflict in society. However, one may concede that conflict is "...an inevitable aspect of human interaction and an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions" (Zartman, 1991: 299).

In a bold attempt to explain the causal relations between conflict and society, Galtung (1969) contends that social structures have the tendency to systematically obstruct other people from enjoying their basic needs. In conceptualizing human needs with

religious violence, Galtung (1990; 1996) bases these concepts on the 'Chosen' and the 'Unchosen.' Galtung illustrates this by showing that people believe they are chosen by God (true believers), whilst others are heretics or unbelievers. The sentiments of being 'Chosen' produce sentiments of specialness amongst a religious group, such as Muslims in northern Nigeria. To Galtung, the 'Unchosen' are deemed ordinary and sub-human. The supposition of Galtung's theory is useful to some extent in explaining religious conflicts. Religious conflicts generate the notion of 'we' as against 'others', which is the causal link to structural violence and has the tendency to transform into cultural violence. However, this causal explanation is complicated by failing to explain how we can socially construct notions of 'we-ness.' Thus, a separate understanding and analyses of cultural characteristics and social structure is required. But how precisely, it may be asked, does one ascertain notions of 'we-ness'?

Conceivably, the best known answer may be provided by Connor (2002). Connor suggests that in order to understand the distinctive character of ethnic conflicts, insights into facts as perceived by the people (the notions of 'we') and not outsiders are to be taken into consideration. Of course, the notions of 'we-ness' must be taken into account in analyzing conflicts but the weakness here is that there may be discomfitures and conflicting notions of 'we-ness' and how it is interwoven with conflict.

Perhaps, it is for this reason that Kriesberg (1998) searches into a sociological conflict theory. He considers conflicts to occur when there are incompatible objectives between parties. These incompatible objectives may occur when there are ethnic boundaries or a clash of religious identities in a state. The sociological conflict theory

provides valuable literature in studying contemporary conflict as it is useful in explaining the complex system of society and its actors. The key issue, however, is that one may argue that notions of incompatible objectives between parties may not always lead to conflict. There are no clear guidelines on the particular conditions for conflict, moreover there are other causal explanations of conflict.

In searching for other causal explanations of conflict, Bartos & Wehr (2002) present an important suggestion by attributing conflict to different hostile parties having incompatible goals. Thus, conflict may be explained as a form of action used to address the perceived incompatible goals. For instance, where Muslims attempt to introduce Sharia, non-Muslims may regard such an act as hostile, and thus, as incompatible. This point shows that religious violence could be understood within the needs of identity in the pursuit of social goals (Burton, 1997). However, it is suggested that there is a non-existent consensus on a single theory of conflict in respect of explaining hostilities between parties.

Using a structuralist paradigm, Jabri (1996) argues that violence is as a result of the breakdown of social order. To Jabri, this breakdown of order is understood as separating the outsiders and insiders, which revolves around identity conflict. Although, this assists in explaining the causal patterns of conflict, it is, however, unlikely that conflicts are generated strictly by a breakdown of social order. A notable feature of conflict is that sometimes there are no early warning signs of societal chaos. Although, Jabri provides an illustrative and pragmatic analysis, its applicability in explaining conflicts has to be treated with caution.

It is worth mentioning that social heterogeneity of societies has been implicated as casual factors of conflicts among identity groups, occurring where one group dominates the other and there exists the perception of differences amongst people in the same social system. However, Osaghae & Suberu (2005: 4-5) illustrate with empirical evidence that division and conflict are not dependent on the number of differences or degree of diversity. This is because some of the most diverse countries enjoy relative peace and stability, while some of the least diverse are the most divided.

Presumably, in terms of propensity for conflicts, religious reformism and fundamentalist religious orientations are highly culpable. In line with this suggestion, Gopin (2000) proposes that the rise in religious warfare is due to the rise in religious revivalism. Gopin's position is that religious revivalism has dual potentials. Firstly, it has a basis of social harmony; secondly, a generator of conflicts within and between religions. From the former perspective, Fox (2004a) and Pearce (2005) draw on several different studies to establish that faith-based conflicts are more intense and destructive as opposed to other types of conflicts. Gopin's argument in many ways explains the social construction of Islam in northern Nigeria, which acts as a double edged sword – it promotes social harmony among its adherents and at the same time generates conflict with non-members of its faith.

In explaining how identity and religion interrelate, Kakar (1996) tells us that identity threats are the root cause of religious conflict and that these threats may arise as a result of economic interests, a perceived discrimination by the state or a change of a political regime. In explaining how identity threats cause conflict, Sen (2006) argues that the root is found in the 'miniaturization' of individuals or the 'solitarist belittling'

of individuals' by others possessing a different identity. There is a perceived perception of viewing the individual as different. On religious identity Sen (2006:13) notes that the world is "not seen as a collection of people but as a federation of religions and civilizations." In articulating Sen's position, his arguments indeed are useful in explaining differences in cultural identities, in northern Nigeria, between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, Sen fails to mention some critical issues of religions overarching ability to create solidarity amongst different identities within certain social constructions.

Hasenclever & Rittberger (2000) who offer three theoretical perspectives on the role of religion in conflict: Primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. On primordialism, Hasenclever & Rittberger underscore Huntington's suggestion that nations will be divided along civilizational lines; therefore, conflicts between nations will be based on religious civilizations. On instrumentalism, they argue that religion is invoked in conflicts when variables such as economic, social and political inequalities are experienced by an identity group. And on constructivism, they explicate that social conflicts are socially constructed and interconnected with group identities and loyalties such as nationalism, ethnicity and religion. Furthermore, Hasenclever & Rittberger argue that the likelihood of religion being interwoven in conflict is as a result of the sacred sanction given in support of the conflict by the elites and effectiveness of group mobilization for supporting the conflict. Although one must concede that group mobilization and the manipulation of religion by the elites are variables that incite religious conflict, it is vital to explore other important variables such as perceived or imagined threats to a religious identity.

Further, Little (1996) provides an intriguing analysis of religious militancy. He views culture or civilization as determinants of religious militancy. One crucial factor noted by Little's determinants of religious is the use of 'violent tolerance', where militants uphold violence to demonstrate a sacred obligation to terminate the perceived religious injustice. In line with Little's 'sacred obligation' as a factor that inspires religious violence, Nelson-Pallmeyer (2003), drawing on the suggestions of Juergensmeyer (1991) and Rene Girard (1977), argues eloquently that religious justified violence is first and foremost a problem of sacred texts and not a problem of misinterpretation of the texts. If it is assumed that religion sanctions the use of violence, then does religion sanction the use of terrorism? This obscures the division between terrorism and religious violence.

On one important issue Stern (2003) explains that religious terrorism is attained by spiritual leaders harnessing grievances and mystifying spiritual texts to support conflict or a Holy War. In a similar fashion, Pearlstein (2004) argues that one of the factors that influence violent ethnic conflicts is religious conflicts that are manipulated by religious fundamentalists. However, Munson (2005) argues that although monotheistic religions have sacred texts justifying violence, religious practices changes with the society and as society changes, tolerance of other religions is replaced by these sacred texts legitimising violence. Munson's view appears to be logical and persuasive, but Munson fails to discuss the legitimacy of religious violence used in the international world. Religion as a causal variable to violence may not have changed with modernity as religion is still a strong primordial identity marker in the contemporary world, especially in non-western societies.

Jenkins (2002) presents an argument that suggests that the mechanism of religious conversion has the capability to promote rivalry and shift the demographic balance between adherents of different religions within a state. Therefore, where elite fragmentation, intra-class, intra- and inter-group discords are pronounced by a religious change, a fertile ground for conflict may be sown. Similarly, Kimball (2002) argues that religious violence exists due to the failure of religious accommodation, which is often associated with monotheism. Here, it becomes necessary to point out that unlike the African social set-up with polytheism as the religious outlook with different gods existing side-by-side with one another and with an understanding amongst believers, the imported religions in Africa foreclosed these accommodative religious tendencies. Perhaps, it could then be argued that religious intolerance was imported by the two Abrahamic faiths. And that before these faiths were introduced, Africans did not wage wars over religion. Therefore, it could be further argued that an unspoken truth of the Puritanism of these foreign religions is that it encourages conflicts, as adherents of other religions are demonized.

In an attempt to illustrate the non-accommodative tendencies of Abrahamic faiths, Rieffer (2003) suggests that religious nationalism, while advancing the conception of a nation conveys religious exclusivity leads to intolerance of other religions. This intolerance transforms into violence (Faris 1935). Rieffer argues that the development of a religious identity leads to the birth of an 'alien other.' This suggestion in some sense aptly describes Islam in northern Nigeria, where Islam unites and divides in equal measures – it is tolerant to those who are part of it and intolerant to those not part of it. Perhaps, then, Ryan (1995:89-90) is not incorrect when he famously argues that religious conflicts are causally linked by the concepts of 'demonization' and

'sanctification', which are inextricably interwoven and do generate Holy Wars (religious conflicts).

2.4: Psychological Factors

Indeed, by way of an introduction, Burton (1990) provides a powerful and persuasive study covering basic human needs theory, which is similar to Galtung's arguments discussed above. Burton argues that social conflict often occurs when there is a frustration of needs, such as security and identity. Hence, if an individual's security is threatened, his or her basic human needs are not being met. He argues that individuals will pursue their basic needs at any cost. Subsequently, whenever the system suppresses a people the end result is social conflict. Within this framework, the theory poses a problem in the sense that human needs are not universal, as they are historically and culturally determined. Therefore, human needs which tend to generate conflict must be identified. However, it may be a complex effort to attempt to identify these needs as the list is unlimited.

As Rickman (1950) writes, aggression is a part of mankind's natural make-up, as mankind strives to dominate others. Galtung (1971:272) defines aggression as "drives towards change, even against the will of others." In consonance with Rickman's view point, De Bono (1985) informs us that the root of conflicts is the fact that people see things differently. In explaining his suggestion, De Bono attempts to define beliefs to include perceptions, behaviour, values and principles. These beliefs are based on the perceptions of the mind. The premise of these arguments is on the notion of 'want' as a variable factor of conflict. Thus, a methodical causal pattern of conflicts arises where a belief is coerced in a system against others beliefs.

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In relating violent conflict to psychological explanations, Rapoport (1995) attempts to find an answer to violence in human nature. Rapoport concedes that it is not human to be violent, rather violence is attributed to circumstances human beings find themselves in. On the theory that frustration leads to aggression, he argues that every frustrating experience does not lead to aggression. However, he concedes that there is a link between frustration and aggression and ultimately violence.

In their psychological explanation of conflict, Vyas & Vyas (2000) argue that all groups desire cultural esteem or revered self image, and such sentiments of loyalty have the tendency to produce cultural aspirations of the individual, which in turn produce a coalition based on common interests. This image, Vyas & Vyas argue, is instinctual. Consequently, it is clear that that the "greatest need of all the needs is the preservation of the self (self interest)..." (Vyas & Vyas, 2000:19). When self-esteem and self-interest are threatened, the result is conflict. The difficulty arises when one looks into what determines self-esteem and self-interest. Moreover one might argue that the emergence of self-esteem and self interest are, to some degree, more prevalent to the individual than to the group.

2.5: Biological Factors

Lorenz (1968) applies a biological approach to conflicts (cf.Davies, 1980). Lorenz considers violent conflicts not within the paradigm of the human mind, but as an innate characteristic of human nature and the animal kingdom. Lorenz built his argument on the earlier work of Sigmund Freud. Freud (Freud, Gay & Strachey, 1989) suggested that mankind has innate conflicting needs. To him, this centered on libido and an aggressive constitution, which he termed as *Thanato*. Freud made an attempt to

argue that man's violent behaviour is similar to animal behaviour. The main drawback of Lorenz's argument is that conflict cannot be deemed to hereditary or part of the psychological reality of humans. Such an argument clearly implies that humans and animals have identical thinking patterns. As mentioned earlier, there are different incidences of conflict. Conflicts may be culturally determined and its causality varies from one culture to the other. However, the natural biological make-up of man can be understood to be within expressive traits such as hunger, thirst, laughing, etc. Traits such as aggression or drunkenness are self induced.

2.6: Economic Factors

The Marxian economic theory of conflict remains influential and persuasive. Marx and Engels (1964) provide a socio-economic explanation that economic inequities are the causal link to class conflict. The intellectual influence of Marxism is that the forces of production produce conflict by two classes – the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The end result is a class struggle, which leads to a revolution. This social inequality may create either a stable environment or cause a revolution that would lead to social change.

The Marxian economic theory informed early scholars on religion and conflict such as Mathews (1918), who, in a conservative analysis, suggests that religious conflict was an option of increasing the wealth and the land of the state. Mathews argues that economic development during the ancient world was warranted by war and consecrated by religion. On the contrary, Ballentine (2003:274), in a broader analysis, perceptively argues that economic incentives for conflicts is lacking in ethnic and religious conflicts because it involves non-divisible values. This may indeed be

correct as religion is based on a system of thought. Ballentine further suggests that ideologies in respect of identity and belongings are distinct from economic incentives.

In another study, Senghaas (2000) observes that at the initial stages of a crisis, issues of culture and religion are usually not of primary importance. One of the central issues raised by Senghaas' analysis is the 'distribution conflict.' This conflict is the main instigator of conflicts, with religion being deployed in furtherance of socio-economic agenda, privileging the instrumentalization of religion. In a similar sense, Jeong (2000) argues that cultural violence based on hatred, fear and suspicion, is conveyed by uneven distribution of wealth or political control and incompatible religious conditions which threaten the identity of a group. In line with this suggestion, Azam & Hoeffler (2001) tell us that the distribution of resources plays a vital role in bonding a group's identity. The distribution of resources can financially empower a group and equip it for the purpose of instigating conflict. The lack of resources, on the other hand, can cause grievance amongst a group and this may also lead to violence.

Furthering our understanding of economic conflict, Keen's (1998) suggests two forms of economic violence. First, is the 'top-down' category, in which politicians and the elites mobilize the grass-root people to carry out acts of violence in order to achieve political currencies. Keen notes that a pre-condition for this conflict is that there must be state weakness. Alternatively, is the 'bottom-up' category. Here the grass-roots people mobilize themselves to instigate conflict because they perceive that they relatively deprived of political, social or economic participation. This perception is a link to frustration which emanates into conflict (Gurr, 1970). The question then arises: How is economic violence associated with religious violence in northern Nigeria?

How is economic violence incited by politicians and the elites using religion as a mobilization tool or instigated by the grass-root people when there is a perceived threat to the primordial identity of Islam in northern Nigeria?

It is crucial to note that the economic variable or the modernist approach rejects the traditionalist approach expounded by Gurr (1970) as being over-simplified in explaining causal patterns of conflicts. The greed theory is useful in explaining the causal link of civil wars in states that are non-developed or developing states, which are characterized by poverty, economic exploitation, uneven distribution of resources and lack of provision of basic needs. However, the theory of greed is not the only causal explanation for conflict as other inherent dynamics exist. Thus, Collier & Hoeffler's views on conflicts based on economic perceptions fail to present a wider framework for conflict dynamics because they appear to offer a single level of analysis.

Yet, an intriguing scholarly contribution by Haynes (2007) laments in detail and provides a satisfactory rational explanation on the causal patterns of conflict, especially in Africa. Haynes argues that civil wars in Africa are as a result of political and economic factors caused by ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in society. Haynes provides a useful guide and reasoning – that states such as Cameroun, Malawi and Tanzania, having high levels of ethnic and religious groups, have limited and contained ethnic and religious conflict, because the state has, to some extent, dealt with major public and economic concerns. This is in striking contrast with Somalia which is largely homogeneous, but suffers from incessant conflicts due to a poor functional economic system. The critical aspect of these analyses shows that

perceptions of greed by one group can be limited to a certain degree when there is an even distribution of wealth in a state.

2.7: Historico-Political Factors

Ethnic boundaries create conditions for group conflict in divided societies (Horowitz, 1985; Connor, 1994). Most crucially it is the most important dimension in explaining social conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002). In substantiating this, Azar (1984:90) argues that group identity formations such as ethnicity are wedded to protracted social conflicts in a state. At this point it is ripe to mention that this study is in some way contradicts Azar's position.

However, what is crucial about Azar's (1990) argument is that the dearth of human needs is a causal link to protracted social conflicts. Azar notes that developing countries are more prone to experience protracted social conflicts due to weaknesses in political institutions and the presence of a fragile economy. A weak state is characterized by poor democratic systems and resource distribution. Poor democracies are more prone to civil war than liberal democracies (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000).

More fundamental and therefore more important, however is that ethnicity is not usually the causal link to social conflicts but merely is the form in which they exist. What exists is the linkage of social, political and economic conflicts among people of different ethnic groups (Ryan, 1995:23). For instance, self determination and grievances have been identified as the leading causes of protracted social conflicts (Fox, 2004b; Gurr, 1993). Likewise, it could be argued that religion exists

independently from ethnicity, but its distinctiveness can form an element in ethnic identity and can converge with ethnicity in times of conflict. Furthermore, the discovery of Fox & Squires (2001) that nationalism is a more significant influence on ethnic conflict than religion is very informative. The authors suggest that *ethno-nationalist* ambitions are more common than religious ones.

Social conflicts have also been attributed to the complications arising from democracy. During the initial stages of establishing a democratic order, heterogeneous states are likely to produce ethnic and religious conflicts (Wimmer, 2003; Fox, 2000b; Gurr 1993). The large scale of ethnic and religious conflicts following from the return to civil rule and its new democratization in Nigeria on May 1999 provides empirical justification to the above assertion. Nigeria has witnessed more ethnic and religious conflicts from 1999 since her independence.

Arendt (1970) provides an influential account of conflict. Arendt considers violence to be interrelated with the struggle for power and domination of one group or state over another. This suggestion is observed when members of different faiths use violence to achieve domination over members of another faith, solely to achieve power. Arendt's suggestion is rather complex and unduly restricting due to the fact that violence and power may not always be interrelated. In this context, different groups yearning for power may not use violence as a last resort to achieve dominance.

From Lincoln's (2003) point of view, in what may be termed as a hegemonic discourse on violence, religious conflict arises when the 'religion of the status- quo' is used as a source of domination over 'religions of resistance.' This, in the long-run, can

result in religious conflict between the dominant majority and the dominated religious minorities. Religious abhorrence to other religious adherents and its antecedent competition of interests are found in the histories of conflict between these groups (Sullivan, 1988). This analysis in many ways describes 'Islam as the status quo' in northern Nigeria. However, a missing link is perhaps that the 'religion of the status quo' might be an ideological tool to unite minorities or people of different ethnic groups in the region.

Gurr (1993), in his treatise on 'Minorities at Risk', argues that discrimination against an ethnic minority provides the basis for the minority to form an opposition to protest and terminate the perceived discrimination. Fox (2000c) shares a similar view with Gurr and argues that religious factors are capable of giving rise to discrimination and grievances, which can give rise to ethnic and religious conflicts. Fox argues that the causes of religious discrimination are different from other types of causes of discrimination. Discrimination is usually seen as an act committed by a dominant group over a minority group. Thus, where religious issues are prevalent in ethnic, political, economic and cultural ideologies discrimination and conflict have the tendency to escalate. Fox (1997) argues that religion has a distinct difference from culture and as such is a distinct and separate feature from ethnic conflicts, notwithstanding the fact that religion is an element of the conflict. Yet, the religious causes of discrimination arise where the minority group believes that the majority group is threatening their religious identity, where religious legitimacy has been summoned by religious groups and the relevance of the emotiveness or sentiment of religion to the conflict (Fox, 1999b).

Of central importance is Fox's (1999a, 2000c & 2004b) concept of the leading religious causes of ethnic conflicts. To Fox, these causes are influenced by four functions:

(1) Religious demands: Religion provides a foundation for understanding the world. When these foundations are attacked, the consequence is a conflictive response.

(2) Religious grievances: Religion provides a link for the individual to a greater whole. Thus, any grievance by a group can lead to the use of religion by that group as a tool for conflict.

(3) Religious legitimacy: Religion has the potential to legitimize actions and conflict.

(4) Religious institutions: Religion can be used to rally support from the masses in order to mobilize the masses for political action and ethnic conflict.

A notable problem in Fox's research is that it is scarcely developed, as it does not focus on the rigorous causal patterns of religious conflicts but only on the conditions that make them exist. However, as previously noted, Collier & Hoeffler (2007) have suggested that the conditions that determine conflict (civil war) to exist (for instance greed) are more important than the causal motives of the conflict.

However, Fox (2000a) argues causes of conflicts between different ethnic groups with different religious affiliations are more often ethnic than religious. Fox observed that religion was a primary factor in only 12 out of 105 cases. In addition Fox observes that ethnic minorities are not usually the instigators of religious conflicts rather it is the ethnic majority that is most likely to instigate conflict.

Leatherman et al. (1999) express that the mélange of nationalism and religious nationalism have the tendency to promote political desires by a group, which gives rise to 'negative emotions.' These emotions generate violence in the execution of a seemingly just cause. Similarly, in a persuasive analysis, Kunovich & Hodson (1999) argue that 'diverging interests' are the causation of religious conflicts. They illustrate their argument with the diverging interests of the Roman Catholics, the Eastern Orthodox and the Muslim faiths, coupled with the policies of the Communist regime, the deeds of various churches during World War II and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which led to the search for religious and ethnic identities among its people.

Drawing on these theories, it is clear that most conflicts in Africa, and, more specifically Nigeria, have a historical foundation due to the invented traditions of the colonialists. Mazrui's (2001) view is that the incessant conflicts across the continent are as a result of the pluralistic nature of African countries (cf. Ndula 2002:143). Mazrui raises the idea that the root causes of conflicts may be as a result of the 'forces of decolonization.' In addition, Mazrui asserts that the source of conflicts in Africa may be as a result of Africa's previous history of colonization. Mazrui suggests that Africa is going through socio-political transformation, from the pre-colonial period into a new birth. The osmosis of colonialization shows that it may be a link to conflicts due to the invented traditions by the British colonialists as explained above. However, it does not recognize that colonialization may be an indirect link in bringing different ethnic groups together, in some societies, who became united under the umbrella of religion. The Hausa-Fulani and the old Kanem-Bornu Empire in northern Nigeria are useful illustrations of the impact of colonialization which merged different groups together by indirect rule.

In this context, it may be constructive to note Englebert's et al. (2002) arguments, which are similar to Mazrui's. Englebert et al. posit that the partitioning of pre-existing homogenous African societies, (dismemberment) have led to incessant conflicts. Englebert's et al argue that the dismemberment of African societies forced people with different history, languages, culture and religion under the same political systems which are highly autocratic.

These analyses are susceptible to ceaseless interpretations, as conflicts in Africa have different causal explanations and analysis. It is possible that conflicts may exist where there exists a common language, common culture and a common ethnicity. As earlier noted, ethnic homogeneity failed to serve as a check to the conflict in Somalia exposes the inadequacy of the foregoing position.

2.8: Need of Supplementing Literature

In linking the above literature to northern Nigeria, scholars from Nigeria have not identified the peace and conflict dynamics of Islam. The predominant intellectual response is that they particularly focus on the conflict potential of the religion and the politicization of religion (Ibrahim, 1991; Falola, 1998; Aguwa, 1997). In attempting to explain religious violence in northern Nigeria, scholars use a multi-causal analysis to explain religious conflicts-on historical, economic, political and/or social variables. Similarly, conflicts in northern Nigeria in general and Kaduna State in particular are explained in the context of a clash of values and competition over scarce resources, power and status (Yusuf, 2007).

As Küng (2007:590) reminds us, religion has existed since the existence of human beings and from the time of this existence there has been violence. Küng argues that religions, especially monotheistic religions, are prone to violence. "Holy wars are understood to be wars of aggression, waged with a missionary claim at the command of a deity" (Küng, 2007:592). Küng further points out that the use of aggression was officially allowed during the Christian crusades. On the other hand, he asserts that Jihad was a policy for Islamic imperialism. Küng's explanation of the genesis of religious violence is then a powerful reminder of the historical and inherent conflict generative mechanism of religion.

A point to be introduced in connection with Küng's reminder is provided by Fox (2001b), where he demonstrates through quantitative testing that religious differences make conflict more likely and more intense in a given geographical area. Fox posits that varied religious beliefs in a country promote religious conflicts. In addition, Fox asserts that religious sentiments can escalate into ethnic conflicts, but such conflicts are easily controlled without the existence of religious sentiments.

From these points of view, the key problem has to do with faith-based differences. While religion is not necessarily conflicting, the individual's intolerance of other people's belief system and the desire to use religion as a platform for political domination and economic advantage makes religion a veritable conflict generating potential.

Vastly important, and vastly ignored in the preceding literature, is that most scholars do not view religion, Islam as our case in point, as having the potential to generate

social bonding between different identity groups. Religious identification is considered as having the potential to create group division, which leads to segregation and violence. Linking this discourse to this analysis, one may argue that it would be erroneous to apply such analyses within the context of a civilization in a non-western society, such as northern Nigeria. Western literature may be argued to be inconsistent with the internal dynamics of a non-western society. This misinformation led Roy (1994) to argue that Islam is limited in its cultural sphere and has failed to act as an egalitarian religion to achieve unity because it has not significantly transformed the Middle East. It was used as an oppressive tool in Iraq; it could not prevent the Americanization of the Gulf after the Gulf War and the prevalence of inter-Islamic wars in the Middle East. He further argues that western domination is ubiquitous in Islamic societies due to the fact that their intellectuals are educated in westernized environments. Furthermore, Pipes (1995) notes that this pattern points to a paradox where intellectuals who want to reposition the Islamic world back to the seventh century practice western traditions and appear to appreciate westernized ways of life. But, as interesting as such explanations may be it must be remembered that Islam is understood, practiced and perceived differently in different societies.

A pointer to the misconceived political culture of Islam is explained by Price (1999:16) where he notes that "the west has always approached the study of Islam from a position of power and dominance, the colonizer and the hegemony, which has prevented western scholars from gaining an accurate understanding of Islam and Islamic societies."

2.9: Misconceptions in Western Literature

Islam, more than any other religion, has been accused of propensity for violence. Given its orientation and the contemporary assertiveness, if not defensive disposition, Islam has come to be seen as fundamentalist, violent and undemocratic. In the light of this, Carapico (1997:29-31) perceptively notes that:

> In Orientalist depiction, Islam is often seen as the antithesis of tolerance, social justice, individualism, and legal-rationality. Jihad (often erroneously understood as "holy war") appears more central to this great religion than prayer or charity.

While widespread evidence of violence traceable to Islamists abound globally, to uncritically generalize that Islamic is prone to violence is an over-generalization that demands serious contextual analysis.

Now it is important, that what needs to be recognized here is that the community of Islam is theocratic in nature. An illustration of the *Umma* is best put by Bernard Lewis (Midlarsky, 1998:486):

> The *Umma* thus expressed, from its inception, the fusion of politics and religion characteristic of the later Islamic states. . . . In the Islamic world, therefore, there could be no conflict between Pope and Emperor, for the powers which these two represented were one and the same.

This above assertion explains the phrase '*hukm illa lillahi*' (No rule but that of God alone). This effectively divides the world between the House of Muslims (*dar al-Islam*) and the House of non-believers (*dar al-Harb*) due to the interwoveness of Islam with politics. In the light of the above, Islam has been misconceived as unconstructively related to democracy and is effectively at variance with western

forms of governess.[22] As captured by Brenner (2000:144): "Islamic religious culture is a much broader and more inclusive conceptual frame of reference than 'Islam' and includes all cultural manifestations and social or political institutions that are defined as Islamic by Muslims themselves in any given social context." It should be noted that the Qur'an has 6,348 verses and covers all aspects of social life, such as civil law, marriage, international law and economic affairs. (Salmi et al., 1998:33). In this respect, Islam could have different meanings to an individual. Thus, Klausen (2005:81) rightly observes that "for some, Islam is a source of identity and family tradition. For others, it is a source of intense spiritual commitment. And yet others think of faith as a practical problem for Muslims and a source of bias, but not of great personal relevance."

Furthermore, the *Umma* provides religious solidarity among its adherents and sanctions the communal system of praying and fasting together as opposed to non-Islamic faiths, which permits these practices in the private realm of the individual. Thus, Gellner (1981:1) rightly points out that "Islam is the blueprint of a social order...It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained and independent of the will of men...Judaism and Christianity are also blueprints of a social order, but rather less so than Islam." This practice enables Islam to operate under a rigid closed system. In this sense, Islamic civilization appears not to differentiate between religion and politics.

While it is inconceivable that Islamists have their share of the blame in the incidence of violence and the criminalization of Islam, the issue needs deeper contextualization,

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[22] Manus I. Midlarsky (1998:492).

especially in the context of the political economy of oil and the centrality of the Middle East in the global energy politics. It is against this background that one of the objectives of the USA in relation to the Middle East according to Wanamaker (1964:199) is "to achieve sufficient stability to make possible orderly political and economic development and insure the continued flow of Persian Gulf oil to Europe." Flowing from this strategic consideration of the capitalist high command, the region has never been free of imperialist domination and manipulations, with its attendant violent conflicts, counter-hegemonic violence and even wars.

2.9.1: The Origins of Islamophobia

Lewis (1988:71) observes that "Islam is perceived from its inception, as a militant, indeed as a military religion and its followers as fanatical warriors, engaged in spreading their faith and law by armed might." Ernest Renan's (Kurzma, 1998:3) scathing comments on Islam are also informative:

> Islam is the complete negation of Europe ... Islam is the disdain of science, the suppression of civil society; it is the appalling simplicity of the Semitic spirit; restricting the human mind, closing it to all delicate ideas, to all refined sentiment, to all rational research, in order to keep it facing an eternal tautology: God is God.

Such views are prevalent not only amongst some academics but even amongst politicians such as Geert Wilders. The controversial Member of Parliament in Holland made an insensitive statement when he said: "I don't hate Muslims. I hate Islam." He further says that "Islam is not a religion; it's an ideology, 'the ideology of a retarded culture."[23] Opinions such as those quoted above have led to a general linking of all

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[23] 'I don't hate Muslims. I hate Islam', says Holland's rising political star. Accessed on the 16th of October 2009 at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/17/netherlands.islam.

religious militancy with Islam. Most recently in September 2010, plans by a controversial church (Dove World Outreach Center) in America, through the misguided thoughts of its Pastor, Terry Jones, in an attempt to fan the flames of 9/11 planned to burn copies of the Qur'an over protests against the construction of an Islamic community centre close to the spot where the Trade Centre was destroyed by terrorists. This sort of pronouncement by injudiciously minded people, which is not fairly accurate of popular Islamic culture of tolerance and peace, has enjoyed front page sensation in the hands of western and international media and given rise to Islamophobia in western societies.

Clearly in many ways, Islam is going through a process of resurgence in order to rediscover its nostalgic Golden Era and place in the sphere of international glory it once enjoyed. As captured by Fuller, (2003:2) "...many Muslims attribute the past achievements and durability of Islamic civilization to the very message and implementation of Islam itself. Logically then, any apparent straying from that faith might be perceived as a direct source of decline and failure." Islamic resurgence is often tagged as Islamic fundamentalism by western media. An illustration of this label is provided by El Fadl (2001:135) that in Israel, religious parties practice politics, support and oppose candidates, lobby for laws, clash with secularities and worship God freely. But if any Muslim group participates in politics they are recognized as political Islam or Islamism and thus establishing all political 'Islamists 'extremist' by definition. This misconception has prompted western governments to suggest that democratic ideals are contrary to Islamic cultures.

The resurgence of Islam is also attributable to the discontentment about the decline in the true practice of Islam. This sentiment has induced radical thoughts about reviving Islam which in turn has the tendency to produce militant reactions. In this context, Piscatori (1986) identifies three rationales behind these views. First, he suggests that the practice of orthodox Islam has been neglected. Second, that Muslims, especially in the Middle East, have not taken advantage of new ideologies to enhance its industrial capabilities and he proposes that there should be a separation of Islam from politics. Third, he suggests that the integration (mainly by western Muslims) of destructive practices known as 'westoxication' poisons the Islamic community and pollutes Islamic practices.

Islam declined in the global scene after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.[24] Militant Islam started in the 18th century following the fall of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922), and waxed stronger in the 20th century. After the fall of the Empire, western powers took control of the old empire and much of the Middle East. Consequently, the nationalistic sentiments were transformed into religious nationalism in the Arab world. This gave rise to reformers who sought to purify pristine Islam primarily in the struggle against oppression perceived as being sponsored by the West.

2.9.2: The Overarching Solidarity of Islam

Islam overlaps ethnic identities in certain societies. Religious identities were often synonymous with ethnic identities, for instance the Jews, the Armenians (Armenian Church) during the Ottoman Empire and the Coptics in Egypt. Islamic symbolism lies in the concept that an individual is a member of the social order within society. Islam

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[24] Islam came to Europe (Spain) in 709 and declined finally in 1918 after the 1ˢᵗ World War.

has been defined as an egalitarian religion as it brings a message of equality and rejects social differentiation (Lewis, 2002:82). Lamenting along these lines, the Anglican Bishop of the central Nigerian city of Jos, Nigeria, Reverend Benjamin Kwashi,[25] notes that "the Muslims are winning – they have won. Islam is growing very fast. For many Africans, it makes more sense to reject America and Europe's secular values, a culture of selfishness and half-naked women, by embracing Islam." One may argue that Islamic ideology has a tendency to produce a sinewy primordial identity than ethnicity. As captured by Mazrui (1985:828) that "Islam envisaged itself as being a fusion of three religions and ways of life-Judaism, Christianity and the religion fostered by the Prophet Muhammad...so doctrinally almost from the beginning Islam had the seeds of multiculturalism....".

2.9.3: Islamic Culture as Homogenous

Different cultures are modeled and impacted in varying degrees by Islam and as a result Islam has many faces. Price (1999:24) points out that the varied characteristic of political Islam is that it is characterized by a deficiency in political agenda, in the sense that its values and laws were adopted by a society that existed over 1,000 years ago. In some cultures Islam is interwoven with pre-existing cultural identities such as language and indigenous lifestyles. For instance, in the majority of the Islamic population in African states, women are not accorded political roles. However, in Islamic states such as Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, (a female) was elected as Prime Minster from 1988–1990 and from 1993–1996.

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[25] Onishi, Norimitsu. 'Rising Muslim Power in Africa Causing Unrest in Nigeria and Elsewhere', *New York Times* November 1, 2001 cited by Kareem M. Kamel in an article: 'Beyond Miss World: Muslim Protest in Nigeria', accessed on the on the 30th of March 2008 at:
http://www.islamonline.net/english/Views/2003/02/article04.shtml .

Contrary to the universalization of Islam, the dynamism of Islamic political odyssey globally has been innately contingent on situational variables informed by prevailing socio-economic, cultural and political conditions. In this context, history also plays important role. It is to this extent that it becomes an empirically invalid generalization to presuppose a universally correct Islamic culture of violence and anti-democratic disposition.

The denial of a universal Islamic tradition was supported by El-Zein (1977). In arguing the dynamics of different facets of Islam across the globe, El-Zein (1977:232) notes that Islam finds unity of meaning through the expressions of a particular religion and as a continuous tradition throughout generations. El-Zein (1977), also demonstrates empirically how contextual variables condition the different Islamic cultures that underscore politics and power contestations in Morocco and Indonesia. For instance, while the nuances of the warrior personalities that introduced Islam in Morocco predisposed the country to belligerent political interaction, the introduction of Islam by traders resulted in the direct opposite of the Islamic culture in Indonesia. Contrary to these empirically valid propositions, Orientalist scholars such as Carapico (1997: 30) argue that:

> The Orientalist mind-set attributes political struggles in the Middle East to culture, not social, economic, or individual factors. For instance, while lynchings, hate crimes, and family violence in America are but individual exceptions to a sound social ethic, "Islamic terrorism" is portrayed as if it were a religious expression.

Thus, it can be safely suggested that the facts on the ground illustrate that in Islamic nations, peculiar dynamics are sometimes ignored rather than analyzed and understood. In the light of this, Ahamed & Nazneem (1990: 804-805) argue that:

As a social force, Islam is dynamic; in critical times it has served as a rallying point in an environment where political institutions and organizations are very strong and political processes are free. Where these processes are closed and where democratic institutions are weak, the social force of Islam, mixed up with political activities, strengthens the forces of conservatism.

What is incontestable is that violence attributed to Islam, rather than being the dictates of Islamic orthodoxy should be understood as a fallout of conservatism that is engendered in the first instance by authoritarian political systems. It may be safe to submit that violence as a strategy is thus a means to an end and does not enjoy any primacy that should warrant a philosophy of sanctioning violence or any pre-eminence that would according to Burgat permit the "over-ideologiz(ing)" of political aggression (Langohr, 2001: 594).

Arguing against the criminalization of Islam and Islamists on the ground of charges of violent disposition, Burgat (Langohr, 2001:591) notes that "any western political party could be turned into Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected to the same repression Islamists had endured." This point cannot be emphasized enough given the large-scale state-sponsored international violence and persecution against Islam by the western world under the leadership of America, especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.

It is pertinent to note that a recent Gallup survey (2006) in 10 Islamic states, which represents more than 80% of the world's Muslim population, provides sufficient evidence to the fact that different Islamic states are inclined to different socio-political orientations.

Graph 2.1: Gallup survey on Sharia in Islamic States (2006)

Source:http://media.gallup.com/MuslimWestFacts/PDF/GALLUPMUSLIMSTUDIES IslamandDemocracy030607rev.pdf

2.9.4: Paradox of the Community of Islam

At this point one must acknowledge that the *Umma* has been subjected to criticism. Eickelman & Piscatori (1996: 56) proffered three arguments against the concept of *din wa-dawla (Islam is both state and religion)*. Firstly, Eickelman & Piscatori argue that the blend of Islam and politics is often exaggerated, as religion is often central to people's lives. Eickelman & Piscatori illustrate this by contending that religion is interwoven with politics with the Pope's (Pope John Paul II) political inclinations in Poland and in South Africa with Bishop Desmond Tutu's influence in the politics. Secondly, Eickelman & Piscatori argue that politics is guided by 'rational interests' and arguments supporting Islam and politics are stereotypical in nature. Thirdly, Eickelman & s Piscatori argue that since it is presumed that Islam incorporates both

religion and politics and establishes a social structure in society, this assumption presumes that everything is assumed to be political. Eickelman & s Piscatori argue that all Islamic structures are not political in nature as they overlap with each other.

Now, we come to a central point in understanding the *Umma*. The Islamic community (*Umma*) plays an integrative role in uniting different cultures and people under the same umbrella. But there is still a paradoxical and mystifying issue – different prevailing social conditions either facilitate the *Umma* or undermine it. Different ethno-nationalities can either be a source of division among Muslims in a state or it can facilitate an overarching solidarity among different ethnic identities.

In some contemporary Islamic states, the *Umma* has failed in uniting different identity groups. In states such as Afghanistan there are ethnic contentions between the Pashtuns, Tajiks and the Hazara. In Pakistan ethnic conflict exists within the Baluch, Sindhis, Punjabi and the Pashtun. In Iran conflict subsists amongst the Kurds, Baluch and Azeri, and in Somalia, despite being a homogenous nation-state, the *Umma* could not resolve incessant political conflicts. But, this does not help us in understanding the *Umma*. The interesting questions then are: Why are there different interpretations and contradictions in the *Umma*? In what sense, then, may we understand the *Umma*?

When the questions are phrased in this way, answers may be found in Fuller's (2003) thoughts, where he notes that the primary explanation for this intractable social phenomenon is reflected in the state's constitution of Muslims. Thus, the intriguing and compelling questions should be: Are such Islamic states sectarian or fragmented in composition? In Islamic states such as Pakistan, Iran and Iraq there are sectarian

divisions between the Shi'as and the Sunnis. These differences have given rise to conflicts within the state. This conflict is mainly centred on power struggle and resource control. Second, are the Muslims the ethnic minority in a non-Muslim state? Where Muslims constitute an ethnic minority within a state, the Umma tends to create an overarching solidarity amongst the Muslims. Here, Muslims are associated with a religious identity. In this state of affairs, Islam defines their ethnic identity (for example the Tatars in Russia). Third, are there Muslims of a minority ethnic group within a Muslim State? Where such a state exists, there is a tendency of conflicts generating in such a state. Here, Muslims of the ethnic minority group tend to foster for self-determination. The Kurds in Iraq and in Iran are contemporary examples. Fourth, are Muslims the majority ethnic group in a state? Where such exists, the minorities are excluded from the public sphere of governance and tend to be discriminated against due to their social status of 'dhimmis' (non-Muslims). Finally, are Muslims living in a state where there is a converging division on ethnicity and religion? Where Muslims are in a state where religion has provided some sort of geographical convergence, Islam provides a religious identity to Muslims in such state. Typical illustrations of such states are Nigeria and Sudan.

2.9.5: Islam and Democracy: A Convergence

To a large extent, the ideology that Islam is totally theocratic may be doubtful as the Qur'an does permit its members to protest against the politicization of Islam as it instructs that "their affairs are determined by mutual consultation" (Qur'an 42:38). The Qur'an makes this clear in Chapter 4:58: "Surely Allah commands that you vest authority into the hands of those who are best suited for it." Again the Qur'an in Chapter 4:59 states: "O you who believe, you shall obey GOD, and you shall obey the

messenger, and those in charge among you. If you dispute in any matter, you shall refer it to GOD and the messenger, if you do believe in GOD and the Last Day. This is better for you, and provides you with the best solution." This excerpt shows that Islam is not against democratic principles of governance. Yet, varying degrees of democratic principles are practiced in Islamic societies. Some shift towards secular democratic governments as in the case in Turkey, while some others shift towards religious nationalism and fundamentalism, such as in Iran (a democratic state) and Saudi-Arabia (a non-democratic state). As aptly put by Iran's President Mohammad Khatami,[26] "the existing democracies do not necessarily follow one formula or aspect. It is possible that democracy may lead to a socialist system. Or it is possible that democracy may lead to a liberal system. Or it may be a democracy with the inclusion of religious norms in the government. We have accepted the third option."

The observation above may have informed Hunter (1998:15) to note that:

> During the years immediately following the Iranian revolution, the division of Islam into good and bad versions took on a distinct and ethnic and sectarian coloring. Shi'a Islam and Persian traditions of Iran were said to be responsible for the excesses of its new Islamist ideology...Sunni Islam was said to be more democratic and egalitarian.

Similarly, Esposito & Voll (1996:6) caution that Islamic traditions should not be viewed in isolation, as Islamic cultures experience different socio-political developments. For the purpose of this discussion "democracy is identified as a cornerstone of western civilization and it is strongly prescribed for the rest of the world and humanity."[27] Western democracy has been argued to be the end of man's

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[26]Esposito and Voll 'Islam and Democracy', accessed on the 1st of November 2008 at:
http://www.neh.gov/news/humanities/2001-11/islam.html
[27] Farooq, 'Islam and Democracy: Perceptions and Misperceptions', accessed on the 4th of November, 2008 at:

evolution and a supreme universalistic ideology since it triumphed over Communism during the Cold War (Fukuyama, 1992). It is not surprising that some Islamic ideologies consider democracy as antagonistic to Islamic culture.

Another misconception in western literature is the view that Islamic culture is homogenous. As pointed out by Esposito & Voll (1998:13) "democratization is the demand for empowerment in government and politics made by a growing portion of populations around the world." Yet, Esposito & Voll argue that some Islamic states desire democratic governance modeled on Islamic culture as opposed to a westernized democratic model. In some societies democratic governance is tolerated. For instance, in Turkey there are democratic elections, a liberalized market economy, largely modeled on westernization. Other Islamic states such as Malaysia, Pakistan and Algeria practice democracy, with Islam as the state religion. But other Islamic societies, such as Saudi-Arabia, have an authoritarian regime.

It is important to note that the Qur'an does not specify any theory of political governance (Caha, 2003:40). Scholars have argued that Islam as sanctioned by the Qur'an accommodates democratic principles.[28] This is perhaps a truism, as Islam allows the popular rule of its citizens as vetoed by the community of Islam. The community of Islam endorses that all individuals within the community are equal. The significant difference is that popular sovereignty lies in the power of the people but in Islam power lies in God. God's sovereignty has been suggested to mean "expressions of God's creative role in the entire universe" (Caha, 2003: 46). Thus Islam curtails the

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 http://www.globalwebpost.com/farooqm/writings/islamic/democracy.htm
[28] Khan, 'Islam and Democracy', accessed on the 4th of
November, 2008 at:
http://www.geocities.com/sunrisinginwest/democracy.html

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rights of the people to demand for that which is contrary to the Qur'an, Sunnah and Sharia law. This in some sense curtails human rights in most Islamic states (curtailment of human rights from a westernized point of view). One may argue that Islam does condone democratic principles of governance because it is a struggle against westernization, but not against modernization (Esposito, 1991:163). However, the Islamic injunction that power lies in God, has been used for hegemonic purposes and for ethnic and political manipulations. This meaning has been hijacked by fundamentalists and the elites/politicians who seek to politicize Islam. This is perhaps the reason that informs Manji's (2004) calls for tolerance and the liberal reformation of Islam.

2.9.6: Jihad and Violence Nexus

Contrary to claims that Islam is a violent religion, the meaning of Islam, paradoxically, is 'Peace and Submission.' Responsible for the association of Islam with the pathology of violence is the misconstruction and misrepresentation by fundamentalist Islamists and some people of other faiths without the depth to understand the true meaning of Jihad as contextualized by the Holy Qur'an.

While Jihad has been politicized by extremists and the popular western-based media as a reproach for violence, Jihad, however, in many quarters means "struggling in the way of God." It also means 'striving'; that is, striving with God. The contextualization of Jihad therefore is spiritual rather than military. When divorced of its spiritual content and context and interpreted as a mechanism for mass political mobilization Jihad assumes the mantle of sectarian militancy and becomes a crusade against oppression, that is, a *fard al-kifaya* (a religious communal duty).

Deployed in the context of Islamic marginalization, persecution and oppression, and as a platform for the defense of Islam, Jihad becomes a personal religious obligation for every Muslim to fight and defend the *Umma*. A further application of Jihad is that an individual should fight against evil, a fight for justice and a fight against adversaries of Islam. It is in this context that Jihad has been used as an instrument for spreading Islam, thus earning its unmerited violence and undemocratic epithet.

As shown above, in the course of history the term Jihad has been understood to mean a 'Holy War.' This interpretation is not based on sacred texts but on the quest of man to use religion as a tool for acquiring political power. Hence, a section of Muslims have turned Jihad around to inculcate violence as a justification for non-religious purposes.

