

A critical understanding of Khomeini
through his words during the Iran-Iraq war
(1980-88)



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Declaration

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University.

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

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My thanks also go to my family, my parents, my brother, my sister-in-law and my nieces for their continuous support and their unconditional love. I have not been a good son to my parents, but they have been the best parents in the world. I also need to thank my uncles, and their families for their generous support that without which, I could not have completed my PhD.

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Dedication

To my family: without their love, life would be impossible to bear.

Abstract

The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war is recognised as one of the longest wars of the 20th century. During that time, it is estimated that around half a million people were killed (Kurzman, 2013). From the beginning, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini saw the conflict as an opportunity to expand the Islamic Revolution into Iraq's territories. Hence, when after the liberation of Khorramshahr in May 1982, President Saddam Hussain called for a ceasefire, but Khomeini rejected it. While, several excellent pieces of research already have studied the Iran-Iraq war and Khomeini's ideology (Harmon and Todd, 2009; Moein, 2009; Willett, 2003; Hiro, 1990; Masters, 1991; Bakhsh, 2004; Razouxand and Elliott, 2015), by linking between Khomeini's words and his ideology during the war, this thesis makes a new contribution to the field. By making comparisons between Khomeini's thoughts before and after the revolution with his words during the Iran-Iraq war, it can be seen how his discourse during the Iran-Iraq war was shaped. Also, such a comparison helps us understand the complexities of Khomeini's doctrines and its evolution.

To do this, I built a corpus of 118,000 words of Khomeini, and it includes all of Khomeini's words during the war. This thesis studies how and why Khomeini insisted on the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war. Also, by fixing the Iran-Iraq war as a focal point to study Khomeini's thoughts, his view towards matters such as nationalism and sectarianism become apparent. The study shows that Khomeini did not use nationalist nor sectarian language during the war. Additionally, this thesis uses a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) as theoretical framework. Various studies have used such a combination as a theoretical framework (Charteris-Black, 2004 and Lukeš and Hart, 2007), however, this combination is mostly used to examine the linguistic aspect of the language. By contrast, this thesis intends to use the theoretical framework in broader political and social context. Namely, this research uses CMT and CDA to discover the political, not linguistic, features of Khomeini's discourse. Also, based on research theoretical framework, this thesis develops a new synthesis of methodological tools including intertextuality, metaphor analysis and predication strategy.

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Timeline

1979 (February): Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in Paris and the Pahlavi dynasty collapsed.

1979 (April): In a referendum, the Iranian people voted for an Islamic republic under the leadership of Khomeini.

1980 (April): An unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on former Foreign Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz. The Baath Party blamed Iran and Ayatollah Bagher Sadr for that attempt.

1980 (April): Sadr and his sister, bint al-Huda, were executed by the Baath regime and thousands of Iraqi Shias were arrested.

1980 (April): Khomeini heard about the execution of Ayatollah Sadr and sent a message to the Iraqi people and army officers, encouraging them to protest against the Baath regime.

1980 (September): Saddam Hussein blamed Iran for shattering the Algiers Accord by meddling in Iraq's affairs and supporting rebel groups.

1980 (September): Iraq invaded Iran from four different points.

1980 (October): Khorramshahr was sized by Iraq.

1981(May): Iraqi troops captured twenty-five miles of Iran's territories from Qasr-e-Shirin to Mehran.

1981 (Jun): Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the first Iranian president after the Revolution, was impeached by parliament for mismanagement resources in the war.

1981 (Jun): After ousting Bani-Sadr, a harmony was established between the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's regular army. Bani-Sadr favoured regular military operations, which was in sharp contrast with the tactics that were practised by the Revolutionary Guard.

1982 (March): Iran began the Fathol Mobin (Great victory) operation and by the end of this operation Iran had regained 940 square miles of its territories.

1982 (May): Khorramshahr was liberated 575 days after its fall.

1982 (Jun): Saddam called for a unilateral ceasefire and instructed the Iraqi army to withdraw from Iranian territories.

1982 (Jun) Khomeini proclaimed three conditions for peace: 1) Iraq should be punished, 2) the aggressor should pay compensations, and 3) Iraq should withdraw from Iranian territories

1982 (Jun): Iran launched an attack against Basra, the second-largest city in Iraq. However, Iran's military operation was unsuccessful.

1982 (July): UN Security Council passed resolution 514 and asked Iran and Iraq to agree on a ceasefire. Iraq accepted the resolution and Iran rejected it and reiterated its previous conditions for peace.

1982 (July): Algeria attempted to make peace between the two countries. Iraq welcomed Algeria's mediation, but Iran rejected it.

1983 (October): UN Security Council passed resolution 540 and asked for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq.

1983 (October): Iraq immediately accepted resolution 540 and announced that it was ready to give sufficient guarantee that Iraq will not break the truce between the two countries. However, Iran stated that it would never accept such a one-sided resolution.

1984 (February and March): Iran managed to capture some parts of Basra and Majnoon Island. Iraq retaliated by using chemical weapons.

1985 (January): Iraq enjoyed a wave of international support and started an operation towards Iran's border for the first time after 1982.

1986 (February): United Nations Security Council Resolution 582 was unanimously adopted by the UN and it called upon Iran and Iraq to immediately accept a ceasefire.

1986 (February): Iran reiterated its previous requests and Iraq welcomed the UN's attempt to end the war.

1986 (February): Iran launched Operation Valfaj 8 (Dawn 8).

1986 (February): During the operation, Iran successfully breached the Iraqi borders at several points and captured the Fao Peninsula.

1986 (April): Iraq regained control of the Fao Peninsula.

1986 (October): the GCC members suggested a plan that both countries should return to their borders and accept a ceasefire.

1986 (October): Based on GCC members' suggestion, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 588.

1987 (July): Resolution 598 was updated by United Nations Security Council and for the first time, the resolution included some punitive measures for the party that rejects the ceasefire.

1988 (July): Iraq recaptured all its territories, including Majoon Island.

1988 (July): Iran finally accepted UN Resolution 598, and both sides agreed to return to the old borders.


Maps

1: The War Zone



Source: (Tucker-Jones, 2018, p.194)

Map 2: Iraqi assault on Khuzestan (September 22– October 1, 1980)



Map Key

Size of military units:

XXX: Corps
 XX: Division
 X: Brigade
 III: Regiment
 II: Battalion

Type of Military Units:

INF: Infantry troops
 MD: Mechanized Division

Source: (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015, p.40)

Preface

My first recollection of Khomeini belongs to the day that he passed away. On that day, my dad came home earlier than usual, telling us that people are saying that Khomeini has died, and we were advised to close the shop. My parents were then nervously whispering about something for a while. I did not know what the exact problem was, but I knew something was not quite right. Later, I realised that they were worried that Khomeini's death might negatively affect their or my grandparents' lives. Both of my parents' brothers belonged to leftist political groups in Iran, and both were executed at the beginning of the revolution. My mom's brother was charged with distributing anti-revolutionary newspapers and just one day before his release from prison a famous cleric, Ayatollah Abdul Hossein Dastgheib, was killed in an explosion. The regime blamed anti-revolutionary groups for the death of the Ayatollah and in retaliation, executed some political prisoners, including my uncle. That sad memory was engraved in my parents' memories, they worried that Khomeini's death, like the death of Dastgheib, could have serious consequences for them.

The death did not trigger any trouble for them, but it just shows how they were afraid of Khomeini, and more precisely from his death. To avoid any possible clash with the regime, they chose an apolitical lifestyle. My brother and I were discouraged from talking about either politics or our family background with anyone. Life taught them that politics is a dangerous and sensitive area, and that it should be avoided as much as possible. In that sense, I was not a loyal child; I wanted to know what happens around me. Such curiosity was the reason why I changed my studies to politics after I got a degree in microbiology. I knew Khomeini was not really popular in our house, but I was aware that he had been loved by some Iranians, including some of my friends. On TV, I could see that Khomeini's words touched people inasmuch as their eyes were wet with tears when he was speaking. Likewise, the Ayatollah loved his disciples and compared them to the disciples of Imam Hussain and asserted that the Iranian Revolution was heading along the path of the prophets (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13).

One particular event that could show the influence of Khomeini's words on the Iranian people was the Iran-Iraq war. The conflict lasted for eight years and with around half a million deaths on both sides. A glance over the wills and testimonies of the war's casualties shows how Iranian soldiers were calling themselves Khomeini's soldiers, and they were ready to sacrifice their lives for him.

The Iran-Iraq war finished when I was just 3 and half years old, but I still remember a particular event when an Iraqi aircraft bombarded the wheat silage, which was located less than half a kilometre from

my parents' house. The aerial bombardment was so massive that as a result, all the windows in our house shattered. My mom grabbed my brother and I, and ran downstairs where my dad had built a small shelter for us with metal barrels; my dad even now says that the barrels for us were like helmets for soldiers in battlefields. I do not remember all the details, but it is still painful to recall my mom's foot bleeding, probably as a result of running apprehensively in a place full of shattered glasses.

It was the only memory that I have from the war. However, the end to the war by no means meant an end to the discourse of war. To this day, the Sacred Defence Week- an annual commemoration of the Iran-Iraq war- is honoured in Iran. The pictures of the war casualties have been painted around the cities in Iran, and most of the streets renamed with the name of the war's fallen soldiers. TV programmes give lectures about the greatness of the war and its everlasting achievement for the country. However, three decades after the end of the conflict, the official narrative about the war is being challenged by Iranians. For instance, now and then, I can see on my twitter timeline a series of tweets that question the necessity of the continuation of the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr in May 1982.

People are also questioning Khomeini's insistence on continuation of the war after Saddam called for a ceasefire. After the liberation of Khorramshahr, Khomeini (2010, vol16 and 17) constantly advised the Iranian people that the war should continue until Saddam was toppled. He asked the Iranian soldiers to purify their hearts for God "to reach the final victory" (Khomeini, 2010, vol16. p. 199).

An investigation into Khomeini's words during the war also enable us to identify other aspects of his ideology such as his views towards nationalism and sectarianism. Khomeini's words addressing the Iranian people show whether he intended to mobilise the Iranian people through nationalist language or not. Similarly, analysing his words to the Iraqi people can help us understand if he used sectarian language or not.

I do not deny that my background is not relevant to the way I look at Khomeini's ideology or the Iran-Iraq war. However, the same parents who do not like Khomeini taught me that I should not be biased and judgmental in my view of others. This time, and through this thesis, I tried to be obedient to their advice.

Introduction

In Persian literature, autumn has been usually used as a metaphor for death. Even Rumi (1981), a poet full of hope and optimism, describes autumn as a melancholic season. However, the autumn of 1980, literally, not only metaphorically, offered an inkling to one the bloodiest wars of the twentieth century; it is estimated that the Iran-Iraq war caused around half a million deaths from both sides (Kurzman, 2013). Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini did not see the breakout of the war as a disaster but assured Iranians that their belief in God would make them prevail over the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13).

The nascent revolution in Iran had a large number of devotees who were ready to sacrifice their lives for their Imam: Khomeini. Hence, one should not be surprised to know that eighty-four per cent of the war's fighters came from the Basij, a paramilitary volunteer militia that was established after the revolution (Iran-Times, n.d). Such devotees of the Imam were usually used as human shields in the front lines (Farrokh, 2011 and Karsh, 2014). They heard the Ayatollah's promise that "if we are killed, we will go to heaven, God's willing, and if we kill, we also go to heaven" (Khomeini, vol.13, p.440). These disciples of the Imam did not ask: "If God's on our side, who ... could be on theirs?" (Saving Private Ryan, 1998). Instead, many of them in their last words and testimonies advised the Iranian people to take care of the revolution and its leader: Khomeini (Hawzeh, 2016).

Alongside his speeches to the Iranian people, Khomeini also talked to the Iraqi people. In his discourses, Khomeini (2010, vol. 13) tried to convince Iraqis to rise against the Baath party and overthrow Saddam. He saw the Iraqi regime as an un-Islamic one that should be replaced with a more pious state. Therefore, he asked the Iraqi people to behave like the Iranian people and start a revolution (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 12). During the war, he also asked them to support Iran's army to topple Saddam and his regime (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 16).

A large body of studies has investigated the Iran-Iraq war from different angles (Hiro, 1990; Malone, 2007; Potter and Sick, 2014; Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). Such studies used various theories to explain the reasons behind the Iran-Iraq war. Also, a wide range of literature has studied Khomeini's ideology and life (Willett, 2003; Harmon and Todd, 2009; Moin, 2009). I situate this research amongst these studies, although with a different locus. I put the Iran-Iraq war as the starting point of studying Khomeini's ideology. Few studies (Soltanzadeh and Othman, 2013) have taken the

importance of the Iran-Iraq war in understanding of Khomeini's ideology into consideration, which is where this study intends to cover this gap. In doing so, this thesis analyses Khomeini's words to the Iranian and Iraqi people. Pursuing such a project can be beneficial to discussions on understanding Khomeini's thoughts on matters such as nationalism, sectarianism, peace and war.

Regarding nationalism, it is plausible that even forty years after the triumph of the 1979 revolution, there is still no unanimity of opinion among scholars and analysts on Khomeini's views on nationalism. For instance, there have been three different arguments in the literature on Khomeini's view about nationalism. The first group of scholars argues that Khomeini was a nationalist (Munson, 2003; Aburaiya, 2009; Aghai, 2009; Adib-Moghaddam, 2018). The second group of scholars applies religious nationalism to Khomeini's ideology (Gieling, 1999 and Farzaneh, 2007). Finally, the third group of researchers denies that Khomeini was either nationalist or religious nationalist.

Interestingly, the literature is even more ambiguous when it comes to Khomeini's nationalist views during the Iran-Iraq war. For instance, Saleh and Worrall articulate that Khomeini abhorred nationalism and for him it was just an Islamic Iran that was worth glorifying (Saleh and Worrall, 2015). They also argue that up until the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's officials followed the same viewpoint towards nationalism, but Iran softened its view towards nationalism after the war started (Saleh and Worrall, 2015). However, Saleh and Worrall do not explain whether the beginning of the war also changed Khomeini's views towards nationalism nor not.

The Iran-Iraq war was a conflict between a country with a majority Arab population- Iraq - and a country with majority non-Arab population - Iran. Hence, when the war started, the Iraqi regime hailed the conflict as 'Saddam's Qadisiyyah', referring to the battle of Qadisiyyah in the year 636 when Arabs conquered Persia (Lewental, 2014). Khomeini could have also used nationalistic language to mobilise the Iranian people against their Arab neighbours. However, as this thesis shows, Khomeini avoided using nationalistic language in his rhetoric towards the Iranian people. For Ayatollah Khomeini (2010, vol. 13), Islam was the main reason that the Iranian people rose against the Pahlavi regime, and it was that reason that united them in sacrificing their lives. For Khomeini (2010, vol.16), moving along the path of Islam was the main factor that distinguished Iranian soldiers from their Iraqi counterparts.

Saddam and the Baath party were bluntly nationalist, but they did not shy away from using sectarian language. As Bengio (2002) explains, *ṭāʿifiyya* (sectarianism) and *ṭāʿifia* (sect) were the most common terms that the Baath regime used to refer to Shias. Initially, these terms had neutral connotation and were used for referring to a particular group in society (Bengio, 2002). However, “it was the Baath party that gave it an exceedingly derogatory note, using it in the contexts of racism, tribal fanaticism, and civil strife” (Bengio, 2002, p. 100). The term *ṭāʿifiyya* was used by the Baath Party “to convey to the Shia that loyalty to the Iraqi state must be placed above loyalty to their religion — otherwise there was a danger that in times of crisis Iraqi Shiʿis would look to their coreligionists in Iran rather than act in conformity with Iraqi interests” (Bengio, 2002, p. 100).

Applying such a policy by the Baath Party left no room to doubt that the Iranian Revolution “across the border enhanced the awareness of the Iraqi Shiʿi of their sectarian identity” (Dawisha, 1999, p.557). Therefore, the Shia groups such as *al-Daʿwa* gained a fresh impetus to fight against the Baath Party (Dawisha, 1999). Although Iran supported Shia groups in Iraq, we should not jump to conclusion that Khomeini and Iran followed a sectarian policy in Iraq. Put differently, scholarship on Khomeini’s attitude towards sectarianism is divided. Scholars such as Nasr (2004) and Cohen (2018) argue that Khomeini tried to expand Shia Islam into the Islamic World. For instance, Nasr highlights that Khomeini openly supported Shia political groups in Pakistan and Syria (Nasr, 2004). Likewise, Cohen argues that Khomeini’s “religious-political interest was to enhance Shiʿa dominance” (2018, p.36). However, there are scholars who claim that there is nothing sectarian about Khomeini’s ideology (Enayat, 1983; Rhanamh, 2014; Sabet, 2014). For instance, Enayat and Sabet infer that by introducing the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*, the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, Khomeini contradicted the conventional approach of Shia seminaries and moved closer to the Sunni school of thought.

While the Iran-Iraq war can shed more light on Khomeini’s views towards sectarianism, neither group of scholars has given much attention to the importance of the Iran-Iraq war in investigating this aspect of Khomeini’s ideology. It is true that the war between Iran and Iraq was a conflict between two countries with different ethnicities, but it also true it was a conflict between two neighbours with Shia majority populations. Fifty-five per cent of the Iraqi people during the war were Shia Muslims (CIA, 1984) and they were ruled by a non-Shia government (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). Such a situation could be tempting for Khomeini to operate a ‘divide and rule’ policy. However, as will be seen in chapter five, Khomeini’s writing during exile and his words during the

Iran-Iraq war call for unity amongst Muslim people around the world. Analysing Khomeini's words during the war show that in his 30,000 words to the Iraqi people, he never targeted the Shia population in Iraq, but always addressed the entire Iraqi people regardless of their sects. Put differently, although Khomeini tried to convince the Iraqi people to back Iran in the war, he did not ask the Shia population to rise against a Sunni government. Instead, he asked all Muslim people in Iraq to help Iran to topple an un-Islamic government: the Baath Party.

Khomeini's insistence on toppling Saddam was one of the main reasons that the Iran-Iraq conflict became one of the longest wars in the 20th century¹. A large body of work have studied why some wars are longer than others (Ramsay, 2008; Stanley and Sawyer, 2009; Nilsson, 2012; Fearon, 2013; Nilsson, 2018). Political scientists have written most of these studies, therefore, rather than addressing the role of ideology in prolonging a war, they seek to rationalise the continuation of a conflict "in terms of commitment to problems and private information" (Nilsson, 2018, p.94). Moreover, the importance of language, and more explicitly religious language, has not received much scholarship. The Iran- Iraq war and Khomeini's religious discourse for legitimising the continuation of the conflict can be a good case study to reflect on how ideology can prolong a war. It can show us how after the liberation of Khorramshahr and when Saddam expressed his willingness for peace, Khomeini insisted on the continuation of the war (HDRDC, 2008).

To cover such gaps in the literature, this thesis addresses the following question:

- To what extent can Khomeini's ideology be seen as nationalistic or sectarian?
- How did Khomeini frame the war to the Iranian and Iraqi people?
- What were the key determining factors in Khomeini's decision to continue the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr, and how did he justify this decision to his audiences?

Addressing the first question helps us develop a better understanding of Khomeini's ideology towards matters such as nationalism and sectarianism. Discussing the second question can help us realise how Khomeini framed the war to his audiences. Also, talking about the third research question helps us recognise why and how Khomeini insisted on the

¹ See chapter six.

continuation of the war. But before addressing these questions the Iran-Iraq war and its roots should be discussed. Such a review helps us get acquainted with the events that led to the war. It also helps us realise that the two countries had issues with each other on national borders and sect-based politics, even years before the Iran-Iraq war. More importantly, an accurate understanding of the Iran- Iraq war helps us get a better vision of the context in which Khomeini addressed his audiences.

[A brief history of Iran-Iraq tensions from the 16th century to the Iraq Revolution \(1958\)](#)

Some scholars claim that the roots of conflict and animosity between Iran and Iraq should be traced back to when Iraq was under the control of the Ottomans, and Persia was ruled by the Safavid Empire (1502-1722) (Marr, 1985 and Osman, 2014). During this time as Malone (2007: 23) infers “division lines were cemented by divergent religious beliefs”. With the introduction of Shia Islam as the official religion of Iran during the Safavid dynasty, the Sunni Ottomans feared that their Shia neighbour would attempt to incite the Shia population in Iraq (Holden, 2018). Both states were guilty of embracing sectarian policies “in the service of their imperial designs, come across as the taproot of the Muslim sectarian rift in Iraqi society” (Osman, 2014, p.195).

The hostility between the two empires continued even after the collapse of the Safavid dynasty in 1722 (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). The collapse of the Safavids led into a series of territorial losses for Persia. The Iranians’ attempts to retake those territories provoked a new series of wars between the two nations in the 1730s and 1740s (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). The Treaty of Kurdan terminated these territorial disputes between the Ottoman Empire and Persia in 1746 (Masters, 1991). Although the treaty gave the Iranian people the right to complete the pilgrimage to the holy Shia shrines in Ottoman Iraq, it accentuated that “the Persian people, having totally abandoned the unseemly innovations introduced in the time of the Safavids and having embraced the religion of the Sunnis, shall mention the Orthodox Caliphs, of blessed memory, with respect and veneration” (Cited in Masters, 1991, pp. 10-11).

However, the Treaty of Kurdan did not end the hostility between the two states and the dispute continued until the 19th century while the Qajar dynasty was ruling in Iran (Aboulhasani, 2006). On 31st of May 1847, the Treaty of Erzurum was signed between a delegate from the Qajar Dynasty and the Ottoman Empire (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). The treaty established the frontiers between the two states with greater accuracy with the help of Russia and Britain (Razouxand and

Elliott, 2015). In the Treaty of Erzurum, Iran relinquished its claim over Suleimaniya and some parts of Qasr-e-Shirin and, in return, got Muhammara (Khorramshahr) (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). The Treaty of Erzurum also defined the Shatt-Al-Arab boundaries, and in 1914 the International Boundary Commission confirmed these boundaries (Bakhash, 2004). Although Iran's delegate initially signed the contract, however, Mohammad Shah Qajar¹ refused to sign the agreement, arguing that Iran's rights had been denied in the Shatt-Al-Arab (Aboulhasani, 2006).