2.9.7: Qur'an, Peace and Violence

Concurring with T.W. Arnold, Ling (1968:228) states that "the Qur'an enjoins preaching and persuasion and discountenances force in the conversion of non-Muslims, and for this reason the history of expansion of Islam is in fact very much more a history of missions than a history of violence or persecutions." Again, Ling (1968:228) citing T.W. Arnold, further points out that the forced conversion to Islam was not a characteristic of the Arabs early occupation of Spain. Hence, he argues that "the tolerance of Islam towards Christianity made possible the acquisition of Spain." Furthermore, to argue that Islam is militant may not be tenable because Christianity in the course of history has been more militant. The early crusades and European wars, such as the thirty-year's war, illustrate this argument.

At this point it is expedient to present some theological arguments. As a measure of peaceful disposition, Islam has great respect for people's religious persuasions. The Holy Qur'an 109:6 emphatically states that "To you your religion and to me mine." Another verse in the Holy Qur'an unequivocally states that "You shall have your religion and I shall have my religion." In addition, Qur'an 2: 256 commands Islamic faithful "Let there be no compulsion in religion." It cannot be over-emphasized that Islam is tolerant to other religions and it strives to promote peace amongst people. Although Islam, like many other religions, maintains a puritanical aloofness from other faiths, like Christianity, Judaism and paganism it requests of its faithful that members of other faiths should be treated with love as opposed to hostilities. Though Islam allows the use of force in defense of the religion and the faithful, force must be limited to the attack imposed on the Muslim.

While one must bear in mind that most religious crises have been caused by feelings of self-righteousness flowing from denigration of some religion and religious practices as 'kaferi' (non-Muslims in northern Nigeria), the Qur'an 6:108 warns that "And do not abuse those whom they call upon besides Allah, lest exceeding the limits they should abuse Allah out of ignorance." To safeguard peace and harmony amongst its adherents and those of other faiths even in times of crisis, the Qur'an 8:61 enjoins Muslims that once the enemy inclines towards *peaceful resolution*, the Muslim is obliged to incline towards peace as well: "But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah: for He is One that heareth and knoweth (all things)."

Obviously, suicide bombing is a loud violation of the ecclesiastical dictates of the Holy Qur'an, but this has paradoxically become the defining character of Islamism especially in the Middle East and in particular in Iraq and Palestine. In this regard, the Holy Qur'an 2:195 commands: "And spend your wealth for the cause of Allah, and make not your own hands contribute to your destruction; but do good, for Allah loveth those who do good." If violence with which Islam has come to be associated violates Islamic tenets, where then does militant Islam get its cradle from?

Given the totalizing orientation of Islam, as not just a religion, but a way of life and its disposition for a theocratic order, Islamists within different national borders, even where they are not majorities, often strive to engender the convocation of an Islamic order. It is argued that this is as far as it goes. On the contrary to a unifying and homogenous dominant Islamic culture of violence, I argue that the dynamism of Islamic political odyssey globally has been highly contingent on situational variables. This is informed by prevailing socio-cultural and political conditions. In this context, history also plays an important role. I contend that it is an empirically invalid generalization to presuppose a universally correct Islamic culture of violence and anti-democratic disposition. I argue and demonstrate with textual and empirical evidence that the different violence blamed on Islam, rather than being the dictates of Islamic orthodoxy, should be understood as fallout of conservatism that is engendered in the first instance by authoritarian political systems. Furthermore, with extensive reliance on the Islamic holy book, the Holy Qur'an, I argue in favour of the peaceful orientation of Islam and that interpretatively Islam is a religion of peace.[29]

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[29] An illustration of this can be seen in the life of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a Muslim Pushtun, in former India now in Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan mobilized 100,000 nonviolent Muslim soldiers who through patience and non violent action were one of the factors instrumental to achieving India's independence. See Mohammed Abu Nimer, 'Nonviolence in the Islamic Context.' Accessed on the 4th of August, 2007 at:

It is argues that global Islamic violence, rather than being inherently Islamic, is a function of the dialectic of resistance and repression that privilege the oppressive and exploitative relations between Islam and the new global imperialist power with the logic of transnational capital accumulation from the oil-rich Arab peninsula in the Middle East. In concurrence, Bienin & Stork (1997:10) perceptively argue that important Islamic movements now are revolutionary movements that challenge political regimes that have served western interests.

2.10: Conclusion

Altogether, then, little scholarly attempts has been made in seeking an enquiry into the peace dynamics of Islam. This is the gap this thesis intends to fill. In responding to these gaps in the scholarly literature, the significance of this thesis is that it seeks to account for the internal dynamics and tensions within a civilization in a non-western society (northern Nigeria). It sheds light on how religion has assumed a centre stage in defining individual identity in various non-western societies and it supplements the conspicuously parochial literature on the peace dynamics of Islam in a deeply divided society.

A striking observation is that it is only relatively recently that there has been some recognition of the peace dynamics of religion between different groups. In this light, Clark (1990) rightly points out the bonding potentials of religion, especially the capacity of Islam to create solidarity among groups. Clark notes that people desire to

http://www.forusa.org/fellowship/sept-oct-04/abu-nimer.html. See also Johansen, Robert, C., 1997. Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint among Pashtuns, *Journal of Peace Research*, 34 (1): 53-71.

belong to social structures and are opposed to conflict. Clark argues that in this regard (Clark, 1990:51):

> The major religions of the world, of course, come first to mind. It is no accident that they arose in parallel with the earliest civilizations, largely to ameliorate some of their worst excesses, and even today they represent important sources of sacred social meaning for tens of millions of people. Islam is perhaps the chief contemporary example.

From the above discussion, there is a need for a sympathetic understanding and analysis of the Islamic within civilizations such as northern Nigeria. Therefore, it is in order that the next chapter discusses political Islam in the northern part of Nigeria.

CHAPTER 3

EXPLAINING POLITICAL ISLAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

> In classical Islam there was no distinction between Church and State. In Christendom the existence of two authorities goes back to the founder, who enjoined his followers to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and to God the things which are God's...In pre-westernized Islam, there were not two powers but one, and the question of separation, therefore, could not arise
>
> Bernard Lewis (1988:2)[30]

3.1: Introduction

Political Islam in northern Nigeria has performed both functional and dysfunctional roles in nation building. It performs a functional role by bridging the gap between individuals divided on ethnicity and dysfunctional as it acts as counter force for inter-religious harmony. It is a source for peace and a source for conflict. Another crucial dysfunctional role is that Islam in northern Nigeria has tendency to be manipulated by political elites seeking political capital for personal and group interests. This is perhaps one of the many reasons why Tamuno (1970:564) states that it is "easier to establish the Nigerian state than to nourish the Nigerian nation." It is important to stress that, at the same time, Islam has succeeded in uniting different ethnic groups under a system of religious nationalism.

This chapter attempts to answer the intriguing question: Is Islam a positive or a negative force in northern Nigeria? It also seeks to explore the role of Islam in northern Nigeria and its political system. The objective here is to profile, critically

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[30] Lewis, Bernard, 1988. *The Political Language of Islam*. University of Chicago Press.

analyze and explain the interface between politics and Islam in conditioning the power struggles, crisis and conflicts among different political gladiators in northern Nigeria in particular and, by extension, in Nigeria in general, given the centrality of the north to Nigerian politics.

3.2: Impact of Islamic Civilization in Northern Nigeria

Clearly in some ways there exists an international context favourable to the politicization of Islam that was influential to the Islamization process in northern Nigeria. As noted by Olivier Roy (Pipes 1995), the process of transforming Islam into a political ideology was rooted in the assumption by Islamic fundamentalists that the western scientific-technical advancement can be explained by its western ideologies. To advance and develop technology, the fundamentalists wanted to establish Islam as an ideology to draw a parallel level with western technology without losing its Islamic identify. Against this background, political Islam may be seen as an ideology of power. Thus, Islam provides a broader geographic political culture and the foundation for a national identity for northern Nigeria.

It is here that the creation of religious hierarchies was a condition that not only engendered the politicization of Islam but also set a standard for its manipulation for political advantages. As Detlev Khalid (Pipes, 1995) notes, concerning Saudi Arabia, a number of religious appointments has transpired whose posts were previously absent, like the Secretary of the Muslim World League, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference and the Rector of Islamic University in Medina. Khalid also notes that for the first time in history, the Imam of the Ka'ba was sent on tour on international tours as a priestly envoy.

It is certainly true, as Pipes (1995) observes that the expansion of Islam's scope on politics and the decline of secular law marked the beginning of an Islamic political agenda, especially in the twentieth century, and it marked the consummation of the marriage between politics and Islam. To Pipes, Islam is seen less as the structure in which individuals make their lives, but more as a creed for regulating societies so that for fundamentalists, Islam represents the path to power. He further argues that Islam is another ideology – like capitalism, socialism and communism.

3.3: Contextualizing Islam in Northern Nigeria

Religion plays an important role in the day-to-day existential conditions of the average African. It is imperative to note that African culture, including the political sphere of existence, is mainly based on religion. Crutcher (1966:436) writes that the traditional African notions of reality are essentially religious in nature and the most developed African organizations are based in the existence of a monarchical state. Crutcher further notes that the monarch's authority lies in his intermediary position among the society as a whole and the ancestral and divine powers, through which he regularly secures and establishes the welfare of his people and the regulation of society.

Crutcher (1966:437) argues that Africans traditionally experienced celestial and divine understanding primarily as a manifestation of authority and effectiveness. The politicization of religion, in particular the Islamization of politics in what has become known as political Islam in northern Nigeria, makes sense in the context of the important place Africans generally accord religion in the ordering of interpersonal and social affairs. Any attempt to understand the social construction of African life,

politics inclusive, which fails to take into account the religious context, is bound to be very fruitless and deficient.

In northern Nigeria, Islam is the foundation of political power. Therefore, the perceived proximity to the religion is highly advantageous in power contestation. According to Kukah (1993: x), "The tripodal structure of power in northern Nigeria which is rooted in the Islamic world is 'the fear of God, being a *Bawan Allah* (God's servant), *trust in Ikon Allah* (the will of God).'" As he further observes, Islam was...the foundation on which the authority of the Caliphate rested (Kukah, 1993:13). As explored in Chapter 1, the political currency and utility to which Islam is put in the north can only be matched and understood in the context of the instrumentalization of ethnicity in the southern part of the country. Islam in the north and ethnicity in the south serve the objective of the different factions of the Nigerian ruling elite that are rooted in the regional geography of the country and to help to gain the upper hand in the power struggle and control of the instrumentalities of state power.

Perhaps the image of a united and homogeneous northern Nigeria is more of a political project rather than an act of history as previously argued. There exists serious fragmentation and contestations amongst northern Islamists for position, prestige and power. The ruling class of northern Nigeria, the "...Masu Sarauta, were generally descendants of the founders of the Sokoto Caliphate and, like them, were Sufi Muslims who belonged to the Qadiriya brotherhood" (Reynolds, 2001:601). There were other minor Islamic sects, like the Mahdi and Sanusiyya, which co-existed with the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods. The colonial authority in its politicization

of religion deliberately embarked on policies that privileged the *Sarauta* against other Islamic faithfuls which had been antagonistic to British imperialism.

3.4: Islam as an Element in Northern Nigeria

Given its political context, religion is a dominant element in both international and domestic politics. Fox (2001a) identifies three important characteristics of what role religion plays in international and local politics. Firstly, foreign policies are based on religious views. Secondly, religion acts as a source for criticizing government decisions both internationally and locally. Thirdly, religious conflicts usually affect both local and international attention. Nations with religious identities have emerged in recent times and have been based on religious ethno-nationalism. This perhaps explains that states such as Nigeria, Iran, India, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Israel and Palestine are all interwoven with religious ethno-nationalism.

The relation between religion and politics or between religion and perceptions of the state is rooted in history (Ellis & Haar, 1998:188). In non-western societies, religion tends to have the capacity to be used as a political instrument. Islam plays this dominant role in some non-western societies because it is the building block of most societies. Therefore, it could be argued that the unification of ethnic identities under one umbrella (religion) is a positive role of Islam. For argument sake, supposing that the various ethnic identities (about 250) in the north of Nigeria, by an act of history, based their identities on ethnicity, as opposed to religion, this would have given rise to a plurality of group formations within the region, which may have generated multiple ethnic conflicts. Thus, one may agree with Sani's (2007: 41) observation: "This phenomenon unlike the Muslims of the northern states is informed partly by the fact

that the Christians in the northern states had no historical foundation in terms of seeing themselves as one big and inseparable family."

Religion, especially Islam in non-western societies, is sometimes used as a salient economic tool of control. "Psychologically the infusion of faith into the public domain often functions to control thinking and stifle debate" (Spilka et al., 2003: 201). Here, it could be argued that religion could be used as a tool of control over people. In the light of this, Sanusi[31] portrays the life in northern Nigeria by saying:

> The poor peasant farmer in Zaria, condemned to life-long penury by the circumstances of his birth, the inadequacy of his education and the deprived state of his general existence, feels a stronger bond with and affinity for his rich, capitalist Emir than his fellow farmer in Wusasa... In this sense, religion may be used to manipulate people to the wishes and whims of the elites.

It is important to reiterate that in a non-western society, especially where religion happens to be a strong primordial identity marker, the perception of religion is conceived with fear – the fear of the unknown. Hobbes (Mukerjee, 1929:11) notes that "the fear of things invisible is the natural seed of religion." Man in his primordial nature is in awe of nature because he lacks a scientific understanding about nature itself. This inability to explain natural phenomenon produced fear and the attachment of the individual to religion. Religion was a reasoned force for every unexplained event. Religion was considered the "guardian of order" (Ward, 1898:186). In this context, religion as an identity marker in a non-western society does not admit any form of religious tolerance. The debate here is useful in understanding that the ambivalent relationship between Islam and the socio-political culture in northern

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[31] 'Religion, the Cabinet and a Political Economy of the 'North'', accessed at: http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/rarticles/religion1.htm

Nigeria is that religion may be used as a force for functional and dysfunctional purposes.

3.5: Integrative Role of Islam in Northern Nigeria

Osaghae (1998b) provides a useful explanation and classification of the constitution of identity groups in northern Nigeria. Osaghae explains that, northern Nigeria consists of three culturally distinct components. Firstly the 'Hausa-Fulani axis' (Fulani Caliphate), that is those ethnic groups under the Fulani Empire which was founded by Uthman dan Fodio in 1804 through a Jihad. Secondly, the 'Borno (Kanuri) axis' and thirdly the minority ethnic groups mainly located within the Middle Belt of northern Nigeria. However, Osaghae notes that, the significant cultural group is the Fulani Caliphate, which has merged with the Hausa tribes. It is worthy to note that the Hausa-Fulani has been the curator of Islam in the region. The Hausa-Fulani has been merged and assimilated into the same ethnic group. Ethnic assimilation is multidimensional and interactive, involving a process of boarder reduction between the ethnic groups (Yinger, 1985:154).

The political advantage of majority vote and majority does not exist in the Muslim north, as ethnic groups professing Islam are unified under a common religion and identity. This provides a political unity of all Muslims in northern Nigeria. The minorities in northern Nigeria are religious minorities as opposed to ethnic minorities in southern Nigeria. This unity is provided by the community of Islam, where identical and equal membership in the community was bestowed on conquered people (ethnic minorities).

The 'Borno (Kanuri) axis' is centered on the Kanem-Bornu Empire (1396-1893). The Kanuri are a minority group and are separate and distinct from the Hausa-Fulani axis as they were under a separate political structure of the old Kanem-Bornu Empire. The 'Kanem-Bornu axis', the 'oldest continuous Islamic state in Africa' is not considered as a political minority, due to the fact that they are a seemingly similar cultural group with the Hausa-Fulani by being rooted in Islam and Sharia, long before the advent of the British colonialists. The Kanuri people, known by the Hausa, as Beriberi, have adopted the Hausa language and culture. Despite this, it is interesting to note that the Kanem-Bornu axis have an alliance and strong solidarity with the Sokoto Caliphate, based on an overarching trans-ethnic identity provided by Islam.

The Middle-Belt Minorities (non-Muslims) and other non-Muslims living in the core northern Nigeria are considered a political minority. It is pertinent to note here that Islam in northern Nigeria unites ethnic identities, but builds boundaries between other faiths. Thus, in the exercise of democratic values these 'undersized' or minority ethnic groups do not have the political prospects of prevailing in democratic elections because they cannot achieve majority vote. In the practice of true democracy, majority rule in perpetuity is not conceived as majority rule (Horowitz, 1985:86). The positioning of this group as a political minority has generated conflicts with the Muslim groups. Historically, this group has attempted to resist the powerful Fulani-Hausa hegemony.

3.6: A Critique of the Uthman Dan Fodio Jihad

The perceptive analysis of the Jihad reveals its political character, as it was primarily aimed at taking over the control of governance and reforming the state machinery

under the banner of Islam. This is especially so, given the precipitous nature of inter-birni conflicts, which provided the "immediate background for the Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate" (Shenton, 1986:3). The Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio of 1804 was far from being aimed at the elimination of the remaining pockets of animists. On the contrary according to Kenny (1996:339), the Uthman dan Fodio 1804 Jihad in Hausa land "...was not aiming so much at the conversion of pagans as at the reform of lax Muslims." The need to fight corruption and end authoritarian governance of the Sarakunas[32] was, according to Ibrahim (1991:120), accountable for the Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio. The Jihad can be understood as a coup d'état against the Hausa kingdoms and the establishment of a new economic and political kingdom.

A more subtle realization of the principle of Uthman dan Fodio's Jihad, the tenet of brotherhood and the welfare, the class distinction and political race in reaction to the developmental and democratic trend in the country, is brigandage in the pursuit of wealth. Wealth has assumed economic monsterism with which the cikin fada (Muslim commoner class) attempts to challenge the authority of the cikin gida (palace clique). Recognition and endorsement of the ruling class is 'purchased' with the acquisition and certification of the people. Clearly recognizing that the 'right' to the Islamic collegiate and opinion was already founded by Uthman dan Fodio's example – which can challenge the religious adherence of the rulers. This ideology led to the militancy of the teacher and cleric – Maitatsine in the 1980s and the Boko Haram Jihad of 2009. These militant gestures are intertwined with political undertones.

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[32] The structure of the Emirate system in Northern Nigeria consisted of the Sarakuna, (otherwise known as the rulers, sons of the Emirs, members of the royal family and other notable indigenes). It also consisted of the Talakawa, (otherwise known as the commoners). Thus, it affirmed that the Marxist form of class struggle had its foundation in the Fulani Jihad.

The setting-up of the Sokoto Caliphate by Uthman dan Fodio after the conquest of the Hausaland was in conformity with an over-arching political agenda and imperative. As Bako (n.d:8) suggests "this Jihadist movement did not only reform and purify Islam, but it also erected a reformed and bigger Islamic polity called the Sokoto caliphate, which survived between 1803 and 1903, until it was conquered by the British colonial forces." Shenton (1986:4) concludes that although the Jihad was justified in religious language, it was mainly concerned with the relationship of ruler to those that were ruled and royalty demanded from commoners. In the light of this, Waldman (1965:334) argues that Uthman dan Fodio changed his goals and demanded for political overthrow of the Hausa system instead of its reform. The appeal of his movement widened such that it constituted all of those who had an interest in a change of rulers for Hausa land. It is incontestable that, in terms of objective, political rather than religious goals clearly conditioned the Jihad. Islam has historically been politicized in the affairs of northern Nigeria.

Although the Fulani conquest of Hausa land was legitimized by the Fulani under the umbrella of "the backsliding, syncretistic nature of Hausa Islam" (Paden, 1973:45), what can be deduced from the above explication is that the Islamic project in Nigeria, by virtue of the Uthman dan Fodio's Jihad, is political and its objective transcends mere ecclesiastic goals. It was in this context that northern political Islam was born.

Implicit, and most times explicit, apart from being descendants and flag bearers of Uthman dan Fodio, the Emirs in northern Nigeria are representatives of the Islamic order. The period of colonial rule in Nigeria not only promoted the influence of the Emirs in the political affairs of the state, as earlier mentioned, it excessively protected

the north and Islam from the missionary activities of non-Muslims. The autocratic rule of northern Emirs under colonial rule was possible given the importance and the position of the Emirs not only as descendants of Uthman dan Fodio but also their religious significance. Consequently, religion and religious positions were exploited by the Emirs for political advantages. Paden (2008:27) rightly notes that "the key to understanding Islam in Nigeria is to recognize the central place of the Sokoto Caliphate, which serves as a frame work or model even today." The system of 'Indirect Rule' appointed the Emirs from the Hausa-Fulani ethnie to govern the minority ethnic groups. The Emirs were sequentially guaranteed the right to political rule as long as they conceded to the demands of the British. This systematically enabled the Hausa-Fulani ethnie to form and gain a political advantage over political minority groups and set the causal link for political rivalry between Muslims and non-Muslims in the region.

3.7: The Role of the British in Islamic Identity Formation in Northern Nigeria

The Sokoto Caliphate was conquered by the British on March 15, 1903. Although the Caliphate was overthrown, the same method of authority and administration by the Caliphate and Emirs (who were known as Native Authorities) were still in place. This system of governance became known as 'indirect rule.' This structure of governance is similar to the present-day class systems of governance in northern Nigeria. The ruling classes are known as the 'Masu Sarauta' (possessors of governance); the descendants of 'Uthman dan Fodio and the common people or the peasants known as the 'Talakawa.'[33] The Sokoto Caliphate gained prominence through indirect rule and,

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[33] The Talakawa in Hausa connotes the grass-root people/peasants

after independence, merged into party politics under the umbrella of the Northern People's Congress (NPC).[34]

The indirect rule form of governance allowed the traditional Muslim rulers to rule as stooges of the British imperialists. This system of governance systematically established the ruling class as powerful elites and succeeded in "keeping Africans as far as possible in rural areas under their own traditional rulers" (Bayart, 1999:5). On the other hand, indirect rule may be seen in the context of an Islamic reaction to the colonialists. Heussler (1968:173) notes that in 1900s the organization of Islam had provided northern Nigeria with an advantage over tribal societies and its antecedent anarchy in the South of Nigeria. The British, aware of the overwhelming Islamic identity in northern Nigeria, had encountered difficulties in enforcing direct rule, illustrated by the constant warring between the British and the Hausa-Fulani and the minority tribes in the Middle Belt.[35]

With the privileged access to power given to the Emirs, who personify Islamic rudimentary theocracy, the British policy of indirect rule set the context for the modern politicization of Islam and the Islamization of politics in the north. Under the indirect rule system, the Emirs were in political and economic control of the Native Authority system, with responsibility to report to the colonial administration. The Chiefs functioned as modern 'local government chairmen' with very wide and excessive powers in their areas of jurisdiction. As Miles (1987:241-2) argues, "...

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[34] Interestingly, the NPC was founded in Zaria, Kaduna State by a northern Christian; Dr R. B. Dikko, who is the first Northern medical doctor. The NPC was established as a cultural society. However, it was later hijacked from its cultural objectives and re-established as a political party with Sir Ahmadu Bello becoming its president. One could argue that the NPC was hijacked from its socio-cultural function and given the status of a political-religious party.

[35] A notable battle worthy to mention is the popular reaction by Attahiru Ahmadu I. In the words of Frederick D. Lugard (1904:27) "a most sanguinary battle ensued, in which the town (Burmi) was captured, and the ex-sultan ... with some seven hundred of the Burmi fanatics were killed."

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chiefly pre-eminence was not restricted to local politics. Central bureaucracies as well as subordinate countries were heavily staffed and controlled by members of the ruling dynasty." Tibenderana (1988:86) argues that the Sultan was ineffective and a mere salaried agent of the British, who ruled in name only. One may concede that the British pulled the wool over the eyes of the northerners by making them believe that the Sultan was their ruler.

To a great extent, the British policy of 'divide and rule' was a crucial factor in politicizing Islam in northern Nigeria. British politicization of religion during colonial rule took two dimensions. First was the protection of Islam by the prevention of Christian missionary activities in the north. Second was the deliberate policy of privileging the Qadiriya brotherhood against the other competing Islamic sects in the north. As Reynolds (2001:601), notes that what was to be defined as a threat to 'good order' was any religious ideology that that was contrary to the tenets of the *Masu Sarauta*. Through the use of Indirect Rule the British were required to be accommodative towards the Caliphate and to curb those who were perceived to threaten the 'good order.' The British assisted with the politicization process of Islam in northern Nigeria because the system of indirect rule granted the Sokoto Caliphate powers over the vast region of the north. As noted by Sir Ahmadu Bello (1962:19), "...the British were the instrument of destiny and were fulfilling the will of God."

The romance of the colonial authority with the Islamic ruling class, according to Reynolds (2001), follows from historical experience in India and Egypt. According to Reynolds, the British knew that Islam could not be considered as an insignificant element in the wake of their decades of experience with Islam in India and Egypt.

They were conscious that political authority of a government in a Muslim region was closely connected to the popular perception of the rulers as pious Muslims (2001:604). Reynolds (2001:604) explains that to become legitimate, a Muslim government needs to uphold Islamic law and allow Muslims to have the freedom to practice the demands of their religion. The colonial power consequently used the policy of non-interference with Islam to legitimize their rule. It is interesting to note that Islam was regarded as a symbol of traditional religion by the colonialists. In northern Nigeria, Islam had obtained a firm foundation and resisted Christianity from the colonialists and the missionaries. In order to achieve the unperturbed acquisition of northern Nigeria and understand that Islam was the first identity of its natives, the colonialists and the missionaries were not allowed to proselytize in the region (Haynes, 1998:106). As Reynolds (2001:605) further notes, the British used propaganda to present themselves as surrogate Muslims.

It is then safe to say that the indirect rule system introduced in northern Nigeria, coupled with the associated privileges and powers of the Emirs and members of the northern ruling class, was the primacy of political power and the centrality of Islamic ideology as a platform for seeking, capturing, defending and retaining political power, especially given the socio-economic advantages that tagged along with it. The Caliphate was reconstituted in a well-organized administrative division. Sharia law was instituted by the Islamic courts and the status of the Sultan was revered in the region. The general acceptance of Islam in northern Nigeria by the Hausa and other pagan tribes was due to the 'political prestige' of Britain's support of the authority of the Sokoto Caliphate (Yeld, 1960:113).

3.8: Politicization of Islam in Northern Nigeria

This section explores how Islam has been politicized in northern Nigeria in particular and Nigeria in general. This section examines the utility of Islam as a tool for popular political mobilization and the rationalization of the status-quo in northern Nigeria. The essence of this concern is to analytically determine the place and position of Islam in the socio-political society in northern Nigeria.

3.8.1: Politicization of Islam under the 1ˢᵗ Republic (1960-1966)

In many ways Islam took a new dimension during the Islamization agenda of Ahmadu Bello. Ahmadu Bello was a charismatic leader who engineered the popularity of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) through Islam, by using propaganda that the NPC represents the consensus of the society *(Ijma)* and not accepting the NPC amounts to 'Bid'a' (a rebel from the community) (Dudley, 1968:143). The use of Islam under colonial rule only became possible because of the mutual reinforcing tendencies of both Islam and politics. Dickson[36] notes that in exchange for British support, Ahmadu Bello insisted on the teaching and practice of Islam in this region. Traditional Islamic clans coalesced into a northern party that effectively excluded westernized intellectuals and secularized non-Muslims.

The politicization of Islam during the Nigerian First Republic attained it zenith in the policy of Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, to Islamize Nigeria. According to John Paden, between 1963-1964 Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Northern Region, in his drive to achieve the Islamization project, also embarked on "conversion campaigns among the animists of the Middle Belt area and the Maguzawa, who are

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[36] Dickson, David. 'Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda', accessed on the 30th of November, 2008 at: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr140.pdf.

non-Muslims Hausa, and hoped to extend these campaigns to other areas of Nigeria" (Hunwick, 1992:148).

Sir Ahmadu Bello engaged in Islamic missionary tours throughout northern Nigeria. The tours were intended to convert the minority ethnic groups to Islam. According to J.D. Hargreaves, during the 1964 missionary tour an estimated 100,000 people in Zaria and Niger converted to Islam (Clarke, 1982:222). Hunwick (1996:239) notes that an African leader who played a significant role in the institution of this first new pan-Islamic body was the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (d. 1966), Premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria, and who was a prominent man in international Muslim diplomacy in the years following Nigerian independence. He was also actively promoting the cause of Islam within his own region of Nigeria. The unity of the north perhaps provoked some degree of envy in the political leaders of the west and eastern region. It was in this spirit that Ahmadu Bello said to Chief Awolowo and Dr Azikiwe, [37] "Don't envy the unity of the north but worry about the division in the south so that we can have a united south and a united north in a united Nigeria."

Perhaps the most important achievement of Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello was the founding of an Islamic civil society, the *Jama'atu*[38] *Nasr Islam* (JNI) 'the Society for Victory of Islam', which united the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods. Equally important is that the JNI was and still is an umbrella for all Muslims in northern seeking to advance political, social and economic interests of co-religionists in

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[37]'Nas, Wada. 'Sardauna: Political Legacies and Contemporary Politics', accessed on October 10, 2008 at: http://dawodu.com/nas1.htm.

[38] Jama'a meaning community or people is similar to the Umma, the Community of Islam.

northern Nigeria.[39] Sir Ahmadu Bello used the tool of religion to legitimate most of his political agenda and rapid Islamization of northern Nigeria, as religion had the persuasive capability to legitimize policies that politicians find impossible to implement. In 1962, Ahmadu Bello established the Jama`atu Islam (Group for the Victory of Islam) on the advice of Abubakar Gunmi, the Grand Khadi of northern Nigeria[40]was a political strategy of gaining control of popular consciousness (Hunwick1992: 151). The *Jama`atu Nasil Islam*, according to Kenny (1996:345), was a project to "harmonize Muslims representing a common voice in Nigeria and taking the mantle as the representation of all Muslims in the country." As Kenny (1996:345) further notes, the organization was to serve as a channel of contact with the government of Nigeria on Islamic affairs and as the only channel of contact on Islamic matters. This is considered a social-political organization, made up of the emirs, chiefs and the elites. The height of this attempt at politicization of Islam is noted by the words of Sir Ahmadu Bello,[41] when he said:

> This New Nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great grandfather, Uthman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We use the minorities in the North as willing tools, and the South, as conquered territory and never allow them to rule over us, and never allow them to have control over their future.

The NPC was only open for members of the northern region (both Muslims and non-Muslims). Southerners were excluded from membership. Thus the motto of NPC was: 'One North, One People, Irrespective of Religion, Rank or Tribe.' In order to assert that the party is based on Islamic predisposition, the colour of the party flag was green

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[39] A similar political association, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) founded on March 7, 2001 is a proactive Northern political organization, however, it has not encapsulated all Northern Muslims under one umbrella.
[40] Hunwick, in Charles E. Butterworth & I. William Zartman, Ed, 1992: 151.
[41] Oyeyemi, Remi: 'The Northern Agenda: Reason for Political Liberation of Nigeria', accessed on the 7th of January 2008-01-08 at:
http://nigeriaworld.com/columnist/oyeyemi/102402.html.

– the colour-symbol of Islam. One may safely suggest that the politics in northern Nigeria in the First Republic could be regarded as religious.

The formation of NPC in the march towards Nigeria to independence using Islamic ideographic contents is all part of the construction of a hegemonic political architecture. According to Falola (1998:44), "The Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) succeeded in building a strong party, solely limited to the north and united by Islam under *Sardauna* Alhaji Ahmadu Bello." It goes without saying that the new leaders of modern Hausa societies are inheritors of the religious legitimacy based on Islam and enjoyed by the emirs within the modern political order.

Paradoxically, the Mallam Aminu Kano[42] led Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), a radical and anti-conservative political party of northern Muslims, was similarly excluded from power– that anti-status quo parties and elements in the north are often excluded from power just like people from other religion in the north based on their perceived non-Islamic orthodoxy. This is not to suggest that Aminu Kano's NEPU never profited from the Islamic currency in its politics. According to Whitaker (1967), NEPU despite its radical and anti-establishment stances employed religion in its 'appeal and propaganda.'[43]

The strategy of the NPC for gaining political currency involved the use of "...traditional Hausa norms of *barautaka* (clientage)... to cultivate the support of the

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[42] Commenting on the radical politicization of Islam by Aminu Kano, Paden, (1981:27) notes: "The political thought of Aminu Kano is firmly rooted in Islamic tradition but interprets that tradition to repose all trust in the ordinary citizens of the community rather than in elites or traditional rulers. The principles of "equality before the law," "redistribution of wealth"' and "progress and education" are all argued in terms of the moral tradition of the Sokoto Caliphate."

[43] This is illustrated by the fact that Malam Aminu Kano was one of the twelve Northern delegates who advocated for Sharia in the 1979 Constitution, and one of those who boycotted the Constitutional proceedings on April 6, 1978.

talakawa (commoners): Patronage, economic security and protection (were) exchanged for personal loyalty and obedience" (Miles, 1987:242). For Mallam Aminu Kano and his NEPU political party, Islam is in support of the empowerment of the people as against the prevailing cases of mass poverty, diseases, injustices, unemployment, human rights violation and backwardness.

The NEPU leadership in the 1st Republic politics was drawn predominantly from the Tijanniya Islamic movement. According to Sabo Bako, (n.d:9) the Tijaniyya reformist movement popularized Islam among the grass-roots people by turning it into a power ideology for resisting oppression and also provided the movement as a tool against colonialism and northern feudalist hierarchy. He further notes that the Tijanniya movement contributed to the materialization of left wing politics through the NEPU, which popularized grass-root radicalism in West Africa. The Qadiriyya was linked with the NPC whilst the Tijanniya was closely linked with the NEPU and several clashes between the two movements were held in the past prior to independence. Before independence, NPC became the northern region party for the Nigerian election. The north rallied around the party, which provided its landslide victory in the federal elections. The party rivalry was suppressed, NEPU became localized mainly in Kano and by 1966 the separation between religion and politics in the north had completely vanished (Reynolds, 1999:194).

Despite the vast importance given to the identity of ethnicity in northern Nigeria, as earlier explored in Chapter 1, it was difficult, if not impossible, for rallying the northerners under such identity, due to the vast amount of ethnic groups and communities in the region. Islam had an appeal of unity to bring these groups under

one umbrella. Other political associations, such as the non-Muslim League of Northern Nigeria (NML) founded in 1949 under the leadership of Pastor David Obadiah Vrengkat Lot, were formed to counter the Islamic agenda of the NPC. This attempt was met with failure due to its confinement to indigenes of the Middle belt, which consisted of diverse ethnic groups and also the NML lacked a definitive political strategy. Other political associations that tried to proceed with the objectives of the NML were the Middle Zone League,[44] established in 1950, and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).

Despite the political divisions between NPC and NEPU, and UMBC on the other hand, there was an absence of serious disagreements on issues of northern unity and solidarity. These structures were deeply rooted in the united interest of northern unity. Through the charismatic efforts of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the NPC used religion to facilitate an overarching solidarity among people of the north, who were divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. This sentiment provided an overwhelming appeal for northerners to remain a people and a nation – 'One north, one people.'

During the First Republic, power struggle was centered on the three dominant ethnic based regions: North (NPC), west (AG) and the east (NCNC). The regional-based nature of the politics of the First Republic was exemplified in the decision of the "leaders of the parties [NPC-NCNC) in coalition to remain in their regional seats of government" (Ekekwe, 1986:75), therefore, effectively promoting the Islamization of politics in the north.

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[44] Its leader Pastor Vrengkat Lot was elected to the House of Representatives in 1951.

3.8.1.1: The 1ˢᵗ Military Coup (January 15, 1966)

The military intervened in Nigerian politics in the January 1966 coup. The coup was engineered by junior officers of the Army, led by Major C.K. Nzeogwu. The officers were mainly from the Igbo ethnic group.[45] Moreover, no political leaders from the East (Igbos) were killed in the coup. Despite the political "coalition of convenience" (Horowitz, 1985:372) of 1959-1964 of the northern political parties, the NPC and its eastern counterpart the NCNC, there were political agitations between the Hausa-Fulani ethnie and the Igbo ethnic group, who dominated the eastern region of Nigeria. The coup had both ethnic and religious undertones as among those who were killed were mainly Muslims of the Hausa-Fulani ethnie, which included Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, and the Premier of the Northern Region, (the Sultan of Sokoto) Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello.

The assassination of the Sultan was considered an attack against the Islamic and political establishment in the north. Schacht (1957:125) aptly captures the political and religious significance of the Sultan:

> The Fulanis did not succeed in conquering the state of Bornu, and the rulers of Bornu (Shehu = Shaykh), descendants of Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi, have always considered themselves the equals of the Fulani Sultans; nevertheless, a rigorist member of the Council of the Shehu did not hesitate to call the Sultan of Sokoto the spiritual head of all Muslims in northern Nigeria.

The passage above sheds light on and articulates an important insight into the overarching solidarity provided by Islam in northern Nigeria. Although the coup was unsuccessful, an Igbo Head of State emerged – Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi.

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[45] However a Yoruba; Major Ademoyega was the only non-Igbo of the plotters.

This coup, viewed as a threat to political Islam to northern Muslims, laid the foundation of the events that followed and led to a bitter and catastrophic civil war.

3.8.1.2: Northern Nigerian Military Counter-Coup

In light of the above contentions, a group of northern military officers staged a counter-coup in July 28, 1966, killing the Head of State and many Igbo officers in the Army. Northern soldiers acted out of a pre-emptive self-defense mechanism that the Igbos may strike again to forestall any opportunity of the northern soldiers daring to avenge the aborted coup of Major CK Nzeogwu.[46] Most importantly, the counter-coup could be viewed was a latent religious counter-coup as a reprisal and reaction for the killing of the religious leader (Sir Ahmadu Bello) of the northern region. Led by Lt-Col Murtala Mohammed, northern rebels instigated the counter-coup with the aim of northern secession. However, Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a non-Muslim and the highest-ranking northern officer, became Head of State. The 'Muslim North' was confounded by the fact that the Head of State was a northern non-Muslim, thus, there remained disgruntled Muslim elites in the region due to the fact that a non-Muslim had broken its reign of power for the first time in hundred and sixty years (Hickey 1984: 252).

In order to reflect Nigeria's ethnic plurality, Gowon on 5, May 1967, divided Nigeria into 12 states.[47] This was applauded by the northern elites although the eastern region viewed this as an attempt to "balkanize the region and undermine its opposition to what it saw as a northern-dominated and anti-Igbo federal military government"

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[46] Siollun, Max. 'The Northern Counter-Coup Of 1966: The Full Story', assessed at: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare1.com/Articles/Siollun.html on December 21, 2006.

[47] Lagos State, western state, mid-west state, east-central state, Rivers State, south-eastern state, Benue-Plateau State, north-central state, Kano State, north-eastern state, Kwara State and north-western state.

(Suberu, 2001:86-87). During this period, ethnic tensions led to killings in the northern part of Nigeria, especially in Kano. In retaliation, Igbo soldiers ventured into the massacre of northerners in the eastern region of Nigeria. After a breakdown of a series of peace conferences, including the Aburi Peace Accord held on January 4-5, 1967 that proposed a Confederationist System of Government, which was later rejected by the Federal Military Government. Lt. Col Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern Region, declared the east as the new state of Biafra, prompting the Nigerian-Biafran War of July 6, 1967 – January 13, 1970.

The war could be understood, to some extent, to be religious in orientation, as the causal link could be traced to the assassination of Ahmadu Bello by the Igbo-led military coup of January, 1966. Also, Colonel Ojukwu declared at the onset of the war that "Biafra is a Christian country, we believe in the Almighty God to come to the aid of the oppressed and give us victory as he gave victory to young David over Goliath" (Walls, 1978: 207). The victory of the war for Nigeria was regarded as a salient conquest by Muslim Hausa-Fulani under the religious identity provided by Islam over the south. Osaghae (1998a:66) clearly alludes to this suggestion as he remarks that "the war was presented as a genocidal one waged by the Muslims of northern Nigeria who had declared a Jihad to exterminate Igbos from the face of the earth." Let us assume, but not concede that the war was genocidal, what is clear is that this victory laid the foundation of the Hausa-Fulani hegemony, the control of the military and the marginalization to some extent of the Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups due to the overarching solidarity of Islam among Muslims people in northern Nigeria.

It is not surprising that the north acquired and still maintains control of the armed forces, as Kaduna as well as the home of the Kaduna Mafia, has been the base of most military equipments. In addition, the Arabic emblem of Uthman dan Fodio for the Nigerian army is an indication that the north are in control of the army (Kukah & Falola 1996:51). Again, Osaghae (1998b:8) notes that "for most southerners, every northerner is 'Hausa', a euphemism for the controllers of federal power, whether he or she is a minority member or not." Religion has transformed the Hausa ethnic group to be a social glue for other minority groups, especially those professing Islam in northern Nigeria.

After nine years of General Gowon's rule, on July 29, 1975, his deputy, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, (the first Muslim military Head of State) a Hausa-Fulani from Kano, staged a bloodless coup.[48] However, Mohammed's reign lasted until February 1976, as he was ousted by an abortive military coup. The assassination of Murtala Mohammed had a religious dimension. Murtala was considered a Muslim martyr, whilst his assassins were considered Christian villains (Usman, 1987:12). General Olusegun Obasanjo, a non-Muslim from the Yoruba ethnic group and a former commander of the 3rd Marine Commando Division, during the Biafran-Nigerian war became Head of State. General Olusegun Obasanjo fulfilled his predecessor's promise of returning the country to democratic rule on October 1, 1979, which ushered in Shehu Shagari, a Fulani Muslim as the President of the ill-fated Second Republic. An interesting aspect on General Obasanjo assuming office was that Lt. Colonel Shehu

[48] Now the paradox is that, it was General Murtala who sought the secession of Northern Nigeria during the July 29, 1966 counter-coup that now attempted to unify Nigeria-his regime sought to bridge the divide in Nigerian ethnic diversity. He annulled the 1973 national census even though it favoured the north, his own ethnic group, and relocated the capital of Nigeria to a central location-Abuja. Most importantly, he instituted a transition programme for the hand over to a civilian regime scheduled for October 1, 1979. However, his regime was short lived, as he was ousted in an abortive bloody coup on February 13, 1976.

Yar'Adua, a northern Muslim, was promoted to Brigadier and appointed Chief of Staff, Supreme Head Quarters. His promotion and elevation to office was to pacify the north, especially the Kaduna mafia (Osaghae, 1998b:89). In clear terms, Osaghae (1998b:89) commented that General Obasanjo had to visit the north on several occasions to assure the northern elites that their interests were protected. This, in Osaghae's (1998b:89) view, established Obasanjo as "a 'hostage head' of state whose degree of freedom was limited."

3.8.2: Politicization of Islam under the 2nd Republic (1979-1983)

To a very large extent the politics of the 1st Republic fed into the 2md Republic in all important ramifications. Islam helped to define the character and politics of the political parties between 1979 and 1983. Thus, one will agree with Hunwick (1992:147) that, "During the periods of civilian rule...dominance at the federal level, which was in the hands of essentially northern-based Muslim-led parties, was considered to be the key to economic development." Similarly, Miles (1989:326) notes that the "Islamic dimension to northern Nigerian politics did not dissipate with the Second Republic politics. In 1983, all political parties expressed affinity to the percepts and practice of Islam."

On October 1, 1979, the second civilian regime assumed office. The 2nd Republic in Nigeria had its religious baptism even before it was born. The Sharia controversy that preceded the inauguration of the Second Republic at the constitutional drafting stage, especially at the Constituent Assembly (CA), set the religious tone of the short-lived experiment in civil democracy. The controversy centered on the inclusion and non-inclusion of the provision of the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal in the 1979

Constitution of Nigeria. The controversy expectedly polarized the country along religious and ethnic divides. While northern politicians who were mostly Muslims advocated the inclusion of Sharia in the Constitution, their southern non-Muslims counterparts saw it as a ploy to Islamize the country.

The striking out of the provision of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal resulted in the withdrawal of eighty-eight Muslim members from the Constituent Assembly (CA) until a compromise solution was achieved to make the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal a chamber in the Federal Court of Appeal (Kenny, 1996:348).

An interpretation of Sharia acculturation could be understood as an attempt to gain advantage and determine the structure of society and its social relations in the context of the new political system that was being constructed by the military after thirteen years of military dictatorship and the exclusion of politicians from power. Laitin (1982:413) perceptively captures the political undertones of the Sharia controversy that preceded Nigerian Second Republic in the following words:

> The North, with its political cohesiveness and large population had, in the First Republic, captured political power at the centre. Control over the government by the North was seen by northern interests as a counter-weight to southern control over the economy and the bureaucracy.

Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who was to become the nation's first Executive President from October 1, 1979 under the auspices of the NPN,[49]argued that the inclusion of Sharia in the nation's Constitution was not too much of a price for the unity of the nation (Laitin, 1982:418). Shehu Shagari's regime witnessed intense religious and political

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[49] The political party was founded by the North but later incorporated other ethnic groups.

conflicts especially the 1980 Maitasine riots, which occurred in Maiduguri and spread to some northern cities in Nigeria. Before the Second Republic, the Sharia debate received limelight in the 1977 Constituent Assembly on the draft constitution of the Second Republic. A Federal Sharia court of Appeal and State Sharia Court was proposed by northern delegates of the Assembly.[50] A number of politicians of northern extraction rationalized the inclusion of the Sharia clause in the 1979 Constitution in different way. There is ample evidence to support the assertion by Lucas (1984:24) that the manipulation of Islam for political gains is due to the fact that the consumption patterns of elite were subsidized through "inflated state contracts, low interest loans, government jobs and corrupt accumulation." Similarly, Othman (1984: 442) correctly notes that commercial and business rewards were dependent on favourable decisions by the State because it was the main provider of capital and commercial opportunities.

It is significant to note that the NPN was projected as an Islamic party due to its northern roots (Kenny, 1996:342). Against this background, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the presidential flag-bearer of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was forced to make "better promises in support of Muslim interest" (Kenny, 1996:342). While the NPN had a seeming national character, it was essentially a party formed and controlled in the overall interest of northern Islamic interests. According to Othman (1984:446):

> It was true that real power within the NPN rested with the Party's northern elements, who formed an unofficial organ called the northern caucus. Within this caucus, however, was a powerful clique officially called the Committee of Concerned Citizens, but best known as the Kaduna Mafia. The dispute between this group and other northern

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[50] A compromise was met with the inclusion of three judges versed in the Sharia would sit in the Federal Court of Appeal and decide cases sent by a state's Sharia Court.

elements was to become NPN's most serious internal rift, whose major significance…lay in provoking the collapse of Shagari's regime.

A further illustration ought to be made here, to reveal the political intention of the northern caucus, Alhaji Maitama Sule, an ambassador to the United Nations, alleges that the easterners like the Igbos are the business entrepreneurs, the west, the Yoruba, make excellent administrators, civil servants and teachers, in the north, the Hausas are blessed with the gift of leadership and must be accepted as such (Soyinka, 1996:107).