In 1932, Iraq became an independent state, although in reality it was still governed by Britain as the mandatory power (Hume, 1994). The problems between Iran and Iraq still existed (Wilks, 2016). In the 1930s, Iran expressed its discontent towards the Treaty of Erzurum by claiming that the boundaries of 1914 were defined unequally (Bakhash, 2004). In those years, due to its unstable political situation, Iraq was in a weaker position than Iran, hence, pressure from Iran led to a new agreement between the two countries in 1937 (Hiro, 1990). The new deal shifted the boundaries of the Shatt-Al-Arab in Iraq's favour (Hiro, 1990; Potter and Sick, 2004; Malone, 2007; Elliott and Razouxand, 2015). After that, the relations between the two countries showed some improvements, especially when Nuri-al-Sa'id, a pro-Western prime-minister, was in power in Iraq (Bakhash, 2004). The Shah of Iran and Nuri-al Said were determined to fight communism in their countries. Also, as Bakhash state collaboration was "the product of common regional security" (2004, p.11). However, this functional relationship did not last long, and this short period of peace between the two nations came to an end when the government of Iraq was overthrown by the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 (Hiro, 1990).

[Iran-Iraq relations after the Iraqi Revolution](#)

The 1958 Revolution in Iraq caused strain in the relationship between the two neighbours. General Qasim, who was the head of the new revolutionary regime in Iraq, improved his relations with the Soviet Union and considered the pro-Western government in Iran as a truculent government (Bakhash, 2004). Conversely, Iran during the Pahlavi dynasty improved its relationship with the West, and particularly with the USA (Hiro, 1990). During the Qasim government, Iran-Iraq hostility regarding the Shatt-Al-Arab once again flared up (Hiro, 1990 and Bakhash, 2004). Mohammad Reza Shah, the Shah of Iran, believed that the Shatt-Al-Arab boundaries should be based on the 1937 Iran-Iraq agreement, while Qasim's administration

¹ Then the King of Iran.

asserted that the deal was imposed unfairly on Iraq (Hiro, 1990). However, Qasim's power was challenged by Kurdish rebels, the Baath party and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). Such a position put Iraq in the weaker position than its neighbour. While in these years Iran's situation was relatively stable, Iraq experienced three coups and five various governments between 1958-68. Iran particularly gained more power in the region after Britain declared in 1968 that it would withdraw its military bases from East of Suez by 1971 (Bakhash, 2004). Afterwards, the Shah positioned himself as "guardian of the Gulf" (Karsh, 1990, p. 27) and decided to cover the vacuum Britain had left in the Gulf.

The same year that Britain announced its decision, the Baath party came to power in Iraq (Mallat, 1988). The Baath regime called for freedom (*hurriyah*) from foreign control, unity (*wihdah*) between all Arabs in one single government and socialism (*ishtirakiyah*) (Devlin, 1991). As a result of such slogans, the party developed its relationship with the Soviet Union and supported an Arab separatist movement in Khuzestan (Bakhash, 2004). Such policies gave the Shah unease. Hence, Iran tried to make the new regime in Iraq unstable. For instance, the Shah's regime supported a military coup against the Iraqi government just one year after the Baath Party came to power (Karsh, 1990). Furthermore, for making the central government in Iraq unstable, Iran armed Kurdish guerrillas that were already fighting against the Baath regime (Hiro, 1990). The hostility between the two neighbours reached its highest point in 1974-75 when the two countries experienced direct military confrontation (Karsh, 1990).

The conflict and Iran's support for Kurdish rebels spelled disaster for the Iraqi economy and militarily, hence, Iraq saw no alternative but to negotiate with Iran (Sirriyeh, 1985 and Bakhash, 2004). Such a situation paved the way for the Algiers Agreement, an agreement between the Shah and Saddam Hussein, the vice president of the Baath regime at the time (Karsh, 1990; Hiro, 1990; Bakhash, 2004). The Algiers Agreement was signed on 6 March 1975 in Algiers and it defined the boundaries of Shatt-Al-Arab based on the 1937 Iran-Iraq agreement. In response, Iran promised to stop bolstering the Kurdish insurgents (Karsh, 1990; Hiro, 1990; Bakhash, 2004). The Shah finally got what Iran had pursued in the Shatt-Al-Arab, hence, after the agreement Iran withdrew its support from the Kurds, which subsequently led to a ceasefire between Iraq and the Kurdish rebels (Sirriyeh, 1985). Afterwards, the relationship between the two states enjoyed a period of stability, however, this peaceful situation changed dramatically with the advent of Islamic Revolution in Iran (Donovan, 2011; Razouxand and Elliott, 2015).

Iran-Iraq relations after the Iranian Revolution and the breakout of the war

By the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the relationship between Iran and Iraq experienced lots of strain, which finally culminated in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Iraq recognised the new government in Iran, however, Iran did not reciprocate such moves (Donovan, 2011). The new Iranian regime's insistence on exporting the Islamic Revolution made the leaders in the Persian Gulf, including Saddam Hussein, concerned that Iran's revolutionary government might make their states unstable (Bakhash, 1980 and Donovan, 2011).

Khomeini's militant slogans gained a powerful attraction among the Shia population of Iraq (Hiro, 1990). Just after the triumph of the Revolution, in a congratulatory telegraph, Ayatollah Bagher Sadr wrote to Khomeini that: "other tyrants have yet to see their day of reckoning" (cited in Hiro, 1990, p. 28). Sadr also issued a fatwa articulating that it is forbidden for Muslims to belong to the Baath Party (Mallat, 1988). In April 1980, an unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. The Baath regime found a new pretext to put more pressure on the Shia community in Iraq (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). Tariq Aziz survived, however, the Baath Party blamed Iran and Ayatollah Bagher Sadr for the assassination (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). Sadr and his sister, bint al-Huda, were executed by the Baath regime, and thousands of Shias were arrested (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). In addition to that, Iraq expelled thousands of Iranians who were living in Iraq at the time (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015).

Following the death of Sadr and his sister, on the 22 of April 1980 Khomeini sent a message to the Iraqi officers and encouraged them and to protest against the Baath regime (Afshari, 2014). The message was translated and distributed among the Iraqi people (Afshari, 2014).

To make the situation even worse, Iran granted asylum to the Barzani brothers, two leaders of the Kurdish rebels that had fought against the central government in Baghdad between 1974-75 (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). The Baath interpreted such a move as an attempt by Tehran to destabilise Iraq's government and saw it as a move against the Algiers Agreement (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). On 17 September 1980, in a televised speech, Saddam Hussein proclaimed that Iran had shattered the Algiers Accord by meddling in Iraq's affairs through financing and supporting rebel groups (Hiro, 1990). Then, Saddam declared that "we consider the Accord as abrogated from our side" (Hiro, 1990, p.39). Just five days later, Iraq invaded Iran from four different points (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). Chubin correctly highlights the reasons for Iraq's

invasion of Iran as: “motivated by fear, opportunism and overconfidence, a mixture of defensive and offensive calculations, Iraq’s decision to resort to force was a compound of a preventive war, ambition and punishment for a regional rival” (Cited in Hiro, 1990, p.39).

To attack Iran, Saddam and his armed forces had a three-pronged strategy (See Map 2). On the northern fronts, Iraqi troops captured twenty-five miles of Iran’s territories from Qasr-e-Shirin to Mehran (Tucker-Jones, 2018). On the central fronts, Iraq managed to capture some of Iran’s territories from Dezful to Ahwaz (Tucker-Jones, 2018). Finally, on the southern bridgehead, Iraqi’s troops occupied a six-mile area of Iran’s soil from Khorramshahr to Abadan (Tucker-Jones, 2018). On 24 October 1980 Iraq fully sized Khorramshahr. However, what saved Iran from a complete defeat was not Iran’s robust military response, but rather, Saddam’s limited military objectives (Karsh, 2014). The Iraqi government had hoped that this would be enough to create disarray across Iran and to encourage Khomeini and Iranian leaders to start renegotiation over the Shatt Al-Arab. As Wright indicates the war for Iraq “was an extension of the politics of border negotiations by means of a military siege” (1980: 278). Additionally, for Saddam, the war was an opportunity to halt Iran’s threat against the Baath regime (Karsh, 2014).

However, Saddam dramatically had miscalculated the situation, and Iran not only did not see the war as a threat to its survival but the new revolutionary regime in Iran considered it “as a means of consolidating its power, displacing its rivals, and transforming Iran’s political culture” (Takeyh, 2015, p. 367). Therefore, when a nine-member delegation suggested a peace accord between Iran and Iraq, much to Baghdad’s vexation, Iran rejected the suggestion. In the war, Iran had several advantages compared to its neighbour. For instance, Iraq’s population in 1980 was around 16-17 million while at the same time, Iran’s population was about 45 million (Farrokh, 2011). The revolutionary spirit of the Iranian armed forces was another advantage. Similar to their revolutionary leaders and Khomeini, Iran’s soldiers considered war as a great opportunity for Iran to export its revolution to the rest of the world (Navid-Shahde, 2016 and Hawzeh, 2016). Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Parliament and the commander in chief, in his monthly column for *Pasdaran-e Islam*-the guardians of Islam- reflected on this when he said: “Therefore, we reach that conclusion that this war should continue until we achieve our goals” (1980, p.66).

The impeachment of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the first Iranian president after the revolution by parliament on 20 June 1981 was a turning point in the war for Iran. Bani-Sadr was accused of being

a client of Western countries and mismanagement of the resources in the war (Takeyh, 2006). Bani-Sadr fled the country and went to France where he still lives. Bani-Sadr favoured a regular military operation, which was in sharp contrast with the guerrilla tactics that were practised by the Revolutionary Guard¹. After ousting Bani-Sadr, finally, harmony was established between the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's regular army (Farrokh, 2011). In March 1982, Iran began the Fathol Mobin (Great victory) Operation and by the end of it, Iran had regained 940 square miles of its territories and captured 15000 Iraqi armed forces; the next step was Khorramshahr (Farrokh, 2011). To liberate Khorramshahr, Iran launched the Beit Ul-Moghdadas- Holy city- offensive. The last phase of the operation began on 22 May. Iran deployed around 70,000 troops against 35,000 Iraqi armed forces inside Khorramshahr (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990). The operation was a significant success for Iran and Khorramshahr was liberated 575 days after its fall (Farrokh, 2011). After the liberation of Khorramshahr, Iran arrived to Iraq's territories and proclaimed that the war should continue until Saddam's regime was toppled (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990).

After Khorramshahr was regained by Iran, Saddam withdrew all his troops from Iran and called for a ceasefire (Karsh, 2014). Thanks to its recent victories, the Iranian regime responded with a more hubristic manner than ever and proposed two prerequisites for any peace deal: 1) the removal of Saddam from power 2) payment of \$ 150 billion USD as compensation. Around a week after Saddam's peace proposal, Iran launched an attack towards Basra, the second-largest city in Iraq. However, this time Iran's military operation, in contrast with the two previous operations, was unsuccessful. After defeat in the Fathol Mobin and Beit Ul-Moghdadas operations, Saddam had improved his military facilities and such an improvement proved rewarding, and Iran failed to capture Basra. However, Iran insisted on the continuation of the war, and during the summer of 1983 Iran launched five massive offensives in the direction of the Iraqi territories, all of which failed to accomplish Iran's goals.

On 24 February Iran launched another major offensive in the direction of Basra, the operation of Khaybar. As Karsh states:

For some time it seemed as if the Iranians were about to breach Iraq's formidable line of defence, as they managed to cross the vast expanse of marshland, considered impassable by the Iraqis, and to

¹In 5 May 1979, to establish order and also to keep an eye on regular army, Khomeini decided to establish a parallel army fully loyal to the revolution and its revolutionary zeal (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015)

capture Majnun Island, strategically situated on the southern front, some 40 miles north of Basra (2014, p.56).