3.8.2.1: Islamic Mafia in Northern Nigeria

The Kaduna Mafia is not a criminal organization. It refers to the effective efficiency at networking and achieving political and economic currencies (Loimeier, 1997:123).The Kaduna Mafia, according to Othman (1984:448), constitutes "the sophisticated faction of the northern political establishment." He notes that the Kaduna Mafia have considerable success in providing a strong support base of federal power and in influencing major national issues (1984: 448). He further argues that as a result of the importance the Mafia in the Nigerian political economy, eminent southern elites sought to form an 'entente' with the brotherhood. This argument is supported by the claim that General Obasanjo permitted representatives of the Kaduna Mafia to hold key positions in his regime from 1976-1979 (Loimeier, 1997:165).

Osaghae (1998a:25) notes that the Kaduna Mafia consists of northern elites, old and new intellectuals, serving and retired military officers and administrators, business men and politicians and its main object is to defend and support of northern interests while sustaining northern political domination of Nigeria. Therefore, in many ways,

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Islamic solidarity is used to achieve economic and political advantage by the Muslim elites (Uzoigwe, 1999:15).

The establishment of the Kaduna Mafia can be linked to Mohammed Gumi and Isma'il Idris founded Izala movement in Kaduna.[51]The services of the movement, during the First Republic politics, were conducted at the Sultan Bello Mosque Kaduna, following the dominance of Pro-NEPU Tijaniyya. As noted by Sabo Bako (n.d: 15): The emergence of Izala was to emerge northern Nigeria civil servants, technocrats and well-informed politicians based in Kaduna, transformed into Kaduna Mafia to have their own movement separate from Quadiriyya, which represents the feudal upper classes and the Tijaniyya, which represented the commoners.

A major Islamic personage that has vigorously engaged Islam politically in confrontation with secular authorities in Nigeria is Sheikh El-Zakzaky and his Shiite reform movement. Sheik Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, leader of the Shi'a Muslim brotherhood, has provoked controversy by calling for an Islamic state as opposed to a secular state. Zakzaky followed the radical teachings of Sheik Abubakar Mahmoud

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[51] The Yan Izala movement was founded in 1978 was anti-brotherhood to the Quadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods. It professed reformists religious doctrines of Abd al Wahhad. Gumi sought to purge Islam from all spheres of westernization, especially in respect of education. Izala sought to build a powerful Islamic identity. Jama at *Izalatul-Bid'a wa Iqamat as Sunna*, (Society for the Eradication of Evil Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunnah) known as the Yan Izala movement[51], a branch Wahhabism Islam was introduced in Nigeria by Mohammed Gumi, the former Arabic translator for Sir Ahamadu Bello and Isma'il Idris. Izala stressed importance in the Qur'an and the Sunna as rock of Islamic faith, and it gained prominence as a result of Saudi Arabia's Islamic propagation activities. Izala is an anti-sufi movement. The movement founded in February 8, 1978, is constituted by many eminent Nigerian. The movement seeks only to reinstate traditional Islam in society. It therefore rejects the Quadiriyya and Tijanniyya sufi practices such as mysticism. Izala abhors Sufi practices such as praising the saints, recognizing Islamic conciliators or intercessors, who claim absolute knowledge of the Hadiths (saying of the Prophet) and direct link to Allah. In addition, they reject praise songs to Muslim scholars. Aside from this, the Yan Izala is a peaceful and non-violent movement and is regarded as a reformist movement. The Izala group eschews violent conflict and reproves Muslims to up hold the rule of law. It is concerned with enlightening Muslims of the need of establishing Sharia, Islamic reform and political change. However, the movement has been involved with minor conflicts with the prominent brotherhoods (Quadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhood). The main objective of Izala was to put an end to these broherhoods by *al-'Aqidah al-Sahihah bi-Muwafaqat al-Shari'ah* (The Correct Faith According to the Shari'ah). Members of Izala are mostly drawn from the elites, educated Muslims and from the civil service, this selection has transformed the sect into a non-violent sect. Thus, they do not conflict with other religious groups but only with Islamic groups not abiding by the true practice of Islam.

Gumi, a reputable Islamic scholar whose rhetoric sought for the Islamization of Nigeria and the non-election of a non-Muslim in government. He proclaimed, 'There is no government except that of Islam.' They made assertions that the Nigerian state is a fraud and only the Islamization of the government of the country can bring peace, justice and development. These fundamentalist Islamic groups reject the Nigerian flag, legal institutions and constitution, accepting only Sharia (Kenny, 1996:344).

3.8.3: The Military & the Politicization of Islam (1984-1999)

The military intervention of January 1, 1984 up until May 29, 1999 contributed its own fair share of politicization of Islam. With the military rule, northern Islamic hegemony continued in the Nigerian polity. Islam was highly functional during the military regimes. Most of the high ranking officers of the military came from the north. This was solely because the British enlisted soldiers mostly from northern Nigeria and the officers from the Igbo ethnic group had lost their dominance due to the circumstances of the Biafra war.

The failure of the 2nd Republic paved way for successive military regimes of Major General Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Fulani-Hausa Muslim from Daura, whose regime had an appalling record for human rights abuse.[52] The General Mohammadu Buhari government was said to be "Islamic in its general sympathy, and was accused of being the military arm of the ousted NPN government" (Kenny, 1996: 342). It was also said that its mission and policies were based on the 1980 NPN manifesto (Falola, 1998:62). The coup, which brought the regime to power, was connected with re-

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[52]An international highlight of the regime is the aborted attempted to smuggle Umaru Dikko, (a northerner and former minister in the Shagari regime) out of the United Kingdom on July 5, 1984. Dikko was believed to have fallen out with the Kaduna mafia.

establishing the interests of the Kaduna mafia (Osaghae, 1998b:167). This was particularly true in the administration's treatment of politicians detained and jailed for their role in the defunct Second Republic.

Politicians from southern Nigeria, who were mostly non-Muslims, were sentenced to long-jail terms. Former Governor Bisi Onabanjo of Ogun State was confined in jail, and denied medical attention, which ultimately lead to his death.[53] However, Muslims from the north, with serious cases to answer to, were treated with leniency and in most cases they were allowed to escape justice (Osaghae, 1998b:175).

Major General Ibrahim Babangida, a Nupe Muslim from the Middle Belt in the north, overthrew General Muhammadu Buhari's regime on August 27, 1985. Major General Babangida was a stratocratic dictator who had a fist full of economic failures and little or no regard for human rights. President Ibrahim Babangida overplayed the Islamic propaganda when he dragged Nigeria secretly into become member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)[54] in January 1986 and imposed Nigeria's full membership status in the organization. What is alarming is that overnight Nigerians woke up and found that they were in an international organization for Islamic countries.

Kenny (1996:360) acknowledges the paradox of Nigeria's membership of the organization: "Before Nigeria joined the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

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[53] In addition, Chief Obafemi Awolowo was put under surveillance and his passport and personal documents were seized by the Buhari regime. In addition, another former civilian governor Chief Michael Ajasin, though innocent of corruption charges was left to languish in prison. However, a strong political power broker of the north Alhaji Uba Ahmed, the Secretary-General of NPN was arrested on the day of the coup, but later was alleged to have escaped but returned to his home in northern Nigeria during the tenure of the Buhari regime. See Wole Soyinka, 1996: 85-87 & 89.
[54] Interestingly, Sir Ahmadu Bello and the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was one of the founding members of the OIC. The OIC was conceived in 1964 and later established in 1971.

hardly a Nigerian had heard of it. Then it became another 'right' for Muslims, like government institutionalization of Shari`a." By joining the OIC, the Babangida government committed Nigeria "directly to the advancement of Islam" (Kenny, 1996:351). It was argued by Muslims that since Nigeria has diplomatic relations with the Vatican, its membership in the OIC was not objectionable. The manipulation of religion by Babangida by committing Nigeria with the OIC further enhanced religious division in Nigeria. Furthermore, in showcasing Babangida's Islamic agenda, he appointed an all-Muslim-service-chief, in furtherance of his hidden political agenda of clinching to power under the regime's transitional programme. In January 1990, nine out of eleven ministerial positions were given to Muslims while the other two were non-Muslims.

3.8.3.1: The Gideon Orkar Coup

In an attempt to curb the politicization of Islam in northern Nigeria a military coup was attempted. The Major Orkar-attempted coup to oust the Babangida military administration on April 22, 1990 was as a result of "deepening socio-economic and political contradictions arising from programmes which have increased divisions, conflicts, pressures and insecurity" (Ihonvbere, 1991:614). In some ways it was a coup based on religious grounds. In a national broadcast Orkar complained that "the northern aristocratic class [has a history] replete with numerous and uncontrollable instances of callous and insensitive dominatory, repressive intrigues by those who think it is their birth-right to dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the people of the Middle Belt and the South" (Ihonvbere, 1991:616).

Again, this issue can clearly be seen in the coup d'etat speech by Major Okar, where he stated "well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and the southern parts of this county"[55] and attempted oust core Muslim northern states from Nigeria, namely, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi States.

The attempted coup was similar to the circumstances of the January 1966 coup, as there was an attack on the Islamic and political establishment of the north. If the Orkar coup had been successful, history may have repeated itself but with more severe consequences: A protracted religious war disguised as a civil war would have occurred.

3.8.4: Politicization of Islam during the Transition to the 3rd Republic

A political bureau created by the Babangida military junta in 1986, attempted to provide a constitutional blueprint for the transition to civilian rule projected for 1990, which was subsequently changed to 1992 and again to 1993 – thanks to the political ambitions of Babangida. The constitutional exercise of Third Republic was premature as General Ibrahim Babangida outrightly refused Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola the presidential seat after winning the Presidential Election on June 12, 1993. Abiola's election was annulled on June 12, 1993. Babangida, in conjunction with some northern elites, desired that political power must remain within the northern Islamic hegemony. Although Abiola was a Muslim, he was forestalled from office because he was considered to be a second-class Muslim since he was not from northern Nigeria (Maier, 2000:170).[56]

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[55] April 1990 coup d'état speech accessed on September 12, 2007 at:
http://www.dawodu.com/orkar.htm
[56] Although Abiola was a Muslim, he was forestalled from office because he was considered to be a second-class Muslim since he was not a northerner (Maier, 2000:170). However, from another point of view, one could see

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General Babangida was forced out of office by public opinion of both civilians and the senior officers of the military. After the demise of Babangida's regime, an interim government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan came into existence. His tenure was short lived as General Sani Abacha, a northern Muslim from the Kanuri ethnic group, assumed power via a coup d'etat on November 17, 1993.

Both Babangida and Abacha regimes were "powerful and unapologetic representatives of northern interests" (Falola, 1998:56). Nevertheless, the Abacha regime was laden with dictatorship, the abuse of the rule of law, political wrangling with some powerful northern elites, mass abuse of human rights and a large scale of siphoning of public funds.[57] General Abacha died in office in the hands of Indian prostitutes (Jackson, 2007:598) and was succeeded by General Abdulsalami Abubakar, a northern Muslim from Nupe, who handed over to a democratic elected president; Olusegun Obasanjo.

3.8.5: Politicization of Islam under the 4th Republic

It is pertinent to stress that before Obasanjo came into the realm of power in 1999, Islam was the religion of power in Nigeria (Maier, 2000:154). Obasanjo indirectly came into power due to the repeal of the 1993 election by General Babangida, which should have paved way for Abiola, a Yoruba man into office as President. The annulment cast distrust by Nigerians, especially those from the Yoruba nation. The

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that Abiola won the majority of electoral votes, not only in southern Nigeria but even in northern Nigeria. After 15 years, from the controversial annulment by Babangida in June 2008, Professor Humphrey Nwosu, the Chairman of the then-electoral body, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) claimed that Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) amassed 8,323,305 of the federation votes out of a total of the 14,396,917, a third of the votes in 28 of 30 states. Alhaji Tofa's National Republican Convention (NRC) amassed 7,076,612 votes, which was less than one-third of the votes in 15 states. See June12: I'll unmask those behind annulment —Nwosu, accessed on November24, 2008 at: http://www.punchontheweb.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art200806082585628 & Nwosu on June 12, accessed on November 24, 2008 at
:http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art200806182104910.
[57] $600 million is alleged to be hidden in banks across Switzerland.

annulment of this election gave both Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and his political opponent, Chief Falae of the Alliance for Democracy (AD), sympathy nominations because they were from the Yoruba ethnic group. Obasanjo won the presidential elections largely due to the immense support provided by the Muslim north. On the contrary, Obasanjo received little or no support from his ethnic group (Yoruba). The Yoruba had sentiments of distrust for Obasanjo, as they considered him a political stooge for the north. Paradoxically, the north found trust in Obasanjo, due to the fact that he handed power over to a northern Muslim (Shehu Shagari) in 1979, when he was a military Head of State. This reassured the north of Obasanjo's loyalty to northern interests and a repeat of the same gesture of 1979, of transferring power back to the north after his tenure, which was anticipated to last for one term.

Before Obasanjo's election, during the debate on the type of constitution for Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the Sharia controversy was exhumed by politicians from the north. The re-introduction of the Sharia in some northern states did not receive popular support from other religious groups, especially non-Muslims. This adaptation led to severe conflicts in the northern region, between non-Muslims and Muslims leading to the destruction of lives and property. Perhaps the main reason for the conflict was that northern state governments who adopted Sharia did not adequately enlighten non-Muslims about the tenets of Sharia law.

The return of Nigeria to civil rule on May 29, 1999 provided a most recent platform for the explication of Islamization of politics not only in the north but in Nigeria as a whole. Dickson[58] observes:

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[58]Dickson, David-Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda, accessed on November 30, 2008 at: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr140.pdf.

Islamic fundamentalism acquired a more pronounced political edge as the national fortunes of the governing Muslim national elite declined dramatically with the election of President Obasanjo, a born-again Christian from the South. After playing a major, often dominant role in the government and military for almost forty years, northern Muslims felt sidelined. Among the reasons for these sentiments was Obasanjo's removal of politicized military officers, who were disproportionately Muslim.

For the first time in the nation's political history the issue of Sharia moved from mere disagreements to implementation on September 19, 1999 in Zamfara State. Wole Soyinka, considered as Nigeria's moral voice, referred to implementation of Sharia as a "virtual act of secession."[59] The Zamfara State governor, Alhaji Ahmed Sani Yarima, introduced the Sharia law in the state to take effect from January 27, 2000. Zamfara State was followed by seven northern states in Nigeria. This led to relentless opposition from non-Muslims and other political elites in Nigeria.[60] Alhaji Ahmed Sani, the Governor of Zamfara State, declared Sharia in the state to what many considered as contrary the provisions forbidding any state religion in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Ahmed Sani's election as the Governor of Zamfara state was conducted on the platform of Sharia resurgence. Ahmed Sani's argument for the implementation of Sharia was that the Constitution guaranteed the right to freedom of religion. His introduction of Islamic law in Zamfara state spread like wild fire to eleven other states with monumental political, social and economic problems in the country.

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[59] Guardian Thursday, November 11, 1999, p.8.
[60] Buba Jangebe became the first individual to be convicted under Sharia law for stealing in Zamfara State. His right hand was amputated on March 22, 2000. On October 19, 2001, Safiya Hussaini Tungar-udu was convicted to the death penalty by stoning by the Shari'a court in Gwadabawa, Sokoto State, for being pregnant outside wedlock. However, in March 2002, her conviction was overturned. In addition, the first death penalty implemented under the Sharia law in Katsina State was held on January 3, 2002; the culprit; Sani Yaku Rodi, was found guilty of murdering a woman and her two children while robbing their home.

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) aptly commented that (Ukiwo, 2003:124): "The attempted introduction of the Sharia legal system by some states in the federation might therefore be an attempt to checkmate what they consider to be a Christian threat." Northern Muslims had sentiments of their primordial identity was threatened by the southern non-Muslim president. In concurrence, Dickson[61] rightly notes that to the political elite the spread of Sharia was as a result of Nigerian Muslims' desire to re-emphasize their political prerogative in to what they perceived as a newfound southern non-Muslim political hegemony.

Beyond this there is the notion that the ideology of implementing Sharia in the north can be understood as a political scheme by some northern elements. However, most of all, the actualization of Sharia could be seen as a reassertion of the primordial Islamic identity of northerners in the face of a perceived threat of a non-Muslim president.

3.9: Between Constitutionalism and Shariazation

The contending issues of the implementation of Sharia in northern Nigeria have prompted critics to ask the intriguing, fundamental and strategic question of how to determine whether the Constitution or the implementation of Sharia takes precedence. Despite the implementation of Sharia in 12 northern states,[62] it could be argued that it contravenes the Nigerian 1999 Constitution; Section 10(3) of the 1999, which states that: "No government in Nigeria shall adopt a law peculiar to any religion". Moreover, Section 10 (7) states that, "Any State that breaches Section 10 of the Constitution shall

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[61] Dickson, David-Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda, accessed on November 30, 2008 at: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr140.pdf.
[62] Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Niger, Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe and Borno.

be deemed to have withdrawn from the Federation and, therefore, shall, after due process, be denied Federal allocation of funds until it purges itself of its effrontery."

However, it may be argued that the implementation of Sharia is a declaration of the rights of a state under federal principles of democratic governance, which seeks to balance ethnic and religious identities from being dominated by others. In addition, Sharia could be viewed as the establishment of democratic governance, where the majorities are Muslims. Surely one may argue that the freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution; Section 38 (1), "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion..." establishes the political will of people to choose the religion they wish to adhere to. In adhering to Islam, its fundamental principles are the compliance with Sharia law. Furthermore, Governor Umar Musa Yar'Adua,[63] the former governor of Katsina State defended the implementation of Sharia on April, 19, 2000 by saying that it is the "collective will of the Muslims in the state."[64] He further explained that: "It should be emphasized that the Sharia law applies only to the Muslims in the state and would not apply to those of other faiths or beliefs."[65] Thus, it should be noted that the northern states implementing Sharia respected constitutional prohibition of a state religion by excluding their non-Muslims from the application of Islamic law (Suberu, 2009: 553).

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[63] Umar Yar'Adua became the President of Nigeria on May 29, 2007. It was during his regime as governor of Katsina State that in 2002, Amina Lawal, received international attention, when she was sentenced by a Sharia court to death by stoning for committing adultery due to the fact that she was pregnant but not married. However, her sentence was overruled following an appeal.

[64] Minchakpu, Obed 'Christians and Islamic Law in Nigeria: An Overview of the Situation Facing the Church in Northern Nigeria', accessed September 1, 2008 at:
http://www.worthynews.com/news-features/compass-nigeria-sharia-3.html.

[65] accessed on September 1, 2008 at:
http://listserv.episcopalian.org/wa.exe?A2=ind0005c&L=virtuosity&D=1&H=1&O=D&F=&S=&P=2237.

Although one cannot pretend that there are no religious implications, the desire for Sharia, is more and primarily political rather than for the religious needs of the people of the north. According to Bienen (1986:50), it was necessary for northern leaders to emphasis Islam in order to maintain northern unity.

Bienen (1986:51) goes further to tell us that the dispute over the implementation of Sharia was useful in determining its constitutional legitimacy. The debate was also a political struggle between elites from different regional and religious groups in Nigeria. Disputes over Sharia showcased the challenges of the Nigerian federalism, the might of the central government, the relationships between north and south divides and the relationships between the major and minority ethnic identities.

Map 3.1

Map of Nigeria showing the Sharia States

Courtesy: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2632939.stm#map

3.10: Rationalization of Sharia Law in Northern Nigeria

Sharia law was administered in the 12th and 15th Century in the Kanem Bornu Empire and Hausa regions before Nigeria was colonized by the British. Moreover, Sharia law was administered in northern Nigeria through the Native Authority in the 1950s until 1960, just before independence.

The Native Courts Proclamation (1906)[66] and the Native Courts Ordinance of 1914, dispossessed the Sultan of his judicial power as the final arbiter under the Sharia law. Sharia law was subject to the repugnancy test so far as the laws were not repugnant to equity and good conscience. Sharia law was subsequently administered in conjunction with the English common law. It should be noted that the Customary Courts entertained cases pertaining to minority ethnic groups.

Sharia law was substituted by the penal code on October 1, 1960 on the advice of the 1957 Willinks Minority Commission. Sharia law became applicable to civil cases while the penal code was applied only to criminal cases. Another factor that that paved way for Sharia law to be substituted by the penal code was the concern by the non-Muslims in northern Nigeria (Reynolds, 1999:87). The resurgence of Sharia is some northern states was as a result of a willingness to revisit and recapture Islamic sensibilities, which had been in existence before the British conquered the region but deprived by the colonial advice of the 1957 Minority Commission. Naniya (2002: 26) argues that the colonial administration de-emphasized Sharia law for the penal code for economic reasons, especially on issues relating to banking and the charging of

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[66] It has been argued that this Ordinance is the origin of religious conflicts in Nigeria as the northern Muslims were considered to identify with their culture through Islamic law whilst non-Muslims were subjugated as not being equal with Muslims (Alabi, D. T.,2002) .

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interest, which is contrary to Sharia law. This was imperative for protecting British interests and investments in northern Nigeria.

It is now understood that Islamic political thought is based on the concept of a union of religion and state. Understandably, an Islamic nation recognizes that Islam is its national religion and therefore must apply Sharia law. Sharia law is binding and remains in force until there is sufficient proof of its revocation (Friedmann, 2003:22). Sharia mainly regulates the law and the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims (*dhimmis*) or otherwise called 'Magazawa' (people whom it was acceptable to live along-side Muslims in peace) also referred to as 'Kaferi' in northern Nigeria. The continued debate and persistence about the implementation of Sharia will continue to be a part of the political debate in northern Nigeria as Sharia is considered by Islamic adherents as a core tenet. It is therefore not surprising that the Sharia has taken this position.

Thus, the attempt to Sharia-lize the north was an attempt at reviving previous religious traditions in order to check the corrupt practices of politicians (Harnischfeger, 2004). The sentiment of reviving Islamic identity is noted by Sanusi (2005): "Unlike many of the groups in southern Nigeria where ethnic and tribal identities are primary to all others...Muslim people in northern Nigeria have, starting from the 19th Century, seen themselves primarily as Muslim".

Sharia is an important component of the primordial identity of northern Muslims. Mazrui (Frieder, 2008:605) noted that, "Nigeria is the only African country outside

Arab Africa which has seriously debated an alternative to the Western constitutional and legal option."

The politicization of Sharia does not enforce religion but creates an environment conducive to its development.[67] The implementation of Sharia without the manipulation of the elites, but employed in truth and in the spirit of Islam, then it can be stated in light of the spirit of the Hadith that "Allah is beautiful and Allah loves all that is beautiful...since Shari'a is the way to God, it is of necessity the way to beauty" (El Fadl, 2001: 114).

3.11: Islamization of the Federal Capital

The Islamization of the Federal Capital, Abuja was orchestrated by the Murtala Mohammed regime in 1976. The National Assembly is designed with a grand Islamic architectural design. In addition, the city gateways are designed with an Islamic-Arab architectural design and a notable architectural piece in the capital is the Central Mosque.

The western style of dressing, which is considered too revealing for 'morality' and Islamic cultures, has been branded offensive and the police machinery aided by a task force ensures such compliance. Yet, there has not been a report of any individual tried by the task force. Most culprits, especially women, are considered prostitutes, regardless if they are found in the day or night. This also applies to the preferential location of worship centers with Islamic bias. Though it is said that there are many non-Muslim sects jostling for space, the kind of liberties enjoyed by worship locations

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[67] Sanusi L. Sanusi: 'Between the Shariah and "Barbarism"', accessed on the 30th of November, 2006 at: http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/barticles/between_the_shariah_and.htm.

that have noisy affectations give people the inclination to believe such. In the demolition exercises to harmonize the city plan, most non-Muslim worship centers were demolished.[68]

The non-Muslim delegates to the Constituent Assembly, headed by Justice A.N. Aniagolu, expressed their concerns amongst others that Abuja looks like a Muslim city with Muslim architectural designs, especially with the bus stops designed like mosques and the fact that the hospital in Abuja has no mortuary and coffins cannot be bought anywhere in Abuja (Falola, 1998:89).

3.12: Islamization and Gender Politics

Islam acknowledges equality of both sexes.[69] The often-quoted Hadith of Prophet Muhammad acknowledges Islam's position: "All people are equal, as the teeth of a comb. There is no claim to superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab or a white over a black or a male over a female. All God-fearing people merit a preference with God."[70]

However a popular context of politicization of Islam, which most commentators fail to address, lies in the gender bias, in northern Nigeria. Given the Islamic culture, women were usually excluded from participation in public affairs. Women, while not in

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[68] 'Violent Protests Rock Abuja Over Churches' Demolition', 27 September 2000, accessed at: http://www.ugandaruralcommunitysupport.org/2000/10/02/violent-protests-rock-abuja-over-churches-demolition-27-september-2000-2/.
See also '300 demolished churches in Abuja', accessed at:
http://www.ourchurch.com/view/?pageID=309522.
[69] The ill treatment of women was practiced in the Arab nation. However, this practice is contrary to Islam. The Qur'an (16:58-59) states emphatically that "And when the news of (the birth of) a female child is brought to any of them, his face becomes dark, and he is filled with inward grief! He hides himself from the people because of the evil of that whereof he has been informed. Shall he keep her with dishonour or bury her in the earth? Certainly, evil is their decision."
[70] Malik Sardar Khan, 'Tolerance and solidarity-II', accessed on November 20, 2008 at:
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=200806169392&archiveissuedate=16/06/2008.

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purdah, are only to be seen and not heard in northern Nigeria. The few women who dared to participate in politics were usually institutionally confronted by male candidates, making sure that they lose their deposits at the polls if their political parties nominated them in the first place. The Chairman of Bakori Local Government, Hajiya Mariya Abdullahi of the SDP, lamented that she was politically disadvantaged because her political opponents preached and campaigned in the mosque (Shettima, 1995:77). In addition, she stressed that a large number of women could not vote for her, mainly due to the fact that their marital status prevented them from voting for a candidate not sanctioned by their spouses.

3.13: Conclusion

I have examined the utility of Islam as a veritable platform for power and economic advantages from the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial politics of northern Nigeria. The chapter argued that the Islamization of politics by northern politicians gives these politicians advantages over and above their political rivals both within and outside of the north. This over-arching political currency that is possible through the Islamization of politics is a result of the nature and character of the Nigerian state.

The centrality of Islam in the society and politics of northern Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized. Johnson (Hackett, 2003:67), notes that in some non-western cultures, religion primarily motivates political action. Even though western policymakers dismissed its divisive influence, religion has significant potential for overcoming the impediments that lead to political and social collapse. Similarly, Ellis & Haar (1998:178) perceptively note that the fact that politics ought to be connected with the distribution of power in society but when religious texts exploit this role they become

political in nature. It is not surprising that politicians in northern Nigeria attempt to gain political currencies using the platform of Islam.

More to the point, Falola (1998:44) emphasizes that "religion is used to consolidate existing identities and to forge a new one. In northern Nigeria, Islam successfully merges with ethnicity to create the political concept of a united north." Islam provides the context for the defining, conceptualizing, posing, arguing and resolving political questions even within a secular paradigm. It is futile to attempt to analyses and understand the politics of northern Nigeria without contextually situating the role of Islam in the region. This reveals the complexity and essential nature of society, politics and power in northern Nigeria.

A potential observation from the foregoing is that northern Nigeria is synonymous with Islam, as Sanusi (2004) suggests with regards to Kano but with relevance to the whole of northern Nigeria:

> Islam remains a dominant force in the constitution of the identity of the people of Kano [*northern Nigeria*]. A lot of our attitudes to some of the issues affecting our political economy...are traceable in part to a wrapped and distorted understanding of the Islamic religion, and its confusion with the traditional values of Hausa society and feudal social formation, or the congealed history of medieval Arabia.

It is perhaps now clear why and how Islam acts as supra ethno-national identity to Muslims in northern Nigeria.

It has been argued that the northern elites have engineered Islam to provide northern harmony (Sanusi, 2001). Sanusi notes that the people answerable for the dilemma of

the Muslim northerner are the northern Muslim elite. Sanusi further states that the elites must be aware that the Muslim northerner can readily identify them as their true enemy — it is not the Nigerian Constitution which guarantees them liberty and equal opportunity and not the poor southerner or non-Muslim but the rich northern Muslim who has subjected them to indigence and kept them in perpetual lack of basic needs.

The ideal for the politicization of Islam in northern Nigeria ought to be for the sacrosanct purpose of eradicating social injustice and oppression and uplifting social and political rights, as championed by Sir Ahmadu Bello and Mallam Aminu Kano. The politicization of Islam, for un-Islamic purposes such as political repression, prebendalism, accumulation of wealth by other leaders from the north and as a fog for conflict, is the pollutant that has partly corrupted the process of politicization and political consolidation of Islam and may have placed an indelible stain on Islam, thereby situating it as a museum piece in northern Nigeria.

The next chapter focuses on the research methodology used in this study. It explains the justification for both quantitative and qualitative data used as the backbone of this thesis.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

Things do not happen by chance or without a reason. Behind events
and courses of events there are powers generating them

Danermark, et al. (2002: 198)[71]

4.1: Introduction

This research uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. Within the framework of

qualitative investigation, I used (a) semi-structured interviews and (b) FGDs. While

semi structured interviews with individuals and groups provided part of the narrative,

the other part came from FGDs, where particular propositions/hypothesis were

examined in order to pin down key arguments and their various strands. Crucially,

these twin strands within the qualitative method were helpful in providing the basis

for further explanation as to how the 'us' and 'them' identification is established.

Most crucially, a form of target setting that identifies a Muslim from a non-Muslim by

the use of certain sets of codes becomes apparent while interrogated within the

qualitative method.

While the qualitative method is important in this study, it is not exhaustive. The

answers and findings of qualitative method were based on abstract reasoning. In order

to provide a more scientific basis to the findings, I have triangulated it within a

quantitative framework. Thus, causal explanations in the qualitative framework are

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[71] Danermark, Berth; Ekstrom Matts; Jakobsen Liselotte & Jan Ch. Karlsson, 2002. *Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences*. London: Rutledge.

examined simultaneously with quantitative figures. This form of interrogation has allowed me to verify an abstract response in a scientific context.

The use of observation is a vital method in studying social groups. The methodological foundation of this thesis is the critical realist paradigm. The utility of critical realism flows from its practical usefulness in resolving complex and intricate social problems. In line with the critical realist orientation, my effort at understanding the dialectic of Islam and conflicts in northern Nigeria is highly pragmatic. While the research is conducted with clear-cut framework and pre-determined methodological constructs, my field-work activities are oriented by a critical realist practical disposition. In order to effectively use this method of observation, I built my research on a grass-roots assessment as a mechanism of understanding religious conflicts in northern Nigeria.

4.2: Causal Explanations

Qualitative method complements the critical realist framework of analysis. It defers significantly from the positivists' limited orientation and allows the research to be a real-life experience. From using the qualitative methods, I was able to generate categories based on the data collected from the field. With empirically based categories, I am able to better understand, investigate and analyze the dynamics of Islam and conflict in northern Nigeria, which would have otherwise been impossible. Qualitative methods provide a causal analysis of what has been observed and demonstrate what affects and enables occurrences. The empirical methodology would depend on the object of study and the facts to be gathered from such study (Sayer, 2000:19). For instance, the empiricist can discover patterns of conflict behaviour that

Muslims and non-Muslims possess in northern Nigeria. However, the critical realist will causally analyze the reasons for the conflicts and the salient and latent societal causes that facilitate these conflicts.

The use of qualitative methods determines the theoretical aspect of the research which will illustrate the 'tendency' of the theory. An 'Intensive Research Design' (Sayer, 2000) was adopted to explain the causality of the theory. In seeking an Intensive Research Design (IRD), the analyses of a social event is embedded in immense discourse not relatively statistical to the whole (theory) but related and participatory in a wider discourse. The IRD approach focuses on 'conditions of possibility' or the 'generative mechanisms' that explain a social phenomenon (Danermark et al., 2002:166). In other words, in searching for the truth and the best explanation the research question seeks a practical adequacy on the discourse (Sayer, 1984:2000).

In utilizing the IRD qualitative method, I depended on historical experiences of the people and areas under investigation as well as conducted semi-structured interviews and FGDs, which were complemented with content analysis of government documents, newspapers, magazines and other publications, in order to fully capture all dimensions and all relevant data important to the research.

The design of the research instruments is to enhance the possibility of obtaining reliable and maximum data for the research. Hence, semi-structured interviews and FGDs format is adopted given the advantage of the freedom it offers respondents and the control it imposes on respondents regarding the issues in focus. The advantage of oral testimony could be seen from the often quoted dictum of Gardner (2003:187) that

"the force of the spoken word...always rests upon its intimacy, together with its rootedness in the local, the personal and the particular. It is this which gives to oral testimony its capacity for depth and authenticity." Furthermore, it is an ideal instrument in the context of the critical realist framework as it gives room for going into important issues that came up during the interview. Such issues were in-depth as the respondents gave much more insights than would have otherwise been possible. The instrument also enriched the historical depth of the research, just as the psychological dimensions of the issues as illustrated thorough the emotive reactions and body languages of the respondents especially when sensitive issues bordering on faith were discussed. Following the advice of Krueger, (1998:3-5) questions were asked in a clear conversational manner, which allowed sufficient time for questions to be answered. Moreover, I took into consideration Holstin & Gubrium's (2003:69) observation of an effective interview technique of a journalist that interview questions were "casual in nature...the kind you would ask while having a drink...in short it was a conversation." With this in mind, in each of the study locations, I with my team of researchers interviewed 50 individuals in each of the study locations in order to collate sufficient data for analysis.

On the analytical approach of this study and its importance for evolving solutions, the research is grass-root oriented by connecting with the people who have first-hand experience in the impact of conflict. The rationale here is borrowed from Albert Wendt (Friedman, 1992: 854) who argues that "a society is what it remembers; we are what we remember; I am what I remember; the self is a trick of memory."

Apart from interviewing to collate historical perspectives, interviews were conducted from a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology is a philosophical concept founded by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who sought to describe experience not by subjective or objective methods but by the experience of things the way they are as perceived by an observer or researcher. Phenomenology is the "study of lived experiences and the ways we understand those experiences to develop a world view" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 112).

The interviewees were able to relate their experiences of religious conflicts and how Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity to reduce conflicts in Nigeria. Phenomenology provided us with the immediate experience of religious conflicts as experienced by the observer as "the individual's life is the vehicle of historical experience" (Thompson, 2000:269). In addition, I took into consideration the importance and relevance of oral history as noted in the dictum of Jan Vansina (Thompson, 1994: 6):

> Yes, oral traditions are documents of the present, because they are told in the present. Yet they also embody a message from the past, so they are expressions of the past at the same time... To attribute their whole content to the evanescent present as some sociologists do, is to mutilate tradition; it is reductionistic. To ignore the impact of the present as some historians have done is equally reductionistic. Traditions must always be understood as reflecting both past and present in a single breath.

The primary function of FGDs is to collect qualitative data to answer research questions (Morgan & Krueger 1993:11). In the FGDs about 12 to 13 people per location participated (Kano, Kaduna & Jos).[72] The use of FGDs enhanced observatory processes for searching for an explanation into the dynamics of Islam and conflict in

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[72] 12 participants in Kano; 12 Participants in Jos & 13 participants in Kaduna.

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northern Nigeria. Focus groups use discussions to "generate a rich understanding of participants' experiences and beliefs" (Morgan, 1998:11). As rightly noted by Litosselti's (2003:18) observation FGDs are useful for discovering new information, collating different perspectives on the same subject matter, gathering insights into the participants' views, analyzing participants' general understanding (probing) of the subject matter, engendering new suggestions from participants understanding group dynamics and discovering contentious issues.

With the use of FGDs, social, economic, political and religious notables across ethnic divides were carefully selected based on their experience and possibilities of adding value to the research outcome. There was one of such FGD in each of the three study locations. Open-ended questions were asked during the FGD. A key feature of FGDs is to unravel the 'internalized opinions' of the participants (Morgan, 1993:57). This was adopted to allow the participants to exhibit expressive freedom and prevent the use of leading questions (Morgan, 1993:63). In addition, keeping questions open to the group stimulated useful "trains of thought" from the participants (Knodel, 1993:36). I maximized interaction among the participants by "challenging people's taken for granted reality and encouraging them to discuss the inconsistencies both between participants and within their own thinking" (Kitzinger, 1994: 106) that explain religious conflicts in the region. Individuals were asked to explain the reasoning behind their thoughts on diverse issues (Kitzinger, 1994:113). The FGDs were conducted in "pleasant, loving environment" (Ressel et al., 2002:3) in order to relax the participants to co-opt sufficient data for analysis. It is useful to note that bureaucratic permissions were not required for the use of oral interviews and FGDs, as the targets of these twin strands of investigations were the grass-root people.

The main attraction for using FGDs is to delve into the consciousness of the individuals and unearth the underlying rationale for their actions in order to form unbiased impressions of the subject matter (Goebert, 2001:5). The FGDs were highly enriching as the researcher was able to develop personal rapport with the audience and obtained information that would not otherwise be possible.

The use of oral interviews and FGDs were useful qualitative methods to address all the salient issues in the research question. The use of both methods enhanced observatory processes for searching for an explanation of the dynamics of religious conflicts in Nigeria.

The method of seeking to authenticate this thesis is different from other enquires into natural science and indeed other patterns of social behaviour. Noting that any social system has a distinct and complex characteristic, the community as a reference point in gathering oral testimony via interviews and the use of FGDs greatly enhanced the output of the qualitative research and further validated the interviews. By applying random selection of the participants in the FGD, the incidence of bias was limited (Krueger, 1993:71). Furthermore, interviews are central in creating new knowledge whilst FGDs discover innate traditions and the reality of the people.

4.3: Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

An 'Extensive Research Design' (ERD) was adopted to evaluate the theory and hypothesis. This method of predictions and calculations is used to supplement causal explanations. Although, this method does not casually explain social phenomenon, it

assisted the study to obtain results from its hypothesis and was quite useful, as it is not only a tool of analysis, but also an element of the object of study (Sayer, 1992: 178).

After first determining their qualifications for inclusion into these predetermined research categories, respondents were distributed by faiths and ethnic origins and were randomly selected for measuring how quantities vary. All the respondents were 18 years old or older. About 35% of the respondents per population were women. The greater percentage of men is attributed to the fact that men are the primary actors in most of the religious crises, just as they play dominant positions in issues of faith. Since religious conflicts are mostly between non-Muslims and Muslims, those selected on religious basis were limited to these two religions critical to my research. Quantitative models that formed the basis of 20 sample questionnaires are derived from the major variables of the research problematic (see Appendix A). Questions were systematically woven around these variables so that the responses to these questions were later coded for analysis. Emphasis was placed on how the questions were worded in order to impute adequate understanding and proper response (Clark & Schober, 1992). The researcher and his field assistants conducted a pre-test of the research instruments in the study locations. This helped to determine the problems associated with the instrument, if any, possible ambiguities, and whether or not the instrument can assist in eliciting the desired responses from the respondents. After the pre-test, some modifications and corrections, for instance questions relating to ethnic diversity were made to the research instrument before actual fieldwork commenced.

Aside from the respondents selected for semi-structured interviews, separate and distinct respondents were selected to fill in a questionnaire. All the more important,

however, respondents who filled in the questionnaire were usually those who declined to participate in semi-structured interviews. It is useful to note that respondents were sought in public places such as the town market, mosques and non-Muslim places of worship, the post office vicinities which is usually an economic nerve centre in the North and other areas of commercial activity.

Furthermore, each respondent was independently selected to reduce the chances of external influences on the respondent. The respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses and guaranteed that the data are solely for academic purposes.

4.4: Data Gathering

Drawing on these diverse sources of information, I developed a unique dataset based on the analytical categories on conflicts within the northern region. Keeping in mind that critical realist orientation allows research to be a product of the empirical realities of the research situation. Data obtained through primary sources are supplemented with secondary materials to increase the reliability of the research findings. Materials obtained through secondary sources are used as an evaluation tool for the data obtained from my primary sources to test their validity and reliability. Some of the secondary materials used in the research are journals articles, books, periodicals, monographs, government publications and White Papers (scholarly work), both published and unpublished. Libraries both in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, as well as the Internet, are very rich sources of most of the materials used in gathering the secondary data used for the research.

Data collection is a very important phase of research projects because it refers to the obtaining of relevant information regarding the major ideas of the hypotheses of the study for the purpose of demonstrating their validity (Newman, 1998). The mode of statistical technique depends on the nature of data as the type and method of data collected determines the quality of the research outcome. In the first section I explore the quantitative findings.

4.5: Data Analysis

Statistical analyses are evaluated from the responses from the sample questionnaires. This was preceded with the sorting and coding of the responses in consonance with the core variables of the research. The coded responses were subsequently subjected to frequency counts and percentages analysis to determine their weight and prevalence. Furthermore, descriptive analyses principles for causal explanations are applied in the data from the semi-structured interviews, FGDs and the open-ended interviews. These responses are both recorded in field notes and on tapes.

4.5.1: Role of Researcher Assistants

In order to carry out an adequate assessment of the research questions, it was highly necessary to constitute a team of research assistants for the purpose of assisting me in the study. This team constituted of five motivated and organized individuals, including one who was conversant with the Hausa language. The main role of the team was to assist me to gather, analyze qualitative and quantitative data from the study locations. In addition, the research team assisted in the selection of interviewees for the twin strands within the qualitative method (semi-structured interviews and FGDs).

4.6: Validity

It is pertinent to note that in validating a hypothesis, the search to disprove the hypothesis must be adopted and only if the search to disprove the hypothesis fails that the hypothesis becomes valid (Cashman 1993:7). The corroboration of FGDs with interviews demonstrated a reliable test for validity and reliability for qualitative methods. In addition, the triangulation with quantitative methods further enhanced the validity of the propositions and hypothesis. The triangulation with another method is not conclusive that the hypothesis is valid (Morgan, 1993:232), however, the differences in the data in both methods create an understanding of the sources of these dissimilarities. The advantage of using both qualitative and quantitative methods is that the former entails that the knowledge about 'truths' can be substantiated through experimentation and observation (Philips & Burbules, 2000), whilst the latter entails that knowledge of 'truths' are obtained by the construction or observation by society being studied (Neuman, 2000). In addition, the use of another researcher analyzing the information gathered and explaining the data enables corroboration of the methods and enhances reliability of the data (Golafshani, 2003:604).

Deliberate efforts were made all through the research process to ensure that compliance with the five counts of establishing validity in qualitative research as advocated by Maxwell (1992) were achieved. The five validity tests to which the data for this research were exposed to are:

1. Descriptive Validity: Conscious efforts were made to ensure absolute factual accuracy in the research process.

2. Interpretative Validity: Researchers' bias and personal opinions were totally eliminated from the research. Where there were noticeable ambiguities,

respondents were asked to clarify what they actually meant by their statements. The use of interpreters was engaged to eliminate the possibilities of misinterpretation due to communication problems.

3. Theoretical Validity: Careful efforts were taken to ensure that the theoretical framework adopted has the capacity to guide the research process and ultimately assist in the achievement of the research objective.

4. Generalizations: Careful efforts were made to ensure that generalizations were informed by theoretically based observable regularities.

5. Evaluative Validity: The data gathered for the research were carefully coded and systematically analyzed.

4.7: Population of Study

The northern states have increasingly become a hot-bed for religious crises in recent years. Some major results of these crises are the massive dislocation of citizens, loss of life and property. Following these predicaments there is an increased segregation of the population and masses along religious lines.

To conduct a complete enumeration or survey of all the states in the northern Nigeria is impossible for one obvious reason – it is too enormous. To this end, the researcher committed the study to three states: Plateau, Kano and Kaduna in northern Nigeria. The rationale for selecting these locations is that Kaduna state seems to be the only state in northern Nigeria that is sharply divided along religious lines it has an equal divide of Muslims and non-Muslims; A unique aspect of Kano is it has a homogeneous Hausa population united also by the Islamic faith, there are more Muslims than non-Muslims and in Jos the majority of the people living in this location

are non-Muslims (Christians). The sample study was conducted based on the assumption that all the states in the north possess identical administrative set ups, a common identity marker amongst Muslims and share similar social constructions.

4.7.1: Population of Study: Kaduna, Kaduna State

Map 4.1

Kaduna State

Kaduna, meaning "crocodiles", derives its name from the river that flows across the town (Isyaku, 2001). Unlike most other northern settlements that are predominantly Muslims of Hausa-Fulani extraction, Kaduna has a highly cosmopolitan character, evident in the ethnic and religious composition of the town. Kaduna is not only ethnically diverse, it is also religiously balanced, with an even distribution of Muslims and non-Muslims. Given the location of the town at the point of convergence of the railway line from Lagos to Kano its status as the political nerve center of the north, people from far and wide consider Kaduna to be ideal for professional, commercial and vocational interests.

Among the different ethnic nationalities that are indigenous to Kaduna are: Hausa-Fulani, Kataf, Gwari, Baju, Kagoro, Jaba and Moro'a. According to Isyaku (2001:215), "Kaduna State seems to be the only state in Nigeria that is sharply divided along religious lines." This is because Kaduna can easily be parallel into a Muslim/non-Muslim divide. In terms of the indigenous population, there exist the Hausa-Fulani populations, which are mostly Muslims, as well as the different ethnic nationalities in the southern Kaduna area, which are predominantly Christians and animists. Added to the latter groups are the 'foreigners', mostly the Christian Yoruba, Igbo and other people from the southern and Middle Belt ethnic regions of the country.

4.7.2: Population of Study: Kano, Kano State

Map 4.2

Kano State

The pre-colonial Kano was peopled by Muslim Hausa, Fulani, Tuareg, Arab and Nupe (Paden, 1973:22). With 20,760 square kilometres of land mass Kano occupies an important position in any discourse not only on northern Nigeria but on Islam and Nigeria as a whole. Historically, Kano is a center of commerce as well as an Islamic learning. It has recently added religious Puritanism and violence to its credentials.

Kano is only next to Sokoto in the ranking of importance of northern cities religion-wise.

While there are many settlers from different parts of Nigeria, such as Yoruba, Igbo, Edo, Tiv, Igala, Nupe, Idoma and Bachama, as well as many foreigners from Syria (Lebanese), Europe, India, Niger, Chad and Sudan living and doing businesses in Kano, the overwhelming population of Kano is Hausa-Fulani. A unique aspect of Kano is that the city has a primarily homogeneous Hausa population united also by the Islamic faith (Paden, 1973:14). Relying on the 1952 census, Paden (1973:44) noted that "Islamic affiliation in Kano State was 98% in 1952 and probably over 99% in 1970."

According to Paden, (1973:44) the city is divided into (1) Kano City, the old Kano city, which is populated mostly by Hausa-Fulani, (2) Waje – "new town" – made up of Fagge, an Hausa settlement and commercial center, Sabon Gari where the Igbo and Yoruba have their residence and Tudun Wada and Gwagwarwa for Muslims immigrants from other places in the north and (3) Township, the former Government Reserved Area (GRA), where Nigerian civil servants and foreigners live.

Located at the heart of northern Nigeria, Kano tastefully blends traditionalism and modernism. Given its love for political and social reformism, modern Kano provided the platform for Malam Aminu Kano radical *talakawa* politics that frontally challenged the oppressive and exploitative feudal order in the north.

4.7.3: Population of Study: Jos, Plateau State

Map 4.3

Plateau State

The capital of Plateau State, Jos, apart from its historic popularity as the Tin City, has a rather human-friendly climate, which makes it very attractive for migration and for tourists to Nigeria. Jos is located at the heart of Nigeria, and it is less than three hundred kilometres away from the nation's capital, Abuja. Formed in 1915 as a camp for the transportation of tin, Jos is made up of about 54 ethnic-groups, some of whom are: Angas, Mupun, Amo, Bugi, Mujango, Hausa, Birom, Mwa gharul, Pyapun, Sha, Rukuba, Yashi, Taroh, Yeskwa and Geomai.

When Plateau State was created by the Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo's administration in 1976, Jos became the capital of the new state. As a result, the city has political, economic and commercial importance. Several mineral resources are found in the state, some of which are quartz, feldspar, mica, tin, talc, limestone, gemstone and dolomite.

Jos in particular, and Plateau State in general, is historically reputed as a very peaceful place, hence the reference to it as the "home of peace." The different fratricidal

religious wars that rocked the city and the state in 2001 dented this image. In a short span of one year Jos and Plateau State witnessed at least seven gruesome religious riots. Some of the riots experienced in 2001 are: Wase conflict, Shendam ethnic militia attack, Quaan Pan ethnic conflict, Quaan pan Local Government conflict, Langtang conflict (spill over of Wase conflict), Jos Jumaat prayer conflict and Jos North Local Government riots.

Given the conditions existing in Jos and other communities in Plateau State prior to the 2001 riots on the contentious issues of settler/indigenes dichotomy, it was obvious that Jos and its surrounding state was sitting on a 'keg of gun powder.' It was not surprising that two seemingly unrelated events provided the ignition for the combustion that almost destroyed the whole of Plateau State and threatened the stability of Nigeria as a state-nation.

4.8: Conclusion

The use of the critical realist research method offered flexibility which provided unexpected but important issues and discoveries relevant to the research problematic. The need for this flexibility can be understood against the background that to the critical realist "our knowledge of reality is a result of social conditioning and, thus, cannot be understood independently of the social factors involved in the knowledge derivation process" (Dobson, 2002).[73]

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[73]Page not numbered. Accessed on the 3rd of April 2007 at http://informationr.net/ir/7-2/paper124.html

Multi-disciplinary perspectives and diverse methods were used to generate the required data as well as explicit responses from those interviewed in order to adequately grasp the problematic of the research. To the critical realist, the scientific and social worlds need a method or methodology of observation to explain a tendency. However, one must note that it is complex using methods of observation because predictions are fragile and variable in the social science.

The purpose in using critical realism as the springboard of the methodology is that it allows one to transcend the common-place explanations of the relations between Islam and conflict in northern Nigeria. Furthermore, it engages the substantive issues involved in the discovery of causal factors that are the generators of the observable phenomenon of religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. As aptly put by Wendt (Geller & Singer, 1998:18) "whereas the empiricist explains by generalizing about observable behaviour, the realist explains by showing how (often unobservable) causal mechanisms which make observable regularity possible work."

Critical realism methodology is concerned with causation and causal analysis Sayer, 1984). Consequently, the methodological focus of the research empowers us to enquire into what makes something happen. In other words, I seek 'causal analysis by 'explaining why what happens actually does happen' (Danermark et al., 2002:52). The design of my research instruments and empirical activities in the field were systematically structured to achieve this goal. The methodological mechanism for achieving the above is anchored on both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The research seeks a Kantian transcendental argument into "what is, why it came to be the way it is, and about how it ought to be" (Hammersley, 2002:35) in explaining the

analyses of the data collated from the field. The thesis seeks to search for that which is not known, to ask transcendental questions and answer them via internal critiques (Cruickshank, 2002:61).

The next chapter explores the conflict dynamics in northern Nigeria. It attempts to do this by highlighting crucial factors that influence conflict in Nigeria as a whole before narrowing down more specifically to religious conflicts in northern Nigeria.

CHAPTER 5

THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION & CONFLICT IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

> I make bold to say that violence is the creed of no religion...I object to
> violence because when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary;
> the evil it does is permanent.
>
> Mahatma Gandhi[74]

5.1: Introduction

One may begin with an important enquiry: If states such as Nigeria are sustained by
an invented tradition of unity (Anderson, 1991), then what are the factors hampering
its nation-building efforts? In this part of the study, I wish to chart the nature of
Nigerian (dis)unity. I propose to do it in the following manner: Gurr's (1970) relative
deprivation thesis (Grievance) is used to highlight ethnic separatism; I underscore
Anderson's (1991) argument's on invented tradition to pitch my questions on the
north-south divide; I explore Collier's & Hoeffler's (2004) arguments on the
perceptions of greed and Juergensmeyer's (1993) theory of religious divide to explain
the growing sense of divide between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The paradigm of conflicts in any state consists of complex determinants, such as
historical, social, political and economical causal patterns (Braathen, Boas & Saether,
2000). This categorization is consistent with Nigerian society, which is largely divided
and disunited on ethnic and tribal differences but mostly on religious divides.

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[74] The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi', complete book accessed online on the 1st of March, 2008 at:
http://www.mkgandhi.org/momgandhi/momindex.

In explaining conflict, it is crucial to understand how the conflict "fits together and interacts," identifying the "dominant forces at a particular moment in time" and seeking a paradigm for resolving such conflict (Adedeji, 1999:10). In order to understand the myths and truths about the roots of conflicts in Nigeria, clearly, her diversity in language, culture and religious faiths are key factors on what generates its causal patterns.

Conflict is inherent in all societies. Conflicts occur due to one or several factors either occurring as remote or immediate causal patterns; the failure to properly manage differences amongst cohabiting human beings, value disagreements, low level of tolerance, ideological contradictions, resource dominance, faith-based conflicts and hegemonic struggles over power. These pertinent factors constitute serious threats to the prospects of peaceful living and development among human beings globally.

Still more strikingly, violent conflict is an old companion to Nigeria's troubled history. What is the explanation for this incorrigible and systemic national culture of brutal behaviour? An important enquiry is to seek the main causal patterns that construct Nigeria as a state pregnant with trouble. It is pertinent at this point to dwell briefly on the various factors that hamper Nigeria's nation building and its democratic future and chart the deeply destructive forces affecting its unity, as a cursor to understanding conflicts in the region of northern Nigeria and Nigeria in general.

5.2: Ethnicity

The prevalent complexity of a multi-ethnic society in Nigeria is concisely and clearly noted by Saro-Wiwa (1995:63): "The ethnic nature of Nigerian society is a real one. It

cannot be prayed or wished away...." Nigeria, a deeply divided country, is the most complex state in Africa and perhaps in the world. Nigeria's most striking feature is that it is divided along the fault lines of culture, language and religion. As previously noted, Nigeria, Africa's most populous state and democracy is a divided house consisting of 250-400 ethnic groups, with 140 million people, and is the tenth most populous state in the world. Since independence in 1960, these divisions may have led to propagation of conflicts in the state.

As noted in the introduction, and in the body of this study, Nigeria consists of three dominant ethnic groups: The Hausa, Igbo and the Yoruba. These divisions are geographically known as the North, the East and the West respectively.[75] The Nigerian state, which consists of a complex relationship of different group identities, has encountered a proliferation of intractable conflicts and political traumas ranging from a bloody civil war (which left two million dead) and a cocktail of ethnic and religious conflicts. Some of the catastrophic conflicts that Nigeria has been confronted in her troubled history are within the paradigms of ethnic conflicts. Misra (2008:13) categorizes four critical aspects of ethnicity within a deeply divided society. There must be (1) a real or imaginary homeland, (2) a shared body of cultural beliefs, (3) a historical consciousness and (4) and identification with a racial attachment. Clearly, these categories define Nigeria's multi-cultured and divided society.

Despite attempts to create an equal derivation formula on revenue allocation, centralize and depoliticize politics from the ambits of the three major regional ethnic groups, there still subsist ethnic conflicts and severe tensions within the polity. To

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[75] Despite this division, Nigeria has been divided along the North and Southern lines due to the differing socio-economic developments of the regions.

fully understand conflicts in Nigeria and in Africa as a whole, the study of ethnicity cannot be avoided. As seen in Chapter 1, ethnicity is the construction of people "formed along racial or cultural lines; its members allegedly possess common traits and customs" (Farnen, 1994:47). In addition, it is equally clear that "ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate" (Horowitz, 1985:52). It is perhaps for this characterization that nation-building, as opposed to state-building, is an inconceivable task for Nigeria. It bears emphasis that a nation should have the characteristic of a community of people with a common language, a common territory (Stalin, 1994). The profusion of communities and nations has made it impossible to create a common political culture in Nigeria. Hence, it would be possible to justifiably term Nigeria as a 'nation of whiners.'[76]

What is astoundingly striking is that a federal system of governance was established in order to check the imbalance of many ethnic groups and to prevent any ethnic group hegemony in the state's affairs. Despite a federalist structure of governance and the division of Nigeria from three regions at independence and gradually metamorphosing into 36 states in 1996, the prevalence of ethnic conflicts has not subsided.

5.2.1 Ethnic Variable in Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

In order to understand the dynamics of Islam and peace in northern Nigeria, one has to contextualize the problems of socio-cultural and political dynamics that privilege social relations and power context in Nigeria in general and northern Nigeria in particular, as a basis of analyzing, interrogating and understanding the Islam and peace/conflict nexus in northern Nigeria.

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[76] Characterization used by Senator Phil Gramm, (U.S.A senator) in describing the American public in contradicting the prevailing American economic crisis.

There has been a social pattern, particularly in the last decade, where differences in cultural motifs reflect the level of religious tolerance that exists in areas of the north, for example in the central north of the Jos plateau, southern Kaduna, the core Kanuri in the northeast and the Taraba axis just below it. While all these areas may not have experienced violence of ethnic and religious nature, the trend of political dominance and resource exploitation has awakened the dire imperative for the grass-roots people to be intransigent towards fellow citizens of differing faiths. This has made people to bind together in ethnic or religious groups rather than accepting a blanket nationality. In some ways, this renders individuals and groups to be subservient to the instrument of a religious or ethnic imperative. Consequently, an individual develops an instinct for survival albeit championed by a religious cleric or a political statesman.

In this context, it is significant to note that ethnicity and religion could be deployed singularly. It is also possible to engage them profitably in political contests at the same time. The interesting thing about the deployment of ethnicity and religion in political contests is that they veil the actual political dimensions of conflicts, giving them different colorations, thereby making conflicts intractable and endemic. In this way, struggles for power for selfish interests are camouflaged as protection of collective survival or and the preservation of religious faith. An important fallout of this is the blurring of class distinctions and class contradictions. The result is the obliteration of class struggles and re-unification of ethnic and religious differences. The deployment of ethnic and religious sentiments as a tool for the struggle for power and mobilization by elite elements could be better understood against the bifurcation of the social sphere as noted by Ekeh (1975) into the civic public and primordial public in the course of colonialism.

Clearly, ethnicity does play a part in conflicts because ethnic affiliations often form the synthesis of groups in conflict (Braathen & Sarther, 2000:13). In examining the centrality of this argument, Azar (1984:90) explains that group identity formations such as ethnicity are linked to protracted social conflicts in a state. He notes that ethnicity indicates that there is a bond between people and interconnected with people sharing similar culture, language, religion, beliefs and other similar values.

It is useful to note Osaghae's (1998:1b) suggestion that ethnic conflicts privilege conditions under which two or more ethnically distinct people are in conflict. Religion may or may not be an issue in ethnic conflicts, depending on whether or not the conflicting social formations are religiously homogeneous or heterogeneous. Ethnic groups are impacted upon by a number of variables, modifying their appearance and affecting their constitutions, conflicts and contestations. It is for these reasons that intra-ethnic crisis is as possible as are inter-ethnic crises. In spite of these intervening variables, it is still possible to locate ethnic categories with respect to the parameters of 'we-ness' that they set to distinguish their members from those outside the deliberately structured cultural boundaries that are erected. It must however be noted that these cultural barriers are not immutable.

Osaghae (1994) identifies variable factors as determinants of ethnicity such as: The character of ethnic demands and interest articulation; the extent of legitimacy of ethnicity and quality of management; the balance between economic and political control; the degree of decentralization of government structures; ethno-genesis within the democratic crucible, competition for scarce resources and the competition for state

power, such as the Tiv and Jukun (non-Muslims) ethnic conflict in northern Nigeria in 2001.

Very close to Osaghae's argument is a line of reasoning earlier expounded by Ekeh (1975) who asserts that ethnicity has flourished because the African elite who inherited the colonial state has conceptualized development as transferring resources from the civic public to the primordial public. The civic public is a contested terrain where representatives of the primordial publics struggle for their share of the 'national cake.' In this struggle, politics is amoral and the end justifies the means. The ease of deployment of ethnicity instrumentally is the political and economic architecture of patron-client exchanges that privilege a double coincidence of 'want' between ethnic elites desperate for power in the civic public and the ethnic underdogs' needs to be extricated from the grinding poverty of the primordial public.

It is necessary to stress that in explaining the logic of the instrumentalization of ethnicity, and how ethnic boundaries create conditions for group conflict, Osaghae (1991:49) argues that the elites are aided in this process by the marked inequalities and grievances that exist among groups in terms of development and opportunities of development. As explored in chapter 3, this makes the task of ethnic entrepreneurs easier because, in the name of bettering the lot of their ethnic groups and or catching up with others, the elite succeed in recruiting the masses for the promotion of the particularistic and selfish agendas of the elites.

It would seem that one might want to inquire into an often ignored aspect of the foregoing analysis, which is the fact that the elites have the propensity to mobilize co-

ethnics for their individualistic agenda in Nigeria. This is an indication of a wide

citizen gulf and, more importantly, a crisis of confidence between the citizens and the

state on the one hand and the nations across the political terrain of the country on the

other. It is clear that the Nigerian state in terms of enjoying the loyalty of its citizens

and ensuring its own stability and survival is not only in crisis but also in severe

danger.

Clear from Osaghae's analysis and the discussion above, is that ethnic boundary may

be a causal explanation for conflict, thus it remains to be asked that why has northern

Nigerian not had any significant ethnic/communal conflicts between different ethnic

groups professing the same religious identity (Islam)? It may be fair to assume that the

primordial sense of Muslims in northern Nigeria is fostered by a religious identity. It

may then be clear that Islam functions as a basis of an overarching solidarity and unity

amongst ethnic groups' in northern Nigeria professing Islam. To list a few major

ethnic groups living under the umbrella provided by Islam are the Gwari and Nupe in

Niger State; the Teda, Fulani and Kanuri in Bornu state; the Kanuri, Kwanka, Paa,

Seyawa and Warji in Bauchi state, the Eloyi, Gwandara, Gwari; Fulani, Hausa, Puku

in Sokoto state.

Perhaps most crucially, placing this assumption in the above context and to further

explore this point, an empirical illustration is provided by Anthony (2002:108) when

depicting the civil unrests of 1966 pogrom against the Igbos:

> In Kano, Yorubas had been among the safest migrant groups during the worst
> of the rioting. In large part this was because most of the Yorubas in Kano were
> Muslims from the portion of Yorubaland in the Middle Belt. These Muslim
> Yoruba men and women tended to wear clothing distinctive from but similar to

Hausa styles...and, if necessary, they could show that they were Muslims by reciting the Shahada or demonstrating other Islamic knowledge.

This explains the suggestion, that perhaps the Hausa-Fulani clash more with the Igbo, given that they are mostly non-Muslims, unlike the Yoruba who are equally divided between Muslims and non-Muslims.

During the Igbo pogrom in 1966 the same protection was bestowed upon Igbo Muslims. Anthony (2002:105) notes that "the few Igbo men known as Muslims were not threatened." He further provides empirical evidence suggesting that the overarching solidarity of Islam acted as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts amongst co-religionists during ethnic pogrom:

> Alhaji Sani, an Igbo Convert...assimilated to the point of becoming Hausa...He remained during 1966 and the war years despite widespread knowledge of his Igbo origins.

5.3: Invented Tradition

The scramble for Africa and the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 resulted in the abstruse quilt of borders and its artificial partitioning, stitching across the African continent and creating irrational demarcations. It seems relatively obvious that this gave rise to people of different civilizations, traditions, languages and religious loyalties co-habiting under tense political systems. However, Horowitz (1985:75) argues the arbitrary drawing up process is over exaggerated, as boundaries were drawn up in response to ethnic demands. At a closer look this argument is not all embracing. There are many examples of this such as the Yoruba-speaking people of Nigeria also exist in the neighbouring state of the Republic of Benin; and the Fulani people also subsist in Niger.

This arbitrary portioning of land developed the states and nations unevenly and brought people together who shared nothing in common. Did post-colonial borders invoke conflicts by uniting peoples, distinct groups and identities which, had in the past, lived under diverse social structures? Commenting on postcolonial borders, Oliver & Fage (1969: 267) note that "statesmen and diplomats met in offices or country houses and drew lines across maps which themselves were usually inaccurate." Consequently, the foundations of conflict may have been laid.

The effect of colonialism of Africa prevented self-realization of its people "in every crucial field of life, the British had frozen the indigenous institutions while at the same time robbed colonized people of every scope and freedom for self-development" (Davidson, 1992:72). Conflict, it would appear, is natural to the checkered history of the Nigerian state. As the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in one of his statements to the Parliament, suggested:[77]

> Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite... Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country.

A striking similar observation during this period by another leading nationalist and leader of the Action Group (AG), Chief Obafemi Awolowo, succinctly classifies Nigeria as a *mere geographical expression.* Awolowo noted that "Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not" (Awolowo 1947: 47-48). These mindsets of leading political figures in Nigeria not only exacerbate ethnic differences, they nurture the ground for

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[77] Legislative Council Debates, Nigeria, March 4 1948, p 227.

their germination and transformation into intolerance and cataclysmic crises. From the foregoing, it is clear that what the people of Nigeria have in common lies only in sharing an identical race and differs in historical, language, heritage, custom and religious backgrounds. In this sense, there is no realistic basis of a common national identity. This construction of the Nigerian society has impeded nation building and the search for a common identity.

In the light of this discussion, one would like to agree with Chinua Achebe's comments in his critically acclaimed book 'Things Fall Apart' where he attempted to make sense of Nigeria's national unity by noting the negative impact of the political invention of Nigeria and quoting W.B. Yeats: "Turning and turning in the widening gyre. The falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall apart; the center cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world" (Achebe, 1958: introduction). This passage succinctly describes Nigeria's present predicament – the fundamental rupture of a state falling apart on the threshold of its inherited invention. This is clearly a causal link to ethnic and religious anarchy.

5.4: Deprivation

A few observers suggest various reasons for Nigeria's abundant political crises, secessionist and divisive forces (Diamond, 1988 on economic competition: Otite, 1990 on ethnicity; Mahwood, 1983 on federalism and governance; Bayart, Ellis & Hibou, 1999 on prebendalism). However, others suggest that ethnic and religious diversity are not the causal links to these simmering conflicts but there are other inextricably interwoven conditions such as deep-rooted and widespread poverty, decadence, pandemonium, economic plunder and the lack of an innovative economic

base (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). If this suggestion is anywhere near correct then one may enquire: Has various religious and secular pronouncements by political leaders and the elitists (in order to gain an economic advantage) contributed to unnecessary conflicts, which are usually labeled as religious or ethnic in nature? Cramer (1999:15), perhaps in surmise to these comments, notes it is probable that conflicts in Nigeria and indeed Africa have led to a dearth in socio-economic resources on the continent. He further observes that from 1970-1997 sub-Saharan Africa lost $52bn from agricultural production due to armed conflict (Cramer 1999: 8).

In line with this, Oxfam[78] reported that the cost of conflict on African development was approximately $300bn between 1990 and 2000. This is equivalent to the amount of money received in international aid during the same period. These problems have made Nigeria and indeed, Africa, termed a 'third world of the third world', returning to the "heart of darkness" (Bayart, Ellis & B Hibou, 1999:116). It may be surmised that Nigeria has inherited a basket-case economy. However, in linking these problems, one should take cognizance of the fact that "the wealth of the European countries grew out of the triangular transatlantic trade-slaves from Africa to America, raw materials and precious metals from America to Europe, merchandise and weapons from Europe to Africa" (Moltmann, 2003: 23).

Mazrui (1980:70) notes that that Africa, although is the most endowed continent was experiencing the "pathology of technical backwardness". The paradox about Africa is the more a country has vast wealth and natural resources the less the people have. The great paradox confronting the Nigerian state is that it is perhaps the most religious

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[78]Accessed on the 17th of November 2007 at:
http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/2007/pr071011_control_arms_cost_conflict_africa

state in the world and perhaps the most corrupt. It may be stated that an economic

autopsy reveals that the systemic attitude of corruption in Nigeria's leadership, and

indeed in Africa, is a cause-effect emanating from the larceny and exploitative

administration of colonialism. Colonialism was used exploitatively for national

glorification. Over a long period of time the indigenes of these colonial states

witnessed their land being looted and exploited by the colonialists. This generated a

passion for economic accumulation and a thirst for the economic pleasures which the

colonialist enjoyed. Although, this was a factor which led to nationalism, it also laid

foundations for self interest, greed, the privatization of wealth and socialization of

debt.[79] The foundation of the culture of prebendalism is best summed up by J. Mars

(Coleman, 1963: 148): "The moral objection to stealing is largely confined to stealing

from members of the extended family, village or tribe. The moral obligation to

support the extended family is held to condone theft from others."

This mindset has laid the foundations for ambitious soldiers and rabble-rousing

politicians to thrive on a prebendalistic culture of 'stealing a slice of the national cake'

for self and their extended families. It seems particularly palpable that the point which

emerges from this is that economic exploitation has left Nigeria within the fangs of

economic hardship, deep-rooted poverty and deprivation within the international

economic system. Therefore, one finds that prebendalism has reduced Nigeria's

opportunities of being a partner in international institutions. With these

insurmountable and recalcitrant socio-economic problems, Nigeria has been termed as

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[79] A contemporary example of this is noticed in the personage of Tafa Balogun, the former head of the Nigerian Police was arrested on April 4, 2005 by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for the theft of over N17 billions of naira($100 million). Balogun was sentenced to only six months in prison. However, he was given a grand reception after serving his sentence: General of Police, Alhaji Tafa Balogun, as he returned to his native Ila-Orangun, Osun State, in a blaze of glory. From entry point into Ila-Orangun to Tafa Balogun's house is just about half a kilometre; but it took about two hours to cover the distance. The crowd was simply awesome, all shouting *Olu Omo, Olu Omo...* (Child of choice!)"-(*The Tribune Newspaper*, Sat. 19th Jan. 2008). See at: http://www.tribune.com.ng/19012008/myriad.html, accessed on the 25th of September 2008.

a fragile state and Low-Income Country Under Stress (LICUS) by the World Bank.[80] Compounding these problems, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has reported that the Human Development Index (HDI)[81] for Nigeria as at 2008 is at 448, which gives Nigeria the position of 154th out of 179 countries (75 million people live in poverty).

Officially, Nigeria exports two million barrels of crude oil a day, at the average price of 60 US dollars per barrel, ($120 million). This accounts for at least 90% of Nigeria's foreign earnings and 40% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[82] Paradoxically, Nigeria is the largest producer of crude oil in Africa and the fifth largest in the world. Nigeria has earned about $122 billion from crude oil exports since 1986. Confronted with this paradoxical situation, the World Bank has rated Nigeria the second poorest state in the world. However, the 'curse of oil syndrome' is that the Nigerian people suffer from intense poverty (per capita income of 30p per person per day). One may agree in line with Collier & Hoeffler (2004) that the causation of the high incidence of conflicts is that they offer financial rewards and a means of survival for an identity group, who are aggrieved over economic hardship and social retardation.

At the core of Nigeria's problems, like most African states, is its classification as a weak democratic and failed state.[83] It is not surprising that Nigerian politics has been described as a 'market' (Ifeka, 2000: 452), or as the 'economy of plunder' (Bayart, Ellis & Hibou, 1999:71). In Nigeria, wealth is considered a symbol of belonging and

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[80] http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/licus05_map.html
[81] The HDI measures living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income). See
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_cover.pdf, accessed on 16th February, 2007.
[82] The oil production has led to incessant conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria
[83] According to the 'Fund for Peace' a research organization

of acceptability in one's community. In a country where production is low, with a high turnover in population (Malthus, 1960) and the operation of a vibrant Dutch economic system, the consequences is the prebendalism of economic resources and the retarded development of socio-economic infrastructures, which has lead to protracted conflicts. Indeed, this profusion of socio-economic problems has contributed to the spate of ethnic and religious violence in Nigeria.[84]

Now, it bears emphasis to note that the economic dimension of most ethnic conflicts in Nigeria has to do with the struggle for wealth. In a state where there is a depletion of resources but an increase in populace, economic interests and conflicts definitely emerge (Malthus, 1960). Scholars have attributed ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria to the economic struggles brought by diversion of resources meant for the public, black marketeering and scarcity of resources, amongst others. The true challenge of this truism is whether it can be justifiable to say that there is a depletion of resources in the face on an increase in populace, which by no means is culturally relative to known endowments of natural resources, but is rather idiosyncratic, feeding on a political arrangement to which the collective of nationhood is as wise as ignorant and the rest of the world in awe of the ascendancy of wealth abused.

A further consequence of these extraordinary chains of events is that the economic plunder of Nigeria has pre-empted economic ethno-nationalism, whereby different group identities are struggling for scarce resources. Perhaps, an overall description of

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[84] As a result, Nigeria, despite its abundant human and material endowments, is not an attractive destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is desperately required by state managers to turn-around the state's comatose economy for the better. The socio-economic state of Nigeria has deteriorated that the United States of America (USA), State Department in a recent report[84] predicted that Nigeria would extinct as a nation on account of its numerous religious and socio-political crises in the next fifteen years! Alarmist has this prediction maybe, it reflects the seriousness and perception of the Nigerian crisis by the international community.

economic nationalism has been defined as "demands for changes in the inter-national or interethnic distribution of property or ownership of the stock of wealth located in the territory" (Breton, 1964:377).

5.5: Regional Divide

Another and perhaps more serious division that has become the defining character of Nigeria's weak and fragile political system has to do with the colonial policy that promoted the partisan development between the north and south. The differences in regionalism are noted by the British officers posted to these regions, during its colonial history:

> The officers of the north were lean and, lanky and brown while those of the south were flabby and white. While those of the north galloped on horseback...the ones in the south were carried along the bush paths, across crocodile-infested rivers by natives bearing hammocks.[85]

This division has in many ways given rise to a fierce dichotomy between the north and south. It would be unhistorical and misleading if I do not attribute this dichotomy to the concept of invented tradition. The colonial policy of the British was in tandem with the logic of divide and rule mechanism of colonial rule in Nigeria. The failure by the Nigerian nationalists to form a united Nigerian front and common position against colonial autocracy especially in the march towards the state-nation's independence was one of the several direct fallouts between the north and the south.

It is against this background that Sanusi (2005) notes Lord Lugard's comments that indirect rule was imposed on the north due to the "utter disrespect for British and

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[85] Kole Omotosho, in an article: Politics: Struggle between king and kingmaker by William Wallis in Financial Times, Published: June 23 2008 17:47.

native ideals alike that was beginning to emerge in the south." In addition, the primary

aims for integration of northern and southern Nigeria were for economic reasons. It

was a device to assist in the export of northern Nigerian commodities through the

Atlantic Ocean (Awe, 1999:8). The strategy of divide and rule could then be

understood as a mechanism of exploiting northern Nigeria and keeping its people

subservient.

At this point, one might conveniently turn to the first major manifestation of the seeds

of political and social discords sown in Nigeria through the regions. Although Nigeria

witnessed its first religious conflict in 1945 in Jos, Plateau State, the conflict I am

about to concisely discuss sheds an illuminating critical chapter in the history of

religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. The genesis was when Anthony Enhaoro, of

the AG, in March, 1953, on the floor of the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos,

moved a Motion for Self-Government by 1956. The Self-Government Motion failed

due to the opposition of Members of the House, representing the northern part of the

country. The north was not favourably disposed to independence at that particularly

period for fear of southern domination due to the socio-economic backwardness of the

north. Thanks to the fallout of the colonial policy of divide and rule and differential

development.

The north feared that they were still far behind the south in terms of socio-economic

development. For exercising their democratic right of dissent, the northern Members

of the Federal House of Representatives were ridiculed and abused by the people of

Lagos, which was the political base of the AG. The people of Lagos, who were mainly

AG supporters, viewed the members from the north as reactionary elements and

colonial stooges. The northern payback time came in the form of the Kano riots of 1953, during an ill-timed and politically insensitive political tour of delegates of the AG to the north, soon after the Lagos incident to campaign for self-government. Surprisingly, the conflict, which was instigated by a perceived grievance towards the Yoruba (a divided blend of Muslims and non-Muslims), turned towards the Igbo (mainly non-Muslims).[86]

Now an important observation is that, while the Kano riots of 1953 were basically ethnocentric in nature, the religious divide between the two parts of the country involved in this political altercation leans itself to the demarcation of place and space between religious identities. This is evident especially during the Kano riots as shown by the identity groups that took part in the riots and the issues that were canvassed. The riot was a religious inspired political conflict due to the religious divide between the Muslim in the north and the Christian in the south. In addition, the use of propaganda by party newspapers fuelled great suspicions of both ethnic and religious identity groups. As noted by Diamond (1988:43), reports stating that "the Action Group (AG) would ban Islam in the north; the NPC would force it upon the south. The National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) would stack the entire bureaucracy with Ibos" were captions in the dailies.

Politically, it may be argued that the Nigerian political class, across ethnic and religious divides, has profitably exploited this dichotomy. Presently, the regional divide in Nigeria consists of six geo-political zones: The north-east, north-west, north-central (Middle Belt), south-east, south-west and south-south. It is useful to note that

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[86]The victims of the riots were mainly the Igbos (Nkemdirim, 1975). The conflict was centered in the out skirts of Fagge and in Sabon Gari, where most Southerners resided in Kano.

these divisions are not recognized by the Constitution but are useful for geo-political labeling.

5.6: Religious Divide

The foremost and greatest of Nigeria's problem lies in its religious division and, in some ways, its rejection of a secularized Constitution by religious identities. Given this complexity, this rejection is not surprising, as Nigeria is primarily based on a primordial ideology of a non-western society. Nigeria's increasing friction between secularization and its religious primordialism has been contentious throughout its troubled history. The deeper explanation for this mindset is provided by Juergensmeyer (1993), who notes that there is a perceived rivalry between religious nationalism and the secular state. Juergensmeyer views the world as undergoing a new ideological war, based on 'orderliness within society.' He further argues that religion is an emerging ideology of order due to the loss of faith in secular nationalism and that religious identification may have more attachment and sentiments than secular beliefs or ethno-nationalistic loyalties.

In this sense and in this sense alone, Juergensmeyer's suggestion of religions' new role is not surprising due to religions mystifying and karmic orientations to the individual and groups. This has provided religion with an overwhelming identity maker for the identity groups, for which they are ready to kill and or die for. Conventional thinking suggests that for the northern Nigerian Muslim, religion as their first and foremost identity has the potential to generate conflict due to the fact that it is located in a tense and competing inter-religious atmosphere. Juergensmeyer further argues that where a non-western nation attempts to indoctrinate religion as

secular nationalism, such efforts are usually met with frustration and as such acts as a contributory factor to religious violence.

Given these perceptions, former Nigerian president, President Olusegun Obasanjo's overarching concern with Nigeria's religious divide affirmed, not perhaps unexpectedly, Nigeria's non-secular ideology when Sharia law was enacted in some states in northern Nigeria. He stated that:[87]

> I allowed Sharia law to exist because we are not a secular state. We are a multi-religious state. That is what we call ourselves in our Constitution.

Given this observation, the un-hegemonic nature of the Nigerian ruling classes coupled with the imperative need to control state power as a means of instituting the organization of political patrimonies in consonance with the logic of state prebendalistic politics, continues to privilege the political and instrumental deployment of religion and ethnicity. While religious crisis has a national character and spread in Nigeria, in terms of frequency, scales, ruthlessness and destruction, the northern part of Nigeria arguably provides an intriguing precedent. Certainly, this may well be based on indisputable political and social grievances but one must not forget that the underlying crucial factor in establishing the casual patterns of these conflicts is: The individual's or group's primordial identity.

But perhaps, most important is that if religion can act as a social glue between different ethnic groups, then what are the factors that promote conflict between different ethnic groups having different religious faiths or groups having similar

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[87] See Aliyu, Musa & Kwaru, Mustapha Isah "Nation Not a Secular State - Obasanjo" Daily Trust (Abuja http://www.nigeria.com/dcforum/DCForumID1/1091.html, accessed on the 30th of May 2008. On September 19th 1999, Zamfara State governor, Alhaji Ahmed Sani Yarima introduced the Sharia law into the state. Thereafter 11 other states followed suit.

ethnic identities, but different religious faiths? What is easily observed from Chapter 1, 2 and 3 is that religion, Islam the case in point, unites ethnic identities as well as builds boundaries between other faiths. Islam is a religion that provides a groups' identity with a nationalistic spirit. Religious primordialism may create a tendency in the individual to place excessive emphasis and loyalty on his religious beliefs and religious identity. This form of loyalty could be understood as an attempt at protecting one's identity, which could be described as a collective imagination based on a sacred and primordial identity in a tense and competing inter-religious atmosphere.

Clearly, inter-religious division constitutes a major inhibiting factor to the nation-building projects and national development in Nigeria. Consequently, the northern part of the country has unfortunately acquired, though not without justification, a kind of notoriety for religious conflicts. The epithet, of the *'zone of war and death'* reserved for northern Nigeria is as a consequence of the several religious conflicts that has manifested in the region.

Although a full-scale religious war has not been experienced in Nigeria, the state has had more than its fair share of religious conflicts, resulting in the loss of several lives and property worth several billion of dollars. It is worthwhile to suggest here that the basis of the ongoing religious crises in contemporary Nigeria is deeply rooted in the country's ontological and historical inheritance as a state.

In some measure, Nigeria has had its fair share of violent conflicts since the period of colonial rule. The occurrences, dimensions and destructive consequences of these conflicts have escalated since the attainment of national independence on October 1,

1960. While no part of the nation has been spared the ugly incidence of violent conflicts in one form or another, the northern part of Nigeria has had more than its fair share of these conflicts. Studies, officially and unofficially, into the immediate and remote causes of a number of these violent uprisings in northern Nigeria have shown that they were latently religious in nature irrespective of their overt manifestations. The challenge this poses for research is the need to understand the causal factors of religious violence in northern Nigeria, in terms of the interception of religion and ethnicity.

5.6.1: Explaining Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

Preceding the creation of northern Nigeria were serious struggles by different fractions of imperial capitalists (Shenton, 1986:11). The north, though often depicted as a homogenous political entity, is far from being so in composition. Northern Nigeria is made up of the Middle Belt Provinces comprising of Kabba, Niger and Ilorin, and the Sudan Provinces made up of Sokoto, Kano, Kastina, Bauchi, Bornu and Zaria.

More significant, as Weaver (1961:147) succinctly points out: "Nigeria is a nation by decree, and foreign decree at that. No such colony, territory or protectorate as Nigeria existed prior to 1898." The reason for the above assertion is that Nigeria became a formal political existence in terms of a distinct territorial order on December 31, 1899 (Ayoade, 1973: 57). The formation of the country was far from being a programmatic action of the British colonial authority whose principal agenda was trade and not the construction of a modern nation (Ballard, 1971; Ayoade, 1973).

It is worthwhile to note Kirk-Greene's (1967:6) observes that religious groupings are significant not only for their overall numbers but especially for their distribution. Looking at the northern region, we find in the far north an almost 100% Muslim population. To the south of that, the Middle Belt[88] has vigorous concentrations of Christianity among groups of resolute animists. In spite of the heterogeneous composition of the northern demography, for political exigencies from the periods immediately following the introduction of partisan politics, the slogan 'One North, One God, One Destiny' has been the ideological rallying point of the northern oligarchy. It is not surprising that the north is a tag which is synonymous to mean any individual who is Muslim and who can trace their origins to northern Nigeria (Maier, 2000: 143-144). As mentioned earlier, religious groupings in the north are characterized by distinct residential areas, where non-Muslims reside, which are commonly known as Sabon Gari.

Now attention must be drawn to the fact that the interaction of Islam with politics and society in northern Nigeria is highly dated. The legacies of the transatlantic trade on core northern settlements like Kano and Katsina goes beyond mere commerce as it embraced the institutionalization of hegemonic power. With this in mind, Kenny (1996:338) notes that as far back as the middle fifteenth century, Islam had become a kingly religion in Hausa land as a result of missionary activities of Islamic clerics from all over western Sudan.

The above assertion finds concurrence with Shenton's (1986:3) contention that the adoption of Islam in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was embraced by a

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[88] Most inhabitants here are non-Muslims and attempts to enforce Islam on them in the nineteenth century were not successful. However, its people were used as slaves within the Sokoto Caliphate and were also exported as slaves to North Africa during the Trans Saharan trade.

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significant section of the urban common class people, who were engaged in commerce and other non-agricultural activities. The attractiveness of Islam to these groups of urban dwellers according to Shenton (1986:3) was the amenability of Islam "to the increasing commoditization of everyday life in the city." Islam, according to him, moved beyond the ordering of man's and nature's relationship to embrace "the regulation of man's relationship with man."

Conflicts in northern Nigeria is either incited by politicians and the elites, by using religion as a mobilizing tool, or by the grass-root people, when there is a perceived threat to religious identity. On the former perspective, Aguwa (1997) sheds some light in this regard when he notes that religious identity may use religious popularity as a mobilization tool by the government to acquire and retain power. In this circumstance in northern Nigeria, religion is used as a political tool tends to be the bane of religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. He argues that this has been a source of concern for non-Muslims in Nigeria.

Clearly, the overwhelming evidence from an assemblage of conflict in northern Nigeria goes on to suggest that they are primarily religious in nature. Religion has been at the forefront of most of these conflicts. It is a task to explore in greater detail the role of Islam, which happens to be the main identity marker in northern Nigeria in the overall conflict. A combination of factors, such as primordialism and political mobilization, affect the conflict profile in northern Nigeria. In this case study of northern Nigeria, this would appear to be the case. It is expedient to use those previous arguments to prepare a case here. Without a doubt, the years after 1980 are the most violent period in the history of Nigeria, especially in the northern region. As

outlined in the table below, it is easy to see that religious division in northern Nigeria is momentous, as most of the 56 major riots in northern Nigeria in some form or another, centered primarily on religion.

Table 5. 1: Major Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, 1945-2010

Location	Date	Ethnic/ Religious Group	Reported Cause
Jos Crisis	1945	Hausa (Muslims) And The Igbo (Non-Muslims)	Economic Grievance
Markurdi	1947	Hausa (Muslims) And Tiv (Non-Mulsims)	Political Grievance
Kano Riots	1953	Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) And The Igbo (Non-Muslims)	Political (Agitations Over Set-Date For Independence)
Tiv Riots	1960	Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) And Tiv (Non-Muslims)	Economic Grievance – Unpopular Order Of Closure On The Yandev Market And Ambush Of The Bus Taking The Supporters Of The NPC To The Wukari Convention Of The Party In September 1960
Tiv Riots	1964	Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) And Tiv (Non-Muslims)	Political Grievance – The Results Of The National Census
Maitatsine Riots: Kano; Kaduna, Jimeta-Yola & Gombe	1980, 1982, 1884 & 1985	The Sect Against All Non-Muslims And Non Adherents (Muslims) To The Sect	Intra-Religious: Islamic Fundamentalism And Economic Inequality & Poverty

Kano	1982	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Grievance In Respect Of Non-Muslim Evangelism
University Of Sokoto	1986	Muslims Students (Izala Sect) And Non-Muslims	Grievance In Respect Of Non Muslim Student's Disco Party And A Beauty Pageant
Kaduna Riot Kafanchan	1987	Muslims And Non-Muslims (Mainly Students))	Banner In A Tertiary Institution Proclaiming `Jesus Campus.'
Kaduna Polytechnic Chapel Riots	1988	Muslims And Non-Muslims (Mainly Students)	Grievance On Purported Constructed Of Chapel Near A Mosque
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Riots	1988	Muslims And Non-Muslims (Mainly Students)	Non-Muslim Student Won Student Union Election
Bauchi Violence	1991	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Grievance: Buying Meat By A Muslim Alleged To Be Pork Instead Of Beef
Kastina Riot	1991	Islamic Fundamentalist And The State Authorities	Opinion Poll By The *Fun Times*, Assertion On Islam And The Holy Prophet Muhammad In Respect Of Whether People Would Marry Prostitutes Who Repented And Become Non-Muslims
Kano Riot	1991	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Planned Visit To The Ancient City Of Kano By German Non-Muslim Evangelist Reinhard Bonnke

Zangon-Kataf Riots	1992	Hausa (Muslims) And Kafat (Non-Muslims)	Relocation Of The Zangon Kataf District Market, Hitherto Controlled By The Hausa
Jalingo Riots	1992	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Death Of A Muslim Student By A Non-Muslim Over Disputes About Water Being Used By The Muslims Students For Ablution.
Funtua Riot	1993	Kalakato (Maitatsine Sect) And The Police	Retaliatory Attack On Police for Arresting Suspect Kalakato Members
Plateau State	1994	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Political Grievance Over Appointment Of A Muslim As A Caretaker Of A Local Government
Potiskum, Yobe State	1994	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Grievance Over The Refusal Of The Parents Of Young Girl Preventing Her Conversion To Islam

Tafawa Balewa Crises	1995	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Political Grievance: Control Over Local Affairs
Bassa & Igbirra Riots	1997	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Political Grievance
Ilorin Riots	1998 & 1999	Muslim Students And Non-Muslims Students	A Non-Muslim Place Of Worship Was Demolished By Muslims (1998) Muslim Elders Insisted That All Non-Muslim Places Of Worship Be Transferred From The Town (1999)
Kano Riot	1999	Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) And The Yoruba (Equal Division Between Muslims And Non-Muslims). Ethnic Conflict With Religious Undertones	A Retaliatory Riot Emanating From The Shagamu Riots From Southwest Nigeria
Kuteb-Jukun/Chamba Ethnic Conflict	1999/ 2000	Non-Muslims (Ethnic Conflict	Local Government Politics And Boundary Disputes
Kaduna Riot Kafanchan	1999	Muslims And Non-Muslims	. The Installation Of A New Emir

Kaduna Shari Riot	2000	Hausa (Muslims) And Atyap (Non-Muslims) And Non Indigenous Non-Muslims	Implementation Of Sharia Law
Damboa Riots	2000	Hausa (Muslims) And Non-Muslims	Residence Of A Pastor Used As Non-Muslim Place Of Worship An Event Opposed By The Muslim Community
Tafawa-Balewa Riots	2001	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Muslim Militants Attacked And Destroyed A Bible School
Kaduna Tension	2001	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Setting Fire In Two Non-Muslims Places Of Worship
Jos Riots	2001	Hausa (Muslims) And Indigenous Non-Muslims	The Beating By Some Muslims Of A Non-Muslim Lady That Passed Through The Road Barricade In Front Of A Mosque Close To Her House During The Muslim Friday Jumat Service

Kano (Osama Bin Ladin Riots)	2001	Hausa (Muslims) And Igbo & Yoruba Non-Muslims	Protests Against America's Attack On Afghanistan
Kaduna Riot	2001	Hausa (Muslims) And Igbo & Yoruba Non-Muslims	Suspected Arson Attack On Non-Muslim Place Of Worship
Nasarawa State Awe Local Government	2001	Fulani Muslims And Tiv Non Muslims	Ownership To Land & Grievance Over Assassination Of A Muslim Leader
Ikulu And Bajju Conflict	2001	Non-Muslims (Ethnic Conflict	Local Government Politics And Boundary Disputes
Tiv-Jukun Crisis	1990-1993 & 2001	Non-Muslims (Ethnic Conflict)	Land & Ownership Rights

Jos	2002	Hausa Muslims And Indigenous Non-Muslims	Political Grievance: Party Elections
Kaduna Riot	2002	Hausa (Muslims) And Igbo & Yoruba Non-Muslims	Planned Hosting Of The Miss World Beauty Pageant In Nigeria
Kano	2004	Hausa (Muslims) And Igbo & Yoruba Non-Muslims	Reaction To The Yelwa/Shendam Crisis In Plateau State Where Many Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) Were Killed
Plateau Crisis	2004	Hausa (Muslims) And Tarok (Indigenous) Non-Muslims	Land & Ownership Rights
Borno Danish Cartoon' Riots	2006	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Reaction To A Cartoon Caricature Of Prophet Muhammad Drawn By A Danish Cartoonist

Kano State	2007	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Drawing A Caricature Of Prophet Muhammad On The Walls Of The School
Bauchi State, Yana Town	2008	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Grievance Over Blasphemy Of The Holy Qur'an
Kano Riots, Sumaila	2008	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Cartoon Of The Prophet Muhammad Purported To Have Been Drawn On The School Wall
Jos Riots: Plateau Council Elections	2008	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Muslim Candidate Lost Election To Non-Muslim
Bauchi	2009	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Broken Down Vehicle Impeding Non-Muslims To Place Of Worship

Boko Haram Jihad	2009	The Sect Against All Non-Muslims And Non Adherents (Muslims) To The Sect	Intra-Religious: Islamic Fundamentalism
Bauchi *Kala-Kato* Sect Ramapage	2009	The Sect Against Security Forces	Intra-Sect Division
Jos Riots	2010	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Building Of A Mosque In A Non-Muslim Area Of The City
Jos Riots (Shen Village)	2010	Muslims And Non-Muslims	Reprisal For The Killings Of Four Muslim Herdsmen

Table 5.1 above and Chart 5.1 below illustrates that religion is mainly the bane of conflicts in northern Nigeria. Hence, as explained in Chapter 1 and 3, since Islam is primordially the existing essence of all Muslims in northern Nigeria, it is not surprising then that it has the potential to segregate members of other faiths. It should be noted that the imagined collective identity of Islam has the capacity to hold every Muslim individual within its control. The point of course and a vital question to be posed here is why has northern Nigerian not had any significant ethnic/communal conflicts between different ethnic groups professing the same religious identity

(Islam)? It may be fair to imagine for the sake of argument that that in those instances, where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity or a seemingly similar culture, but not in a common religion (i.e. Islam), the conflict is very severe. This showcases the peace dynamics of Islam within a multi-cultural state, as ethnic antagonism and the fetters of ethnic boundaries are in many ways eliminated amongst adherents of the Islamic faith.