However, Iraq prevented Iran's advances by spraying Tabun nerve gas, releasing 200,000- volt electrical discharge into the marshes near to the Iranian base and using chemical gas (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). Despite all these, the Iranian army managed to keep control of Majnoon Island. Due to Iran's intransigence over the suggested peace deals, by January 1985 Iraq enjoyed a wave of international support and started an operation towards Iran's border for the first time since 1982. However, the scale of the operation was not large, and Iran managed to thwart the Iraqi operation.

In February 1986 Iran launched Operation Valfaj 8 (Dawn 8), which was another turning point. During the operation, Iran successfully breached the Iraqi line at several parts and captured the Fao Peninsula, a strategic city in Iraq, and only port before Basra (Tucker-Jones, 2018). Afterwards, the Iran armed forces moved towards Umm Qasr and "had this follow-up attack succeeded, Iran would have severed Iraq from the Gulf and would have become Kuwait's immediate neighbor" (Karsh, 2014, p.46). Although Iran could not expand its operation in other parts of Iraq, however, it gave it massive confidence to continue in the war. Karbala-4 (December 1986) and Karbala-5 (January 1987) were the last two major operations in the direction of Basra. Despite their initial achievement, these two operations were thwarted by Iraq and Iran lost a massive number of its people and military equipment.

On 17 April 1988, after almost six years in defensive position, Iraq regained the control of the Fao Peninsula in a 48-hour operation (Farrokh, 2011). As Tucker-Jones observes, "essentially the victory at Fao in 1986 had been for nothing, while the battle for Basra had fatally weakened the Iranian armed forces" (2018, p.71). By 12 July 1988, Iraq recaptured all its territories, including Majnoon Island (Nilsson, 2018; Tucker-Jones, 2018). Saddam did not reiterate his claim over Shatt al-Arab; instead, on 17 July he called for a ceasefire (Nilsson, 2018). On the same day, Khomeini, who was serving as Iran's president, sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar announcing that Iran would accept UN Resolution 598 calling for a return to the old borders (Nilsson, 2018).

On 20 July 1988, in a letter to Iranian people, Khomeini (2010, vol.21) confirmed that Iran had reluctantly accepted UN Resolution 598. In this letter, he said that accepting the peace for him was like drinking from a "poisoned chalice" (Khomeini, 2010, p.93). By the time of the ceasefire, Khomeini realised if the war continued, the very existence of the Islamic Republic would be in peril.

For Khomeini this was the red line. In Khomeini's (2010, vol.15) ideology, the existing of the Islamic Revolution was the most critical thing. In his lectures on the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*, he meticulously argued that establishing an Islamic government was the aims of all the prophet and the Shia Imams (Khomeini, 2015). After the revolution, he articulated the importance of securing revolution when he said:

Meaning, protecting the Islamic Republic is more important than the preservation of one person[life] – even this person is the Imam of the Era, because the Imam also sacrifices himself for Islam. All the prophets ...had come to struggle for the word of truth and for the religion of God, and they sacrificed themselves (Khomeini, 2010, vol.15, p.93).

By the time that Iran accept the ceasefire, Iran was in the worst position throughout the whole war (Farrokh, 2011). Just before the ceasefire, the Iranian army experienced the worst defeat in the entirety of the war in Dehloran, an Iranian city close to the Iraqi border (Farrokh, 2011). Iran lost a significant amount of military equipment to the extent that it took four days for the Iraqi army to transfer the captured pieces of equipment to Iraq (Farrokh, 2011). All five permanent members of the UN Security supported 598 UN Resolution, including China, which was the major arms supplier to Iran (Shipler, 1987). Therefore, Khomeini faced a dilemma: either to accept the deal and keep the revolution alive or continue to fight in a holy jihad that might destroy the revolution and the Islamic Republic. For Khomeini, the security of the revolution was more important, hence, he accepted the resolution. However, it was not an easy decision for Khomeini and in his letter to the Iranian people in July 1988 he labelled the UN Resolution as a poisoned chalice that he drank for the sake of God.

He also knew that accepting peace with Saddam was in stark contrast to what he had advocated during the eight years of the war. Hence, in a letter he said that "my revolutionary sons: those who are not ready to stop your holy pride...I know [accepting peace] is difficult for you, but [do not you know] it is also hard for me as well?" (Khomeini, 2010, vol.21, p.94). Khomeini never appeared in the public and his family members and housekeepers recalled that he never smiled again (Fras, 2015). To have a better understanding of Khomeini, and his role in the war, the development of his ideological stance before and after the revolution should be studied.

Thesis outline

In the next chapter a discussion about Khomeini's life and ideology will be provided. The chapter will introduce Khomeini's main thoughts. The influence of these thoughts can be traced to Khomeini's words during the Iran-Iraq war. In other words, to understand Khomeini's thoughts on nationalism and sectarianism through the lens of Iran-Iraq war, his ideology such as *velayat-e faqih* and *taqiyyah*, precautionary dissimulation, needed to be studied. Chapter two introduces a theoretical framework for the study of Khomeini's corpus during the war, which is a combination of CDA and CMT. The theoretical framework is examined in four stages. The first stage introduces cognitive approaches, constructivist discourse analysis and poststructuralist discourse analysis as the main three potential alternative approaches to CDA. However, cognitive approaches and poststructuralist discourse analysis can be problematic to apply to understand Khomeini's discourse, due to their problematic ontological presuppositions. Constructivism ontologically is consistent with the constructive/interpretative ontological stance of this research. However, once constructivism comes to the study of discourse, it cannot be more than a descriptive tool (Carta and Morin, 2014). This is the reason that in stage two CDA is presented as one part of the theoretical framework. Despite all its advantages, CDA fails to recognise the importance of cognitive approaches (Chilton, 2005 and Koller, 2004). Therefore, to cover this lapse, stage three suggests that cognitive metaphors should be added to CDA as a complementary theory. Stage four introduces the theoretical framework of the research: a combination of the CDA and CMT. Finally, stage five justifies the use of CDA and CMT as two "Western theories" in a non-Western case study. Although a combination of CDA and CMT per se is not new, the theoretical framework introduced in this chapter mainly focuses on the political aspects of language rather than its linguist aspects.

Moreover, the theoretical framework in chapter two prepares the ground for developing a methodology for study in chapter three. The methodology has four pillars: intertextuality, interdiscursivity, predication strategy, and metaphor analysis. Intertextuality and predication strategy are drawn from CDA while metaphor analysis is driven from CMT. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity, as two CDA tools, can show the link between ideology and language (Bloor and Bloor 2007). Hence, they would be useful methodological tools to show how intertextual usage of Islamic texts and events in Khomeini's discourse can lead us to a better understanding of his ideology. These two methods are also able to inform the persuasion strategies employed in rhetoric

(Bloor and Bloor 2007). Likewise, using the predication strategy can help shed light on Khomeini's ideology on matters such as nationalism and sectarianism. For example, as chapter four shows, Khomeini never used sectarian language against the Iraqi people. Also, analysing the use of predication strategy by Khomeini can demonstrate how Khomeini normalised the continuation of the war by using positive labels for the war and negative labels for the peace suggestions.

Finally, by studying the metaphors that the Ayatollah Khomeini used during the war, his way of thinking and the ways that he reinforces them can be understood. For instance, by analysing brotherhood metaphors in Khomeini's discourse in addressing the Iraqi people, it can be seen that Khomeini avoided using sectarian language against the Iraqi people. Likewise, the study of journey metaphors in Khomeini's corpus in addressing the Iranian people shows how the Ayatollah represented a religiously positive view of the continuation of the war.

By analysing Khomeini's words during the war, Chapter four focuses on Khomeini's views on nationalism. The chapter first analyses the use of journey metaphors in Khomeini's discourse during the war and then it argues why the Ayatollah's usage of these metaphors demonstrates that he was neither a nationalist nor religious nationalist. Then, the chapter looks at the labels that Khomeini used during the Iran-Iraq war. To this end, first, this chapter reflects on what Khomeini meant by *millat* (nation) because Khomeini's usage of term *millat* is the reasons that authors like Grinberg (2017) and Gieling (1999) conclude that nationalism is part of Khomeini's ideology. Second, the chapter reveals how other labels that Khomeini used during the war¹ reinforced the idea that Khomeini's main concern was not nationalism. Finally, the chapter discusses why Khomeini's interdiscursive and intertextual use of Islamic sources illustrates that he was not a nationalist.

Chapter five investigates the link between Khomeini's ideology and sectarianism. To that end, the chapter looks at Khomeini's words to the Iraqi people during the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, it can be seen that demonising metaphors and war with Islam are the central metaphors in Khomeini's discourse when he was addressing the Iraqi people. The chapter also shows that despite a significant usage of demonising metaphors by Khomeini, he did use these metaphors in a non-sectarian way. Additionally, this chapter shows how Khomeini referred to the historical events and

¹ For instance, country of Islam, the warriors of Islam and the children of Quran.

the Quran in a non-sectarian way. It also discusses how Khomeini avoided using any sectarian language in his intertextual use of the Islamic sources and interdiscursive use of the Quran. Meanwhile, it will be seen how Khomeini by these three strategies tried to convince the Iraqi people to support Iran in the war.

Chapter six shows how Khomeini used religious language to normalise the continuation of the war. For instance, Khomeini selectively quoted from the Quran to normalise war between the two Islamic countries. The chapter also demonstrates how Khomeini rarely used the word 'defence' to describe the war between Iran and Iraq after the liberation of Khorramshahr. Such a labelling strategy helped Khomeini to refuse all the calls for a ceasefire. For the Ayatollah, Iran was defending itself; therefore, there was no need for a ceasefire. Additionally, chapter six shows how Khomeini used journey metaphors to normalise and prolong the war. Finally, in the conclusion chapter, a summary of the whole thesis is discussed.

Chapter 1: Khomeini's life and thoughts

Do not risk a thought.

These are strange times, dear...

The person who knocks on the door at midnight

They come to kill the light.

We better hide light in the closet...

(Shamlu, 2013)

Introduction

The previous chapter briefly studied the Iran-Iraq war and its roots. However, before studying Khomeini's ideology throughout the war, the development of his ideology before the Revolution should be analysed. This chapter studies how Khomeini developed his ideology on matters such as involvement in politics and contracting with Sunni Islam. The young Khomeini was under the influence of his apolitical teachers, therefore he also did not get involved in politics. However, after the death of his teachers and when he became an ayatollah, he advocated his political ideology more freely. Also, when the Shah of Iran introduced his social plans for developing the country, Khomeini found such reforms un-Islamic, and therefore became more outspoken than ever. The Shah decided to send him to exile, first to Turkey and then to Iraq and France. As this chapter shows, in Iraq, Khomeini (2015) developed his ideology on how an Islamic country should be run. Also, it was in Iraq that Khomeini theologially talked about the importance of unity between Shias and Sunnis. Having a clear understanding of these aspects of Khomeini's thought can help us in analysing Khomeini's words during the Iran-Iraq war. For instance, if we study Khomeini's theological view of the importance of unity between Shias and Sunnis, it will help us understand him better when we analyse his words to the Iraqi people in chapter five.

It is true that Khomeini was a *faqih*, but we should be careful not to overlook his other thoughts. For instance, mysticism was an important part of Khomeini's (2007; 2013; 2016) ideology and such a fact should not be ignored if we want to have a holistic understanding of his thoughts. Such an aspect of Khomeini's ideology represents itself more clearly when he used mystical words to explain why the Iran-Iraq war should continue after the liberation of Khorramshahr and after Saddam withdrew his forces from Iran.