At this point, it is pertinent to mention that there is little or none existent statistical data on the number of deaths on these conflicts. Whilst the data from later years have improved, data from the early years have been unavailable. Most of the data collated on deaths are usually overblown estimates by newspapers, speculations by NGOs and underestimated data by the government which leaves us with factually inaccurate data and vast empirical gaps.

Chart 5.1: Major Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, 1945-2010

In considering the implications of the table and chart above, it will readily be seen that Islamic fundamentalism to an extraneous degree threatens the unifying umbrella

provided by Islam. Notable militant fundamentalism is observed in the Boko Haram Jihad (2009), Maitasine Riots (1980), and the Maitasine-Funtua Riot (1993).[89] If one assumes but does not concede that there is a stain on Islam in northern Nigeria due to the activities of militant Islam, it is suggested that there is a gap between scriptural Islam that is what it preaches and what its followers may practice.

5.7: Profiling Major Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

We turn next to review key conflicts in northern Nigeria and in some aspects how Muslim and non-Muslims identities are interwoven in violence. The striking question this section intends to answer is: What is the basis of violence in northern Nigeria? Ikime (1985) traces the inter-linkage between ethnicity and religion in Nigeria. In doing so he notes that among the varied ethnic groups in Nigeria, religion was interwoven with governance for the preservation of political order, stability of government and the endorsement of a moral code in the pre-colonial era. This observation finds concurrence in Falola's (1998:1-2) assertion that "religion and politics have been bedfellows throughout Nigerian history."

As the foregoing argument suggests, from time immemorial, people define themselves religiously amongst many other convenient identity profiles, given the polytheist religious orientation of Africans, religious identities and factors were never a basis for communal disputes in Nigeria until the colonial era. Indeed, the colonial authority in

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[89] An intra-religious conflict within the paradigm of northern Nigeria consists of co-religionists conflicting with each other under the umbrella of a common religious group. Recently new Muslim groups have been founded in northern Nigeria. These groups have been founded mainly on ideology founded in Saudi Arabia. These new Muslim groups have sought to challenge the existing status quo of the powerful Islamic Northern hegemony. However, these confrontations are regarded as trivial as these groups are small in number and do not have sufficient membership to foment rivalry within the Islamic North. Among these groups two have gained large following and have produced intra-religious conflicts; the Izalatul-Bid'a wa Iqamat al Sunna, the Shi'ite and the Maitatsine. An important observation in sectarian brotherhoods and the orthodox brotherhoods is that despite their differences, they all regard religion (Islam) as their primordial identity and aspire to establish Islam as political machinery in northern Nigeria.

Nigeria not only imposed the non-Muslim ideology of its society on the political order and structures of the nascent nation, they equally used their peculiar educational ideology and the non-Muslim missionaries to the maximum advantage for the consolidation of imperial rule in Nigeria. In Nigeria, colonialism engendered a condition under which ethnic divisions are conterminous with religious divides and, by extension, the framework of power and power struggle, rather paradoxically, is favourable to the North.

The field of religious conflicts has come to be the defining character of the Nigerian state and politics since independence in 1960. The negative dimensions of religious crises in Nigeria was aptly stated by Kukah (1993:9) when he suggests that "both Islam and Christianity are straddled across the Nigerian polity, each no longer knocking and pleading to be admitted, but seeking to take over the architectural design and construction of the Nigerian polity." The situation has become quite anarchic that, by 1980, according to the report on the Kano riots, the north had witnessed over 33 religious conflicts (Falola, 1998:5). It is clear that most conflicts in northern Nigeria are within the parameters of religion as a persistent variable. Yet, there are puzzles. What establishes this unrelenting social phenomenon? Is it possible to offer a cause-effect account of ethno-religious violence in northern Nigeria whilst ignoring the primordial construction of religion to the individual? Can religion be separated from primordalism in northern Nigeria when examining ethnic and religious conflict in northern Nigeria? Is it possible to ignore the role of the politicians and elites?

As may be apparent from the discussion above, the causal pattern for conflict in northern Nigeria amongst others is the blend of religious and ethnic identities. A

common attribute of religion is that it is an identity frame for individual and collective differentiation, especially within the context of the struggle over socially inadequate values. Religion simultaneously serves paradoxical functions of empowerment of ethnic groups and co-religionists and the disempowerment of those that do not belong to these identity frames. Now let us assess key conflicts within northern Nigeria, which illustrate the point of how Islam sets boundaries from those professing non-Islamic faiths, conflicts which may be considered as the most brutal and catastrophic in northern Nigeria.

5.7.1: Jos Crisis, 1945 & Markurdi Crisis, 1947

The colonial period in Nigeria witnessed three major religious and ethno-political crises. The first was the Jos crisis of 1945 involving the Hausa (Muslims) and the Igbo non-Muslims). The crisis was in some respects a blend of religious and economic variables. Due to the severity of this crisis, the Igbo had to relocate from their former residential location within Jos. The second colonial inter-religious crisis of note in Nigeria took place in Markurdi in 1947. The 1947 Markurdi crisis, involved the Hausa (Muslims) and the Tiv (mainly non-Muslims). This crisis was basically rooted in ethnic and political factors. The Tiv often perceived the Hausa as 'strangers' despite their control of the traditional political power through the emirate system, a condition, the Tiv despised and resisted. The Hausa political domination of the Tiv in their own region was made possible through colonial rule that was favourably disposed to the Hausa-Fulani system of government. In other words, the Markurdi crisis of 1947 was a crisis for the consolidation of power by the Hausa and a counter-hegemonic struggle by the Tiv who were not too comfortable with their domination and oppression by a 'foreign' power in their own land. But, what is observed here is that the varying

religious identities provoked this conflict as there was a clear demarcation of religious identities.

5.7.2: The Gideon Meriodere Urhobo Article, 1949

In practical terms, the first major religious schism in Northern Nigerian was that provoked by an article in Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe's *The African Pilot newspapers*, on February 20, 1949. The article written by Gideon Meriodere Urhobo, the founder of God's Kingdom Society in Nigeria and a member of the Zikist movement. Mr. Urhobo in a most unkind and provocative manner slandered both Islam and the Holy Prophet Muhammad. For him, Muhammad was not a true prophet, just as the Holy Qur'an was not God's book. He also caused provocation by alleging that Muhammad was a not a true prophet (Falola 1988:41). While, there was no violence associated with this incidence, there were reactions from Northern elite and the political establishment, including the Sultan. The political dimension to all of these is appreciated when one recalls that Islam was, and remains a primordial identity marker for Muslims, in northern Nigeria.

5.7.3: Kano Riots, 1953

The third major crisis before Nigeria's independence was the Kano riots of 1953 (discussed partially above). Though contained all the trappings of an ethnic crisis, the Kano riots of 15th-18th May, 1953 was essentially political (the conflict was centered in the out skirts of Fagge and in Sabon Gari, where most Southerners reside in Kano). Nkemdirim, (1975:60) notes that cost of the riot left 36 people dead and 240 people wounded. As earlier noted the riots had its roots in the negative and uncomplimentary treatment melted out to Northern political leaders of the NPC, in Lagos on account of

their objections to the Self-Government Motion in 1956, by the Sardauna of Sokoto, moved on the floor of the House of Representatives, Lagos, by Chief Anthony Enahoro, a member of the Chief Obafemi Awolowo led AG, on the 31st of March 1953. The majority members of the NPC moved a motion to defer the debate until 1956. This motion agitated members of the Action Group and thereafter labeled the Northern members of the House of Representatives as 'traitors' and 'colonial stooges' of the British. In addition, the Northern legislators were jeered and rebuked as they left the House of Representatives.

At a later date, the AG under the leadership of its Deputy Leader Chief Ladoke Akintola, went on a tour of the North and visited Kano, the Northern crowd paid them back in their own coins, by retaliating the humiliation which their leaders experienced by the Lagos crowd. The riots started as an ethnic riot aimed at the Yoruba ethnic group. However, the victims of the riots were mainly the Igbos. The riots later took a religious dimension. Nkemdirim (1975:82) recorded the Northern rebels' agitations: "the Ibos have killed all the Northerners in the Sabon Gari...we must kill the pagans before they kill us". This illustrates the religious variable of the conflict.

5.7.4: The Tiv Riots: 1960 & 1964

Anifowose (1982) is the most authoritative work on political violence in Tivland. These people known for their republican political tradition were predominantly non-Muslims. The irrepressible nature of the Tiv was demonstrated by their protracted resistance to British colonialism. They were one of the last groups of Nigerians pacified by the British colonialist, Anifowose, (1982:73). The Hausa, British colonial power, placed the administration of Tivland in the hand of Hausa-Fulani political authority under the indirect rule system through the Native Authorities.

The centralized power of the Hausa-Fulani emirate system which formed the basis of the indirect rule ran contrary to the egalitarian politics of the Tiv people. To engender an administrative structure where none hitherto existed, District Heads were created by the British authority. The District Heads became not only arbitrary, but oppressive and exploitative in administering the region.

The emergence and development of a political party in Tivland provided a veritable platform for the Tiv to challenge the continued domination of the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy and secure the self-determination of Tiv people. This expectedly pitched the Tiv people against the NPC controlled Northern Region Government. To complicate matters, the Tiv people under their umbrella political party, the UMBC, led by Joseph Tarka formed an alliance with the leading oppositional party to the NPC, the AG. Consequent on the radical posture of the Tiv people, the Northern Regional Government employed administrative, judicial and police powers of the Native Authority in the Tiv Division to intimidate, subjugate, control and oppress the people, Anifowose, (1982:97).

In addition, the use of taxation as a political instrument against the Tiv people was instrumental to the emergence of the conflict. As Anifowose, (1982:97) notes, that arbitrary taxation, were weapons of victimization. Members of the opposition party complained of arbitrary and heavy levies. The tax raid procedure made Tax Rate Clerks 'terrors' in the rural areas. In addition, opposition supporters were sometimes jailed for a period not less than six months.

The immediate cause of the 1960 riots was the attempt to impose an unpopular order of the closure on the Yandev Market established by a member of the UMBC, first by Mr. Kumbul Akapi and later by the clan head, assisted by the Native authority police (Anifowose, 1982). Severe clashes between supporters of NPC and UMBC ensued. A further precipitant of the riots was the ambush of the bus taking the supporters of the NPC to the Wukari Convention of the party in September, 1960, on account of the persistent refusal of the Native Authority to give the opposition permits for their political rallies. The death of a man as a result of gun shot by the Tiv Native Authority riot squad provoked serious riots which continued till October of 1960 Anifowose, (1982). The uprising left 30,000 houses burnt, £500,000 assessed on damaged properties, 45 people dead and about 5,000 people were captured and imprisoned (Nkemdirim, 1975:110).

The seed of conflicts in an independent Nigeria started following the Federal elections in 1964. Nigeria was engulfed in civil unrests, notably the Tiv's riot 1964 contending against the inflated proportions of the 1963 national census, and attempts by the ruling NPC to curtail Tiv *ethno*-nationalism championed by the Northern Progressive Front (NPF) and enabling the Hausa/Fulani domination in Northern region of Nigeria. What is obvious is that the Tiv riots which were both political and economic in nature, being motivated by the need to redress injustice, oppression and achieve self-determination. However, one may suggest that the absence of sharing a common religion, created an absence of an overarching solidarity among people divided on ethnicity in the region.

5.7.5: Maitatsine Riots (1980, 1982, 1984 & 1985)

The Maitatsine riots that engulfed major cities in the Northern part of Nigeria started from Kano in December of 1980, and extended to Bulumkutu near Maiduguri, the

capital of Bornu state. The activities of Maitatsine which spilled into Rigasa,[90]in

Kaduna State in October 1982, sailed to Jimeta-Yola[91] between February and March

1984, before finally berthing at Gombe[92] by April, 1985, was a religious phenomenon

of unparallel dimension in Nigerian history, both in terms of style, followings,

zealotry and military-like execution. As argued in chapter 1, religious primordialism

may create a tendency in the individual to place excessive emphasis and loyalty on his

religious beliefs and religious identity.

An understanding of the causes of the riots cannot be separated from the unmasking of

the central figure and motivating force of the movement, in the person of

Muhammadu Marwa, an 'Islamic' preacher and pseudo-Muslim prophet and citizen of

Cameroon. Isichei (1987:195) quoting Alhaji Abubakar Gummi, noted that Maitatsine

was "a trail of one-track minded Mallam versed only in the recitation of the Qur'an by

heart, and not fully comprehending what it contained." In shedding more light on this

religious personage, Falola (1998:141) notes that "Marwa was an enigmatic character,

whose image has become mysticized by both his followers and his enemies. He

apparently had an impressive ability to travel far and wide, to evade security

networks, and to mobilize thousands of people". It is pertinent to note here that

Maitatsine's teachings were rejected by all the conventional Muslim groups in

northern Nigeria.

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[90] Following a police enquiry on the activities of the fanatics, in the small village of Bulumkutu, the fanatics engaged and enraged in butchery resulting to 3,350 people being killed and the bodies maimed (Isichei, 1987).
[91] Fanatics who had fled the Bulumkutu riots relocated to Yola. However, they began their dreaded religious activities. After the usual police investigations, an assault on Yola central market and destroyed market stalls of 2,000 traders and 60,000 inhabitants of Jimeta were left homeless and about 1,000 people died (Isichei, 1987).
[92] Following a tip off, the police attempted to arrest members of the sect, in Pantami ward located in Gombe. However, severe fighting broke out as sect members were led by Yusufu Adamu, a disciple of Maitatsine. Over 100 people lost their lives in the encounter (Isichei, 1987).

Marwa considered himself, a prophet of God who had equal standings with the Prophet Muhammad. Maitatsine not only inspired his followers, who were mostly the wretched of the society and lumpen-proletariat elements, he also assured these socially disempowered people of eternal life (Falola, 1998:141). His members were of different sexes and age groups, some of whom were from neighbouring West African countries such as Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Niger.

Muhammadu Marwa was known to his followers as a reformer and to others as a fundamentalist. As noted by Riesebrodt (2000: 272):

> Reformers claim to transform social institutions in order to realize the spirit of the ancient community. The fundamentalists, on the other hand, claim to restore social institutions according to the letter and the law of the ancient community with regard to the past, their approach can be called "mythical," referring to a timeless, unchangeable, fixed eternal truth. With regard to the present and (near) future, their view is often eschatological and chiliastic.

This explanation, clearly defines Marwa's religious objectives and ideology. In another dimension, Ischiel (1987:201) points out that most of Maitatsine's followers were poor and he calculatingly recruited young men, homeless and jobless, who had just arrived from the countryside. His claim to restore 'order' in public made the Maitatsine movement quite attractive to the jobless youths. Hickey (1984:235) observes that the urban Muslim poor were attracted to Maitatsine because of his condemnation of hypocrisy and affectation of the *nouveau riche* and his promise of salvation to God's virtuous people. Hickey further notes that this attracted the almajirai (the young students of the Koran). However, Hiskett (1987) argues that most of Maitatsine's followers were from the social and economic class of the '*Yan-ci-*

rani.' These were non-Hausa-Fulani Muslims who came from the rural villages to seek wealth in the urban towns of Hausa land.

Similarly, Hunwick (1992:154) tells us regarding the character of the Maitatsine followers that they lacked economical and social influence, and therefore possessed a strong sense of grievance against the state and the elites. Assumptions that economic deterioration, inflation, unemployment, mass poverty, maladministration and endemic corruption in the context of rapid national wealth from petrol-dollars, has been figured as being responsible for popular dissent at the root of the Maitatsine revolts (Hunwick 1992: 154). This economic dimension to the radical deployment of Islam, by the underclass and the ruling class in the North is aptly captured by Kenny, (1996:361):

> The political manipulation of religion is made easier by the economic depression of the country, beginning with the fall in oil prices in the early 1980s. This has left the masses of unemployed youth who are mobilized by extremist leaders (the Kaduna Mafia) to riot; some youth caught in the Kaduna riot of 1987 admitted being paid to join the riot.

An important factor contributing to the inflammatory spread of the Maitatsine riots was the '*almajiri*' system, whereby parents entrust their sons to an Islamic teacher, who often takes them from their homes. According to Falola (1997:138), the Maitatsine violence can be explained as a consequence of Islamic fundamentalism, political decadence and economic troubles of the 1970s. One could therefore agree that religion was used as a channel to protest the prevailing grievance of economic downturn, and the amass corruption by politicians, which was considered as threats to the sanctity of Islamic tradition. Thus, "like Luther and Calvin in the sixteenth century, Maitatsine sought to sweep away the accretions which, he believed, had polluted Islam in the new and materialistic Nigeria" (Hickey, 1984:254).

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Altogether, then, the actions of Muhammadu Marwa and his followers were clearly without regard to the laws of the land. In 1980 Kano, the commercial centre of northern Nigeria could justifiably be described as the epicenter of the Maitatsine criminal violence against Muslims and non-Muslims in the name of Islam. The loss of human lives were immeasurable, that it was alleged that the carnage made the abundance of human bodies and or parts to be used as sacrificial charms (Hiskett, 1987:216). Many police officers were killed in these confrontations. At least 4,000 people died as a result of the uprising (Roy, 1994: 114).

While the violence was in some sense against state institutions and agencies, it is however, ironic that the Maitatsine had no concise political agenda. At best the sect was peopled by disgruntled elements. The Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances 1981 noted that the fanatics (talakawas) generally had a grudge against the privileged people of society.

From this discussion, it is safe to submit that the Maitatsine riots which started in Kano and spread to other parts of the north was a classical case of relative deprivation based on socio-economic needs, especially, given the deteriorating economic conditions, corruption and the monumental mismanagement of the country by the NPN. But, what is most important to note here that, religious identity was the channel used to convey socio-economic grievance, through radicalizing the perceptions of Islam. One may speculate here that religion being central to the identity of the grass-root people, had the potential to convey public grievances.

5.7.6: Kano Riot, 1982

This crisis which lasted twelve days, took place between the 18th and 29th December, 1982. The immediate cause of the crisis was the decision of the Christ Anglican Church, Faggae, Kano to build a bigger place of worship within the premises of their former Church. Incidentally, the location of the new place of worship was close to the fence of a road that separated the place of worships' premises, and that of the Faggae Central Mosque. Now, the proposed building of non-Muslim place of worship was seen as a threat to Islamic identity in the area. Despite the objections of the Muslims to the building project, the foundation of the new non-Muslim place of worship was laid by the visiting Archbishop Runcie of the Church of England. Tensions mounted between Muslims and non-Muslims as a result of these circumstances.

Furthermore, the attempt by Muslim fanatics to burn the non-Muslim place of worship was effectively frustrated by the police. However, the Muslim fanatics in frustration marched to Sabon-Gari area of the city and destroyed other non-Muslim places of worship. Eight non-Muslim places of worship were destroyed, with the recorded casualty figure of as much as five thousand people. It is interesting to note that the non-Muslim place of worship had been in this location for forty years before the Faggae Central Mosque was built.

Broadly speaking, one might be inclined to conclude, that a remote cause of the riot was the fear of political intervention by non-Muslims in the affairs of the nation, which at that time was under the control of a Northern Muslim President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, and a northern based political party, the NPN. The visit of the Archbishop Runcie barely two months after a similar visit by Pope John Paul, on the

invitation of President Shehu Shagari, was perceived by Islamic fundamentalists as an indication of the dominance of non-Muslims.

In much clearer terms, the visits of the two non-Muslim leaders within two months, and the aggressive evangelisms of winning converts by non-Muslims were some of the fatal stimulus that caused the crisis. This situation constituted a frontal attack on Islamic identity and also on the foundation of the feudalist oligarchy of the Northern elites.

However, the most likely alternative explanation of these findings is that, the crisis was as a result of the perception that non-Muslims appeared to be taking a central place in the affairs of the nation, and many Muslims were falling to the allure of non-Muslim evangelism. Hence, it is not surprising that to the Muslims, there was a need to preserve its religious identity.

5.7.7: Kaduna Riot (Kafanchan), 1987

An appalling trend in northern Nigerian institutions of higher learning is the siege of religious riots between Muslims and non-Muslim students. It is important to note that these riots occur mainly in northern universities in Nigeria.[93] However, the University

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[93] **University of Sokoto, Students Riots, 1986**
The University's Students Union was in the process of organizing a disco party and a beauty pageant in remembrance of Nana Asma'u (1793-1864), the daughter of the great Jihadist, Uthman dan Fodio. However, Muslim students, especially those belonging to the Izala sect went on rampage, attacked non-Muslim students and caused destruction to the University's' properties. They were protesting that the usage of Nana Asma'u in a beauty contest, defied Islamic rites.

Kaduna Polytechnic Chapel Riots, 1988
Muslims students on the 9th of March 1988 rioted over the establishment of a Chapel for non-Muslim students. The cause of the riot was due to the fact that the Chapel was to be constructed near the Mosque. The crisis was fed upon by historical ethno-religious contestations between the Muslims and non-Muslims in Kaduna state. In addition, a non-Muslim Chapel near a Mosque was considered to be a menace to Muslims.

Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Riots, 1988

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of Ibadan (southwest Nigeria), on the 5th of May 1986 witnessed clashes between Muslims and non-Muslims over the site of the University Chapel. Closely connected to this explanation in respect of religious clashes in northern Nigerian tertiary institutions, is that Islam as a primordial identity is prevalent only in northern Nigeria. Although, they are usually skirmishes between students within the confines of the institution, however, in most cases these conflicts extend to Muslims and non-Muslims outside the boundaries of the institutions, extending into nearby towns.

It is sufficient enough to assert that, no one would have thought that the decision of the Federation of Christian Students (FCS), a non-Muslim organisation of the Federal College of Education, Kafanchan to host weeklong activities to mark the end of its annual week from 6th March 1987, could result in blood-letting that followed on the heels of this innocuous religious celebration. The first indication of crisis had to do with the objection of the Muslim Students' Society (MSS), to the FCS banner which proclaimed the campus 'Jesus Campus'. Now, this banner was considered as a threat to the Muslims students' identity. This was quickly resolved with the intervention of the college's authority to which the matter was reported.

However, the immediate cause of the riots was the allegation that Reverend Abubakar Bako, a non-Muslim convert from Islam who was the guest preacher on the occasion, misinterpreted the Holy Qur'an during this speech. This led to serious altercations between the Muslim and non-Muslim students on the campus, leading to the closure

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Again, in June 1988 Muslim and non-Muslim students clashed over the Student Union elections. A non-Muslim student won the Students Union election, which was violently refuted by Muslim students. In the brouhaha, students were injured and property destroyed. The University had to close down.

of the school by the State Government. Unfortunately, despite this pre-emptive closure, the crisis still spread outside the campus to Kafanchan Township.

Given these premises, students were reported to have moved to town to mobilize support. Unfortunately, the crisis was fed upon by historical ethno-religious contestations between the indigenous Kafat (non-Muslim) population and their Hausa (Muslim) settlers who were perceived as 'over-lords'. As Kukah (1993:185) picks the point that the crisis was a fallout of "many years of degradation and humiliation."

Nevertheless, the riots lasted three days, leading to the killing of many Hausa-Muslims and the destruction of mosques. Making reference to the Donli Committee on the crisis, Ibrahim (1989:67) noted that a total of 19 people were killed, 169 hotels and beer parlous destroyed. In addition to this, 152 private buildings, 152 churches, 5 mosques and 95 vehicles were damaged (Ibrahim, 1991).

As a result, people, mostly of the Hausa-Muslim stock fled in droves to other safe parts of the North. The backlash resulted in several inter-religious crises in places like Kaduna, Zaria town, Wusasa, Samaru, Funtua and Kastina. Sadly, the police could not prevent the mayhem that escalated throughout the town (Ibrahim, 1989:69). It is worthy to note that, even the Hausa-Fulani, who were non-Muslims, were not left out of the violent attacks by Hausa-Fulani Muslims. In the words of Ibrahim (1989:68), Hausa-Fulani non-Muslims were "soughed for and executed". Perhaps, this illustrates the notion that where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe.

The conflict took an ugly turn, when Muslim students at the Bayero University, Kano, attacked their non-Muslim colleagues on account of the Kafanchan riots. The non-Muslim lecturers at Bayero University were also not spared in this violence by the Muslim students. The violence by Muslim students at Bayero University similarly spread into the city, leading to violent conflict between non-Muslims and Muslims. In Kano and Kaduna States, the government was forced on account of the riots to close schools. And for 8 days, markets in Kaduna, Funtua, Zaria, and Kastina remained under lock and key (Falola, 1998:185).

Clearly, the underlining causes of the crisis, which had to do with grievances based on the age-long injustice and disempowerment of the people of southern Kaduna (non-Muslims) by the Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) were not addressed.[94] To President Ibrahim Babaginda, the military Head of State, the riots was viewed as: "the civilian equivalent of an attempted coup d'état organized against the Military Government and the Nigerian nation" (Hunwick, 1992:153). As stated above, the riots can be safely labeled as religiously motivated. In this light, the Federal Government, instead of allaying fears pertaining to imagined threats to primordial identities, went ahead to ban religious organizations in schools, with offenders liable to five years imprisonment, thus losing a very valuable opportunity to attack and correct the cankerworm at the root of the crisis. In truth however, it is fair to say that, religion provided the cannon for the conflagration of the riot, as it awakened the deep political, historical, ethnic and most of all the deeply religious differences between the Muslims and non-Muslims.

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[94] The indigenes of southern Kaduna were considered as political and religious minorities

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More fundamentally, a clear confirmation of the superficial treatment of these riots was the outbreak of another Kafanchan riot on the 22nd of May, 1999. This time over the installation of Alhaji M. Mohammed as the new Emir of Jema'a by Colonel Umar Faruk Ahmed, the former military administrator of Kaduna state; an action which the people of Southern Kaduna violently and vociferously contested. Not surprisingly, therefore, they (non-Muslims of southern Kaduna) demanded the discontinuity of the rule by the Emirate; a position that was opposed by the Hausa-Muslims. In the aftermath of the conflict, over 100 people were killed and properties worth several millions of naira were destroyed.[95]

5.7.8: Bauchi Violence, 1991

Between the 20th – 24th April, 1991, Bauchi played host to one of the most gruesome riots in recent Nigerian history. Unlike previous riots, there was no identifiable leader, nor was it championed by any particular sect. There were different versions of the precipitants of the riots, which started from confrontation at an abattoir in Tafawa Balewa, a town outside Bauchi.

Interestingly, the cause of this conflict is similar to Hindu and Muslim conflicts in India, where the cause of some conflicts relates to the 'cow' which is a sacred animal to the Hindus, but a delicacy to the Muslims (Kakar, 1996:44). In a similar sense, pork is an unholy and impure animal to Muslims, but it is commonly regarded as suitable for consumption by non-Muslims.

There are, admittedly, different speculations pertaining to the cause of this conflict. One version states that, a Muslim who had brought meat from a non-Muslim butcher

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[95] *Newswatch Magazine*, June 14, 1999, p.28

was refused his refund, when a fellow Muslim scolded him for buying from a non-Muslim. The other story was that a Muslim was informed that the non-Muslim butcher had sold him pork instead of beef (Falola, 1998:204). Another narrative is that the main cause of the conflict was the allegation by an unidentified leader of the town that non-Muslims would be allowed to slaughter pigs and dogs at the local abattoir. It is probably impossible now, to discover the correct version of what transpired. Whatever the true account was, these speculations sparked off the crisis, with non-Muslims and Muslims taking sides with their co-religionists. Unfortunately, adherents of the two religions in the area were ethnically divided, hence the ethno-religious dimension of the crisis (Hausa-Fulani and the Sayawa). As was the case with other religious crisis, other parts of the state replicated the crisis, thus, engendering a serious religious conflict. On April 20, the riot spread to Dass, with Muslims killing non-Muslims (Aguwa, 1997:339).

At a point in time, a vehicle conveying corpses from the fracas broke down and in the course of transferring the dead bodies to another vehicle, the people who saw this incident spread the news of dead bodies of Muslims killed in the riots. Bauchi was subsequently engulfed in violence, following the rumoured arrival of the dead bodies to the Specialist Hospital in Bauchi. Muslims from near-by villages came into Bauchi to assist in the destruction of their 'enemies'.

Given the antecedence of the Nigerian police in similar crises, it was not surprising that the police were not only helpless, but also lost control in face of monumental anarchy. To control the raging crisis, the Federal Government sent in the army to quell the riot. In a way, even the army complicated the crisis, as many rioters were killed by

the army. This occurred when a crowd formed part of the entourage of the Emir of Bauchi to the Government House, on the mistaken belief by the army that they were about to attack the Emir. Clearly, this aggravated the anger of the Muslims, and it led to further attacks and violence. Consequently, the Muslims accused the police and the army of bias for the non-Muslims.

In any event, while the crisis cannot be separated from its religious roots and other multiple causes. As Falola (1998:205) rightly notes that: "....economic decline in the country, religious divides and manipulation, and attempts by minorities to assert themselves" were factors that informed the violence. By the time the riot got to Bauchi city, it had moved beyond the original incident to encompass a general attack on southerners, mainly non-Muslims who were perceived to be dominating the economy of Bauchi to the detriment of the indigenes (Muslims).

It is worth stressing at this point that, the facts on ground showed that the crisis apart from being religious was also interwoven with political manipulations. In drawing this connection and quoting a source, Imobighe (2003: 134) had this to say:

> ...the 1991 mayhem was precipitated by the woeful performance of Hausa-Fulani candidates in the local government elections. Sensing that they had lost grip of power in the area, they decided to throw the town into confusion to create a situation of anarchy. The motive was to stop a Basayi man (Sayawa man) from heading the local government.

What matters here is whether this statement therefore, is one of those little clues that seem to state that the chief principle of northern Islamization and politics was essentially to unify, albeit by coercion, the non-Muslims living in the north, to accept willy-nilly the sacrosanct ordination of the northern hegemony in the political entity

called Nigeria.[96] But, what one can understand from the events of this riot, is that the Hausa-Fulani Muslims imagine that their national identity is threatened when an election is won or power is conceded to a non-Muslim.

5.7.9: Katsina Riot, 1991

This riot centered on a certain Malam Yakubu Yahaya, a Shi'ite preacher, and former, Arabic teacher at the Kastina Teachers' College. Yahaya had a large base of supporters. In terms of his preaching and political disposition, Malam Yahaya could be said to be a religious puritan, and anti-state agent in orientation. "Yahaya believed he was sent by God to end injustice, oppression, and exploitation in Nigeria" (Falola, 1998:195). He was against secular authorities, which he believed are inferior to divine authority. As Falola (1998: 195) points out, Malam Yakubu Yahaya deemed it right that the Nigerian government should be overthrown, if necessary by forceful means. It was therefore not surprising that, he was always at logger-heads with the state government.

The immediate cause of the riot was the publication of an opinion poll by the Fun Times; one of the publications in the stable of the Federal Government owned Daily Times. The polls enquired whether people would marry prostitutes who repented and became non-Muslims. Malam Yakubu Yahaya, with his followers in throes, matched to the Katsina office of the Daily Times castigating the Federal Government, and the newspaper on account of the publication of the opinion poll. Another offending article

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[96] It is crucial to note that the Tiv (non-Muslims) in Awe Local Government in Nasarawa state have been involved in a similar conflict with the Fulani. The Tiv's are settlers in the town, which is largely constituted by the Fulani ethnic group and other ethnics (Muslims). The Tiv's mainly had notions of grievance pertaining to rights to land use and ownership and threats to life, which occurred systematically from Dec. 2000 - June 2001. Complaints to the Azara Traditional Council in connection with the perceived threats were not addressed by the Council or by the Police. Unfortunately, the Sarkin Azara, Alhaji Ibrahim Musa was assassinated by unknown people on the 12th of June 2001. This incident triggered reciprocation on suspicion that the Tivs were behind the said assassination. The crisis resulted in the butchery of the Tiv people and displacing many from their homes.

in the magazine made reference to the Bible and Qur'an concerning prostitutes that changed to lead good lives (Falola, 1998:196-197). The most offensive of the stories was the reference to the love affair of Prophet Muhammad to a prostitute that became his wife. This to Malam Yahaya and his followers desecrated Islam and the Holy Prophet Muhammad. For all these perceived irreverence to Islam, a religious motivated riot ensued and copies of the magazine were seized and burnt.

Predictably, one may argue that the crisis would have been better managed, but for the careless statement of the State Governor, Colonel John Madaki, a non-Muslim, who threatened to kill Yahaya publicly, if he generated trouble again (Falola, 1998:197). Yahaya, subsequently denounced the Nigerian government and its laws, and pledged his allegiance solely to Allah. He canvassed for an Islamic government in the country, which would be institutionalized through a revolution. On account of this, Mu'allum Ibrahim Al-Zakzay, another 'Izalla' Islamic fundamentalist leader based in Zaria, who doubled as Yahaya's leader, mobilized his members to storm Katsina. This posed serious security problems in the state. The stage was set for an epic confrontation with the state, and its security agencies with the arrival of Al-Zakzay in Kastina for the planned protest march on 16th April, 1991, with about 2000 fundamentalists. He instructed Yahaya to proceed to the Central Mosque on Friday 19th April, 2001, to preach, in what turned out to be a major confrontation with the State enforcement agency.

At this point, Yahaya, supported by his people, carried out Al-Zakzay orders on the appointed day in spite of heavy security mounted by the state. Expectedly, in their implacable frontal attack on the perceived notion of religious nationalism, there were

clashes between the supporters of Yahaya and the police, resulting in heavy casualties. Three policemen were reported killed and eight injured, while twenty-nine civilians sustained injuries. Yahaya was subsequently arrested after surrendering himself to the police. He was tried by the Justice Rabiu Mohammed Danlami under the Civil Disturbance (Special Tribunal) Decree of 1987, found guilty and subsequently jailed.

Strictly speaking, the sects' crucial position and contention were in respect of the secularity of the Nigerian state, the desire to Islamize Nigeria and co-opt Muslims to affirm their allegiance solely to Allah, rather than the Nigerian state with its non-Muslim oriented laws. Clearly, this gave the riot a sort of religious construction. The state inefficiency, even when it pertains to matters bordering on its sanctity and continued existence, like other times, was highly palpable as events before and during this riots clearly showed. Additionally, Falola (1998:203) adds that the fact that the followers of Yahaya's sect lost their fear of death, the police and the army could not find the capacity to avert the crisis.

5.7.10: Kano Riot, 14 October, 1991

The riot broke out on the 14th October, 1991. The immediate cause of this riot was the planned visit to the ancient city of Kano by Evangelist Reinhard Bonnke on the invitation of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). An event which was accompanied by massive and unprecedented media hypes, to the chagrin and annoyance of the predominantly Muslim Kano people. To worsen the situation, the Race Course for which approval was denied to the Muslims for a similar activity months ago, was approved for the use of non-Muslims for the Evangelist Bonnke crusade. Muslims, thus, insisted on the total cancellation of the crusade. The

aggressive campaign by the non-Muslims for the crusade, in spite of the Muslim opposition was also viewed as non-Muslims over-stepping their bounds and threatening Islamic identity.

In the ensuing riots that broke out on the 14th October, many non-Muslims were murdered in cold blood, properties destroyed, places of worship, shops, vehicles and government properties burnt. The urban warfare was quite serious at the Sabon Gari area of the city. According to Falola (1998: 212), official sources reported twelve deaths large numbers of injuries, the burning of thirty-four houses, one non Muslim place of worship, a mosque, forty-two shops, four hotels, fifteen cars, eight trucks, and nine motorcycles were set ablaze, and many public buildings damaged.

Beyond the immediate religious problems, the riot was a good case of political manipulation of religious sentiments to cause disaffection and crisis in northern Nigeria. It was this that informed Falola (1998:213) to note that scheming Kano politicians informed the less privileged people that the non-Muslims are their enemies. It hardly seems misleading, to suggest that the riots can be understood as not only against intolerance for unbelievers (non-Muslims), but also as perceived grievance in respect of economic stagnation, youth unemployment, popular impoverishment and disempowerment within the context of the suffocating Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), being implemented by the Federal Government, and the struggle for power among the political class in the context of the transitional politics at the time.

5.7.11: Zangon-Kataf, Riots 1992 & 2001

The Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) community had lived in Zango-Kataf since the 17th century. To complicate matters within Zango-Kataf, the Hausa-Muslims were in control of political power in the community. They were also largely regarded by the indigenous Katafs (non-Muslims) as settlers, impostors and oppressors. The Kataf were predominantly a non-Muslim ethnic group. These differences in identities gave rise to age-long grievances between these groups.

It is important to bear in mind that the Zango-Kataf riot was orchestrated by the misgivings over the relocation of the Zangon Kataf district market, hitherto controlled by the Hausa Muslims. The market relocation on the 6th of February, 1992, by the Chairman of the then newly created Zangon Kataf Local Government, was an implementation of a 1988 resolution by the default Kachia Local Government for the reason of space, lack of public conveniences and accessibility. The possibility of increased revenue was also part of the considerations for the decision to relocate the market by the local government (Akinteye, Wuye & Ashafa, 1999b:223).

In expressing their displeasure and opposition to the relocation of the market, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims attacked Kataf non-Muslim women, who came to the market for business on the official opening date. Thereafter, Kataf men burdened with grievance counter-attacked the Hausa. The riots lasted from the 17th to the 18th of May 1992. Given the ethnic colouration of the crisis, despite the state government's immediate institution of a Judicial Commission of Enquiry to look into the crisis, the riot spread to Kaduna, Zaria, and other parts of the state. Most of the victims were Hausa-Muslims of Zangon Kataf. At least 1,536 Hausas were killed in Zangon Kataf.

Most of the houses in the town were razed to the ground and Hausa household property valued at N29, 173,850 destroyed (Mustapha, 2003). Subsequently, the Army had to be called in to quell the riot.

It is safe to assume that, though religious primordialism was an attribute to the conflict, the cause of the crisis also forms along, political and socio-economic lines. While Zangon Kataf is to some extent a Hausa-Muslim community, the surrounding villages were Atyap (non-Muslims). There were about fifty autonomous villages in the area (Akinteye, et al, 1999b: 224). However, there had been cases and complaints of political domination starting from the period of the indirect rule system. The division between the Hausa and ethnic Atyap was fractionalized on religious lines. This condition existed during colonial rule, when the Atyap were subjected to the rule of the Zaria Emirate Council who appointed District Heads for the area. Thus we have a situation whereby the commercial and political headquarters of the Atyap was under alien rule of the Hausa-Muslims, a condition that they resented.

Under the Emirate system, during colonial times, the indigenous Atyap were exploited by the emirate to provide revenue for the colonial authorities. This laid the foundation for grievances emanating from the Atyap identity group. As mentioned earlier, in terms of religion, the Atyap were mainly non-Muslims. Their popular acceptance of being non-Muslims has been attributed to its utility as an escape from the exploitation and oppression by the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy (Akinteye, et al, 1999b: 227). Consequently, the Atyap sought every opportunity to assert their autonomy and rulership over their own affairs and territory. The crisis provided an opportunity for the ventilation of the age-long animosity against the Hausa-Muslims.

It should be stressed that there was also a socio-economic dimension to the crisis. The Hausa were the economic and political elites of Zangon Kataf, despite their minority status. Above this, the Atyap suffered discrimination on their land. For instance, at the only hospital in Zango town, treatment for the Hausa was free but the Atyap had to pay before being treated (Akinteye et al, 1999b: 231). To compound the situation, the Hausa loathed the Atyap who they regarded as uncultured and non-religious people, hence the appellation 'Arna', meaning infidels or unbelievers (Akinteye, et al, 1999b: 231).

Unfortunately, the tardiness of the state government in handling the crisis was largely accountable for the escalation of the crisis. Even the imposition of curfew by the state government did not prevent the riots and blood-letting. Not only were many lives lost, the violence spread to other parts of the state, such as Kaduna and Zaria. The army was called in belatedly to contain the riot. The fact that the State Governor, Alhaji Dabo Lere, was himself a Muslim/Hausa equally affected the efficiency of government in handling the crisis. In another dimension, Major General Lekwot and five others of the Zango-Kataf stock were sentenced to death by the Justice Benedict Okadigbo Tribunal for their roles in the conflict. However, there sentences were computed to life imprisonments.

It is crucial to note that, a re-enactment of the Zango-Kataf riots occurred on 7th April, 2001, resulting in the death of 8 people, with 17 people injured following the creation of 20 new chiefdoms and 62 new districts in Zangon Kataf Local Government Area. The crisis this time was between Bajju and Ikalu ethnic groups. The common grievance denominator of the two crises which remained unresolved was the struggle

for economic-determination, fight against oppression and internal colonialism by the Hausa-Fulani in the area.

5.7.12: The Jalingo Riots, 1992

The death of a Muslim student by an act of a non-Muslim occurred over grievances pertaining to water being used by the Muslims students for ablution. Now, ablution is considered as a strong sacred characteristic of the Islamic faith and identity. It is used as a cleansing ritual before praying.

One can conclude that as a result of this grievance, severe clashes broke out in Jalingo, the capital of Taraba State between Muslims and non-Muslims. The mayhem resulted in the burning of several non-Muslim places of worship and mosques. The death toll as a result of the riots was put at forty-two.

5.7.13: Funtua Riot, 1993

The Maitatsine-influenced riot occurred again in the town of Funtua on the 19th of January 1993. The riot occurred due to contentions between two Malams; one of the Malams belonged to an Islamic sect known as the Kalakato (Maitatsine), and the other Malam was an orthodox Muslim. The Orthodox Malam disciplined an almajirai (Young disciple) for a disorderly act. This act of discipline was reported to the Kalakato Malam, who then decided to launch a violent assault on the Malam and his household, thus precipitating a crisis which was reported to the police. The police visited the scene to arrest Kalakato members involved in the crisis. However, the fundamentalists resisted arrest and attacked the police. Thereafter, on the 22nd January the extremists went on rampage in Funtua, burning and looting government

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parastatals. People killed indiscriminately in the course of this violence, were about two hundred. Several police stations in Funtua were also raised down by the fundamentalists.

It is, essentially not easy to account for the causation of this conflict. Both Islamic identities of orthodox Islam and Islamic sects were competing in a tense religious atmosphere, and the breakdown of socio-economic relations within its community. Both were attempting to forestall any perceived deviation from the canon of Islam. The conflict shows leans towards an intra-religious riot emanating from religious fundamentalism under the concept of preserving the prestige of Islamic identity.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the though the crisis is rooted in religious zealotry and fundamentalism, the sect's doctrines and preaching were in many respects contrary to mainstream and popular Islamic theology. Paradoxically Muslims who were not members of the sect were not spared from their venous attacks. It is important to bear in mind that the threat to Islam here pertains to the purification of Islam. This is not surprising, as noted by Ahmadu U. Jalingo (1980:24):

> Muslim fundamentalists have not changed their position till today. Whenever and wherever compromises by Muslims appear to threaten the basic identity of society, they call for a reaffirmation of the unchanging truth of Islam.

Yet, sometimes this reaffirmation may be characterized by intra-religious conflicts, on issues pertaining to adulterating the Islamic identity. This ideology may be seen to be consistent with Islamic tradition, for the reason that Uthman dan Fodio called for a Jihad in 1804, against Muslims he considered to be unorthodox and lukewarm.

5.7.14: Jos, Plateau Riots, 1994 & 2002

As will be noticed, the election of a non-Muslim or Muslim in the volatile city of Jos is a crucial variable in the causation of conflicts in the city. The appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato a Hausa-Muslim as the Caretaker of a Local Government was met with opposition by a peaceful protest by other non-Muslim ethnic groups. Their grievance was based on the contention that the Caretaker was not an indigene of Plateau State. The peaceful protest later turned violent on the 12th of April 1994, after Alhaji Aminu Mato was sworn into office. Clearly, perceived differences in religious faiths was a causation of the riots.

Interestingly, another bout of violence occurred in Jos in May, 2002 due to similar circumstances. This time the PDP election of party officials, led to mass protests and the usual carnage that ensued between Muslims and non-Muslims. The conflict was related to the battle of supremacy in the Jos North local Government. The death toll was estimated to be 40.[97]

5.7.15: Potiskum, Yobe State, 1994

On Sunday September 4, 1994, in Potiskum, Yobe State, Muslims burnt several non-Muslims places of worship to portray their grievance over the refusal of the parents of a young girl from allowing her conversion to Islam. The father of the girl was also accused of desecrating the Qur'an.

However, it is crucial to note that a further causation of this inter-religious grievance in Potiskum is that the minority Bolewa ethnic group (Muslims) are the overlords of

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[97] *The Guardian Newspaper*, May 5th, 2002, p. 3

the town. This position has been a source of grievance to the Ngiim/Kara-Kara majority (non-Muslims). Clearly, this foundation can be traced to the British colonialists, who deemed it expedient for administrative purposes to situate the Ngiim/Kara-Kara under the Bolewa.

5.7.16: Tafawa Balewa Crises, 1995

To begin with, for the people of Tafawa Balewa, July 15, 1995, was another black day for its community. The Hausa-Fulani Muslims and their Sayawa non-Muslim neighbours made mince meat of one another, especially considering the fact that the wounds of the 1991 religious crisis were just healing.[98] The immediate cause of the crisis was the replacement of the Commissioner of Education in the State, Mr. J. K. Manzo, a non-Muslim from the Sayawa ethnic stock, with Mr. Ibrahim Musa, a Hausa-Muslim. The Sayawa felt marginalized by the removal of their tribesman from government. Due to this grievance, Sayawa women mounted a road blockage to prevent the hosting of the reception organized by the Hausa-Muslim community for Mr. Musa, leading to the cancellation of the ceremony.

Certainly, there was tension which led to conflict. Now, the causation that led to the conflict was the forced cancellation of the reception on account of the Sayawa women road blockage, which was seen as an unpardonable affront on the part of the Sayawa, by the Hausa Muslims, whose youths organized retaliation. Thus leading to the crisis in which several persons were killed, and property worth several millions of naira were destroyed. Other ethnic groups, fractionalizing on religious divides, later got

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[98] The Tafawa-Balewa violence of 1991 spilt over to the neighbouring towns.

involved in the crisis and at the end of the day, over forty-four villages and hamlets became victims of the crisis (Akinteye, et al, 1999a: 311).

As is evident, this crisis though fought along the Muslim – non-Muslim divide, was also a case of power struggle propelled by historical grievances, desire for self-determination, the control over local affairs and the struggle to terminate the regime of imposition and oppression the Sawaya experienced under the emirate system, which exploited the weakness of the non-Muslims (the Sawaya) for the reason that they were considered as a religious and political minority.