In doing so, we will first study the development of his ideology from the time that he was a non-political cleric until the time that he became an important opponent of the Shah's regime. Then, we shall examine how Khomeini developed his ideology when he was living in exile. In the next step, we will analyse how he implemented his political thoughts in Iran after the revolution. Finally, we will study Khomeini's view on the Iran-Iraq war.

[Khomeini from quietism to a political dissident](#)

Khomeini was born in a merchant-cleric family in Khomein, a small city in the southwest of Iran (Sabet, 2014). When he was an infant, his father was killed, and the reason for his death is still unknown (Harmon and Todd, 2009). At the age of four, he started learning the Quran, and by doing that he also learned how to read and write (Harmon and Todd, 2009). By the age of 15, Khomeini was an orphan, so he went to live with his brother, Morteza Mousavi Pasandideh (Harmon and Todd, 2009). Pasandideh was six years older than his brother and lived seven years more than Khomeini (Kadivar, 2016). Pasandideh himself was a cleric and had a good relationship with his brother, however, politically, he did not support his brother.

Before the revolution, Pasandideh was a supporter of the National Front and its leader Mohammad Mosaddegh, and in the confrontation between Mosaddegh and Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani in 1950s¹, he supported Mosaddegh (Kadivar, 2016). Conversely, Khomeini (2010, vol15) denounced Mosaddegh, and supported Kashani. After the revolution, he diverged from his brother by supporting the Council of Nationalist-Religious Activists of Iran, a group that Khomeini publicly denounced (Kadivar, 2017).

Pasandideh believed in both nationalism and Islam (Moradiniya 2016) while Khomeini denounced nationalism.² After the revolution, Khomeini marginalised those clerics who believed in nationalism and Mosaddegh, including his brother and Ayatollah Zanjani, one of his first classmates (Kadivar, 2017 and 2017a). However, the young Khomeini was still under the guardianship of his brother, and after consultation with Pasandideh, he decided to pursue his religious studies in Isfahan (Moin, 2009). Even before moving to Isfahan, Khomeini always

¹ When Mosaddegh became Iran's prime minister, he pushed for nationalisation of Iran's oil industry. Kashani first supported Mosaddegh but when Mosaddegh moved towards republicanism and the communist Tudah Party, Kashani diverged from the Prime Minister Mossadegh. Kashani later supported the orchestrated the 1953 coup against the Prime Minister and his government (See Hoveyda, 2003).

² See chapter four.

wanted to study under the supervision of Sheikh Abdolkarim Haeri, a pious and well-known ayatollah. Hence, Khomeini moved from Isfahan to Arak when Haeri established a theological seminary in Arak (Willett, 2003). As a young theology student, Khomeini was heavily under the influence of Haeri, who, like most Shia clerics, refrained from getting engaged in politics (Moslem, 2002). Haeri once stated: “participating in politics equates bleeding and disputing, and I am not ready to see the blood of innocent people wasted” (cited in Fayazi, 1999: 79-78). During the Pahlavi period, Haeri insisted on a quietist approach and did not participate in politics (Willett, 2003). In 1922, Haeri moved to Qom where he established the city as a centre of Shia teaching to rival Najaf (Nasr, 2016). Khomeini joined his teacher at Qom and always remembered the city positively so much that after revolution he once told visitors from Qom that: “wherever I may be I am a citizen of Qom and I take pride in the fact that my heart is always with Qom and its people” (cited in Willett, 2003: 17).

After the death of Ayatollah Haeri in 1936, Ayatollah Borujerdi became the source of emulation, *Marja-e Taqlid*, and Khomeini’s teacher. Again, Khomeini followed his teacher who refrained from politics (Ferdows, 1983). However, it was in 1942 that Khomeini wrote his first political book *Kashfol al-Asrar* - literalism, Revelation of the Divine Secrets. The book was Khomeini’s angry and critical response to a published pamphlet by Ali-Akbar Hakimzadeh. In the pamphlet, Hakimzadeh blamed *ulamah*, Islamic Scholar, for promulgating false information among people to perpetuate their power and status (Richard, 1998). In *Kashfol al-Asrar* Khomeini aimed to defend the apparatus of *ulamah*. What makes this book important is the fact that Khomeini here for the first time speaks about his political ideology. It is in this book that Khomeini (1942) explains the role of *ulamah* in a state. In *Kashfol al-Asrar*, Khomeini did not say that the Shah should be a cleric, however, he highlighted that the Shah should run the country based on Sharia laws. Khomeini (1942) also suggested that a council of *ulamah* should be established to monitor law in the country.

It is not exactly clear how Khomeini arrived at such an Islamist approach, however, we should note that during the Persian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911), and years before Khomeini had written *Kashfol al-Asrar*, Ayatollah Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri drafted a supplementary article for Iran’s constitution which states Majlis should not pass any bill without the consent of an *ulamah* council (Martin, 1987). Khomeini always praised Nuri and in one of his speeches, he even asked

the Shah to act based on this supplementary article (Khomeini, Vol1: 286). Therefore, it seems safe to assume that Khomeini got such an idea from Sheikh Fazlollah.

The Shah's reform plans (1961-1963) and the death of Borujerdi (1961) were two main occurrences that helped Khomeini develop such an Islamist ideology. After the death of Borujerdi, Khomeini became a *Marja-e Taqlid* with a *resaly-e- tozihemasael* – A book that a *Marja-e Taqlid* publishes and in it, he explains the Islamic rules for his followers. As a *Marja-e Taqlid* he had more independence as he was not supposed to follow the quietist approach advocated by other ayatollahs. Therefore, Khomeini directly reacted to the Shah's regime when the regime started a series of reforms including granting women rights to vote and run for office, and also allowing elected candidates to swear on any holy books, not just the Quran. Khomeini wrote a letter to the Shah and expressed his anger towards the law and Alam, Shah's Prime Minister who was responsible for executing this law. However, what makes this letter more interesting is the fact that Khomeini still accepted the Shah as a leader, and even addressed the Shah as His Imperial Majesty:

His Imperial Majesty, after sending prayers and praises, as it is published in newspapers, in the Law of Provincial Associations and the Law of Provincial States, the government has not considered Islam as a condition for voters and elected representatives. And it has given women the right to vote. And this is worrying the *ulamah* and other classes of Muslim (Khomeini, 2010, vol.10).

However, the Shah was adamant about modernising Iran swiftly, and in 1963 he called for the White Revolution. To ratify the White Revolution, the Shah called for a referendum in January 1963 and asked Iranians to support the revolution and its reformist agenda (Shahbaz, 1963). Khomeini and few other ayatollahs boycotted the referendum based on the fact that holding a referendum was not mentioned in the constitution (Yazdani, 2012). However, the White Revolution was ratified through the referendum, and the Shah boasted that “the result of the referendum does indeed reflect the wholehearted approval of my fundamental reforms by the well-nigh unanimous vote of the people of Iran” (Cited in Ansari, 2001: 19). The relationship between the Shah and *ulamah* worsened when after the Iranian New Year of 1963, the state attacked the Fayziya Seminary in Qom (Yazdani, 2012). Soldiers disguised as peasants and farmers attacked

the communities in the seminary while chanting 'long live the Shah' (Azimi, 2014).

Khomeini sent a message and said:

The principles of Islam are in danger. The Quran and religion are at stake. In this situation, *taqiyah* is forbidden.... I now offer my heart to the bayonets of your soldiers, but I will not accept injustices and humility from the Iranian government (Khomeini, 2010, vol.1:178).

At 3:00 am on 5 Jun 1963, Khomeini was arrested and sent to Tehran (Vakili-Zad, 1990).

Khomeini was detained again in 1964, and this time he was sent to exile in Turkey and then Iraq, where he spent 13 years (Mahdavi, 2018). In October 1977, the Baath Regime forced Khomeini to leave Iraq and go to Kuwait. However, the Kuwaiti government refused to give refuge to him, due to the Shah's request. Therefore, on the 4th of October 1978 Khomeini flew to France where he stayed until February 1979, then he returned to Iran. However, as we should see in the following sections, it was Iraq that played an important role in shaping Khomeini's ideology.

Khomeini and establishing his political ideologies

In *Kashfol al-Asrar*, Khomeini (1942) did not directly attack Mohammad Reza Shah, however, he did not hesitate to attack Reza Shah for his un-Islamic policies such as *Kashfe Hejab*, unveiling. The reason for that could be that Mohammad Reza Shah, in contrast to his father, tried to show himself as a religious person (Lotfi, 2018). However, after the White Revolution and the Shah's attack on the seminary, he realised that there is no difference between the son and father in disrespecting Islam (Khomeini, 2010, vol.1). Moreover, it seems that Khomeini changed his ideology towards the doctrine of *taqiyah*, precautionary dissimulation. In *Kashfol al-Asrar*, Khomeini claimed that *taqiyah* is part of Islam and "if someone does not believe in *taqiyah*, he is not Muslim" (1942: 129). He defines *taqiyah* as "when people say something that is not true, or when [people] do an act which is against the sharia, in order to save their, [or someone else's] blood, life and honour". This type of *taqiyah* is called *taqiyah Khofi*: people deny a part or all of their religious belief to avoid persecution (Lankarani, 1993). However, after the White Revolution, Khomeini changed his thinking about *taqiyah Khofi* and asked *ulamah* to talk against the Shah because in Khomeini's views due to the Shah's behaviour "*taqiyah* is haram as the principle of Islam is in danger" (2010, vol.10: 178).

When Khomeini moved to Najaf, he again developed his view towards the ideology of *taqiyah*; this time by writing about a new type of *taqiyah*: *taqiyah modarati* (Khomeini, 1965). This

approach to *taqiyah* can help us understand Khomeini's views towards Sunni Islam. Khomeini talked about this ideology in 1958 in a book called *Al-Rasael* (MoradKhani and Mohsenzadeh, 2011). Az Lankarani (1993) says that according to *taqiyah modarati*, Shias should not harbour hostility towards Sunnis, but instead, they need to make unity with them. In Khomeini's words, the purpose of this *taqiyah* is unity between Muslims countries against infidels:

Perhaps all these encouragements in Islamic Hadiths about *taqiyah modarati* should be seen as Islam's request for unity between Muslims. Islam wants Muslims to be united and not be humiliated among other nations in the world. [Through this *taqiyah*] Islam wants to help Islamic nations to stay independent of foreigners and infidels (cited in MoradKhani and Mohsenzadeh, 2011, p.86).

Therefore, unlike *taqiyah Khofi* where Shias can hide their beliefs when their lives are in danger, in *taqiyah modarati* Shias people conceal Shia thoughts to seek unity with other Muslims:

Certainly, the permissibility of *taqiyah modarati*, but also the necessity of it, is not dependent on fear of yourself and others ... Therefore, for this kind of *Taqiyah*, concealment of secrets [Shia's thoughts] are obligatory. Although one is safe and have no fear of others. (Khomeini, cited in MoradKhani and Mohsenzadeh, 2011: .86).

For Khomeini, *taqiyah modarati* was a good example of Shiism's effort to peacefully coexist with other Muslims (MoradKhani and Mohsenzadeh, 2011). Such a shift towards unity between Muslims also can be easily traced in Khomeini's (2015) writing on *velayat-e faqih*. When Khomeini was in Najaf, he introduced the *velayat-e faqih* ideology in a series of 13 lectures. These lectures were delivered between January and February of 1970, around four years after his arrival in Najaf (Rahnema, 2014). In the autumn of 1970, Khomeini's disciples clandestinely published and distributed the lectures in Iran (Rahnema, 2014). In these speeches, Khomeini argued that, in contrast with the conventional understating, Islam is a political religion and *fuqaha*, Islamic scholars, must establish an Islamic government in Iran (Khomeini, 2015). This ideology was not only incongruous with the traditional understanding of the concept of *velayat*, guardianship, but it was also in contrast with Khomeini's doctrine in *Kashfol al-Asrar*. For Khomeini's teachers and most Shia clerics, quietism was the universal Shia principle. Based on quietism, complete *velayat* (Guardianship) belongs to the Prophet Mohammad and the twelve Shia Imams. Hence, during the occultation of the twelfth Imam, Shias should not be active in

politics. Sheikh Ansari who is considered one the most prominent *fuqaha* and his book *Makasib* is still taught in Shia seminaries considered three responsibilities for a *faqih*:

Issuing legal opinions and adjudicating religious issues for the laity's benefit. There is consensus upon this view; (2) Administering justice based on extrapolations from hadiths such as the *maqbulah* (accepted tradition) of 'Umar b. Hanzala and *mashhura* (well-known tradition) of Abu Khadija. There is also consensus upon this view; (3) A jurist's discretionary authority (*wilayat al-tasarruf*), which includes the political domain. It is here that the jurists have not reached a consensus. (cited in Mavani, 2011, p.810).

While Ansari accepted that *fuqaha* have the first two responsibilities, he firmly rejects that a *faqih* can have the third responsibility (Enayat,2015). Ansari argued that the third responsibility, *velayat-e -siyasi*, political guardianship, belongs to the Imams and the Prophet (Enayat,2015). In his lectures for his students, Khomeini asserted that the Prophet and the Shia Imams have passed the legitimacy to *fuqaha* to rule.

Khomeini's ideology was not only at odds with his predecessors, but it also showed a shift from his earlier thinking in *Kashfol al-Asrar*. In other words, in *Kashfol al-Asrar*, Khomeini suggested that a council of *ulamah* should be established to monitor the constitution, but in his lectures in Najaf Khomeini spoke about the direct leadership of *ulamah*. Also, if Khomeini (1942) used sectarian language against the first three Khalifa, there is nothing sectarian in the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*. Khomeini (2015) referred to Shia Hadith's reports to prove the eligibility of *fuqaha* to rule; however, he was never considering Shiism as an eligibility factor for the *faqih*. In Khomeini's (2015) words, a *faqih* should have two qualities to be considered as the *vali-e-faqih* (the Supreme Leader): he should be a knowledgeable and just Muslim. None of these factors explicitly belong to a Shia *faqih*. Essentially by relaxing the Shi'i condition of infallibility as a necessity for the *vali-e-faqih*, Khomeini moved closer to the Sunni Islam's position; being a just and knowledgeable Muslim are also the only two factors that Sunni Muslims consider for a *faqih* (Sabet, 2014).

As we can see, during his time in Najaf, Khomeini developed two of his most important ideology: *velayat-e faqih* and *taqiyah modarati*. Rahaimi clearly articulates the influence of living in exile and Najaf on Khomeini's views when he states that:

According to Edward Said, distance, nonalignment and nonconnection serve as contrapuntal mediation for a person in exile to form a displaced identity in the liminal space. In many ways, this in-between locality in exile created the sort of intellectual ambience for Khomeini to compose his radical ideas during this critical period. Perhaps similar to Lenin's 1907–1917 exile in Western Europe, where he published *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Najaf also served Khomeini as a place of reflection; a place where he kept his distance from clerical orthodoxy, as he was deemed too radical by many leading clerics (some of whom were pro-Shah), and enjoyed relative freedom from Pahlavi's surveillance. In Najaf, Khomeini was an outsider in a city with a long tradition of quietism (2014, p 297).

Thanks to his time in Najaf, Khomeini revolutionised the quietist approach that was practised in Shia seminaries. However, Khomeini not only transformed the traditional non-political approach that was taught in Shia seminaries, but he also led one of the most important revolutions in the 20th century.

Khomeini and implementing his political ideology in the Islamic Republic

During the 1970s, Khomeini developed the slogan 'Shah must go' and became the main political opponent of the Shah's regime (Vakili-Zad, 1990). The Shah was concerned about Khomeini's activities in Iraq. Hence, in September 1978, he asked the Iraqi government to expel Khomeini from Iraq. The Baath regime followed the Shah's request and expelled Khomeini; the Ayatollah went to France (Algar, 1981). In France, Khomeini enjoyed more freedom and could directly communicate with the Iranian people. Therefore, the opposition got more momentum. Finally, the Shah was forced to leave Iran on 16 January 1979, and Khomeini found a chance to establish a new political system with the centrality of *velayat-e faqih*. Although Khomeini had talked about the *velayat-e faqih*, before the revolution, he never mentioned how the doctrine should be implemented. Khomeini also never mentioned that he wanted to be the supreme leader of the post-Pahlavi political system.

In an interview with *Le Monde* newspaper, which was published just one year before the Revolution, in responding to the question that if he wanted to be the leader of Post-Pahlavi period, Khomeini said: "Personally, no. My age, my condition, position and disposition are not conducive to this. If the opportunity arises, we will choose a person or some people who have the aptitude for such an undertaking" (Khomeini, 2010, vol.2, p.387). Therefore, there was some ambiguity in the structure of the new post-revolutionary state and Khomeini's role in it.

However, Khomeini and his supporters managed to add the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* in the new constitution and Khomeini became the supreme leader. Once *velayat-e-faqih* was added to Iran's constitution, Khomeini proclaimed:

I will assure every stratum of the nation and every law enforcement that if *velayat-e-faqih* and *faqih* supervise the affairs of the Islamic government, no harm will be done to this country. Speakers and writers should not be worried about the Islamic government and *velayat-e-faqih* (2010, vol.10: .58).

However, after Khomeini successfully managed to add the idea of *velayat-e-faqih* to Iran's constitution, in the following years, he showed the revolutionary aspects of his ideology. We should note that although revolutions can be non-violent (Sharp, 2005), however, being a revolutionary for Khomeini coincided with using violence, if necessary:

But the mistake that we made was that we did not act in a revolutionary manner and gave respite to this corrupt stratum; and the revolutionary government, and the revolutionary armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard Corps—none of them acted in a revolutionary manner and were not revolutionary. If right at the beginning, when we defeated the corrupt regime and demolished this extremely immoral barrier, we had acted in a revolutionary manner; broken the pens of all the publications and had shut down all the corrupt magazines and publications; and prosecuted their heads; and had banned all the corrupt parties and had given their heads their due punishments; and had set up gallows in the major squares and had exterminated the corrupt and the immoral, we would not have to face these troubles" (Khomeini, 2008, vole.9 p.256).

Before the revolution, Khomeini promised an open society for all the Iranians, but after the revolution, he purged all his opponents. Also, he asked the Iranian people to gather intelligence from their neighbours:

Currently, the government does not have the power to gather intelligence throughout the country. Well, you should establish intelligence groups. Well, everyone can find who the people living next door are and what they are doing. Each one of you should keep a close watch on two or three houses in your neighbourhood and watch their conduct and those frequenting there (Khomeini, 2008, Vol.15, p. 87).

Mehdi Bazargan, the head of the first interim government after the revolution, wrote a letter to Khomeini, implying that asking people to spy on each other's life is against the Quran's teachings. Khomeini ridiculed Bazargan and said:

A poor guy has written to me recently that I called on the whole nation to watch over the neighbours [and he told me] that this is against the Quran ... True! Quran has ordered us not to do so, and God's order must be obeyed. But the Quran has also ordered us to protect a man's life (2010, Vol.15:99).

Khomeini's insistence on exporting the revolution was another indicator of the revolutionary aspects of his ideology. Wastnidge alludes to this revolutionarily aspect of Khomeini's ideology when he states that:

The Khomeini period arguably saw a near total breakdown in Iran's relations with neighbouring states. Much of this was due to Khomeini insistence on the universal nature of Islamic revolution, and naturally the rulers of Iran's neighbour became fearful that the Islamic revolution might be exported to their countries (2016 p.28).

Such a revolutionarily aspect of Khomeini's ideology is more apparent when he talks on expanding the revolution to Iraq and punishing Saddam.¹

[Khomeini and the Iran-Iraq war](#)

In Najaf, the mainstream clerics were against the idea that *ulamah* should take part in politics, therefore, the Shah and his intelligence service, SAVAK, were hoping that Khomeini would be ostracised in Najaf (Coughlin, 2010). The non-political and traditional atmosphere in Najaf had made him isolated, as far as he even did not leave his home for praying (Coughlin, 2010).

Khomeini himself describes the situation as:

whatever I do, I feel an obstacle from the mullahs of Najaf. If I stand up to the Baath Party, they shout that I want to uproot the Najaf theological centre! If I remain silent, they will accuse me of collusion! If I use the language of counsel with Ba'thists they say: 'why are you not using the same language with the Shah?' Even if I do something that is in the personal interest of these gentlemen, they will still continue to oppose and undermine me (Ruhani, 1986 cited in Moin, 2009: 148).

¹ See chapter six.

However, in the last years of Khomeini's time in Iraq, the non-political situation in Najaf shifted, and clerics organised several protests against the Baath Party and Saddam (Mallat, 1988). Moreover, it was in Najaf that Khomeini was introduced to the Da'wa Party and one of its leading figures, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Moin, 2009; Coughlin, 2010; Bernhardt, 2012). Sadr's ideology was similar to Khomeini and he also believed that *ulamah* should run the Islamic countries (Mallat, 1988). Sadr was also aware of the political power of *velayat-e faqih* and wanted to use this ideology to mobilise all the Muslims (Shias and Sunnis) in Iraq against Saddam Hossein (Tripp, 2007).

The friendship between Sadr and Khomeini continued even after the revolution in Iran. Sadr knew that Khomeini and the revolution in Iran would be a good example to give the Iraqi people the courage and inspiration to overthrow Saddam. He even wrote a draft of a constitution for Iran's post-revolutionary government, which later saw most of its articles implemented in Iran's constitution (Mallat, 1988, Arsanjani, 2008). As Arsanjani (2008) mentions, the clerics close to Khomeini (Behshti, for instance) used Sadr's suggestion as an alternative against the more secular draft that the interim government had suggested.

When in the spring of 1980 Sadr realised that his life was in danger, he wrote a letter to Khomeini asking him for refuge in Iran, but Khomeini responded: "I do not consider the immigration of your excellency from Najaf Ashraf, the centre of Islamic science, as a good idea". (Khomeini, 2010, vol.7, p.422). Khomeini knew that to export his ideology and the Revolution into Iraq, he needed a close friend like Sadr in Iraq. However, a few days later, Sadr and his sister, bint al-Huda, were executed by the Baath regime, and thousands of Shias were arrested (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). Also, Iraq expelled thousands of Iranians who were living in Iraq at the time (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). Khomeini found the death of Sadr so frustrating and in a message stated that "I hope that the Baath regime be put finally to the dustbin of the history like the regime of the Shah. And there is a hope that the victory and triumph of Muslims are near" (Khomeini, 1980). Twelve days later, on 22 April 1980, he sent a message to the Iraqi people and encouraged them to overthrow the Baath regime.

Montazeri (2001), who was once chosen as the successor to Khomeini, referred to the provocative role of Khomeini before the war and says when the revolution triumphed Khomeini and his disciples felt a great sense of pride. Therefore, Khomeini refused Montazeri's (2001) suggestion that Iran should send a group of diplomats to other countries to express Iran's

willingness for cooperation. Khomeini was confident that in a possible war with Iraq, his network in Najaf would help Iran to export the revolution into Iraq. Elliott and Razouxand (2015) argue that Khomeini was aware of a possible war with Iraq. Nonetheless, he did not make any effort to stop it.