This conflict established Tafawa-Balewa as a volatile town. Thus, it was not surprising that on June 18th 2001, Muslims militants from Chad and Niger, attacked and destroyed a Bible school in Tafawa Balewa. This led to a bloody conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro Local Government Areas of Bauchi state.

5.7.17: Ilorin Riots, 1998 & 1999

Ilorin the capital of Kwara state, whose indigenes are mainly from Yoruba ethnic stock, as noticed in chapter 1 are considered to be part of the royal house of the Fulani Caliphate, due to the Uthman dan Fodio conquest of the town in the early 19th century. Religious riots between Muslims and non-Muslims were recorded in November 1998, when 20 non-Muslim students from the University of Ilorin were assaulted and injured. In addition in December 1998, a non-Muslim place of worship was demolished by Muslims on the basis of land occupation. This gave rise to a gory conflict. Yet again, in 1999, Muslim elders insisted that all non-Muslim places of

worship be transferred from the town. This led to another violent conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. Furthermore, 50 non-Muslim places of worship were destroyed by Ilorin Militant Youths.[99]

5.7.18: Kano Ethnic Riot, Reprisal Killings of July 22 July 1999

It is perhaps best to begin with the riots between Yoruba and Hausa in Sagamu in Ijebu Remo, Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria, that broke out following the violation of the curfew imposed on women and non-indigenes as was the tradition during the Oro festival.[100] Two Hausa prostitutes were caught during the Oro celebration as violators of the restriction order. These two Hausa women were killed by the Oro cultists. In retaliation, the Hausa Muslims raided and killed some Yoruba individuals. The Yorubas through the Oduaa Peoples Congress (OPC) clashed with the Hausa Muslims. The Sagamu riot in which the dreaded Yoruba militant organization, the OPC were involved, led to the death of many Hausa-Muslim traders and the destruction of their properties worth several millions of naira.

Given the massive carnage occasioned by the riots, many Hausa-Muslims took the next available means of transportation and returned to the North, especially Kano. Those that returned to Kano fed their kith and kin with litanies of woes and sordid details of brutality, inhumanity, indignity and killings meted out on the fleeing Hausa-Muslim population in the hands of the Yoruba in Sagamu. The 1999 Kano riot was therefore a retaliatory riot, centered on the perceived injustices against Muslims; to pay back the Yoruba in Kano what their kiths and kin in Sagamu did to the Hausa traders living in the town. Driven by these ideals, more than three hundred people lost

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[99] See Govt Deploys attack on Churches in Ilorin: Guardian Tuesday December 21, 1999, p 3.
[100] A Yoruba traditional festival held at night which must not be witnessed by women

their lives during the violence. Furthermore, 50 houses/shops and about 30 vehicles were burnt.[101]

More crucially, perhaps, it is important to bear in mind that, the lingering misgivings over the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections won by a Yoruba man, Chief M. K. O. Abiola, whose presidency was believed to be opposed by the Hausa establishment (thanks to the rapaciousness of the Babangida administration), also added to the venom of the riots especially given the OPC involvement who viewed it as a defense of the Yoruba people and nation against Hausa-Fulani manipulation and control in Yoruba land. One may suggest that the riots emerged from the complexities associated with Babanginda's annulment of Abiola's election. In this sense, ethnic and political manipulations engendered by Babangida laid the foundation for ethnic rivalry between the two identity groups in Kano.

For reasons discussed later, and in the spirit of attempting to shed some light on the above-mentioned issues, it is pertinent to note that, these ethnic riots between the Hausa and Yoruba were the second of its kind in northern Nigeria.[102] Surprisingly, however, as a semblance of the 1953 riots, most of the targets of this riot were not the Yoruba, but those from the Igbo ethnic group. Yet, in times of ethnic and religious conflict, it is suggested that Muslims seek to target only non-ethnics of the faith.

It bears emphasis at this point, to note that while the return of power to civil authority satisfied the requirements of procedural legitimacy, the substantive contents of democratic legitimacy, that is, democratic dividends was still lacking months after the

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[101] *Newswatch Magaine*, August 9th, 1999, p. 22.
[102] The first riot occurred in Kano riot, 1953 as discussed above.

return to civil rule. More specifically, months after the new government came into power the people's optimistic expectations of qualitative and quantitative improvements in their existential conditions were yet to be met. The many ethnic and religious riots all over the country were in a sense, a protest of the unfulfilled expectations resulting from increased frustrations, and calculated attempts at arresting attentions of the state to redress perceived imbalance, marginalization, injustices and other associated socio-economic and political problems that were interconnected to the Babangida and Abacha despotic regimes. More specifically, one may safely assume that, in northern Nigeria, these perceived grievances created a place and space for frustrations, which led to ethnic rivalry.

5.7.19: Kaduna 2000, Sharia Riot

In northern Nigeria Muslims have always advocated the introduction of the Sharia. This was a source of serious mud-slinging at the Constituent Assembly in 1978 and resurfaced during the Constitutional Debate in 1989. What is striking is that the struggle for and against the introduction of Sharia in Nigeria, which, despite the emotional heat it often generates, has never led to violence until the incidence on February 21, 2000.

Soon after Nigeria returned to civilian rule, the Governor of Zamfara State, Alhaji Yerima Ahmed, raised the idea of introducing the Islamic legal system. In spite of serious opposition nationwide and given the reluctance of the Federal Government to test the constitutionality or otherwise of this action in the Courts, Sharia was introduced in Zamfara state. It was not surprising that the decision to introduce the Sharia in the largely cosmopolitan Kaduna State, with a large population of non-

Muslims and southerners, engendered serious controversy and resentment. After the persistent demonstration in support of Sharia by several Islamic fundamentalist groups, which lasted over two weeks, the non-Muslims in Kaduna State, under the leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), also decided to organize a peaceful protest against the introduction of the Sharia. Over 50,000 non-Muslims took part in the peaceful demonstration.[103]

In what followed, the central market areas and other place where non-Muslims and non-indigenes lived were destroyed, with five manufacturing firms closed.[104] Furthermore, about 1,200 people lost their lives[105] and billions of naira worth of properties were either looted or destroyed in the riots, thus, the riot was justly called the 'biggest in the nation's history.'[106] As aptly noted by the then-President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo:[107] "What I found most astonishing was discovery that a majority of those who died in the disturbance were Nigerians who had lived all their lives in Kaduna, and could not truthfully call anywhere else their home."

What was organized as a peaceful demonstration turned into an uncontrollable riot when the demonstrators were attacked by Muslims shouting 'Sai Sharia ko Anki ko anso', (Sharia, whether you like it or not). The rational for this sentiment could be found in the fact that Muslims had notions of a perceived threat towards concerted efforts by non-Muslims to prevent the implementation of a core tenet of Islam. The preceding weight of evidence points primarily to the assertion of religious identity as the immediate cause of these riots in terms of implementation and objectives. The

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[103] *Newswatch,* March, 2000:6.
[104] *Sunday Tribune* 10 February, 2002.
[105] *The Daily Vanguard* Thursday March 23 2006.
[106] *Newswatch*, January 1, 2001, p. 24.
[107] *Newswatch*, March 13, 2000, p. 23.

tensions were motivated by religious sentiment. Inevitably tensions arise where religion is a contending issue in northern Nigeria.

5.7.20: Damboa, Borno State Riot 2000

The background to this riot started on the 27th of March, 2000, as a result of religious meetings in the residence of a cleric of a non-Muslim faith, an action which was opposed to by the Muslim community.

According to Alhaji Lawan Kabu,[108] the Chairman of Damboa Local Government, the origin of the crisis could be traced to the demand for the allocation of land for the building of a non-Muslim place of worship, which was not granted. With the persistent refusal to allocate land to build their place of worship, construction work for a non-Muslim place of worship started on the private residential land of the cleric of the non-Muslim place of worship. The Chairman claimed that the construction work continued despite an injunction prohibiting such by the local government security committee, which was inclusive of non-Muslims and Muslims.

As a result of these imagined threats, militant Muslims chanting 'Allah Akbar' demolished the new place of worship being constructed by the Living Faith Church on the private residence of the its religious leader. Furthermore, all the other non-Muslim places of worship in Damboa were burnt. In this atmosphere, Muslims in this community were nursing grievances over the construction of a non-Muslim place of worship which they imagined to be against Islamic necessities. It should be noted that the imagined collective identity of Islam has the capacity to hold every Muslim

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[108]See http://www.worthynews.com/news-features/compass-borno.html. Accessed on the 17th of June 2008.

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individual within its control. In all, about twenty people were reported dead. Therefore, it would not be misleading to conclude, that the riots were solely on religious grounds.

5.7.21: Kaduna Tension, October 2001

The central discussion of this religious tension is to explicate the volatile and sensitive nature of religion in Kaduna State. This skirmish resulted from the setting ablaze of three non-Muslim places of worship at the Hayin Banki area of Kaduna. According to the State Government, the cause of the fire was due to sparks from faulty electrical cables (Sani, 2007: 109). The Kaduna State Network of Indigenous Pastors (KSNIPAN) argued that the position of the state government on the cause of the fire in the two non-Muslims places of worship was mischievous. Given the fact that another non-Muslim place of worship at a different location in Kaduna, was just fortunate to escape from being set ablaze at the same time, the non-Muslims concluded that the arsonists were Muslim fanatics (Sani, 2007).

In analyzing the religious causation of this tension, it is suggested that the arson was a reaction of the violent conflict and the unhealed religious divide emanating between non-Muslims and Muslims in Jos, in September, 2001 and the perceived identity threat imposed by non-Muslim places of worship.

5.7.22: Jos, 2001 Riots

Given the conditions existing in Jos and other communities in Plateau State prior to the 2001 riots on the contentious issues of settlers/indigenes dichotomy, it was obvious that Jos in particular and Plateau State in general was seating on a 'keg of gun

powder.' It was therefore not a surprise that two seemingly unrelated events provided the ignition for the combustion that almost destroyed the whole of Plateau State, and threatened the stability of Nigeria as a state.

The source of this conflict was the merciless beating by some Muslims of a non-Muslim woman, who was alleged to have passed through the road barricade in front of a mosque close to her house in a locale of Jos called Congo-Russia (mainly resided by non-Muslims), during the Muslim Friday Jumat service on 7th September, 2001. Her relatives and other non-Muslims at the scene of the incident mobilized themselves for a revenge of the maltreatment of the non-Muslim woman. Other people across religious lines soon joined in the skirmish, leading to a grave riot in the city, in which many lives and property were lost and destroyed. It might be critical to note that Congo-Russia, a slum area of Jos is known for its vast numbers of locally brewed alcoholic public houses. This was a source of grievance to the Muslims, whilst the mosque, situated in a non-Muslim residence was a source of grievance to the non-Muslims.[109]

Notably, citizenship and citizenship rights, within the context of settlers-indigenes controversy formed the second leg of the conflict. The appointment of a certain Alhaji Mukhtar Usman, a Muslim-Hausa minority, by the Federal Government as the Chairman and Coordinator of the State's National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), was met with the strong objections by the non-Muslim indigenes. This appointment provoked serious controversy, and ignited the age-old struggle for power between the indigenes and non-indigenes. At the centre of the crisis was the Plateau

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[109]For an interesting exploration of conflict in Plateau State, See Best, G. Shedrack, 2007. *Conflict and Peace Building in Plateau State, Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Youth Council (PYC), representing the indigenes and Jasawa Development Association (JDA) championing the cause of Muslims (Hausa-Fulani). While the Hausa-Fulani claimed to be indigenes and to have actually arrived Jos long before the present claimants, the PYC argued that the Hausa-Fulani are settlers, and impostors.

Now upon an examination of immediate triggers of the conflict; provocative posters such as 'The Devil has no parking space in Jos North'; 'Trace your root before it is too late' and 'Go and teach Islamic Religious Knowledge, it is better' were pasted around Jos town. These posters could be considered as an attack on the primordial identity of Muslims within the state. Also, human excrete were dumped at the NAPEP Chairman's house. Furthermore, there was a serious campaign that non-Muslims should not to vote for Muslims in the then to be held Jos North Local Government elections (Sani, 2007:158).

What is important to realize about this conflict as the various evidences tendered and argued before the Commission of Inquiry showed, that while religion provided the immediate causation for the crisis, other latent factors were present – economic, political and ethnic factors, exemplified by age-old animosities, struggles and contentions over resources and power, especially within the context of the crisis and contradictions engendered by a failing state and a dependent and an underdeveloped economy. The power struggles in the context of the up-coming 2003 General elections, all over the country also played a major role in the conflicts. Reference was made in one of the testimonies at the Tribunal on the unguarded statement by General Mohammadu Buhari, a former Head of State, and a northern Presidential candidate

'that Muslims should not vote for non-Muslims during the 2003 General Elections' was considered as a contributory factor in escalating the crisis.[110]

The political and ethnic dimensions of the crisis was attested to by the alleged clandestine involvement of both the Bauchi State Governor, Alhaji Mu'azu and the former Police Commissioner of the State, Alhaji Mohammed Abubakar, who were alleged by witnesses at the inquiry to have armed and incited Muslim fanatics during the crisis to attack non-Muslims.[111] The confessions of mercenaries supposedly recruited from both Niger Republic and Chad to prosecute the 'Holy War' against non-Muslims[112] also supported the position that the riots was premeditated and carefully executed by disgruntled politicians.

Furthermore, the Muslim practice of blocking roads for the Friday Jumat services has been a source of complaints and misgiving before the riots on 7th September. A month earlier, on 8th August, 2001, the executives of the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) issued a communiqué asking for an end to road blocking during Friday prayers sessions of Muslims in a predominantly non-Muslim locale.[113]

Ibrahim Itse[114] leader of the Plateau Youth Forum (PYF) in a statement on the vested issue of settlers versus indigenes in a poignant way revealed the causation of the crisis. According to him: "It is funny and insulting that a Hausa-Fulani man from Bauchi, Kano, Kastina, etc who is looking for pasture and trade settles in Jos among

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[110] Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of inquiry. See also a reaffirmation of accredited statements of Mohammadu Buhari in The Guardian, Tuesday, September, 11, 2001, p2.
[111] *The Punch Newspaper*, November, 16th 2001, p.1.
[112] *The Punch Newspaper*, November 16th, 2001, p6.
[113] *ThisDay Newspaper*, September 9th, 2001, p.4.
[114] *ThisDay Newspaper*, September 8th, 2001, p.4.

indigenes of Afizene, Anaquta and Borom only to wake up one day to lay claim to a place leased to them for peaceful co-existence."[115]

It is only possible to provide estimates of the economic losses occasioned as a result of the Jos 2001 riots. What is indisputable is that the state and the nation suffered greatly on account of the riots. According to the Miyetti Allah Cattle Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), in their testimony at the Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Jos Riots, the Fulani lost 4,582 cows, 7,973 sheep and 13,152 fowls, in addition to 1,176 houses, 29 motor vehicles, 32 bicycles, 6 motorcycles, 13 water pumps, 17 mosques and agricultural products worth over N 336,913.[116] On the first day of the crisis alone, over 50 people were killed, with 500 people injured. Almost all the mosques within Jos city, with the exception of the Central Mosque were razed down.[117] Many non-Muslims places of worship and mosques were razed down. The Dimili spare parts market was razed down. About 22 trailers were burnt at Rukkubah Road Garage.[118]

Areas mostly affected by the riots were: Dago Dutse, Agwan Rogo, Agwan Madki and Congo-Russia. Medical facilities were grossly inadequate and seriously over-stretched, leading to a situation whereby dead bodies littered the city, and people that would have been saved had medical been care promptly given them lost their lives. Some accounts have it that in all 600 hundred lives were lost.[119] The Jos General

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[115] *ThisDay Newspaper*, September 8th, 2001, p.4.
[116] *ThisDay Newspaper*, September 9[th,] 2001, p.1.
[117] *The Punch newspaper*, October 9th, 2001, p. 5.
[118] *The Punch Newspaper*, September 10th, 2001, p.1.
[119] *The Daily Vanguard Newspaper*, March 23rd, 2006.

Hospital and the Jos University Teaching Hospital (JUTH) were stretched beyond their usual capacity.

As was tradition of such riots in Nigeria, the incompetence of the Nigerian Police was exposed, as the police proved incapable of containing the riots. Hence, President Olusegun Obasanjo promptly granted the request of the acting Governor of the State, and ordered the deployment of the Army to quell the Jos riots. Surprisingly, the rioters defied the military, and for three days in spite of military presence, the riots were still raging on. Soldiers were mobilized from the 3rd Armoured Division of the Nigerian Army, Jos, who mounted checkpoints and patrolled the city to no avail.

Apart from the appeal by the State Government and its functionaries for peace, President Olusegun Obasanjo, who saw the Jos crisis as a national disgrace, called on religious and community leaders to manage their followers. Similarly, the Sultan of Sokoto, and the spiritual leader of all Nigeria Muslims, Alhaji Ibrahim Muhammadu Maccido, the 19th Sultan of Sokoto, appealed for calm and peace between Muslims and non-Muslim. A former Head of State of Nigeria, General Yakubu Gowon (rtd), a non-Muslim, who is also from Plateau State also called for peaceful co-existence among the people of the area.

An important development in the aftermath of the conflict was the Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry was set up by the government to find out the remote and immediate causes of the September 7th – 14th, 2001, riots in Jos. The report of the Committee was submitted a year after. The report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and Environs of 2002 recommended that a

conflict of such magnitude may again appear in the future, if the indigene/settler issues are not resolved.

5.7.23: Kano, 2001 Riots

The Kano 2001 riots, also known as Osama bin Laden riots, started as protests against America's attack on Afghanistan. The protest was planned to be a peaceful way of registering the dissatisfaction of the people of Kano against the attack by the USA on Afghanistan on the suspicion that the latter was hiding Osama bin Laden, the leader of the September 11, 2001, gruesome attack on the USA. During the riots that lasted between October 12 and 13, 2001, the death toll was estimated at 200.[120] Furthermore, several non-Muslim places of worship and properties belonging mostly to non-Muslims and southerners were destroyed. It is worthy to note that religious tensions had been brewing in city since June of that year, when the Kano State Government demolished 17 non-Muslim places of worship.[121]

A striking question is what provokes such attacks targeted against non-Muslims in Kano, if the perceived grievance is against a foreign state? As rightly observed by Christian Ochiama,[122] Deputy Political Editor of *The Post Express*: "Kano has a problem when it comes to matters of Islam. Its attachment to the doctrine can be very passionate. The average Kano indigene can kill in response to any perceived threat to the tenets of that religion."

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[120] *The Nigerian Tribune*, Monday 15 October, 2000, p. 2.
[121] See Religious Crisis Looms in Kano, The Post Express, Saturday, June 23, 2001, p.1.
[122] Christian Ochiama, Sharia: Kano joins the Chorus, *The Post*, Wednesday, June 21, 2008, p. 9.

It is certain that religion was the primary cause of the Kano 2001 riots. However, other salient factors were decisive in the instigation of the conflict. It is suggested that the elites were the violent entrepreneurs who capitalized on innocuous religious incidences to incite conflict amongst the people of different faiths. This was particularly meaningful against the politics of repositioning for the 2003 General Elections in the country.

5.7.24: The Tiv-Jukun Crisis, 2001

The Tiv and Jukun people have lived side each other for centuries in the Middle-Belt region of Nigeria. These people may be described as sharing a seemingly similar cultural identity. The Tiv and Jukun consist mainly of non-Muslims and a minority of Animists. The Tiv and Junkun reside mainly in the former Benue-Plateau State. It is important to stress that in the course of Nigeria's political development, and the associated regional differentiations, in 1960 after independence, Nigeria consisted of 3 regions. This was later increased to 4 regions on the eve of the Nigerian civil war in 1966, and thereafter into 12 states in 1970. Different military administrations in later years further carved Nigeria, into 19 states in 1976 and subsequently into 36 states in 1996. The result of this political action of state creation is rationalized as a mechanism of bringing government closer to the people. However, it produced the balkanization of the Tiv and Jukun people into different states (Plateau, Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa). Quite simply, this division renders palpable, the perception that it was a causal factor in the ethnic conflict between these two similar cultural groups.

The centre of this ethnic conflict has been Wukari in Taraba state. However, other states have experienced hostilities within the Tiv and Jukun communities. The

geographical distribution of the groups is such that, while the Tivs, are the majority in Benue State, they are in the minority in Taraba, Nasarawa and Plateau states, whilst the Jukuns on the other hand are the majority in Taraba state.

What is particularly significant about the Tiv-Jukun crisis is that, it was rooted in indigene and settler issues.[123] Given the fact that the Tiv are the minority ethnic group in Taraba and Nasarawa States, the Jukun claim that the Tiv are subject to the traditional authority of the Jukun traditional rulers (Aku Uka),[124] as the Tiv's are seen as settlers by the Jukun. This was disputed by the Tiv, who claim equal rights to the land and consequently refuse to recognize the authority of the Aku Uka. Culturally, the Tiv do not recognize any one or institution as having traditional authority of rulership, although the Tivs have a common spiritual leader known as the Tor Tiv.[125] The Tor Tiv has his ancestral headquarters in Gboko in Benue state. It was this contradiction in ethnic loyalty that was at the root of the protracted crisis, and sporadic outbreak of violence for ten years, before the catastrophic conflict which lasted from 1990-1993. Thus, the conflict has been rightly labeled as 'Nigeria's longest civil war' (Bagudu, 2003).

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[123] Similar ethnic conflict had been noted in Nasarawa state, between the Bassa, the majority (non-Muslims) and the Igbirra (Muslims). Interestingly both ethnic groups live in the same Local Government Area; Toto Local Government. Notably a destructive communal conflict occurred between these groups in 1997, which left many dead, hundreds displaced and destroyed properties. Both ethnic groups are competing for scare economic resources marginalisation, but mainly on religious division. Another conflict worthy of mention based on ethnic loyalties is the 1999/2000, Kuteb-Jukun/Chamba Ethnic Conflict: These Ethnic groups live in Takum Local Government, Taraba State. Their identity is based on ethnicity. Kutebs, (non-Muslims allege that they are the entitled to the stool of Takum. Chamba/Jukun, (non-Muslims) grouping due to similarity in social status and an early introduction to western education have a stronger presence in the Federal and State Governments. However, the Kutebs are more in population than the Chamba/Jukun grouping. The ethnic conflict relates to indigene/settler issues, local government politics and boundary disputes in respect of a new Local Government; Ussa. Another similar conflict is noted in Ikululand between the Ikulu and Bajju non-Muslim ethnic groups in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna state, especially in the communal crisis of 7th & 8th 2001. Furthermore, another clash occurred in November, 2004. Here, the grievances pertain to land disputes and Chieftaincy titles.
[124] Traditional title
[125] Traditional title

It is instructive to note that the major crisis between these groups erupted in 2001,[126] where the Tiv living in 200 villagers in the border towns of Gbeji, Zakim-Bian, Vasase and Agbayiin between Benue and Taraba States were killed on the 22nd of October 2001 by soldiers, as a reprisal for the killing of 19 soldiers, whose bodies were found on 12th October 2001.[127] The reprisal killings took place in Tiv communities in Benue and Taraba states. It is striking to note that it has been speculated that, the soldiers acted in complicity with Jukuns in burning down most of the homes in these villages, due to the fact that Nigeria's Minister of Defence, at that time; retired Lt-Gen Theophilus Danjuma was from the Jukun ethnic stock.

5.7.25: Kaduna Riot, November, 2002

Lets begin, by noting that against the background of the highly pluralist composition of the Kaduna, which doubles as the political capital of the North, this particular riot confirms that, given the volatility of Kaduna, anything has the potential of sparking inter-religious riots. The background to the riots was the planned hosting of the Miss World Beauty Pageant in Nigeria, which eventually manifested into a parade of shame in Kaduna. Islamic fundamentalists were vehemently against the hosting of the Pageant, which they considered immoral and un-Islamic, anywhere in the country especially not Abuja, the nation's Federal Capital Territory. As noted in Chapter 1, in an obvious act that displayed crass insensitivity to the religious identity of Nigerian

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[126] The Tiv-Jukun people are non-Muslims. Their primordial identity lies in ethnicity as opposed to religion. Thus, one may argue that the solidarity provided by the community of Islam among people divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences, living within communities were non existent. It is observed that other people divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences, but professing Islam have the tendency not to experience severe conflict. To list a few ethnic groups living as such are the Gwari and Nupe in Niger State; the Teda, Fulani and Kanuri in Bornu State; the Kanuri, kwanka, Paa, Seyawa and Warji in Bauchi State, the Eloyi, Gwandara, Gwari; Fulani, Hausa, Puku in Sokoto State. In these instances the people here are bound by the same religious identity provided by Islam.

[127] Soldiers from the 232 Tanks Battalion Yola were sent by President Obasanjo to restore peace and order in the troubled community. Unfortunately, Tiv militia ambushed the soldiers, killing 19 believing they were Jukun militia.

Muslims, the ThisDay newspaper of 16th October 2002, published an article by Miss Isioma Daniel to the effect that Prophet Muhammad might have married one of the contestants in the Miss World beauty contests. This publication was considered an attack on the religious identity of Muslims. Miss Daniel had set the city of Kaduna ablaze by publicizing a disparaging remark towards Islam's Holy Prophet.

Now quite clearly, as a result of the publication, ThisDay newspaper office in Kaduna was razed down by Muslim militants. Many non-Muslims were killed, while hotels and churches were also burnt. The riot also spread to Abuja and Bauchi, with similar effects. The police were unable to quell the riots as they were out numbered by the rioters. Eventually 250 people were killed, and 3,500 injured. A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed in Kaduna, with the army invited to contain the riot. As usual, military formations provided sanctuary for fleeing non-Muslims and southerners. The organizers of the Miss World Beauty Pageant were forced to relocate the hosting of the Pageant to London. Nigerian investors involved directly or indirectly in the Pageant lost several millions of Naira, and the nation's perception in the international community suffered greatly.

The analysis here is that while the riot transcends the immediate publication of the offensive article by the ThisDay newspaper, the riot had serious political undertones. A fatwa, issued by the deputy governor of Zamfara State Government (a Sharia based state in northern Nigeria) called for the death of Isioma Daniel. If this view is correct, then one may suggest that the edit provoked the carnage between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is easy to understand that the tone and substance of this shows that, Islam

can be politically hijacked and manipulated to generate conflict, when there is a perceived threat to its sacrosanct nature.

5.7.26: Kano Riot, 11th May, 2004

The immediate cause of this riot was the perceived grievance based on the inefficiency and incompetence with which the Federal Government handled the Yelwa/Shendam crisis in Plateau state, where many Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) were killed. In order to register their misgivings about the situation, and in order to defend and protect their Islamic identity, under the notion of 'united we stand, divided we fall', Sheikh Umar Kabo, the Chairman Kano State Sharia Commission, led thousands of Muslims from the Umar Khattah Juma'at Mosque, Kano, to the Kano State Government House to register their displeasure. The Federal Government was given a seven-day ultimatum by the protesters within which to address the killings of Muslims in Yelwa, Plateau State or Muslims would be forced to defend their faith and religious identity themselves.

More generally, as it happened so often in most mass actions of this nature, the peaceful protest was hijacked by hoodlums. In the commotion and violence that attended the hijack of the protest, 100 non-Muslims and non-indigenes were killed.[128]

Although the State Governor, Alhaji Ibrahim Shekarau, viewed the crisis as being politically motivated, the riot could better be understood as socio-economic in orientation, especially when viewed against the background of the active participants

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[128] The Guardian Newspaper, Friday, May 14, 2004, p. 27

in the riots. According to Adamu Abuh:[129] "Most of those responsible for the killings were the unemployed and youths under the influence of alcohol. Some others are black-market dealers of petrol who are facing hard times owing to the deregulation policy of government." Even though, this may indeed be the causal-effect of the riot, what should be understood is that the riots transmuted into a religious conflict. It then appears that the nature of Islam, and those professing it, especially when it is the main determinant of identity, is that it generates conflict between different faiths, but not with different ethnic groups sharing the same faith (Islam) in times of socio-economic grievance.

5.7.27: Plateau Crisis, 2004

It is worth mentioning that the origin of this particular crisis is related to the age-long and deep seated hatred between the Hausa-Fulani, Muslims and non Muslims over land ownership rights, and political power. Yet, it is clear that these animosities are due solely to the overwhelming differences in religious identities, which gave space for deeply rooted conflicts. Thus, the serious blood-letting in the wake of the Jos riots of 2001, has a central place as a precipitant of the riot that provoked the volatile Muslim-non-Muslim hostilities.

The riot broke out on the heels of the massacre of 48 Tarok non-Muslims in a place of worship by armed Hausa-Muslims, and the retaliatory killings of many Muslims by Tarok non-Muslims. It is important to note that inter-religious crises in Plateau State have threatened the existence a stable government in the region. According to Thomas Kangnaan, Plateau State Administrator on Resettlement and Rehabilitation

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[129] *The Guardian Newspaper*, May 14, 2004:26

Committee, 54,000 died (18,931 men, 17,397 women and 17,459 children in the riots since September 2001). In addition, 25,129 houses, 865 shops and 1326 cattle destroyed and killed respectively. A further social cost of the crisis was the destruction of primary and secondary schools valued at N130m (about £500.000).[130]

5.7.28: Borno 'Danish Cartoon' Riots: February, 2006

This riot showcased one of the negative effects of globalization. Paradoxically, the riot was triggered off by a cartoon caricature of Prophet Muhammad drawn by a Danish cartoonist, in the Jyllands-Posten daily newspaper on the 30th of September Sept. 2005, and reprinted in several European newspapers.

The riots, which was carefully planned and executed, started from the Ramat Square, the venue of a public lecture on Prophet Muhammad, organized under the auspices of the Muslim Forum in Maiduguri. The immediate cause of the riot was the insistence that, a pick-pocket arrested by the police at the venue of the lecture must be lynched, rather than taken to the Police Station. This then, resulted into the throwing of tear gas at the restless crowd by the police.

The mayhem resulted in hundreds being killed, while hundreds were wounded. Added to this, about 40 non-Muslim places of worship were destroyed as well as several non-Muslim properties and homes.[131] In addition, a Catholic Priest, Mike Gajere, of the Bulumkutu, Maiduguri was slaughtered and burnt to ashes.[132]

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[130] *Thisday Newspaper*, October 7th 2004.
[131] *Thisday Newspaper*, February 25th, 2006, p. 47.
[132] *Tribune Newspaper*, February 20th, 2006, p.1.

One must stress that, the role of the police was in no way less ignoble during this crisis than the previous ones discussed. The religious bias of the state government seriously militated against its ability to control and contain the crisis. The State Governor lost the respect and confidence of the non-Muslims and non-indigenes as a result of the crisis.

Now to complicate matters, militant Muslims in several Northern states[133] took to the streets in protest against of what they considered the denigration of their religious identity and faith and the Holy Prophet by the Danish cartoon. A complexity about the protest is that it took place months after the publication of the cartoon and that objects of attack were Nigerian non-Muslims and Southerners in the North, which were in no way related or connected with the source of the Muslims annoyance. Apart from the burning of the Danish flag and the cancellation of contracts to a Danish firm, Nigerian non-Muslims living in the North were attacked, women raped, several people killed, their property looted and damaged, just as non-Muslim places of worship were set on fire. Expectedly, there were reprisal attacks in the Igbo town of Onitsha, in Anambra State, which resulted to about 100 deaths.[134] As a result of the carnage 10,000 Muslims had to seek shelter in the army barracks.

Understood in this frame, the riot emanated from both a perceived threat to the sanctity of Islam and a perceived justification in protecting their religious identity. Interestingly enough, as was commented in a national newspaper, the rioters consisted of those "who don't even know where Denmark is on the map, in fact some of them

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[133] In the commercial towns of Kontagora and Potiskum witnessed severe riots. 2 non-Muslims people were killed in Kontagora, whilst Potiskum witnessed 4 people killed and mass looting and burning of churches and residence of non-Muslims.
[134] *The Punch Newspaper*, February 23rd, 2006, p. 1.

have not even seen a map in their lives, are instigated to get into the street and do the dirty job of killing Christians."[135] As a result supposed non-Muslim targets such as hotels and bars were burnt down. In addition, the number of people killed was estimated to be 150 (Paden, 2008: 62). The looting and burning was carried out by ignorant youths. This perhaps informed the position of a non-Muslim organization[136] in Borno state to note that the attacks were premeditated.[137] Furthermore, this may indicate the astonishing state of ignorance of the fanatics. This is evidenced when Maiduguri encountered the 'Eclipse of the Moon Conflict', on the 10th January 2001, where a partial eclipse of the moon was regarded as a bad omen brought about by the presence of sinners (non-Muslims). This perception caused carnage in the city, whereby non-Muslims were attacked.

In the present context and for the purpose of explaining the genesis of religious prejudice between non-Muslims and Muslims in Borno state, it was alleged that for 15 years the government refused to allocate land to non-Muslims to build places of worship, even when state resources were used to build Mosques for Muslims. Furthermore, it was alleged that non-Muslim pupils were denied the benefits of their religious education in schools. This was coupled with the non-broadcasting of non-Muslims programmes on the State Radio and Television stations.[138] This is not surprising as Islam in northern Nigeria, sets boundaries to members of other faiths.

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[135] Ayo Oritsejafor, *Thisday Newspaper*, February 28th, 2006
[136] Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN).
[137] *Thisday Newspaper*, February 25th, 2006, p.47. According to Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), from Tuesday February, 14, 2006, there was information of planned attacks on Christians.
[138] *Thisday Newspaper*, February 25th, 2006:47

5.7.29: Kano State, Tudun Wada Riots, September, 2007

Events on the 28th of September 2007, in Tudun Wada, which is inhabited mainly by the Maguzawa, a non-Muslim ethnic minority in Kano state, led to religious and ethnic schisms. The riots were over allegations that a non-Muslim, a student of a Government Secondary School, drew a caricature of Prophet Muhammad on the walls of the school. Another source claimed that the riot started, not due to the caricature of Prophet Muhammad but, due to non-Muslims preventing a non-Muslim's conversion to Islam. Not content to simply turn a blind eye to these narratives, Muslims exploded with an aggregated violence in the town. In the fray, 12 non-Muslims were killed and all churches and businesses owed by non-Muslims were destroyed. The key point here is that the causation of this riot could be understood as emanating from a perceived significant threat to Islamic identity, due to the sacrilege acts committed by a non-Muslim.

5.7.30: Bauchi State, Yana Town, 1st February 2008

Another perceived threat to Islamic identity occurred on the 1st of February 2008, when infuriated Muslim youths in Yana, Shira Council Area, Bauchi state, rioted over a supposed blasphemy of the Holy Qur'an. A non-Muslim woman, Patience Yusuf, was accused of "desecrating" a Qur'an by allegedly refusing to marry a Muslim. In the fracas that followed, a rioter lost his life. The homes of non-Muslims were looted by the raging rioters, who also burnt a police station. In addition, 1,000 people were rendered homeless. What is important to realize is that the purported blasphemy was viewed as depicting Islam in a negative sense, which is considered as an affront to the primordial identity of Muslims in the region.

5.7.31: Kano Riots, Sumaila Riots 8th February, 2008

Students of Government Secondary School Sumaila, in Sumaila Local Government Kano state, took law and order into their hands over the cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad purported to have been drawn on the school wall on the 24th of January 2008, by a the non-Muslim students, from the indigenous Maguzawa ethnic group. The student in question was expelled from the school by the school authority, but was later reinstated to the school after two weeks. This infuriated the Muslim students in the school, who on Friday, 8th February, attempted to lynch the reinstated student, but for the safety provided for the student by a nearby Police Station, where the student took shelter. In the carnage that followed, 2 people and a non-Muslim policeman, Mr. Jibrin Garba, were killed by the rioters. In addition, 20 others were injured and the Police Station in Sumaila was set ablaze.[139]

At this point, one cannot ignore the fact that religion was cause-effect of this conflict. However, a deeper significant causality of the riot is attributable to the age long animosities of the Hausa (Muslims) and Maguzawa (non-Muslims) ethnic groups. These ethnic groups had a history of socio-economic rivalry due to differences in religious faiths. This deep-rooted grievance emerges, when trivial issues or imagined perceived threats to religious identity arises. Yet, in a hypothetical construction, one may call attention to the fact that, if these communities were homogenous it terms of sharing a common religion (Islam), such age-long animosities may not have existed.

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[139] In a Similar incident reported by The Punch Newspaper of Thursday, March 22, 2007 pupils at a secondary school in Gandu, Gombe state, lynched a teacher named; Oluwatoyin Olusesan, a Christian, who was an external examiner at an Islamic Religious Knowledge exam at the Gandu Government Day Secondary School, She was alleged to have desecrated the Qur'an. In another case, in Niger state, on the 28th of June 2006, despite being in police protection and custody in the town of Izom, in Guarara Local Government a 14 year old girl was lynched by a mob for possessing a letter containing statements about Muhammad and Christ.

5.7.32: Jos Riots, November 2008

The Council elections in Jos, on Thursday, November 29, 2008, started peacefully. This serene electoral atmosphere soon became tense when a candidate of one of the parties was assumed to be in the lead before the official publication of the results. This assumption was later verified by the Plateau State Independent Election Commission (PLASIEC), who declared Timothy Buba, a non-Muslim of the People Democratic Party (PDP), as winner of the Council election in the Jos North Local Government Area. Buba defeated his opponent, Aminu Baba, a Muslim of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), who emerged as the runner up. It would seem legitimate to assume that this led to an apparent disdain by Hausa-Muslims who were aggrieved by the fact that their ANPP party candidate had lost to Timothy Buba. Clearly, this condescension is connected to the fact that a Muslim lost the election. The immediate result of this development led to protests and ultimately religious motivated violence, when the presumed winner was declared the successful candidate. The Muslim supporters of Aminu Baba rallied in groups, chanting Islamic war songs, burned and looted properties and killed non-Muslims. Riposte assaults from non-Muslim supporters of PDP then erupted.

The violence that followed left about 400 dead[140] with houses, mosques and non-Muslim places of worship set ablaze. It is worthy to note that the state was blamed for not providing adequate security during the elections.[141] The riot has been said to be worse than the previous riots that had occurred in the city.[142]

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[140] Nigerian City Counts its Dead After Days of Christian-Muslim Riots. Accessed on the 2nd of December, 2008 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/01/nigeria-christianity-islam-jos-riots.

[141] *The Nation Newspaper*, Saturday, February 7, 2009, p. 2-3.

[142] Plateau: Scores killed in council polls violence, accessed on the 2nd of December, 2008 at http://news.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=129&Itemid=1.

It is worthy to note that a report of the riot submitted to the Prince Bola Ajibola Panel of Inquiry, submitted that a former Minister of Information, Alhaji Ibrahim Dansuki Nakande, and a current member of the House of Representatives, Samaila Mohammed, were among the elites who were architects of the crisis.[143] This is not unexpected, as noted from Smith's (2000:795) observation:

> Of course, it is not difficult to cite cases where 'nationalism' or 'religion', or a combination of both, have been used to whip up popular passions and foment bitter conflicts. But that is a very different proposition from the claim that religious or nationalist belief-systems are in and of themselves irrational, violent, and destructive. Many religions are pacific in intent, and not a few nationalisms have sought to eschew Conflict....religion and nationalism may be used by elites and others both to underpin and to undermine political orders and global relations.

The division of religion was the channel and manipulative mechanism used to generate divisions amongst the people as they were the most significant symbols of enemy values. It is easy to understand that the tone and substance of this tells us that Islam can be politically hijacked and manipulated to generate conflict when there is a perceived threat to its sacrosanct nature. In truth it is fair to say that religion provided the cannon for the conflagration of the riot as it awakened the deep political, historical, ethnic and, most of all, religious differences between the Muslims and non-Muslims.

5.7.33: Bauchi Mayhem, 21st February 2009

The contention here started when a broken down vehicle near a Juma'at Mosque diverted traffic bordering to a non-Muslim place of worship. This situation generated

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[143] *The Nation Newspaper*, Wednesday, February 25, 2009, p.1.

perceived grievance by non-Muslims in respect of escalating traffic on Fridays during the Juma'at service.

In the early hours of the 21st of February, 2009, Muslims were woken up to witness a mosque on fire. It was perceived by Muslims, that non-Muslims who were aggrieved about the built-up traffic near their place of worship were responsible for this dastardly act. However, there was no credible evidence to confirm that non-Muslims were responsible for such a devastating deed. On the contrary, non-Muslims alleged that it was Muslims acting on instigations of the elites, burnt down the place of worship, in order to acquire justification to start a clash with non-Muslims. In this light, Governor Yuguda of Bauchi state noted that "the development has nothing to do with religion, but (was) politically motivated to achieve selfish interest."[144] Whatever is the precise causation of this riot, the governor notes that when Islam is used as a manipulative instrument, it tends to generate conflict.

Predictably, Muslims youths acting on an overriding perceived threat to their religion went on rampage killing non-Muslims and burning down properties belonging to non-Muslims. The Bauchi State chapter of the Red Cross reported that the fracas claimed 11 lives and leaving 5,000 people displaced.[145]

5.7.34: Boko Haram Jihad, July 25-30, 2009

An understanding of the causes of the riots cannot be separated from the unmasking of the central figure and motivating force of this movement in the person of Ustaz Muhammad Yusuf, an 'Islamic' preacher and leader of the sect and famously known

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[144] *The Nation Newspaper*, Wednesday, February 25th, 2009, p. 64.
[145] *The Tribune Newspaper*, Tuesday, 24 February 24th, 2009, p. 4.

as the Nigerian Taliban leader. Muhammad Yusuf was born on January 29, 1970, in the rural village of Girgir in Yobe State. Yusuf started his journey as an Islamic scholar as a Tsangaya Qur'anic teacher. He was formerly a Shi'ite loyalist and later joined the Izalatul-Bid'a wa Iqamat al Sunna (Izala) movement. He eventually left the sect and joined the Shababul Islam. Shababul Islam was founded in 1995 in northern Nigerian by Abubakar Lawan. It was also known then as Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijralt and later acquired its new image Boko Haran in 2002, with Muhammad Yusuf becoming its leader. He thereafter changed most of its ideology to fundamental doctrines. His main ideology centered on pervasive ignorance that western education is a sin and that the earth was made flat by God, in contrast to westernized theories of Darwin's evolution. Thus, its ideology was centered on *boko* (western education) as *haram* (unlawful).

Now it is important to bear in mind that fundamentalist' movements are centered on religious leadership. The leader from a choice of explanation and arguments expresses his personal inclination, interpretations and judgments, which are determined by his social and educational background (Almond, Appleby & Sivan, 2003:119). However, the great paradox of this movement is that Muhammad Yusuf was a college dropout, but he has able to enlist a former State Commissioner into the sect. A greater absurdity is the fact that, although Yusuf loathed westernized education, he rode in the latest Lexus Jeep and had a personal physician.[146] And, Muhammad Yusuf had a stronghold of 540,000 followers. A significant characteristic of his followership was its constitution of mainly the unemployed youths otherwise known as the talakawa and the almajirai (students Qur'anic schools). The immense paradox confronting Boko

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[146] See *Saturday Punch*, August 1st 2009, p. 3.

Haram was that each member had to contribute a levy of N 1 daily. This amounted to a whooping N16 million a month (about £64,800). It must be re-emphasized that Muhammad Yusuf took advantage of the prevailing socio-economic conditions, which are prevalent in northern Nigeria.

The supposed Jihad started from Bauchi on July 25-30, 2009, and extended to Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Kano States. Their main targets were the security forces, westernized establishments, non-Muslim places of worship (in Maiduguri, 20 Churches were razed whilst three pastors and one reverend were killed).[147] They raided police stations and army barracks in an unprecedented fashion unknown in sectarian violence in Nigeria. A military tactic employed by Yusuf was the use of civil populace as a shield from the reprisal attack by the police and the army.

The *Guardian Newspapers*[148] reported that thousands of the residents had been made homeless in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital. Moreover, the Red Cross alleged that 780 people (including police and military personnel) were killed in days of violence in Maiduguri alone, which suffered most of the casualties. In addition, there were 3,500 internally displaced persons.[149] In Yobe State, the sect called its cell 'Afghanistan'. In Bauchi State, in a place known as Fadama Madawas, the sect stockpiled its arms and ammunition. In Jalingo, Taraba State, a school was discovered to be the training ground for the fundamentalists. While in Kano, the state government demolished a mosque used by the militants as a centre for preaching its principles opposed to western civilization.

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[147] Northern Govs Move to Stem Religious Crises: *The Guardian*, August 4th, 2009, p. 1.
[148] http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/article01//indexn2_html?pdate=300709&ptitle=Fighting%20rages,%20death%20toll%20hits%20300%20in%20Borno.
[149] *The Nation*, August 3rd, 2009, p. 2.

It was reported that Boko Haram planned to raid Lagos and other states situated in south-west Nigeria. Thirty-eight members of the sect were arrested on their journey to Lagos.[150] This establishes the fact that the sects were desirous of, not only destabilizing northern Nigeria, but also the entire polity. Strictly speaking, the sect's crucial position and contention were in respect of the secularity of the Nigerian state, the desire to Islamize Nigeria and co-opt Muslims to affirm their allegiance solely to Allah rather than the Nigerian state with its non-Muslim oriented laws. Clearly, this gave the riot a sort of religious construction. The state inefficiency, as usual, was highly palpable as events to be seen will show this to be the case.

It is argued that since Islam is, primordially speaking, the existing essence of all Muslims in northern Nigeria, it is not surprising then that the sect had a large followership in the north. Religious identity was the channel used to convey socio-economic grievance through radicalizing the perceptions of Islam. It may be speculated here that religion, being central to the identity of the grass-root people, had the potential to convey public grievances.

It is significant to mention that Muslim leaders and military personnel had warned the state authorities about Boko Haram, however, these early warning signs were ignored.[151] The *Guardian Newspapers*[152] tells us that the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, Mohammed Ali Ndume, blamed the Federal Government for not acting on time to impede the militants, in spite of the earlier security information available to it. On July 14, 2009, 21 reports had been submitted on

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[150] See *Saturday Punch*, August 1, 2009, p 13.
[151] *The Guardian* Newspaper, August 2nd, 2009
"Nigeria accused of ignoring sect warnings before wave of killings."
[152] http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/article01//indexn2_html?pdate=300709&ptitle=Fighting%20rages,%20death%20toll%20hits%20300%20in%20Borno

Muhammad Yusuf's activities and members of his group.[153] Those warnings were reportedly ignored. The sect had some degree of popularity. This is evident by the act of the Governor of Bornu State Modu Ali Sheriff, provided the sect with 80 kilometres of land.[154] Moreover, all attempts by the State Security Service to lure the governor to revoke the plot of land granted to Yusuf were futile.[155] Furthermore, Yusuf had previously been arrested in Maiduguri on November 13, 2008, on suspicion of attempting to disrupt the peace and security of the state. However, he was released on bail on January 20, 2009.[156] Perhaps, more crucial is that a former Commissioner of Religious Affairs, in Modu Ali Sheriff's cabinet, Alhaji Buji Foi,[157] was the second in command in Boko Haram.