The war started just a few months after the death of Ayatollah Sadr, and two years later (1982) Sadr's disciples who had taken refuge in Iran established the Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic of Iraq (SCIRI) (Mallat, 1988). The council was led by closest disciples of Sadr such as Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim and Al-Hashemi (Mallat, 1988). The party and its leader enjoyed the high level of trust by the Islamic republic. Al-Hashemi, who was the first president of SCIRI and later its speaker, became the head of Iran's judiciary system for ten years. The party fully embraced the idea of *velayat-e faqih*, then they were recognised by the Islamic Republic as the official opponent of the Baath Party (Marinova, 2017). Moreover, during the war, Khomeini addressed the Iraqi people ten more times, trying to convince them to support Iran in the war.

Alongside his words to the Iraqi people before and during the war, Khomeini also played an important role in prolonging the war.¹ Khomeini wanted to expand the revolution to Iraq, therefore, he consistently refused all peace deals (Khomeini, 2010, vol.18). After the liberation of Khorramshahr, Saddam regularly called for a ceasefire, but Khomeini refused, asking for the removal of Saddam from power as a prerequisite for peace (Khomeini, 2010, vol.18 and vol19).

Although by continuation of the war Khomeini wanted to export the revolution to Iraq, as Mehdi Haeri Yazdi- an Islamic philosopher and the son of Sheikh Abdul Karim Haeri Yazdi- implies to understand why Khomeini was insisting on the continuation of the war, one should look at Khomeini's mystical thoughts (Nasr, 2016). Khomeini was familiar with mysticism (*Irfan*), and he even wrote several proses and poems on this topic (Ridgeon, 2014). Khomeini's works on mysticism indicate the influence of mystics such as Ibn' Arabi and Sadra (Ridgeon, 2014). The idea of Perfect Mankind, *Insane Kamel*, was a mystical idea that Khomeini borrowed from Ibn' Arabi (Khomeini, 2016). According to this ideology, some individuals can pass all steps on their journey towards God, becoming so close to God that can understand God's message (Knysh, 1992). Haeri Yazdi recalled that once he told Khomeini that "it is not right for Muslims to kill Muslims...Hundreds of thousands are dying in a war that has no end and no good purpose"

¹ See chapter six.

(Nasr, 2016: 120). Khomeini replied that “do you also criticise God when he sends an earthquake?” (Nasr, 2016: 120). Haeri left Khomeini without saying anything and never met him again (Nasr, 2016). Later, Haeri said that Khomeini’s reply made him believe that Khomeini sees himself as the Perfect Mankind (Nasr, 2016). There is no compelling evidence in Khomeini’s writing during the war that could support such a claim. However, the Ayatollah called the Iranian martyrs in the war as Perfect Mankind:

Martyrdom on the path of God is not something that can be evaluated by human measurements and ordinary incentives. Realising the lofty standing of those martyred in the cause of truth and divine objectives is impossible from a materialistic perspective. Its enormous value calls for divine standard, and its lofty standing requires a divine perspective. Not only we, the terrestrial beings, are short of access to them but also the celestial beings are unable to find a way into it, as they are the characteristics of perfect human and the angels are distant from those mysterious stations (Khomeini, 2008: vol.18, p.64)

For Khomeini, mystical journeys are not just meant for anyone, and just a select few people could pass this path (Loon, 2016). Namely, Khomeini implied that just Perfect Mankind can reach to the valuable position of martyrdom (Khomeini, 2010, vol.18). However, in Khomeini’s view, martyrs are just one of those unique people that can reach that remarkable position.

Additionally, Khomeini’s words to the Iranian soldiers are one place that clearly show the influence of mysticism.¹ For instance, he constantly asked the Iranian soldiers to purify their hearts for God. As Sharifian mentions “A Sufi strives to purify the heart through detachment from the world and *from nafs, [ego,]* and through attention to God” (2017: 75).

Conclusions

The breakout of the Iran-Iraq war was not the first major dispute between the two countries, as had fought each other since the time of the Safavid dynasty and Ottoman Empire. The earlier disputes were religious-based ones, however, later, determining the boundaries, particularly Shatt-Al-Arab boundaries, became the significant sources of hostility between the two countries. The 1979 Revolution and its religious essence once again brought back religion as an important factor to Iran’s relationship with Iraq. Put another way, if determining the boundaries

¹ See chapter six.

of Shatt-Al-Arab was the main issue during the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties, the Iranian revolution brought back the religious factor to the hostility once again. Saddam and the Baath Party claimed that Iran meddled in Iraq's internal affairs by supporting the Shia groups (Chubin and Tripp, 1988).

Ayatollah Sadr and his disciples were one group that had established a close tie with Khomeini in Najaf, and when the revolution triumphed, they managed to keep this close relationship with Tehran. It was also in Najaf that Khomeini developed his political and religious thoughts by talking about the doctrines of *velayat-e faqih* and *taqiyah modarati*. If in his earlier writing Khomeini (1948) had not considered a leadership role for *fuqaha*, in *velayat-e faqih* (2015) Khomeini explicitly proclaimed that *fuqaha* are the only legitimate leaders to rule Islamic countries. Likewise, if the young Khomeini (1948) did not hesitate to use sectarian language, the more mature Khomeini (1965) called for coexistence between Shias and Sunnis. As we move forward, it is important for us to see the link between the development in Khomeini's ideology and his discourse during the war. For instance, the link between Khomeini's words to Iraqi people and *taqiyah modarati* and the connection between the doctrine of *velayat -e-faqih* and prolonging of the war.

It is equally important to recognise that some aspects of Khomeini's political ideology remained unchanged. For instance, Khomeini did not change his negative views towards nationalism and nationalists. For him, clerics such as Modares (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13) Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13), and Kashani (Khomeini, 2010, vol.15) were the figures that truly served Iran and Islam, not nationalists such as Mosaddegh and Bazargan (Khomeini, 2010, vol.15). The significance of this aspect of Khomeini's ideology will be more visible when we study the link between Khomeini's words and nationalism during the war.

However, to do this we need to find a suitable framework for the thesis. A framework that can help us understand Khomeini's views on matters such as nationalism, sectarianism, and prolonging the war.

Chapter 2: Theoretical frameworks

Introduction

If our discussions in the previous chapter can teach us one thing it should be about the complexity of Khomeini's ideology. Although he was a *faqih* -Islamic jurist- and such theological position explains some of his most important thoughts such as *velayat-e-faqih* and *taqiyah modarati*, there are other aspects of his philosophies (for example, *insane Kamel*) that have their roots in mysticism. Moreover, Khomeini did not follow the religious quietism practiced by *ulamah* for many years in Shia seminaries, which was clearly a deviation from the norm. Things get even more complex if we want to discover Khomeini's ideology on matters such as nationalism, sectarianism and war and peace.

To handle such a complexity, it is essential for us to choose a theoretical framework that can explain Khomeini's ideology and its twists and turns. Lederman and Lederman (2015: 593) stress the importance of a theoretical framework when they state, "poor or missing theoretical framework is similarly a critical problem". A good theoretical framework should be able to provide a correct frame which helps researchers to answer their proposed questions. Hence, to understand Khomeini's ideological stances, one should use a theoretical framework with two capabilities: it should be able to study and examine Khomeini's ideological stance, and it needs to be able to show how Khomeini by using religious language, rejected the suggested peace deals.

In this chapter, I argue that a combination of CDA and CMT can provide a framework with these two capabilities. Such a framework should be studied in five stages. The first stage offers some critiques of the cognitive approach, constructivist discourse analysis and poststructuralist discourse analysis as the main three alternative approaches to CDA. Cognitive or physiological approaches are traditionally used to describe the political, and ideological stance of elites in foreign policy (McGraw, 2000, Rapport, 2017). However, as Larsen (1997) indicates, there are several issues with applying cognitive approaches in research. One of the most significant problems with this theory is its positivist presupposition, which makes it problematic to employ in non-positivist studies like this thesis.

Constructivist discourse analysis (Larsen, 1997 and Hansen, 2006) and poststructuralist discourse analysis (Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Hansen, 2006) are alternatives that can be used to analyse Khomeini's discourse. As Aydın-Düzgit (2013) suggests poststructuralism rejects the idea of having a rigid methodology, due to its anti-essentialist ontological and anti-foundationalism epistemological positions. Hence, due to the need for a robust methodology to examine Khomeini's discourse, poststructuralism cannot be a useful theory to analyse Khomeini's discourse during the war. Constructivism is ontologically consistent with the constructive/interpretative ontological stance of my thesis. However, once constructivism comes into the study of discourse it cannot be more than a descriptive tool (Carta and Morin, 2014) (See stage one).

After explaining the shortcomings of the alternatives of CDA, stage two explains why CDA should be chosen as the theoretical framework to apply to understand Khomeini's corpus. CDA has an interpretative ontological presupposition and, in contrast to constructivism, it is equipped with linguistic tools. Hence, it is capable of analysing a discourse critically. Despite all its advantages, CDA fails to recognise the importance of cognitive approaches (Chilton, 2005 and Koller, 2004). Therefore, to cover this lapse, stage three suggests that conceptual metaphor should be added to CDA as a complementary theory. Stage four introduces the theoretical framework of the research: a combination of the CDA and CMT. Finally, stage five justifies the use of CDA and CMT as two "Western theories" in a non-Western case study, Khomeini's discourse.

Although a combination of CDA and CMT per se is not new (Charteris-Black, 2005), the way that they are used in this thesis is slightly different. First, unlike other studies that combined CDA and CMT (Charteris-Black, 2005), this combined theory focuses more on the political aspect of language. In other words, while the current literature mainly uses the theory to focus on the linguistic elements of discourse, I am intended to use the theoretical framework in broader political and social contexts. Namely, I am using the theory to discover the political, not linguistic, features of Khomeini's discourse. Plus, the theoretical framework in this chapter prepares the ground for a methodology that will be introduced in the next chapter.

[Stage one: Critiques of alternative approaches to CDA](#)

If we want use CDA as the theoretical framework for our study, first, we need to argue why alternative approaches to CDA (cognitive approaches, constructivist discourse analysis and poststructuralist discourse analysis) are not useful to be applied in this study. The uses of

cognitive (psychological) approaches are well-established in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and decision-making studies (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973). Those scholars who believe in cognitive approaches argue that cognitive factors like memory and belief system are essential in the decision-making process, and politicians should not be excluded from this affair. Researchers also examined how cognitive biases are used by politicians to deal with omnipresent uncertainty in the foreign policy process (Rapport, 2017). In Rapport's (2017) words, these scholars look "at the beliefs and belief systems that are the building blocks for most judgments" (p.1). Therefore, if the researchers can find a way to observe the belief system of actors outright, they can predict and analyse the actors' political behaviour. For instance, Alexander Georg introduced the operational code approach and claimed that "answers to five philosophical and five instrumental questions encompass the essence of 'one's political beliefs" (cited in Holsti, 1970, p.123).