One may begin to speculate about the politicians' awareness that Islam as a primordial marker and therefore a potent instrument have hijacked religion for political currencies. In furthering one's suspicion of the unseen powers behind the sect, a conspiracy theory alleges that Muhammad Yusuf was captured alive and handed over to the police, but later died in controversial circumstances in their custody. Clearly, there is a fair amount of controversy concerning the circumstances of Muhammad Yusuf's death. Was his death imminent to veil those behind the sect? Who were his sponsors? How did the sect acquire sophisticated arms and ammunition? Why was the early warning security reports of the State Security Service (SSS) not acted upon? A national newspaper, The *Vanguard newspaper*, comments that "some very powerful sponsors of the Islamist, whose mindset was already beginning to work upside down, may not want him to expose them and, therefore, may have caused the police to take

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[153] See http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=150277.
[154] *The Nation*, Wednesday August 5th, 2009, p.1: Security Reports on Sect's Leader indicts Governor.
[155] Ibid.
[156] *The Nation*, Wednesday August 5th, 2009, p. 2: Security Reports on Sect's leader indict Governor.
[157] He was killed in the uprising and his body later taken to the State House.

him out."[158] Moreover there was accusing fingers between the Commander of the Military Operation, Colonel Ben Ahonotu, and the former Commissioner of Police, Borno State Command, Mr. Christopher Dega. The former claimed that Yusuf was given to the police alive whilst the latter claimed that the leader of the sect died in a shoot-out with the police.

It hardly seems misleading to suggest that the riots can be understood as not only against intolerance for westernization but also as perceived grievance in respect of economic stagnation, youth unemployment, popular impoverishment and disempowerment. It is possible to speculate that the causal link is due to perceptions of deprivation in terms of socio-economic, psychological needs and resource control.

Notwithstanding these speculations, northern governors have unanimously condemned the acts of the sect. Specifically, Governor Danjuma Goje of Gombe State ordered the destruction of Yusuf's home in the State when he came on a visit months before the sectarian clashes took place.[159] Yet again, it is worthy to note that the governors of Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda, and Kano State, Ibrahim Shekarau, took cautionary measures by giving the security forces the direction to avert the insurgence of the sect. It is important that what needs to be recognized here is that Boko Haram's ideologies are not supported by the majority of northern Nigerian Muslims. The Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI), an umbrella for all Muslims in northern seeking to advance political, social and economic interests of co-religionists in northern Nigeria, has explicitly condemned the sect and the violence that ensued. Confirming the report, the Chairman of the Moslem Council of Nigeria (MCN), Alhaji Inuwa Jauro Manu, said

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[158] Killing of Boko Haram leader: Haram vs Haram: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/08/killing-of-boko-haram-leader-haram-vs-haram/
[159] See After Boko Haram, Time to Move on: *The Nation*, Monday, August 10, 2009 p. 20

emphatically that "sect called itself a religious organization, its actions and activities does not conform with Islam."[160] In addition, the Northern Governor's Forum (NGF), an umbrella body of the 19 state governors of northern Nigeria, agreed to enact legislation that would curb sectarian violence in the region.[161]

5.7.35: Bauchi Kala-Kato Sect Ramapage, December 28, 2009

On the 28 of December 2009, in Bauchi, Bauchi State, 38 people lost their lives (including four children, and two soldiers)[162] after Islamic militants of the *Kala-Kato* sect (a derivative of Maitatsine) went on rampage. The causation of this crisis started when Malam Badamasi, the sect's leader started preaching and supporting violence and militant Islam for the reason that he could not find an adequate cure to an illness he had acquired. He was later advised by members of his sect that his ailment was as a result of a plot by some members of the sect to kill him. He was also advised to kill the plotters, so that he could be cured from the dreaded disease.[163] These suspicions divided the sect and resulted in some members leaving the group. This led to Malam Badamasi's preaching for his enemies to be killed. His neighbours' reported his state of mind and utterances to the security service. Soldiers were then employed to calm tension. However, the militants resisted the soldiers' intervention and in the process killed a soldier.

In the aftermath, loyalists of Badamasi and miscreants consisting children between the ages 10 and 15, with adult members of the sect took to the streets to take advantage of

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[160]http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/article01//indexn2_html?pdate=300709&ptitle=Fighting%20rages ,%20death%20toll%20hits%20300%20in%20Borno
[161] Northern govs plan laws against sectarian violence: The Punch, Tuesday, August 4, 2009, p.2.
[162]'Bauchi Sect Leader Killed, 20 Arrested', accessed on the 2nd of January 2010 at: http://independentngonline.com/DailyIndependent/Article.aspx?id=5917
[163] 'Bauchi Crisis: 20 arrested, 38 confirmed dead - 4 killed in Zamfara mayhem - Security beefed up in Jos', The Triune, accessed on the 2nd of January 2010 at: http://www.tribune.com.ng/30122009/news/news3.html

the chaos.[164] It was gathered that the *Kala-Kato* leader with 34 members of the sect were killed in a shoot out with the police.[165] Furthermore, 20 suspects, consisting of nine adults and 11 children, were arrested.[166] Clearly, this riot showcased the sensitive nature of religion (Islam) in northern Nigeria. More crucially, it exhibits the illiteracy and potent level of ignorance amongst the grass-root people.

5.7.36: Jos Riots, January 17-19, 2010

From January 17-19, 2010 a disturbing riot between Muslims and non-Muslims erupted in Jos, and spreading to nearby villages, notably in Kuru Karama, 30 kilometers south of the city of Jos. There are different and varied causations of this riot. One version claims that the riot started over the building of a mosque in a non-Muslim area of the city. Another alleges that it started over a minor clash over the reconstruction of a damaged house of a Muslim, which was destroyed in the November 2008 riot in a non-Muslim part of Jos. However, a different perspective pertaining to the cause of this conflict alleges that text messages were circulated in the city of Jos asserting that non-Muslims should not to buy food from Muslims because it was poisoned. Furthermore, another text message circulated in the city alleged that the state governor intended to poison water supply of Muslims.[167] The other version was that a local football match started the conflict. Whatever the true account was, these speculations sparked off the crisis which was carried out by non-Muslim and Muslim youths armed with guns, bows and arrows, and machetes. But most crucially, this riot shows that it is usually difficult to ascertain the true causation of religious conflicts in

[164] *The Tribune:* http://www.tribune.com.ng/30122009/news/news3.html &
'Another Religious Riot Claims 38 Lives in Bauchi', accessed on the 2nd of January 2010:
http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=162955
[165] http://independentngonline.com/DailyIndependent/Article.aspx?id=5917
[166] http://www.tribune.com.ng/30122009/news/news3.html
[167] See 'Nigeria text messages 'fuelled Jos riots'. Accessed on the 27th of January 2010 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8482666.stm

northern Nigeria. What appears to matter most is that minor disputes tend to convey religious differences and transform them into deadly conflict.

Clearly, this riot showcased the serious deeply divided religious differences among indigenes and settlers as loss of life, obliteration of houses of worship and places of residence was quite rampant. This led to 17,000 people being displaced.[168] Following this, the state government imposed a 24hour curfew

The death toll from this riot was estimated to be 492, whilst 364 out of this figure were Muslims.[169] Due to the destructive nature of the riot, the military was called upon to contain violence.

5.7.37: Jos Massacre, Shen Village, March 7, 2010

Flowing from the riots discussed above, on the 7th day of March, despite the curfew that had been in place since January, aggrieved Hausa-Fulani Muslims who came from surrounding villages slaughtered at least over 500 non-Muslims from the Berom ethnic group in Shen village of Jos South Local Government Area as a reprisal for the January killings of Muslims.[170] Aside from Shen village, other victims came from near by villages of Dogo Na Hauwa, Ratsat and Zot.[171]

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[168] See 'Nigeria - Mass funerals in Jos riots'. Accessed on the 27th of January 2010 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8472992.stm
[169] See The Punch, 25th Jan 2010 'Another 28 dead bodies found in Jos, as residents flee'. Accessed on the 27th of January 2010 at: http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art201001253435535
[170] See Nigeria ethnic violence 'leaves hundreds dead' Accessed on the 27th of March at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8555018.stm,
[171] See Jos: 416 Victims Get Mass Burial. Accessed on the 27th of January 2010 at: http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art201003093151648

The victims of this devastating act were mainly children, women and the elderly who could not run for safety. It was alleged by observers that the line of attack of Muslims was initiated by alarming the villagers by gun shots in the early hours of the morning, and as they tried to escape, the victims were trapped in fishing nets and animal traps before being put to death by machetes.[172] It was alleged that 93 persons, mostly Fulani, were arrested in connection with the massacre. In addition, it was understood that 19 Fulani herdsmen and 74 other Muslims, made up of varied tribes were also arrested.

In an attempt to explain this violence, Dr. Abel Damina, the National Chairman of the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (youth wing) said that the violence showcased the determination of the fundamentalists to Islamize Nigeria.[173] In another dimension, the Acting Commissioner of Police in Plateau State, Mr. Ikechukwu Aduba, alledged that confessional reports from some of those arrested admitted that prominent individuals were sponsors of the chaos.[174]

5.8: Conclusion

This chapter explored how Islam in northern Nigeria works as a counter-force in mainstream conflict and crucially notes that those professing Islam in northern Nigeria to a large extent have not been unregimented by the concept of different ethnicities. It

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[172] See Nigeria ethnic violence 'leaves hundreds dead' Accessed on the 27th of March at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8555018.stm
[173] See Jos: 416 Victims Get Mass Burial. Accessed on the 27th of January 2010 at: http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art201003093151648
[174] See Jos: We Were Sponsored, Suspects Tell Police, Accessed on the 27th of March at: http://directory-nigeria.org/news/2010/03/11/jos-we-were-sponsored-suspects-tell-police/

should hardly be necessary to add that the principle of unity in northern Nigerian Muslims is, first and foremost, based on religion. Thus, northern Nigerian Islamic tradition is antagonistic to individuals who are non-Muslims.

In many ways, this chapter answered the question: Why is there is a reduced conflict potential, when individuals share one religion (Islam) but belong to different ethnic groups? The intricacy here shows that religion is the contending issue. Illustrating this argument, Frieder (2008: 620) notes that a scholar Musa Gaiya described Zamfara as the most peaceful Sharia State in Nigeria. He explains that the rationale behind this is that there are only a marginal number of non-Muslims living in the state. In this sense, perceived threats to Islamic identity would be at a minimal or in a non-existent state.

Thus far, the negative consequences of religious division are definitely negatively affecting the development of the nation, especially at this historical junction of the nation's polity and growth, when the struggle against the forces of underdevelopment and globalization should otherwise be a top priority. It is sad that the nation continues to lose valuable man hours, destruction of its human and material resources and degradation of its environment in the senseless and unproductive religious riots, which it has been involved in long before Nigeria's independence. The centrality of peace, harmony and unity as a desideratum for individual progress and national development seems to be lost to the people.

A most discouraging aspect to the psyche of citizenry and the common man is the myriad of security implications of his socio-occupational mobility in the territorial franchise of his nation. How safe can an individual be except in his own religious

enclave? This poses a major challenge to nation-building. Perhaps a greater challenge is in realizing how applicable the concept of equality is as provided in the Constitution. What measure of trust and assurances can be considered true by the organs of security and administration in the country? And how can the culture of blood-letting be prevented from flowing on the altar of deceit and political brigandage?

While reiterating the fact that conflicts are inevitable, they could be drastically reduced. The most remarkable and toughest task ahead is that they must be systematically managed to prevent any dysfunctional effects on society. Most cataclysms and conflicts in Nigeria have multi-causal origins. These conflicts have mainly been between the Muslim nationals against non-Muslim nationalities bordering on politics, socio-economic advantages and on ignorance or a tell-tales. However, from an Islamic point of view, they are based on threats to religious identity or perceived affronts to Islamic nationalism, thereby making religious tolerance difficult or impossible to attain.

The next chapter focuses on the qualitative analyses of the data collated from the field.

CHAPTER 6

PUTTING THE CONFLICT IN CONTEXT: QUALITATIVE DISCUSSIONS

> The individualistic truth that people are the only moving forces in history-in the sense that nothing happens behind their backs, that is, everything that happens, happens in and through their actions-must be retained.
>
> Roy Bhaskar (1989: 81)[175]

6.1: Introduction: Empirical Analysis of Field Work

Perhaps, the main problem in empirical research on religious variables in conflicts in northern Nigeria is the lack of adequate data. On the one hand, quantitative studies almost exclusively use religious demographics (whose reliability may be questioned), which cover only a small and possibly theoretically less interesting selection of relevant factors. On the other hand, case studies provide in-depth insights but are hardly comparable to other studies given a lack of comparable research questions, concepts, indicators or operations and are perhaps not suitable for valid generalizations. The methodological focus of the pilot project on religion and conflict has therefore centered on the compilation of a database that collects as many relevant conflict-specific and religion-specific variables in northern Nigeria's violent conflicts. The main crux in these analyses has been to compile data that allow generalizations beyond in-depth case studies and that extend beyond the almost exclusively demographic data used in quantitative studies. It is crucial to note that different sub-categories as explanatory variables of data such as gender, marital status, and income

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[175] Bhaskar, Roy, 1989. *Reclaiming Reality*. London: Verso.

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and how they impact the research findings are too many to include in the data analysis. See Appendix A for the quantitative data via the use of Chi- Square (X^2) as a statistical tool to verify whether the study's hypotheses are reliable with observed data.

It must be stressed that the use of semi structured interviews and FGDs were quite useful strands to address all the salient issues in the research questions. Adopting both stands produced comprehensive and key causal explanations in order to substantiate different levels of investigations and to enquire into profound and intricate arguments of this study. The use of these twin strands enhances observatory processes for searching for an explanation of the dynamics of religious conflicts in northern Nigeria.

I used the community as a reference point in gathering oral testimony via semi structured interviews and FGDs which greatly enhance the data in order to pin down key arguments. A review of literature indicates that grass root people (non-elites) have not been used to gather relevant facts that can explain religious conflicts in the region. The combination of both strands was used to collate archetypal evidence from individuals who have witnessed and partaken in religious conflicts in the location of study. The semi structured interviews and the FGDs were held from January – April 2009. The FGD in Kano was held on the 30th of February 2009; the FGD in Kaduna was held on the 4th of April 2009 whilst the FGD in Jos was held on the 24th of January 2009.

The focus of this chapter analyses qualitative data collated from the field. To complement the quantitative statistical analysis of the responses from the

questionnaire, descriptive analyses principles were applied for the analysis of the data from the semi-structured Interviews and FGDs. These responses were recorded in both field notes and on tapes. This effort was informed by the research questions and the variables involved in the research. For clarity purposes, some of the questions during the interviews and FGDs were interwoven around:

- What is your ethnic identity?

- What is your religious identity?

- Does the recitation of the Shahada promote peace in times of conflicts?

- Do you think you have been fully assimilated in your place of residence?

- During riots, do you think Muslim target non-Muslims?

- Does religion cause conflicts here (Kano, Kaduna and Jos)?

- What are the other causes of conflicts in the north?

6.2: Pilot Study

Before undertaking this field study, from the 1st of June 2008 – 30th of August 2008, I conducted a pilot study in Kano, Kaduna and Jos. I was desirous of ascertaining how co-religionists target members of other faiths, in order to establish what mechanism identifies a Muslim from a non-Muslim. I was aware that conflicts in the region are usually ignited without any formalities. During a pilot study, I discovered that co-religionists target members of other faiths mainly by dress codes. When in doubt of the individual's religious identity, I discovered that during riots, if, for instance, Muslims encounter an individual(s) they believe are non-Muslim but such an individual(s) recites verses from the Qur'an, usually the Shahada (the Shahada is the recitation in the belief that there is only one God and that Muhammad is his Prophet:

Lā ilaha illa al-Lāh, Muhammadun rasūlu l-Lāh), such individual(s) will be out of jeopardy of losing life or limb.

6.3: Target Setting

It is important to note that the Igbos, rather than the Yoruba, are usually selective targets during religious conflicts in northern Nigeria, especially in Kano. This observation is in accordance with the arguments in Chapter 5 (that Muslims tend to target non-Muslims during crises) and with my findings in the field. Horowitz (2002) explains this phenomenon. He tells us that the reason for the ethnic antagonism between the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbos as opposed to the Yorubas' is due to perceived political and economical grievances, especially with the perceived fear of being dominated by the Igbo (the Igbos out-number the Yoruba). One cannot totally reject Horowitz's reasoning. However, I find that a more adequate explanation for this lies in religious identity. As explained in Chapter 1, the Yorubas have an equal proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims, unlike the Igbo who have a clear and overwhelming non-Muslim population. This social reality has been explained in Chapter 1. The primordial identity of the northern Nigerian Muslims is based on religion and it is clear at this point that this identity mark may be incompatible with the Igbos.

The general recognition of the above was collated from the field. The overwhelming majority of Hausa-Muslims respondents in Kano reiterated this assumption. A few narratives describing this are illustrated by a Muslim I met Kano in Sabon Gari on the 27th of January 2009. His locale was run down and could be described as a desolate slum. He had lived there almost all his life and he, among others, was of the opinion

that religious conflicts were the most volatile because people were ready to die for a religious cause. In Sabon Gari, on the 29th of January 2009 with a few well-placed questions, a young Muslim clad in the typical jalabiyya and looking fairly unkempt (reminiscent of persons who spend their days in poverty at Qur'anic schools) lamented the general view of Muslim respondents, "Christians are normally problem." This view is also expressed graphically by a Hausa-Muslim, a civil servant, whom I came across in the suburbs of Kano City on the 20th of February 2009. After he wondered about how he would react to this question, he told us that "we can call the Yorubas our friend, because we interact with them more than the Igbos. They are very simple. Yorubas they are very simple and they are very cordial so most of the time they attack the Igbos." In another emphatic narration, an academic, at the Bayero University, Kano on the 19th of February 2009, with whom I had three hours of exhaustive interactions, stressed that "an average migrant living in Kano identifies the non-Muslims as Igbos, and not the Yoruba or any other ethnic group." Beyond these narratives I was able to corroborate the analyses in Chapter 1, where I theorized about the primordial identity of religion.

The analysis is further highlighted from semi-structured interviews, documented from Muslims in Kaduna, who assume that the Yoruba non-Muslims in Kaduna City are targets during riots. Furthermore, it was observed that the bane of conflicts in Jos is mainly emphasized by religious differences. All together these findings may explain why religion is a central variable in conflicts in northern Nigeria. These observations point to the fact that most conflicts arise in northern Nigeria when an individual belongs to a non-Islamic faith. Further, it illustrates that although ethnic boundaries create conditions for conflict, however, in northern Nigeria, Islamic identity is a

credible factor for engendering unity amongst Muslims of different ethnic groups. Since these patterns have a certain consistency, let me consider how Muslims specifically target non-Muslims in times of conflict.

At this point it is useful to mention that during inter-religious violence, women are also victims. Although they do not actively participate in the crises, if they are found by a divergent group, they would be in jeopardy of losing life or limb. During the field work I did not come across any victim of such violence. However, it is noticed in chapter 5 that women have been victims of religious conflicts. However, the observation of Eugenia Date-Bah & Martha Walsh (2001) noting that the impact of conflict differs from men and women – women are faced with greater burdens during conflict when men are at 'war' and are not given adequate attention. Thus, women should be regarded as 'active' victims rather than 'passive' victims.

6.4: The Dress Code Demon

I observed that a majority of northern Muslims are usually dressed in long flowing gowns (*jalabiyya*), whilst women are either veiled or wear head scarves. Non-Muslims usually wear ethnic dressing or westernized clothing styles. I, however, observed that although this may not be necessary conclusive of a religious identity for Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, in Kaduna it was discovered that some traditional rulers who are non-Muslim wear similar attire as the Muslims. In addition, a few respondents whom I interviewed in Tundun wada Market, between the 3rd – 29h of March 2009, in Kaduna were of the view that dress does not indicate a religious identity.

Notwithstanding these contentions, it was frequently gathered that dressing may earmark an individual's religious identity during religious riots; therefore, it has the potential of revealing the *r*eligious identity of an individual. One of such opinion is echoed by a non-Muslim participant in the FGDs in Kaduna: "I was a victim ... I was staying somewhere around here and when it happened my neighbour gave me something to wear and that was what I actually used that saved me to the Barracks." His voice was more of an imperative warning to heed his advice on import rather than just trying to give us a piece of his mind. Another participant in FGD in Kaduna, an Igbo man responding to this issue, also narrated his experience. Ironically it centered on non-Muslims targeting Muslims:

> I want to share my experience. During the 2001 riots there is this former President Babangida's bodyguard. He was in the vehicle because he put on jeans and shirt so when they ask him what is your name he say I am John that is how he escaped because it was a Christian dominated area but if they have been him with Kaftan and a long cap nobody would ask you question, they would just shoot you. The dressing actually identifies.

In the neighborhoods of Sabon Gari, which is distinctively different from Kano City with its old buildings and untidy surroundings but with a presence of commercialized activities, on the 3rd of February 2009, I came across a Yoruba woman selling Yoruba ethnic food in Sabon Gari, Kano. The respondent, who was unaccustomed to being subject to enquiries of this nature, attempted to tell us the difference between targets of religious conflicts and dressing codes as an element of identification. She narrated that "they (*Muslims*) target you once you are not one of them... whether you are a Muslim or not." She also stated that "the way you dress here in times of conflict would determine whether you will live or die." Exploring the essence of the dress code further, I randomly discovered from respondents in

Kano that dressing is a symbol of differentiation between the non-Muslims and Muslims in times of conflict.

Unfortunately, I was not able to interview individuals from the Igbo group in Sabon Gari, Kano. Individuals from the Igbo ethnic group, who mainly reside here, were tense. They were suspicious and hostile and this was perhaps an allusion of their plight during conflicts. One of such people stood staring, glaringly as if searching for an answer or how to begin. He never did.

In Jos, most respondents I interviewed between the 5th – 18th of January 2009 agreed that dressing is generally considered to have a religious significance. I was able to identify such hidden assumptions during the interview sessions. On one occasion, I met an unemployed non-Muslim man who was prospecting for a shop space close to the Central Bank Office, who remarked that it easy to recognize a Hausa-Muslim by the mode of dressing. In another situation in the southern part of Jos, a non-Muslim, semi-skilled worker I met at the only motor garage in that area reaffirmed the common stance that dress is a religious fundamental.

It was also randomly gathered in Kaduna in interviews held between 3rd of March – 29th[th] [of] March 2009, that dressing was a primordial indicator of the individual/group as it differentiates an individual and a group from the other just as nationality, language and race and most crucially a determinant in conflict.

6.5: Shahada: The Cry for War or Peace

The essence of this recitation reveals that individuals share an Islamic identity. During religious conflicts the Islamic identity promotes peace as it acts as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises. This assumption is supported by majority of northern Muslims I interviewed. A respondent in Kano, whom I interviewed on the 16th of February 2009, who cut a clear impression of a Muslim scholar by his mode of dressing including the turban and a rich thrust of beard, made it clear with a sense of pride that the Shahada "promotes peace in the sense that Muslims are inspired in the sense that they are to abide by the rules of Islam." A cordial-looking Muslim textile trader, with about 25 year's residency in Kano, whom I interviewed on the 17th of February 2009, said that "anybody who recites the Shahada must not be killed by any other Muslim, during riots, if he does that, it would be a sin." Yet, another Muslim textile trader in Kano market, whom I met on the 26th of February 2009, and who spoke wanly with a nasal voice, was of the opinion that it promotes peace and that the individual's ethnic identity was not in question once the Shahada was recited – ethnic identity did not matter, only his religious identity. The above opinions could be taken to suggest a general estimation. A participant at the Kaduna FGD, whose simple candor in speaking to us betrayed some depth and awe, narrated a livid experience:

> I was passing through an Islamic school on governor road and the first thing I would see is that the whole student come out to block the road, I started reciting the one, before I got to the point I don't know, I had gotten to the bush... I think it will go a long way in saving your life.

Most of the respondents noted that the recitation of the Shahada promotes peace in times of conflict, and thus acts as a basis of an overarching solidarity and unity

amongst different ethnic groups. Recalling a few of such views, in the thick of the Kano textile market, on the 13th of February 2009, clusters of people trafficking the market area seemed to pause differently at various spots. Upon enquiry, it was revealed that a Muslim cleric had just finished teaching on certain *torah* and people were dispersing to their shops while acknowledging greetings form older disciples. I chanced upon this cleric who believes that conflicts in the ancient city are due to competitions for worldly possessions and not based on religious issues and that anyone that recites the Shahada becomes your brother. I recalled that on the 8th of January 2009, I had come across a similar voice in Jos. A Hausa-Muslim community leader said, reaffirming the general opinion of Muslim respondents:

> Ordinarily, if he is chasing a non-Muslim, if he says that he should be allowed. Islam had provided an avenue for him to take arms against his fellow human being. If there is such a problem and shouted (the Shahada) then he should be allowed to go.

On the 11th of January 2009, in a serene part of Jos, I attended a non-Muslim place of worship. My intention was to meet with the Chairman of Youth Christian Association of Nigeria, Jos Plateau. The neighbourhoods here were quite different from the other places I had visited, such as Rikkos, Angwan Rogo and Congo Russia. The Chairman perhaps gave the loudest exclamation of these voices: "In terms of conflicts like this that is what you have to say if you have to survive even if you are not a Muslim."

I discerned that Muslims I had encountered in Kano were protective of their religious identity. They did not want Islam to be linked with conflict. Consequently, a few stated that conflicts leaned towards ethnicity not religion. However, they still

affirmed that during riots the recitation of the Shahada promoted peace. An interesting narrative link from a Muslim participant from the Kaduna FGD is extracted to better understand the crucial role of the recitation as a mechanism of reducing conflict:

> I have seen a situation in Kabala where they stopped somebody they ask him, to make the sign of the cross and he was saying the name of the father, the mother and the son he couldn't understand despite that he has the idea. As I speak with you I know how make the recitation both in Islam and Christianity, why because for my protection.

He was willing not just to state his experience but to emphasize, with pride, that not only was it necessary to be able to identify with his religion (Islam) but also to identify with the equivalent recital of non-Muslims, just in case a Muslim was being attacked by a non-Muslim.

Generally, in Jos the recitation of the Shahada was viewed rather differently. To non-Muslims it is regarded as a call to arms. This is probably because of the preponderance of the large number of non-Muslims whose direct and reported experiences have shown that the recitation of the Shahada means a lot more than a means of identifying the 'we' and 'us' divide. Their notion may result from a functional interpretation of the use of the Shahada. In order to explain this phenomenon, I will illustrate one of my findings. I met a young Igbo trader on the 13th of January 2009, who had just set up a new kitchenware shop by the Rayfield settlement junction and he expressed similar views of non-Muslims: *"They use it to alert people that something is happening."* A Muslim participant in the Jos FGD told us that the slogan, Allahu Akbar, is used to scare non-Muslims in times of conflict. Despite the varied interpretations of the Shahada, it was widely gathered

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that Muslim respondents generally thought that when the Shahada was recited, was a mechanism of showing Muslim identity – therefore, it could be used to act as a mechanism to save lives.

The interviews in Kaduna also revealed the use of the Shahada as a mark of a religious identity during conflict. In the words of a Kataf, non Muslim from Kaduna who I interviewed on the 2nd of April 2009:

> It is not everybody that know the Muslim Shahada. They usually say aillahaillalah Mohammadu Bosulullahi, but the Christian way is different. If you cannot say the Shahada, they will kill you. But if you say it they will not kill you

Paradoxically, another important issue that emerged during the interviews was that the recitation of a non-Muslim's sacred slogan may reduce conflict. On the 21st of January 2009, I met a middle-aged Muslim Yoruba man whose family had migrated to Jos over thirty years ago and even considered his family to be more or less indigenes of the state by virtue of the births of his children. He did not wish to narrate his experience about conflicts because he told us that he did not want to recall these miserable events. After some persuasion and some empathy on my part, with the look of grim resignation he graphically narrates the Jos 2008 riots:

> I had to follow the fence to get to my house to pick my child. As I was about to get out my child I was caught. They poured petrol on me they wanted to light matches. Very fortunate for me, you know as a Yoruba man, can't differentiate between Muslim and Christian. So the first thing one said to me was 'In the name of the Father, the Son, then I shouted, 'and the Holy Spirit.' That is what saved me. If for example, when they said in the name of the Father, the Son and I couldn't say the last one word, I couldn't say the last statement, I would have been killed.

This narration shows that the religious identity, as opposed to the ethnicity of an individual is crucial during conflict in northern Nigeria. But in balancing these narratives, the line between the call for peace or arms, there is another diversion: Ignorance. Illustrating the levels of illiteracy and deprivation in the north, a participant in the FGD in Kano, whose look bore marked resignation and helplessness as the topic of the discourse wore on, narrated an incident where a man was about to be attacked whilst reciting the Shahada. One of the would-be attackers, a Muslim, in order to determine the primordial identity of the individual enquired from his co-religionist whether he was reciting it properly. These narrative links seem to provide us with the understanding that in those instances, where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe. Further the recitation of the Shahada showcases that the northern Nigerian Muslim has a strong primordial attachment to religion. The recitation further illustrates that the primordial identity in religion may set boundaries to those professing other faiths.

6.6: Primordial Identities

It is significant to mention that during the FGDs all the people who claimed to be Muslims were robed typically in the Muslim fashion of long flowing robes, caps and often times carried the rosary conspicuously. This was not the same with the others, even though they possibly had cultural affinities to the north or had been resident there for years and possibly shared the same religious identity. Predictably most of the northern Muslim respondents I interviewed conceptualized their identity as being Muslim. They also viewed other non-northern Muslims as brothers. However, there were critical views by a few non-Muslim southern respondents who viewed ethnicity as the identity of Hausa-Fulani Muslims. A non-Muslim religious leader,

whom I met on 10th of April 2009, outside a Church in Tundun Wada in Kaduna, sheds some light here:

> The Muslim from the core north, believe on Islam whether Hausa-Fulani or whatever. Muslims in the south, east and west even apart from the practice of religion, also believes in ethnicity. Yoruba man is a Muslim and his brother is a Christian he cannot fight his brother but in the north it would be different, the word Islam covers every other thing.

The overwhelming marker of a religious identity, as stated through the stern words of a Hausa-Muslim whom I interviewed on the 5th of February 2009, from Kano dressed in a jabila and sporting a grey beard, is useful in demonstrating that Islam has overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria. He explained:

> Every Muslim is a brother to other Muslim. No difference there is no variation. The hadith did not specify that whether you belong to any ethnic group or you are only restricted to that ethnic group....if you are a younger brother to someone, if you are the same father the same mother with him but you are practicing different religion. My closeness is stronger to those who we come under the same religion than him.

This except strongly indicates the cultural bond of Muslims in northern Nigeria, as the variant of Islam practiced in northern Nigeria bridges the gap between individuals divided on ethnicity in the region. Similarly, a non-Muslim cleric from Kaduna whom I interviewed on the 7th of April 2009 also echoed the opinions of northern Muslims: "Muslims to Muslims, whether Yoruba, Igbo or any other tribe, we are one." Against this question, most non-Muslims in Jos were of the opinion that northern Muslims viewed themselves first and foremost as Muslims. However in Kano, although most non-Muslims believed that northern Muslims considered religion more important than ethnicity, a strong perception of non-Muslims was that they viewed themselves as

Hausa. This may not be surprising, as most of the Hausa live in Kano City, whilst most of the non-Muslims live in Sabon Gari, revealing a convergence of religion and ethnicity. Further, ethnicity and religion play dominant roles in the individual's primordial identity

In conceptualizing identities in northern Nigeria, it was frequently observed that Muslims from the region considered themselves equal with Muslims from all ethnic groups within northern Nigeria and Nigeria in general. Illustrating such views, a Muslim trader in Kano Market, who I interviewed in his shed where he sold kola-nuts in bags, told us that "Muslims are one nation anywhere in the world the problem we are having here in the north is lack of education."[176] However, a few non-Muslims conceived that Hausa Muslims attacked Muslims from other ethnic origins.

There were dissenting views from some participants in the FGD in Kano that the fluency in Hausa language was more important than a religious identity in times of conflict. The presentation of this issue led to a discussion aimed at substantiating different levels of opinions and to enquire into profound and intricate conceptions the general and prominent voice that religion matters not language. During one such debate, a participant in the FGD in Kaduna perceived that "the Muslims in the north don't see themselves as Muslims as a whole, they do not see the Yorubas as Muslims until you are Hausa, that is the reason why you attack them. It is a tool the politicians use but it is because the religious bodies have made it so. The first thing they start doing is burning of Churches and Mosques, why is it like that?" From his narration, it

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[176] Interviewed on the 3rd of February 2009.

can be filtered that religion is the significant cause of conflicts in the region because non-Muslim places of worship or mosques are destroyed by these competing identities.

Another intriguing question presented to the participants in the FGD reflecting the hypothesis was: In a conflict situation, do people consider themselves first as Muslims, or whether you are Hausa, Yoruba or Igbo or in conflict situation do they consider themselves first as Hausa person or Yoruba person? The Hausa lady reflecting the general view of the participants in the FGD in Kano who was comparatively educated, libertine and outspoken said:

> As for me, it depends on the society one comes from. If it is from the South you find out that in a family you have Muslims, Christians and traditional worshippers. So one would consider the ethnicity first before the religion. But, if you come to the north you find out that 99.9% of the people are Muslims so they would consider the religion first before the ethnic.

Another crucial comment by a participant, whilst agreeing with the Hausa-Muslim lady, noted that identities matter in time of conflicts. Referencing the Jos conflict, the participant noted in cognizance that Islam facilitates a source for communal unity amongst Muslims:

> The first and foremost they refer to religion a Muslim are not going to kill a Yoruba man that is a Muslim, an Igbo man that is a Muslim and not going to kill a Birom man who is a Muslim but any other tribe, whether Igbo that is a Christian is an enemy.

Sitting behind an academic desk of a tertiary institution, this academician spoke with a finality that pronounced the stark reality that the issue of discourse was beyond the

logic of research or a re-ordering of normative values. In a descriptive commiseration, this non-Muslim academic illustrated the religious division in the north and greater primordial emphasis on Islam as an identity marker:

> I would be staying with you as a brother, and the next thing you attack me, forgetting that for years we have lived peacefully with one another and I didn't know that all these while you've been having something against me and you are aware and you wouldn't tell me...

The above narrative, which echoes the general sense of Muslims towards non-members of the faith, not only demonstrates that Muslims are likely to place excessive emphasis and loyalty on religious beliefs and religious identity but also the volatile state of religion in northern Nigeria.

6.7: In Brotherhood We Stand, Divided We Live

All the towns visited, except Jos (for the reason that it has a majority non-Muslims populace), had a settlement area christened Sabon Gari, which I gathered was the loci of visitors and strangers who were allowed residency but 'separated' on grounds of non-indigeneship and rights appropriation, the Islamic faith and ethnic identity. Through the incidence of increased migration, these areas have assumed dense population markers which have brought them into closer and borderless integration with the main town or city itself. The provision of public and social infrastructure has also watered down the affectations of these settlements. Nevertheless, since these areas still have that nomenclature, the trappings of their necessities are not lost but also make them marked target areas in the event of conflict.

On issues about living in different areas such as Sabon Gari in Kano, I discovered that one of the chief reasons was to eliminate inconsistent practices with the Islamic religion. Revealing that Islam in the North takes preference before other shared features. It was discovered that all the three locations surveyed had religious distinct settlements based on religious grounds other than ethnicity. The segregation of residences for non-Muslims (Sabon Gari) is part and parcel of the history of Kano and other core Muslim states in northern Nigeria. The self differential structure was established to allow the practice of religious freedom among non-Muslims. In Jos I found many areas were strongly demarcated on religious grounds, unlike in Kano that had one major area: Sabon Gari. Furthermore, religious demarcation in residential areas was more prevalent in Jos than in Kano and Kaduna.

It is instructive to note that due to the sensitivity of religious identity, most of the Muslims interviewed in Jos had sentiments of not being fully assimilated as indigenes. A useful insight that provided a clear picture to us (myself & research assistants) was discovered during the FGD in Jos that the indigenes do not want settlers partaking in political roles due to the fact that they are Muslims. However, I noted that this problem would not be apparent if the settlers were non-Muslims. Interestingly, some non-indigenes, who were Muslims, perceived that they were assimilated due to the delineated areas for Muslims and non-Muslims.

A Muslim cleric, whom I spoke to at his Qur'anic School on the 6th of February 2009 in the midst of his disciples in Kano, affirmed intolerance to non-Muslims and showcased his most ardent support for the rationale of the strangers quarters (Sabon Gari) by saying: "Of course, they do know all of us in Kano city are Muslims. We

can't live with Christians, the reason is because of our religion. Bells are ringing at odd times of the day, we cannot tolerate that…" He also affirms that "Muslims are *Umma. Umma* means a community of Muslims. You know the prophet salAllahu alayi wasallam whether you come from the west, or north or the south, once you are a Muslim and you gather together, you should forget your ethnic differences." In concurrence with these views, it was observed that in Kano most southern non-Muslims are aggrieved as they are underprivileged and not assimilated in Kano.

The social construction of segregated living in Kaduna State is more pronounced in the southern part of Kaduna which is dominated by in the region of 90% of Christians while the northern part is dominated by nearly 90% of Muslims. Kaduna, the capital of Kaduna State, is further divided along religious lines. A participant in the FGD in Kaduna rightly notes that "When you are Igbo, Hausa or Yoruba in as much as you go to Church, you would move towards the south of Kaduna while the Muslims move towards the north." Another participant from Kaduna believed that the only solution to religious crisis in Kaduna and in northern Nigeria is by segregation of Muslims and non-Muslims because in twenty years the crisis will still be prevalent. The language here indicates that that religion is a crucial factor in northern Nigeria. There remains a strong divisional line between Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims may not feel welcome in living amongst Muslims; therefore, it is highly unlikely that Muslims would feel unwelcome in northern Nigeria. This is perhaps exemplified by a Hausa-Muslim student, whom I met in Kano, on the 7th of February 2009, who is an indigene of Katsina State, and asserts that he was assimilated into Kano because he was Muslim.

It seems amazing that a few respondents, who are Muslims from other ethnic groups in southern Nigeria, do not feel assimilated in Kano although they were accepted by Muslims in Kano. Perhaps, this explains the notion that other ethnic groups in the south consider ethnicity as their main identity marker other than religion.

6.8: Behind Religious Identities

Against the cultural developments of the 3 locations, vis-à-vis religious inclinations and tolerance, Kaduna enjoys the greater patronage of the elite north and city dwellers and had acquired, by dint of socio-cultural exposition, a level of tolerance that permitted the mutual co-existence of tribes and religion. Jos, on the other hand, had an amalgam of non-Hausa cultures which fostered cultural integration, religious tolerance and peaceful co-existence among the settlers. It was sufficient that the presence of the English from colonial times had impacted positively on the cultural psyche such that there was a preponderance of non-Muslims as against Muslims. The people were more disposed to a tribal or ethnic identity.

In both Kaduna and Jos, before the Fourth Republic (May, 1999), all were living as sisters and brothers, politics tagged along with religious crisis. In Kaduna, a participant displaying a keen sense of contemporary political history of the country and unraveled the internalized opinions of the group. "The politicians have found out that religion is a potent instrument. It is an instrument of capturing power." Balancing these arguments, I began to speculate about the politicization of religion in northern Nigeria. I discovered that some participants and respondents revealed that although religion was the domineering variable of these riots, ethnicity and political interest were attached with religious identity especially when there is a

convergence in religious and ethnic identities. In the words of a participant in the FGD in Kaduna: "It could be political, it could be ethnic but at the end of the day it turns out to be religious."

In the course of the interactive exchange, I asked a striking question: When most of these conflicts arise, you find out that usually there are divisions like Muslim and non-Muslims: why does religious divide come when there are political problems? The second Hausa Muslim lady in the FGD in Kano revealed an answer that all participants agreed with: "I think it has been created by Colonial masters." The center piece of this narration provides us with one of the theoretical notions of invented tradition. My curiosity was aroused again in the FGD in Jos, where the only lady, who was perhaps the most proactive participant in the FGD, said: "If they (Muslims) are not allowed to participate, how can we say the amalgamation of 1914 was properly done, that is where we have the problem." This opinion was agreed upon by other participants.

A large number of respondents in Jos concluded that Plateau State is made up of an army of dysfunctional unemployed, unemployable, uneducated and confused population. And that a large number of people were and still are being indoctrinated into a form of Islam that is anti-peace and pro-war. In terms of experience, the Jos participants in the FGD assisted in the reconstruction of social events, connoting that the crisis in Jos is religious but it relates to the Hausa-Fulani Muslims who are denied indigene-ship and the settlers (non-Muslims). Insights into the study of Islam and conflicts were gathered in Jos. The participants in the FGD in Jos agreed that politics were interwoven with religion. They unanimously agreed that the elites and politicians

have hijacked religion for political currencies, as explored in Chapter 3. Furthermore, illiteracy and poverty were discovered to be sources that make politicians/elites to use religion as a hegemonic political tool and as an instrument for political power.

In Jos, my concern was to explore the indigene/settler issues. I noticed that the conflicts are purely ethno-religious – the Muslim Hausa-Fulani vs. non-Muslims, the Indigenes. The source of these conflicts was deeply rooted in indigene/settler issues and grievances with religion as a vehicle for illustrating these perceived grievances and threats. A Hausa-Muslim, whom I spoke to on the 19th of January 2009, who is head of a local market and in conformity with the views of other Hausa Muslims, said that "Jos indigenes do feel that they don't want anybody that does not belong to their own clan or ethnic group to pick up power in Jos north." In attempting to depick the sharp division on religious grounds, the Chairman of the Youth Christian Association of Nigeria & National Secretary of Religious Council, Plateau State said:[177] "We believe that the Muslims have many Islamic agenda just as the Christian too have. The Muslims want to Islamize the world and the Christians too want to convert the world for Jesus and that is the problem that we have." He also noted that the conflicts were more religious than ethnic.

Most of the Muslims interviewed in Jos perceived they were victims of religious conflicts. Their relative deprivation was centered on deprivation of aspirations, as noted by a Muslim Cleric:[178] "If you are Muslim you will not get chairmanship, you are not allowed to contest. Someone contested and we thought that that person will

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[177] Interviewed on the 10th of January 2009.
[178] Interviewed on the 19th of January 2009.

win the election." Another Hausa-Muslim leader[179] said that they (Muslims) were not given the opportunity to participate in the political process. In this sense, the Hausa-Fulani also perceive that there is the loss in community or political participation (decrement deprivation). It was observed that Jos was once a vibrant tourist city blessed with a temperate climate, eco-culture and a libertine populace who lived with a tranquil understanding that each others' rights. However, since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999, a moment of change occurred, the once tranquil urban town has been a ghost of its former self. This clearly illustrates a perceived progressive deprivation on the part of the Hausa-Muslims since there is a decline in political attainment.

During the exposé of conflicts in northern Nigeria, in the FGD in Kaduna there were murmurs and contentions of who did what, when and where. This FGD gave a clear picture of the state of socio-political decay and that this was attended by socio-economic ills (e.g. lack of job opportunities, contempt for religion and extreme level of fanaticism.) It was subtly revealed and by a participant in the Kaduna FGD and accepted by the group that unemployment and ignorance are not sufficient excuses for incessant conflicts in the state, as other northern states experiencing similar lack of amenities do not experience such crises. However, it was generally noted that other northern states had a minimal number of non-Muslims residing in the state.

The disturbing dimension of conflicts was revealed in the Jos FGD. The group generally identified that the sources of conflict are in politics but later wore the toga of religion. This explains the tendency of Islam, as our case in point to feed into religious

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[179] Interviewed on the 19th of January 2009.

crisis for personal and group interests. Clearly, it was political grievances led to religious conflicts. A participant and a respondent noted that it was the burning of mosques and non-Muslim places of worship and not electoral offices or political party's property that led to his conclusion.

On the level of an individual experience, a participant in the Kaduna FGD who was born and bred in the Kaduna and had witnessed the riots in 1992, 2000 and 2002, was of the opinion that it was strictly a religious affair. He narrated a personal experience:

> I have seen a church where they were telling the people not to have anything to do with the Muslims similarly an Imam close to my house said whenever he sees me with his son, he called me an 'arna' (infidel) that his son has nothing in common with me.

This narration, which was a general perception of the group, is an indication of religious intolerance that was explored in Chapter 5.

The FGD in Kano provided a representative view-point illustrating that the religious link being that Hausa-Fulani Muslims cannot be detached from Islam, and further illustrating that Islam is intolerant to other religions. A Fulani lady, one of the two ladies in the FGD, expressed a perceived notion shared by the group that the conflicts were religious but were political in nature. Another interesting comment which was noted by the respondents and participants was that religion was regarded as a "moving force as politicians and elites, who are aware that most Nigerians are deeply religious." Most of the participants and respondents in the study locations had a shared notion that politics and a religious factor or ethnic factor cannot be separated. It is

easy to understand that the tone and substance of this indicates that Islam can be politically hijacked and manipulated to generate conflict when there is a perceived threat to its sacrosanct nature. Particularly, an interesting observation by a respondent in Jos is that the types of weaponry used during religious conflicts were not within the economic reach of the common man.

In Jos, majority of respondents agreed that both the elite and religious leaders have a role to play in conflicts in Plateau State. A non-Muslim indigene was interviewed on the 8th of January 2009, in his retail provision store not far from the NASCO junction in Jos. He said that due to the political environment, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims have grievances of being dominated by non-Muslims. He also said that due to unemployment and poverty, the elites and politicians conscript the youth as machineries of violence. It was gathered that the youth voluntarily enrolled to partake actively in inter-religious conflict. However, they observed that a factor responsible for this was that the youths came from extremely poor backgrounds. In addition, since the violence was instigated in their areas of residence, it became necessary to become part of the conflict for self-protection and the human instinct to survive. These views show not only the preference for a religious primordial identity but also the leverage which is attendant to it.

The media in northern Nigeria and Nigeria in general is owned by both public and private sectors. However, the majority of media houses are owned by the private sector. It is not surprising then that there are elements of religious bias in reporting religious conflicts in the region. By interacting with focus groups, an underlining issue was brought to the table. One of the participants in the FGD in Jos pointed out that the

media should be fair and objective in their report because the non-Muslim media report one thing while the Muslim-owned media report another event. Attempts to explain this crucial observation is found in the report of The *Guardian Newspaper*, made two headlines on the Kano disturbances on May 12, 2004 and May 13, 2004, which had two stories on the front page. The news report of May 13 was titled, "They entered our house and stabbed my husband's elder brother until he died" and was deliberately couched to arouse sentiments.

The *Businessday* of May 13, 2004, was one of the first newspapers to insinuate that the governor supported the riot in a caption: Obasanjo Meets Muslim Leaders Over Kano Riots: Governor's Speech May Have Triggered Killings. This report was unlike the *Vanguard* report of May 13, 2004, titled: Curfew in Kano as 10 die protesting Yelwa killings. This article stated, among other things, that: "Governor Shekarau also urged them to emulate Prophet Muhammad and allow peace to reign in the state, and promise to personally deliver their letter to the authorities."

A crucial observation from the data is that I found that illiteracy and ill-education were channels through which religious conflicts are executed. The FGD in Kano identified illiteracy and the lack of education as focal points in the causation of conflicts in the state and in northern Nigeria in general. However, a striking observation from a participant noted that illiterates are not skilled enough to strategically implement these conflicts and, as such, "there are literate elements organizing these riots." Beyond the politicians and elites that were identified other causes of conflicts in the north include greed, poverty and unemployment.

6.9: Conclusion

From the above qualitative analysis one can conclude that Islam promotes unity in diversity in northern Nigeria (Kaduna, Kano and Plateau State), contrary to popular notions of disunity. But one must not ignore the fact that religious violence is appalling. The social and economic problems this violence threatens to cause are rampant. It hinders nation building, stigmatizes Nigeria and stunts the development of the north.

From the semi-structured interviews and FGDs, I was able to understand and appreciate the dynamics of Islam in northern Nigeria. I was able to understand what conditions exist to destabilize peace within the context of Islam in northern Nigeria. More precisely and most importantly, I observed that the variant of Islam unites and divides in equal measures – it is conflict-ridden when individuals do not belong to the Islamic faith. Within the views, comments and findings, the following deductions are submitted which align with the acceptance of the Alternative Hypotheses in the statistical analysis found in Appendix A of this study:

- Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, it acts as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises.

- Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria.

- In those instances, where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam), the conflict is very severe.

- Religion, when used for ethnic and political manipulations, tends to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria.

- The more politicized Islam is, the greater the tendency it has to feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for personal and group interests.

The next chapter offers recommendations on inter-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria in particular and, by extension, in Nigeria in general.

CHAPTER 7

CONFLICT REGULATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA-

POLICY PROPOSITIONS

Like an unchecked cancer, hate corrodes the personality and eats away its vital unity. Hate destroys a man's sense of values and his objectivity. It causes him to describe the beautiful as ugly and the ugly as beautiful, and to confuse the true with the false and the false with the true... ...the chain reaction of evil-hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars-must be broken, or we shall be plunged into the dark abyss of annihilation.

Martin Luther King Jr (1963)[180]

7.1: Introduction: Policy Implications

Clearly, it has been seen that religious conflicts have become endemic in Nigeria to such an extent that they have threatened the fabric of its existence, especially in northern Nigeria. The findings of this study have significant implications for religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. Most crucial is that religion as the main identity marker for Muslims in northern Nigeria is a crucial factor for this phenomenon. It may be argued that it is difficult to resolve religious conflicts because the foundation of a religious conviction is sacrosanct and its ethos is not human oriented but of a divine calling to the individual (Faris, 1935:209). However, all religions have a vast amount of sacred literature devoted to peace not violence. Peace and conflict theorists have suggested various methods of achieving peace, however, for every society, a different

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[180] A Season for Non-Violence-Oakland - Famous Quotes from Martin Luther King, Jr. *Accessed* on the 3rd of March, 2011 at: http://www.snvoakland.org/king/kingquotes.html

approach to peace and conflict regulation is required. In seeking adequate resolutions, one must note that "you cannot solve problems with the same level of thinking that existed when the problems were created."[181]

To understand how Islam acts as a counter force for inter-religious harmony, reflections of the past pave the way for insights into the prevailing problems of ethnicity and religion in a multi-cultural society, such as northern Nigeria. The rationale for this suggestion is found in the words of Friedman (1992: 853): "The past is always practiced in the present, not because the past imposes itself, but because subjects in the present fashion the past in the practice of their social identity." This perception supports the use of an ontological analysis applied in this study.

In order to understand the past it is pertinent to pose three questions based on Hidemi Suganami's explanation of the causes of war and conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999:97):

(1) What conditions must be present for religious conflicts to occur in northern Nigeria?

(2) Under what sort of circumstances do religious conflicts occur most frequently in northern Nigeria?

(3) How did this particular religious conflict come about?

The key to understanding these questions have, in many ways, been explored thoroughly in the previous chapters. This study clearly indicates that religion (Islam) as a primordial identity marker, as examined in Chapter 1, is a crucial condition for

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[181] Accessed on the 17th day of July 20009 at: Albert Einstein-http://creatingminds.org/quotes/problems.htm.

the existence for religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. As explored in Chapter 3 and 5, perceived threats to Islamic identity, the use of Islam for ethnic and political manipulations and the politicization of Islam for achieving political and economic currencies tend to generate conflicts that are instigated by Muslims. In addition, the varied factors influencing religious conflicts have been explained in Chapter 2.

In seeking conflict resolutions for these conflicts, questions fashioned by Miall et al. (1999) are useful in preventing violent conflicts: Can religious conflicts be prevented by removing its necessary antecedent causations? Can the incidence of religious conflicts be reduced by controlling the circumstances under which they arise? How can this particular religious conflict be prevented from becoming violent?

The recommendations of this chapter are based upon the data collated from the field work and analyzed in the previous chapter. The propositions are aimed not at entirely resolving inter-faith conflicts, but at finding meaningful mechanisms to curtail conflict and controlling the circumstances under which they arise in northern Nigeria or in a similar society where Islam is a strong identity marker. In addressing these propositions, it is crucial to note that conflict exists only with individuals or groups that have some relationship or ties with each other.

In understanding the relationship or ties amongst people, Avruch (1998) suggests that observing the cultures or traditions of the groups at conflict with each other is pertinent in seeking resolutions for peace. However one must bear in mind that in understanding the cultures of the groups at conflict, it is essential to identify with the grass-root people. As pointed out earlier on, the grass-root people are both the

channels of instigating violent behaviour and the victims of the consequences of the conflict. Indeed, as Paden (2005:29) rightly pointed out the "first step in conflict resolution and mediation is to analyze the nature and dynamics of the grassroots conflicts, then to assess the human resources available for conflict mitigation, including the capacity of traditional civic cultures to adapt to new conflict challenges." In seeking conflict resolutions, it is vital to explore what these relationship or ties are. It is crucial to reinstate that the characteristic of conflicts and its various strategies at resolving them differs from one culture to the other. Fry & Brooks (1997), noting that human conflict and conflict resolution are structural phenomena, suggest that the intricate details of cultural and divergent interests among individuals must be observed and considered to seek conflict resolution. Conflict resolution must take into account the cultural construction of society. It is in order, therefore to raise the following policy propositions.

7.2: Decentralizing the Federal System

It is a serious and great challenge for a state such as Nigeria to embrace so many nations, diverse ethnicities, cultures and religious affiliations with multi-dimensional interest. A centralized federalist government may find it difficult to cope with the pressures from these diverse groups. The inelegant and centric nature of Nigeria's federal structure is a primary precipitant of the numerous religious crises in the nation; therefore, there is a categorical imperative to structurally reorder the Nigerian federalism, such that powers are meaningfully devolved to the sub-national units of the federation. The present federalist arrangement in Nigeria, by the very negation of extant federalist principles that manifest in over-centralization and monopolization of power, is conterminous with divisive conflicts. This system has chronically

underfunded the governance at the local level. To this end, the component nationalities of the state should enter into a renegotiation of binding social contracts between themselves and the Nigerian state, thereby restructuring opportunity for the grass-roots people to ensure equal representation among different zones in Nigeria. It is contended that in decentralizing the federal structure, wealth would be centralized to other tiers of governance and would grant equal participation in governance, which is seemingly denied to the local governments. It is also suggested that a decentralized federal structure would engender the establishment of networks in various local governments to observe and provide feedback mechanisms to the state and central governments in the event of crises.

The findings of this study show that it is possible and necessary to eliminate the practice of differential citizenship for an all-inclusive, non-discriminative Nigerian citizenship. In most parts of northern Nigeria the practice of self differential structures such as Sabon Gari, are prevalent where non-Muslims seek societal protection. Nigerians, irrespective of tribe, ethnic origins, religion or gender, must be made to feel at home and be allowed to own property, marry and contest for elections anywhere and at anytime in the Nigerian federation. The above is non-realizable if rule of law, equity, justice and constitutionalism are not given the pride of place as ordering principles of state action. This reform would eliminate the conflicting issues of settlers versus indigenes, which is a precursor to religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. With this in mind, the former Nigeria leader, President Obasanjo (Alubo, 2004: 146) said:

> Many citizens are threatened and denied their God-given and
> constitutionally guaranteed right to live and earn their living anywhere
> in our nation by such monstrosities as 'non-indigene', 'stranger',
> 'native' or 'settler' constructions which create huge barriers between

our people. Very often, the irony is lost to our people that every Nigerian is both an 'indigene' and a 'settler' and we pay a huge price when we ignore this fact... it exposes all of us and all our primordial loyalties to the evils which it generates... it militates against the imperative of the integration of our national economy which demands that men and capital must be allowed to move freely and grow wherever they choose.

7.3: Distribution of Resources

The economic paradox about Nigeria is that the more the country has in vast wealth and natural resources, the less the people have. In many ways, most of the problems at the root of religious crises in Nigeria are due to the abject poverty of the people and the nation's poverty profile, which makes it malleable in the hands of ethnic and religious entrepreneurs. The northern part of Nigeria consists of two nations: The rich and the poor. It is likened to Disraeli's (1869) depiction of the rich and the poor as two separate nations in his acclaimed novel 'Sybil.' This division has given rise to a generation of unemployed miscreants, unemployed youth such as the talakawa and the almajirai. In northern Nigeria, the roots of religious clashes could be traced to class struggles and resource control (noted in chapter 2 & 5). In social terms, the lack of economic independence for the young generation leads to denial of economic welfare such as housing and the lack of access to justice. This leads to the lack of education, producing disadvantaged adults, which leads to the tendency to commit crimes.

Consequently, the empowerment of the grass-root citizens and its institutions would go a long way in reducing, if not totally eliminating, the scepter of religious conflicts. Perhaps the truth then is that "wealth and population are not, indeed, absolute signs of prosperity in a state; they are only so in relation to each other. Wealth is a blessing when it spreads comfort over all classes" (Sismondi: 1815). It is strongly recommended that there should be a restructuring on the imbalance in revenue sharing

formular used in the polity. Presently, the Federal Government takes 55% of the revenue allocation, whilst the remainder is shared between 36 states and 744 local governments.

7.4: Good Governance & Accountability

Corruption and mismanagement of public funds is a debilitating crisis faced by the Nigerian state. As a result of this, the state has failed in its responsibility to its citizens. Given the rising scale of unemployment, generalized impoverishment, diseases, poverty and other social malaise that the state is unable to do anything about, the grass-root people are left with no other option but to resort to their different religious cocoons. The incompetence of the state and its functionaries fuels the religionization of politics and religionization of ethnicity in northern Nigeria. There is a need for a more accountable government that will deal with corruption, nepotism and empower local government. Deliberate attempts must be put in place to make the state functional, responsive, responsible, transparent and accountable to the citizenry. Programs that would ensure the empowerment of the people and qualitatively improve their quality of lives should be put in place. It has been observed from profiling conflicts in chapter 5 that poverty is a sine qua non for conflict. In this sense it has the tendency to create grievance among people in a tense political system.

An important lesson to learn from history is that "peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice" (Baruch Spinoza, *Theological-Political Treatise*, 1670).[182] In reality, structural injustices, religious preferences, tribalism, nepotism, domination of one tribe, culture or religion

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[182] Accessed on the 11th of November 2006 at: http://www.america.gov/st/bangladesh-english/2005/January/20050125013713.X0mJopUBLC6ZNoriB4f-1Ahsedalgnab.html

over others are what, when put together, result in conflict, especially when leaders are not sensitive to transparency and accountability in public office.

Data collated from the field shows that over 65% of the respondents in the field study emphasized the need for good governance through fairness. Most of them complained of injustices on the part of the state government favouring one region of the state over the other because of their religious affiliation, where schools, hospitals and infrastructures are situated in one section and not evenly distributed.

The overall analysis of this study shows that the realities of religious conflicts in northern Nigeria are alarming and require very urgent, apt and continued attention. As we have seen in Chapter 4, religious conflict in the north is primarily caused by the elite struggling for space and control and scrambling for the allocation of scarce resources. The field study shows that the major factor that has been facilitating this conflict is the issue of illiteracy among the dominant segments of the population. Equally critical is the issue of economic deprivation, which is a product of prebendalistic policies. The best way out of this social problem is by the evolution of dynamic policies that will address the issue of education, poverty and social relations within the micro and macro levels of society.

For the grass-roots people, unaccountability and appalling governance has led to poverty and the lack of economic resources for the unemployed is a source of religious conflicts. As previously noticed in chapter 5, the uneducated and unemployed youth are the usual channel for religious violence. These youth see

conflict as an opportunity to acquire income, plundering carried out for prospects of changing their deprived predicaments.

Political leaders in Nigeria should note that the polity is a pluralistic society and hence they should not involve the government in any issues that are likely to generate religious controversy. This does not mean that government and religious groups should not interact at all. Both have the responsibility to maintain harmony in society. The government is to cater for the welfare of the people and to provide for the economic and social needs of the people. In the process of doing this, it should cooperate and work in harmony with religious bodies. Religious bodies may also come to the aid of the state in educational, health or other social matters. Religious groups and government should be not rivals but rather they should work together for the progress, peace and unity of the country. Government and religion are not to be regarded as mutually exclusive in their different functions.

7.5: Bridging the Religious Divide

The findings of this study show that there is a dire need for bridging religious division in northern Nigeria. It is important to listen to Abu-Nimer's (2001) advice that religion can provide social, moral and spiritual resources to the peace-building processes. The accommodation for other faiths within the realm of Islam is problematic because some Muslims view such tolerance as sacrilegious. This is not surprising, as we have seen that Islam sets boundaries to non-members of the faith. Such Muslims should be made to understand that Islam accommodates a plurality of cultures and religious faiths. There is a need for educating citizens through the local government at the grass-root level of Islam's hospitality of other cultures. Cognizance

should be taken to the Holy Qur'an 5:48 which states: "Unto every one of you We have appointed a law and way of life. And if Allah had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community; but in order to test you by means of what he has given you. Vie then, with one another in doing good works" Similarly, the Qur'an 49;13 states that "O mankind, surely We have created you from a male and female, and made you nations and tribes that you may know each other." This verse illustrates Islam's recognition of diverse cultures, which encapsulates ethnic and religious diversity. A method of disseminating this message is through a 'voice of authority' such as the Imans of all Islamic brotherhoods, Imams of mosques and reputable Islamic scholars.

The 'voice of authority' is usually the spokesmen for the religion's ideology and has the religious legitimacy and independent power to divert religious conflict. An illustration of the pragmatic utility of a 'voice of authority' is observed in a study by Lewis, Bratton, Alemika & Smith (2001:29–30). They discovered that when Nigerians were asked to identify persons whom they would approach if they had a problem, most Nigerians said they would meet a religious leader, influential person and traditional ruler in order of preference.

Religious leaders have a great capacity to act as peace mediators. Such a 'voice of authority' can provide a delegation of mediators for resolving and intervening in conflicts. Abdalla (2000-2001) has perceptively argued that Islamic conflict intervention should be construed on the foundation that Islam is historically based on messages of justice, freedom and equality as opposed its misinterpretation of being repressive. He argues that Islam has procedures for conflict resolution and can adopt

strategies to resolving conflicts according to the conflict the intensity or stage of the conflict. Arguing along similar lines, Gopin (1997:19) provides two useful instructions to religious peace mediators. He advises that both the conflict potentials of religion must not be ignored whilst emphasizing religions' ability to generate conflict resolution. Also, he advises that religion must be understood as consisting of a complex social phenomena that can generate and resolve conflicts.

Added to that, community-based organizations and community leaders can act as mechanism for peace and conflict resolution. They can also use their strength constructively to create awareness and understanding of non-religionists. Religious conflicts in northern Nigeria are often rooted in ignorance, prejudice, misunderstanding, contradictions, injustices and a lack of tolerance and love. Education should hinge on the need to understand other religions and cultures, avoiding religious bigotry. In a persuasive analysis Abu-Nimer, (2001:690) emphasizes that educating participants (religious leaders and teachers) should be within the conceptualization that different conflict resolution theories are identical with the ideals endorsed by religion. On the issue of re-schooling, civil education centered on nation building should be imbibed in Nigerians through all levels of education. This learning would sensitize the next generation of Nigerians to have sentiments of state building as opposed to the nation building.

7.6: Interactive Conflict Resolution & Early Warning Systems

In resolving religious conflicts, the use of Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) is useful as it entails small group discussions between principal actors, community members and unofficial members to analyze the dynamics of a particular conflict in

order to prevent it from occurring in the future. This discussion is facilitated by a moderator. The use of ICR can have a dual effect, as the moderator can also act as skilled mediator and third-party intervener by developing peaceful settlements of the parties. It is crucial that the conflicting parties must accept the intervention of a mediator (Zartman, 1989).

The use of ICR is quite similar to that of FGDs. As seen in Chapter 4, the use of FGDs enabled participants to find resolutions, establish trust and confidence amongst each other but, most important, to analyze conflict. In analyzing the dynamics of conflicts, Ojiji (2004) identifies five stages of conflict as:

1. Pre-conflict Stage – this is usually characterized by hearsay/suspicion.

2. Confrontation Stage – the full conflict starts here.

3. Crises Stage – the height of the conflict.

4. Outcome Stage – the aftermath is characterized by end of the violent aggression.

5. Post Conflict Stage – the end of the violence.

The ICR could act as a problem solving-workshop, a training forum and as a grass-root approach in seeking peace (Fisher, 1997). Through the use of ICR, the voice of authorities can air their views about the conflict and transfer such views to the community and tiers of government. Most importantly, the ICR could facilitate reconciliation, forgiveness and a better understanding of the causation of the conflict amongst the community. It is recommended that the ICR could be utilized in providing information on causal or the dynamics of the conflict (what went wrong), which can identify risk factors through analyzing the five stages of the conflict for early warning systems and the skills to predict the type of conflict to prevent.

Chart 6.1: Stages of Conflict

Furthermore, a useful model for predicting instability in order to prevent patterns of conflicts is provided by Scarborough (1998). She explains that it is necessary to determine 'why' and 'how' the conflict occurs. She also contends that such information can be used to predict early warning signs of conflicts in societies. As observed in Chapter 5, religious conflict in Jos, Plateau State tends to occur after political elections. This information could be used as sufficient data for critical role players, such as the tiers of government and religious leaders, to forecast tension and conflict during elections.

Another view is the application of early warning systems via intelligence reports in crisis regions, in order to anticipate conflicts in the region. Establishing networks in various communities to observe and provide feedback mechanisms to the government or peace negotiators can facilitate this thought. Thus, more recourse should be left to religious leaders, traditional leaders and those closely connected to the grass root people. However, there needs to be an educational agenda to put this in place. This can be achieved by investing in the people by providing educational programmes for the grass root people on early warning systems.

Most importantly, it gives such role players timed intervention to act decisively in taking measures to prevent conflict, especially at the pre-conflict stage. These reports are useful as feedback mechanisms for policy makers at the local government level and for developing cooperation between the grass-roots people, the local government and state governments. From this perspective, change does not occur from the top to the bottom but from the bottom to the top. Empowering the grass-roots people builds networks between community organizations and the tiers of government for information management and feedback mechanisms to identity the potential of conflict.

Flowing from chapter 5 it is readily observed that the police are ineffective in preventing/curtailing religious violence once it has commenced. It is strongly recommended that the police in conflict prone areas are skilled on conflict prevention mechanisms based on an understanding of 'why' and 'how' the conflict occurs. This requires close networking with the grass-root people and creating networks with community and religious leaders. These networks can provide constructive assistance on how violent incidents occur. Most importantly, early warning signals can be adequately conveyed to security personnel to deescalate violence.

An important observation pertaining to religious conflicts is the current inability of non-government organizations to enforce peace. What is necessary is for local governments to establish an Office of Interfaith Affairs for feedback mechanisms from the grass-roots for assessing early warning signs.

7.7: Politics of Inclusion

More concerted efforts are needed to incorporate Muslims and non-Muslims into understanding each others' faiths. The misleading notion of equating western values with Christianity needs to be detached from the sentiments of Muslims. In addition, the conceived notions of imposing Arab-Islamic cultures on non- Muslims should be addressed. These attempts at including Muslims and non-Muslims in inter-faith dialogues and cooperating together have yielded some dividends (see below). However, the process must be continuous and should be emulated by all tiers of governance, especially the local governments.

As a result of the disintegrative forces created by the violence described above, some state governments, individuals and groups have made some attempts at fostering peace at the grass-roots and local levels. In 2002, every local government in Kaduna State was mandated by the state governor to create a dialogue forum between various religious leaders and traditional rulers within their domain. At the state level, a Committee on Religious Harmony was put in place. On his part, the Diocese of Kaduna has created a 'Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations', whose aim is to teach the religion of Islam for the sake of knowledge and peaceful co-existence between the adherents of the two faiths (Muslims and non-Muslims) and to assist Muslims in the discovery of the missing 'Christ' in the Qur'an. Some other state governments in the northern parts of the country have created similar reconciliation committees to enlighten the people and leadership. Similar gestures should be emulated by other northern states according to their required structures.

At the national or federal level, the following bodies have been set up for the purpose of cooperation and reconciliation: 'Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution' in the presidency (IPCR), the 'Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NTREC)' and the 'Institute for Development, Justice and Peace.' The Anglican Church also has a well-staffed department dealing with inter-faith and ecumenical matters.

A number of international organizations are also involved in the process of reconciliation, particularly the International Center for Reconciliation at Coventry Cathedral. In 2001, a peace pact was signed by the leadership of the Christian and Muslim communities in Kaduna city facilitated by Coventry Cathedral in the United Kingdom. Both the Christian and the Muslim communities have been involved in this peace process.

One must commend and applaud the Nigerian government and some international organizations for the establishing some of the above-mentioned bodies. The federal government should, on behalf of these bodies, establish sufficient networks of these organizations in states while the states should establish such networks in their local governments, for feedback mechanisms and to establish areas of weakness and vulnerability in interfaith relationships.

7.8: Objective Reporting By the Media

This study reveals that many non-Muslims regard Islam as a religion that promotes violence, terrorism and war. Several media outlets, such as particular TV stations, radio stations, newspapers and magazines, are influenced by their investors or owners who have certain political agendas. Other media outlets are simply after the 'big story'

in order to make more profit. Others are simply 'followers' who only gather news from other sources, re-package it and try to sell it again purely as a sensational news.

In reporting religious conflicts, the media have usually reported conflicts with a blend of preconceived notions along their religious and ethnic pre-conceived notions instead of providing objective and informed analyses. The media should use its resource to curtail conflicts by promoting interfaith programmes and revealing areas of interfaith harmony. The effective role of the media in preventing conflicts could be used in preventing retaliatory conflicts such as the Kano ethnic riot and reprisal killings of July 22, 1999 and the reprisal attacks in the Igbo town of Onitsha in Anambra State, emanating from the Borno 'Danish Cartoon' riots in February 2006.

7.9: Suggestions for Further Research

In the words of Mahatma Gandhi:[183] "The golden rule of conduct ... is mutual toleration, seeing that we will never all think alike and we shall always see Truth in fragment and from different angles of vision. Even amongst the most conscientious persons, there will be room enough for honest differences of opinion. The only possible rule of conduct in any civilized society is, therefore, mutual toleration." In order overcome the culture of intolerance and violent religious conflicts in northern Nigeria, some of the following pre-emptive and preventive measures are imperative:

I. The development of the national peace policy being fashioned out by the IPCR to serve as the benchmark for peace building and conflict resolution in Nigeria.

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[183] Accessed on the 4th of May 2008 at: http://www.mkgandhi.org/religionmk.htmSource: Light of India or Message of Mahatmaji by M. S. Deshpande

II. The establishment of peace education for all citizens in primary, secondary and tertiary education.

III. To establish and develop peace culture as a social norm in northern Nigeria.

IV. The development and establishment of an effective way to eliminate the bias patronage of religion at all levels of government.

V. Governments should train and deploy 'Peace Ambassadors' from religious and ethnic groups and send them out as change agents to all nooks and crannies of the country to facilitate and promote peace.

VI. Establish an elaborate Early Warning and Early Response mechanism on violent conflict along the model of Interactive Conflict Resolution.

VII. Where there is justification, states should establish either Ministries or Councils for Peace and Conflict Resolution to provide institutional platforms for the operationalization of peace-building initiatives of governments. Furthermore, local governments could set up Peace and Conflict Resolution committees.

VIII. Nigerian governments should institute incentives for peace workers and sanctions against violence in communities, schools and general society.

IX. Leaders and public officials who promote non-violent conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence should be publicly commended and also given awards to serve as incentives to peacemakers and workers.

X. To examine how to ban the use of media, audio/video cassettes or the activities of solo and mobile preachers who provoke or openly denigrate other religions or ethnic groups.

7.10: Conclusion

In order to find resourceful recommendations, the evidence in the quantitative and qualitative were used in finding out what happened 'yesterday', in order to find solutions for today and tomorrow. These recommendations are needed to contribute to knowledge and search into how Islam has a uniting capacity, and exploring how Islam works as a counter force in mainstream conflict. It is important reiterate that the verification of the study was assessed at the grass roots, because in religious conflicts, the grass roots people are used as machineries for escalating and implementing conflicts. The grass roots people are also the first victims of such conflicts. Collating data at these levels rendered a good account of the outstanding problems associated with these conflicts. The relevance this research is that it shifts focus on the experiences of people involved in religious conflict. It shows how people react and respond to people from other religious backgrounds. Furthermore, it would provide access to information to other scholars.

It must be emphasized that implicit in the above observation, this thesis attempts to point a searchlight in understanding religions complexity, unresolved issues, phenomenal nature of religion and mystified perceptions of Islam in northern Nigeria. Furthermore, it attempts to apply pragmatic resolutions to the critical problems of religious conflicts in the region. Clearly, then the main objective of this study is to make a contribution to the literature in peace and conflict studies and analysis: religious conflict, the role of Islam in northern Nigeria and its political system. Most crucially it attempts to do this by linking these areas with the primordialism of religion.

The role of religion in conflicts in northern Nigeria has been a neglected area of research, at least in terms of a general empirical assessment. The compiled database on religious factors in conflicts in northern Nigeria reveals that religion plays a role in conflict more frequently than is usually assumed. Using Chi-square statistics (appendices) and qualitative comparison, it is apparent that there is sufficient evidence that links religious primordialism to conflict. While the de-escalation of conflict (outcome stage) through the use of religion is more common at the descriptive level, most of the religious variables that proved to be significant are negatively related to peace, mainly in respect of conflict termination (post-conflict stage). The effects of religion on conflict duration are almost absent and they are inconsistent when it pertains to the intensity of conflict.

The study notes that the strongest relationships are returned when testing for religious identities, which overlaps with other identity markers. A further finding suggests a strong support for the hypotheses that the mobilization of religion in conflict depends on several characteristics of various religious dimensions. The abuse of religion in conflict is particularly likely when religious and other boundaries run parallel, when religion differentiates the conflicting parties and when stronger connections exist between religious identities and political actors. At first sight, the most astonishing finding refers to the positive relationship between the pro-peace use of religion and ongoing conflict. This must be interpreted in terms of a sequential direction of causation, where violence stimulates religious actors to stage peace initiatives and not vice versa. At the same time, peace efforts seem to generally have a limited impact once violence has broken out.

In the foregoing I have attempted to present a broad and methodical account of religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. My attempts at rendering a concise analysis, account and recommendations are not exhaustive and conclusive. However I am confident that I have developed a methodical analysis and explanation of the research problems and thrown insights to practical solutions to limit religious conflicts.

My understanding of the primordialism of religion in society plays a significant role in religious conflicts in northern Nigeria and in similar societies. The momentous nature of religious primordialism reveals that it is nationalistic in orientation among northern Nigerian Muslims regardless of differences in cultural affiliations. My undertaking of this thesis has been by observation. I have also propounded a bottom-to-top approach in my intellectual analysis of the propositions and hypothesis.

Popular notions of Islam are that it is a religion that is divisive in nature, it is considered to create group division which leads to segregation and violence. In addition scholars have emphatically and powerfully argued that ethnic boundaries are the most important dimension that explains social conflict. However, on the contrary the conclusion in this study shows that Islam in northern Nigeria has a cultural component. It is a product of historical determinism. It acts as a glue to unite people marred by ethnic, linguistic and cultural markers. Crucially, the data gathered overwhelmingly suggests that Islam in northern Nigeria acts a double edged sword Islam in northern Nigeria – it unites and divides in equal measures. It is divisive when individuals are not part of the community of Islam; it is a counter force for inter-religious harmony – it is a source for peace and conflict. Thus, it is unique and different from other societies that are why what is true of northern Nigeria cannot be true in other societies.

Furthermore, the study strong observes that Islam has provided political unity, motivated ethno-nationalism, promoted nation-building and united people. It has provided contentions within the social class structure in the north. It is unfortunate that the beneficiaries of the Islamization of politics in northern Nigeria are the elites, who deploy Islam in their power contests. The concept of *Islam din wa-dawla* (Islam is both religion and state) in northern Nigeria is a divine aspiration and a hegemonic political tool and that has been used by politicians as an instrument for political power and as a fog for conflict.

This study explores a realist conception on Islam in northern Nigeria. It examines the existence of a peculiar characteristic of a people that brings about a commonality,

grouping, bondness, connectedness and primordial ties of Islam in the region. The existence of these peculiar characteristics exists and acts independent of our knowledge about them. Thus, "society is not created by the conscious decisions of individual people, but pre-exists them and moulds their mental life" (T. Benton & I. Craib, 2001:127). This study explains that Islam in northern Nigeria is connected to a common history, which is the foundation of a common identity. There is a logical dependence of how things are as opposed to how things ought to be. At this point it is important to note that when making a comparative assessment of Islam in northern Nigeria, it has a different structure to other religions in Nigeria such as Christianity. I realize that Christianity does not allow the comfort zone that Islam applies during inter-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Christianity does not succeed in preventing individuals from different ethnic groups from losing life or limb. In the context of Islam in northern Nigeria, Islam promotes inter-ethnic peace amongst adherents of its faith. Thus, yet again I reflect that primordialism best explains Islam in northern Nigeria. The conclusion I have come up in this study is that Islam in northern Nigeria has a strong cultural component – it is unique and different from other societies that are what is true of northern Nigeria can not be true in other societies.

This study is independent of our knowledge of the world or what actually exists in religious conflicts in Nigeria. In answering the research questions and the analyses provided in this study, I do affirm that this is the best explanation that can be provided to explain the causal relations within the dynamics of conflict and Islam. However, knowledge, being created by man, is subject to fallibility, as man is an imperfect being.

The findings of this thesis did not come in to existence as a result of this study. In Bastian terminology, the outcome of my explanation of the theory is an index of what I do *not* produce, as it exists and will exist independent of my findings. However, my findings provide new insights on religious conflicts in northern Nigeria, which could act as an arbiter in managing or limiting inter-religious conflicts in the region. In addition, it could serve as a point of reference for other multi-ethnic and religious societies in a non-western state, perhaps, building a common point of reference for such societies.

Section 1

Demographic Data Distribution of Respondents

Table 1 (a): Sex Distribution of Respondents

	Joss	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
Male	66	71	59	196	65
Female	34	29	41	104	35
Total	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (a) above and Graph 1 (a) below and show that 65% of the respondents are male while 35% are female.

Graph 1 (a) Sex Distribution of Respondents

☐ F/male 35%

■ Male 65%

■ Male
☐ F/male

Table 1 (b): Age Distribution of Respondents

		Joss	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
Below 18		19	21	24	64	21
Between	18-25	41	39	42	122	41
	26-35	22	24	21	67	22
	36-50	11	10	8	29	10
Above 50		7	6	5	18	6
		100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (b) above and Graph 1 (b) below reveal that 21% of the respondents fall below the age of 18; 41% between 18 to 25; 22% between 26 to 30; 10% between 36 to 50; while 6% of the respondents are above 50 years.

1 (b):Age Distribution of Respondents

Table 1 (c): Marital Status Distribution of Respondents

	Jos	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
Married	31	33	29	93	31
Single	59	58	61	178	59
Divorce	8	9	7	24	8
Widowed	2	-	3	5	2
	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (c) above and Graph 1(c) below reveal that 31% of the respondents are married; 59% are single; 8% are divorced; while 2% of the respondents are widowed.

Graph 1 (c): Marital Status of Distribution of Respondents

Table 1 (d): Educational Qualification Distribution of Respondents

	Jos	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
SSCE	57	52	54	163	54
OND/NCE	16	21	18	55	18
B.SC./HND	17	20	21	58	19
M.SC./M.A	9	7	4	20	7
M.PHIL/PH.D	1	-	3	4	1
	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (d) above and Graph 1 (d) below reveal that 54% of the respondents are SSCE (or its equivalent) holders; 18% are OND/NCE holders; 19% are B.Sc/HND holders; 7% are M.Sc/M.A holders; while 1% of the respondents are M.PHIL/P.HD holders.

Graph 1 (d): Educational Qualification Distribution of Respondents

- ■ Secondary School Cert
- ☐ OND/NCE
- ▩ B.Sc/HND
- ☐ M.Sc/M.A
- ▩ M.PHIL/P.HD
- ▩

M.Sc/M.A 7%

M.PHIL/PHD 1%

B.Sc/HND 19%

OND/NCE 18%

Secondary School Cert 54%

Table 1 (e): Employment Status Distribution of Respondents

	Jos	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
Public sector	41	39	42	122	41
Private sector	22	20	17	59	20
Self Employed	33	38	35	106	35
Unemployed	4	3	6	13	4
	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (e) above and Graph 1 (e) below reveal that 41% of the respondents are engaged in the public sector; 20% in private sector; 35% are self-employed; and 4% are unemployed.

Graph 1 (e): Employment Distribution of Respondents

- ■ public sector
- ☐ private sector
- ▩ Self-employed
- ☐ unemployed

unemployed 4%

Self-employed 35%

public sector 41%

private sector 20%

Table 1 (f): Ethnic/Cultural Group Distribution of Respondents

	Jos	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
Hausa/Fulani	47	67	71	185	62
Yoruba	31	23	18	72	24
Igbos	18	7	6	31	10
Others	4	3	5	12	4
	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (f) above and Graph 1 (f) below show that 62% of the respondents are Hausa/Fulani; 24% are Yoruba; 10% are Igbos; while 4% belongs to other minor ethnic groups.

Graph 1 (f): Ethnic/Cultural Group Distribution of Respondents

Table 1 (g): Religious Group Distribution of Respondents

	Jos	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
Christians	34	33	27	94	31
Muslims	62	67	69	198	66
Traditional	4	-	4	8	3
Other	-	-	-	--	--
	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (g) above and Graph 1 (g) below reveal that 31% of the respondents are Christians; 66% are Muslims; 3% are traditional worshippers while none belong to other religious groups.

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Graph 1 (g): Religious Group Distribution of Respondents

Christians
31%

Traditional
Worshippers
3%

Muslims
66%

Legend: Christians, Muslims, Traditional Worshippers, Minorities

Table 1 (h): Number of Years Spent in the Study Locations

	Jos	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
Less than 1 yr	11	13	9	33	11
1 – 5 years	30	28	26	84	28
6 – 10 years	39	36	40	115	38
11 – 15 years	6	9	10	25	8
16 – 20 years	9	10	10	29	10
21 – 25 years	3	2	4	9	3
26 – 30 years	1	-	1	2	1
More than 30	-	1	-	1	1
	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (h) above and Graph 1 (h) below show that 11% of the respondents have spent less than 1 year in their present state; 28% between 1 to 5 years; 38% between 6 to 10 years; 8% between 11 to 5 years; 10% between 16 to 20 years; 3% 21 to 25 years; 1% between 26 to 30 years; while 1% of the respondents are more than 30 years.

Graph 1 (h): Number of Years Spent in State

Table 1 (i): Number of Years Spent in Other States (Outside Study Locations)

	Jos	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Percentage
None	24	52	49	125	42
Less than 1 year	51	21	42	114	38
1 – 5 years	19	18	9	46	15
6 – 10 years	6	5	-	11	4
Above 10 years	-	4	-	4	1
	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (i) above and Graph 1 (i) below show that 42% of the respondents have not resided in any other local government; 38% have spent less than 1 year; 15% between 1 to 5 years; 4% between 6 to 10 years; while 1% of the respondents have spent above 10 years.

Graph 1 (i): Number of Years Spent in Other States

Table 1(j) Annual Salary Distribution of Respondents

	Jos	Kano	Kaduna	Total	Per cent age
N20,000-N30,000	17	12	18	58	19.3
N30,000-N40,000	23	28	26	82	27.3
N40,000-N50,000	25	25	35	69	23.0
N50,000 and above	35	35	21	91	30.3
	100	100	100	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Interpretation: Table 1 (j) above and Graph 1(j) below show that 19.3% earn an annual salary range between N20, 000 to N30, 000; 27.3% between N30, 000 to N40, 000; 23% between N40, 000 to N50, 000; while 30.3% earn above N50, 000

Graph 1 (j): Annual Salary Distribution of Respondents

■ Above N50, 000   ■ N20, 000 to
    30%   N30, 000
                          19%

                                ■ N30, 000 to
                                   N40, 000
                                    23%

        ■ N40, 000 to N50,
              000
              23%

```
■ N20, 000 to N30, 000
■ N30, 000 to N40, 000
■ N40, 000 to N50, 000
■ Above N50, 000
■ More than 10 yrs
■
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
Section 2

Questionnaire Items

Since colonial times Nigeria has been divided between a Muslim north and a non-Muslim south. Nigeria is also the largest country in the world with an even division of Muslims and non-Muslims. This division became more crucial after the country's independence in 1960, especially with the emergence of religious tension between Muslims and non-Muslims. With this in mind, the sample questionnaires were formed to be inconclusive of the cultural patterns and diversity of its people from or living in northern Nigeria.

2 (a): The Solidarity among People in Northern Nigeria

	Question	Strongly Agree		Agree		Undecided		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1	Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences.	179	60	87	29	12	4	16	5	6	2
2	Islam legitimizes and even calls for violence against non-believers	176	59	93	31	11	4	13	4	7	2
3	Perceived threats to Islamic identities can strengthen internal group solidarities and foster group association.	182	61	85	28	14	5	8	3	11	4
4	Ignorance and poverty triggers religious conflict in northern Nigeria.	211	70	67	22	9	3	7	2	6	2

2 (b): The Trans-Ethnic Identity among Cultural Groups in Nigeria

	Question	Strongly Agree		Agree		Undecided		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
5	Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria.	188	63	57	19	21	7	29	10	5	2
6	The intensity of Islamic identity determines the potential for mobilization in conflict.	201	67	197	32	2	1	0	0	0	0
7	The political elites and people in government who do not do what they are supposed to are the very ones responsible for religious conflict in northern	176	59	89	30	5	2	16	5	14	4

	Nigeria.									
8	Islam does not approve of conflicts neither does it support unnecessary killings but it is the selfish interest of the people concerned.	223	74	39	13	8	3	21	7	9	3

Source: Field Survey, 2009

2 (c): The Relationship between Ethnic Groups and Religion in Northern Nigeria

	Question	Strongly Agree		Agree		Undecided		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
9	Where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe.	111	37	97	32	42	14	24	8	26	9
10	Most of the conflicts in northern Nigeria are religious as opposed to ethnic.	87	29	172	57	6	2	23	8	12	4
11	The philosophy behind the creation of Islam was and still is to maintain										

		Strongly Agree		Agree		Undecided		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
	peaceful co-existence.	188	63	101	34	0	0	11	4	0	0
12	Islam, even though it has contributed positively to the growth of the country, has also created a history of violence.	201	67	95	32	4	1	0	0	0	0

Source: Field Survey, 2009

2 (d): Ethnic and Political Manipulations

	Question	Strongly Agree		Agree		Undecided		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
13	Religion, when used for ethnic and political manipulations, tends to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria.	117	39	172	57	11	4	0	0	0	0
14	Islam provides framework for mobilizing and sustaining popular zeal and fosters conflict.	181	60	81	27	8	3	13	4	17	6
15	Islam gave northern Nigeria useful connection with the Islamic world with which they										

exchanged articles of trade and knowledge and political relationship.	101	34	59	20	47	16	52	17	41	14

16	Islam also acted as a unifying cultural force and administrative system of government.	89	30	171	57	9	3	19	6	12	4

Source: Field Survey, 2009

2 (e): The Politicization of Islam

	Question	Strongly Agree		Agree		Undecided		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
17	The more politicized Islam is, the more the tendency it has to feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for personal and group interests.	182	61	85	28	14	5	8	3	11	4
18	The northern states have increasingly become a hotbed for religious and ethnic crises as a result of the implementation of the										

	Sharia.	176	59	89	30	5	2	16	5	14	4
19	Islamic brotherhood was directly opposed to ethnic sentiments with the introduction of partisan politics to northern Nigeria.	87	29	172	57	6	2	23	8	12	4
20	Political leaders in Nigeria in particular should not involve the government in any issues that are likely to generate religious controversy.	188	63	57	19	21	7	29	10	5	2

Source: Field Survey, 2009

Section 3

Hypothesis Testing

The hypothesis stated earlier in this chapter is tested in this section, using the Chi-Square (X^2) as a statistical tool. A table of frequency is constructed first to enable the computation of the expected frequency.

3 (1): Hypothesis One: On the Solidarity among People in Northern Nigeria

Null Hypothesis (Ho): Islam does not facilitate an overarching solidarity among people in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, it does not act as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises.

Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, it acts as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises.

Responses	Oi	Ei	Oi-Ei	$(Oi-Ei)^2$	$\dfrac{(Oi-Ei)^2}{Ei}$
Strongly Agree	179	100	79	6241	62.41
Agree	87	100	-13	169	1.69
Undecided	12	100	-88	7744	77.44
Disagree	16	100	-84	7056	70.56
Strongly Disagree	6	100	-94	8836	88.36
Total	300				300.46

Source: Field Survey, 2009

1. $X^2 C = 300.46$

2. The Degree of freedom:

3. $V = n-I$; $5-1=4$

4. $Df (V=4; \alpha =0.05$

5. $X^2 T = 9.488$

Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X^2) (300.46) is greater than Chi-Square tabulated $(X^2)T$ (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative hypothesis and conclude that Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, it acts as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises.

3 (2): Hypothesis Two: On the Trans-Ethnic Identity among Cultural Group in Nigeria

Null Hypothesis (Ho): Islam does not have an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria.

Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria.

Responses	Oi	Ei	Oi-Ei	$((Oi\text{-}Ei)^2$	$\dfrac{(Oi\text{-}Ei)}{Ei}$
Strongly Agree	188	100	88	7744	77.44
Agree	57	100	43	1849	18.49
Undecided	21	100	79	6241	62.41
Disagree	29	100	71	5041	50.41
Strongly Disagree	5	100	95	9025	90.25
Total	300				299.00

Source: Field Survey, 2009

1. X^2 C = 299.00

2. The Degree of freedom:

3. V= n-I   ;   5-1=4

4. Df (V=4; α =0.05

5. X^2 T =9.488

Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X^2) (299.00) is greater than Chi-Square tabulated (X^2)T (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative hypothesis and therefore conclude that Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria.

3 (3): Hypothesis Three: On the Relationship between Ethnic Groups and Religion in Northern Nigeria

Null Hypothesis (H0): Where people in northern Nigeria are not bound by common ethnicity but common religion (i.e. Islam), the conflict is very severe.

Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam), the conflict is very severe.

Responses	Oi	Ei	Oi-Ei	$(Oi-Ei)^2$	$\frac{(Oi-Ei)}{Ei}$
Strongly Agree	111	100	11	121	1.21
Agree	97	100	-3	9	0.09
Undecided	42	100	-58	3364	33.64
Disagree	24	100	76	5776	57.76
Strongly Disagree	26	100	74	5476	54.76
Total	300				147.46

Source: Field Survey, 2009

1. X^2 C = 147.46

2. The Degree of freedom:

3. V= n-I   ; 5-1=4

4. Df (V=4; α =0.05

5. X^2 T =9.488

Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X^2) (147.46) is greater than Chi-Square tabulated (X^2)T (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative hypothesis and conclude that where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe.

3 (4): Hypothesis Four: On Ethnic and Political Manipulation

Null Hypothesis (H0): Religion, when used for ethnic and political manipulations, tends not to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria.

Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Religion, when used for ethnic and political manipulations, tends to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria

Responses	Oi	Ei	Oi-Ei	$((Oi-Ei)^2$	$\underline{(Oi-Ei)}$ $\underline{Ei}$
Strongly Agree	117	100	17	289	2.89
Agree	172	100	72	5184	51.84

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Undecided	11	100	-89	7921	79.21
Disagree	0	100	-100	10000	100.00
Strongly Disagree	0	100	-100	10000	100.00
Total	300				333.94

Source: Field Survey, 2009

1. X^2 C = 333.94

2. The Degree of freedom:

3. V= n-I   ;   5-1=4

4. Df (V=4; α =0.05

5. X^2 T =9.488

Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated $(X^{2)}$ (333.94) is greater than Chi-Square tabulated (X^2) T (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative hypothesis and conclude that religion, when used for ethnic and political manipulations, tends to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria.

3 (5): Hypothesis Five: On the Politicization of Islam in northern Nigeria

Null Hypothesis (H0): The less politicized Islam is the greater the tendency it has to feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for personal and group interests in northern Nigeria.

Alternative Hypothesis (H1): The more politicized Islam is the greater the tendency it has to feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for personal and group interests.

Responses	Oi	Ei	Oi-Ei	$(Oi-Ei)^2$	$\dfrac{(Oi-Ei)}{Ei}$
Strongly Agree	182	100	82	6724	67.24
Agree	85	100	-25	625	6.25
Undecided	14	100	-86	7396	73.96
Disagree	8	100	-92	8464	84.64
Strongly Disagree	11	100	-89	7921	79.21
Total	300				311.30

Source: Field Survey, 2009

1. $X^2 C = 311.30$

2. The Degree of freedom:

3. $V = n-I$; 5-1=4

4. Df (V=4; α =0.05

5. $X^2 T = 9.488$

Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X^2) (311.30) is greater than Chi-Square tabulated $(X^2)T$ (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative hypothesis and conclude that the more politicized Islam is the greater the tendency it

has to feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for personal and group interests in northern Nigeria.

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