However, there are several challenges in applying the cognitive approach to a study. Larsen (1997) includes three problems in using the physiological approach to discover the belief system of policymakers. The tendency of cognitive approaches to focus on an individual decision-maker is the first problem that Larsen (1997) considers for a cognitive approach. The operational code approach, for instance, can be applied to one single actor, but it is not possible to implement the method to a collective group of elites. As this thesis mainly focuses on Khomeini, this problem of cognitive approaches should not be an issue for our discussion. However, as Larsen (1997) points out, the questions that the cognitive approaches ask are general and might not be able to see "the inside of the belief system" (P.7). Hence, using cognitive approaches to discover Khomeini's ideology in subtle matters such as nationalism and sectarianism would be problematic. For instance, using the ten general questions that the operational code approach uses cannot be beneficial for this research in discovering Khomeini's ideology (To study the ten questions that the operational code asks, see Holsti, 1970).

The second problem with cognitive approaches in Larsen's (1997) view is the inclined attitude of cognitive approaches. For adherents of psychological strategies, use of quantitative approaches, which draw on positivist epistemology and ontology can provide "specific types of measurements, meaning that we can make direct, meaningful comparisons across our subjects and conduct statistical analyses that allow for probabilistic generalizations" (Schafer and Walker, 2006, p. 27). The focus of cognitive approach on positivist research methods is in sharp contrast

with the ontological and epistemological stances of this thesis. Our research analyses 180,000 of Khomeini's words by a qualitative approach, which is a non-positivist research method.¹ Therefore, using a theoretical framework which is based on quantitative methods can be problematic for this thesis.

The third problem with psychological mechanisms is that these approaches assume "language is a transparent medium which does not have its dynamics" (Larsen, 1997, p.3). Namely, in contrast with this research perception of language as a powerful tool that can create value, cognitive approaches see language as a firm and transparent way of changing knowledge among people. This perception of language puts our research in a close ontological relationship with discourse analysis. Discourse analysis, in contrast to the cognitive approach, focuses on the role of language to discover an ideological stand. For adherents of discourse analysis, social values are beliefs manufactured and shared by language (Bayram, 2010). They conclude that a shared idea among a society creates a new discourse for that society (Fairclough, 2010). The term 'discourse' in discourse analysis is defined by Burr (2003) as "a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events" (p.64). Therefore, a discourse represents an event, idea, and person in a specific way (Burr, 2013). However, discourse analysis in politics and foreign policy can be applied through different theoretical tools such as social constructivism (Warnaar, 2013; Oppermann and Spencer, 2016), poststructuralism (Larsen, 1997; Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Hansen, 2006) and more recently critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Holzscheiter, 2010; Aydın-Düzgit, 2013, Carta and Morin, 2014).

Scholars who believe in poststructuralism argue that there is no social reality outside of discourse that can be studied (Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Hansen, 2006). Namely, "poststructuralism argues that foreign policy discourse articulates and intertwine material factors and ideas to such an extent that the two cannot be separated from one another" (Hansen, 2006, p.1). As there is no social reality outside of language and discourse, a discourse can only be studied by comparison to an opposite discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2011). For instance, poststructuralism could be used here if Khomeini's discourse was supposed to be compared to an opposite discourse such as Saddam's discourse or the Shah's discourse.

¹ See next chapter.

Although in some instances, for more clarity, I compare Khomeini's discourse with Saddam's and the Shah's discourses, the main focus of the research is on Khomeini's discourse.¹ Also, poststructuralism's stance that there is no reality outside the discourse, makes it unable to "share the goal of emancipatory critique in CDA, which involves the comparison of various representations with an implicit version of the way things really are (or should be)" (Aydın-Düzgit, 2013, p.4). Additionally, due to anti-essentialist ontological and anti-foundationalism epistemological aspects of this approach, poststructuralists repudiate to use a methodological tool (Aydın-Düzgit, 2013). In contrast, CDA accepts that "a discursive approach to social reality does not necessarily require the refutation of methodological tools" (Aydın-Düzgit, 2013, p. 354).

Constructivism is another theoretical framework that can be used as an alternative to CDA. Social constructivism was coined by Alexander Wendt's article "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992 p.390). In this article Wendt (1992) points out that "identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations" (p. 398). Constructivism argues that actor interests are endogenously structured (Reus-Smit, 2013). Such a position is in contrast with Realism, which argues the interests of states are exogenously structured and "questions about identity-and interest-formation are therefore, not important" (Wendt, 1992, p. 392). Hence, according to social constructivism "our knowledge about the social world is not a mirror image of the world, but a product of our ways of categorising it" (Larsen, 1997, pp. 63-64).

Poststructuralism advocates that there is no social reality outside the language and discourse. Conversely, by considering an emancipatory mission for itself, social constructivism argues that there is a real world outside of discourse that should be explored (Aydın-Düzgit, 2013, Carta and Morin, 2014). Constructivism ontologically and epistemologically is consistent with CDA. Namely, constructivism considers a real world out of discourse should be discovered (Hansen, 2006). Also, it stresses that the interests of actors are exogenously structured (Reus-Smit, 2013). Despite all these benefits, and ontological stances, once constructivism comes to the study of discourse, it cannot be more than a descriptive tool (Carta and Morin, 2014). For instance, by

¹ See chapters four and five.

applying constructivism to Khomeini's words during the war, we may see when and where Khomeini used religious language. However, it cannot explain to us why and how such a religious discourse was used. Constructivism can also show how Khomeini's words tried to normalise the continuation of the war, but it cannot demonstrate the strategies that Khomeini used for prolonging the war. Such shortcomings with these approaches, lead us to introduce CDA as one of the theoretical frameworks for this thesis.

Stage 2: Critical Discourse Analysis

After arguing why three approaches are not as useful to be used in this research, stage 2 introduces CDA as one of the theories that should be applied to understand Khomeini's discourse. To that end, first, the concept behind the theory should be studied. CDA calls for using various discourse analytical tools to probe social phenomena (Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004). By analysing discourses within a social context, CDA tries to explain how specific discursive practices echo socio-political power relations (Charteris-Black, 2004). CDA sees a dialectical relationship between a discourse and a social structure (Fairclough et al. 2011). Therefore, a discourse "constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people" (Fairclough et al. 2011, p. 358). Such an anthropological position makes a central difference between CDA and poststructuralism, as for the latter discourse is the only reality that can create the social word (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

CDA considers discourse as a social phenomenon and stresses the role of "language as a power resource that is related to ideology and socio-cultural change" (Bryman, 2016, p. 690). As a result, discourse can be influential in "a particular configuration of the social world" (Fairclough et al., 2011: 358). For example, discourse can be nationalistic or sectarian. Belligerent or peaceful. Therefore, "CDA aims to make more visible these opaque aspects of discourse as social practice" (Fairclough et al., 2011, p.93).

Nowadays, CDA is applied by scholars "more especially to the critical linguistic approach" (Wodak, 2001, p.2). However, it should not be interpreted that CDA is confined to linguistic studies. There are myriad studies that have already used CDA in non-linguistic studies (For example, see: Gavriely-Nuri, 2012; Aydın-Düzgit, 2013; Carta and Morin, 2014). As Breez (2011) suggested, "Critical Discourse Analysis has now firmly established itself as a field within the humanities and social sciences, to the extent that the abbreviation 'CDA' is widely used to

denote a recognisable approach to language study manifested across a range of different groups” (p.493). As a result, CDA is used in disciplines such as international relations (Aydın-Düzgit, 2013); politics (Filardo-Llamas and Boyd, 2018) and history (Achugar,2017).

CDA has its similarities with both constructivism and poststructuralism. For instance, scholars who use CDA and poststructuralism are both inspired by the ‘Western Marxist’ tradition (Carta and Morin, 2014). Also, CDA- similar to constructivism- argues that social structures contain both forms of discursive and non-discursive elements (Aydın-Düzgit, 2013 and Carta and Morin, 2014). However, it is also important to note that CDA distances itself from these two approaches. For instance, in contrast with constructivism and poststructuralism which only describe a discourse and do not show any interest in criticising it, CDA critically observes a discourse (Wodak and Meyer, 2001; Fairclough et al, 2011; Bryman, 2016). Additionally, as Wodak and Meyer (2009) state, CDA is heavily dependent on the linguistic methods and tools which makes CDA unique, in comparison to two other approaches (constructivism and poststructuralism). As Fairclough et al. (2011) suggest, “the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power, which underlie them are often unclear to people” (p.358). Therefore, CDA aims to shed light in “these opaque aspects of discourse as social practice” (Fairclough et al. 2011, p.358).

Despite its usefulness, scholars (Breeze, 2011; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002) argue that CDA is not a theoretical framework without flaw. Having its roots in critical studies and Frankfurt school (Chilton, 2005), adherents of CDA consider a presupposed critical role for themselves in analysing a discourse. In other words, for some champions of the theory, “in the name of emancipation” CDA should “take the side of oppressed social groups” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p.64). Such an ontological stand is the reason that some scholars have accused CDA of subjectivity and bias (Breeze, 2011). However, it should be highlighted that this understanding of the term ‘critical’ is more prevalent in the earlier studies (Fairclough 1993 and Van Dijk, 1993), and now for scholars such as Charteris-Black, (2004) the term critical rather implies that as texts are not neutral, and they should be critically analysed:

This is because, from the perspective of CDA, all utterances are potentially constrained – and, indeed, determined – by the social relations that exist between participants. CDA, therefore, involves the ideological analysis of implicit textual content, and is based on the view that texts are not as neutral as they at first appear; this is because the social processes that lead to

conscious choices being made are concealed or made opaque in their linguistic encoding (p. 30).

Therefore, as discourses are not neutral, CDA aims to show us the hidden aspects of them. For instance, in the case of Khomeini, CDA can help us trace if any relation can be shown between Khomeini's discourse and nationalist or sectarian discourses. Needless to say, this does not sweep aside the fact that CDA is a powerful tool to show the abuse of power. In contrast, it can act as a capable tool to show how by using religious language Khomeini rejected the proposed peace deal.

Ignoring the importance of cognitive approaches is another criticism of CDA (Koller 2004 and Chilton, 2005). In Chilton's words "despite some limited use of work in psychology and cognitive science ... it appears to be fair to say that CDA has generally neglected developments in these fields" (2005, p.21). To solve this problem, scholars such as Charteris-Black (2004), Hart and Lukeš (2007) have added Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) to CDA. The interpretive ontological position of CMT, in contrast with the classical cognitive approaches, makes it more appropriate to be applied in non-positivist research. However, first, in stage 3, the concept of CMT should be examined, before offering a combination of CMT and CDA as the theoretical framework of this research.

Stage 3: Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) as a complementary theory for CDA

Stage 3 explains why CMT needs to be added to CDA as a complementary theory. To that end, stage 3 first talks about the concept of metaphor and its history. Then it is explained how by studying someone's metaphor one can analyse their ideology. The persuasive power of metaphors is also discussed in stage 3.

Aristotle, in his seminal work, *Art of Rhetoric*, for the first time, talked about the importance of metaphor (Musolff, 2012). Aristotle defined metaphor as "giving the thing a name belonging to something else, the transference being on the grounds of analogy" (Aristotle's *Poetics* XXI, 1457b, cited in Coulson, 2006, p. 615). For Aristotle, this ability of metaphor to replace one thing with another unrelated thing is ornamental, not something necessary (Ortony, 2012). However, as Gibbs (2011) mentions, the real change in the study of metaphor happened when George Lakoff and Mark Johnson introduced Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) infer that "the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing regarding another" (p.5). Thus, in contrast to Aristotle, for Larkoff and Johnson (1980),

metaphor is not words with ornamental nature. Instead, they see it as "a kind of a sense like seeing or touching or hearing, and as such it provides ways to perceive and experience much of the world" (p.239). For example, in the metaphor, TIME IS MONEY, time, as an abstract, is the target domain, and money, which is concrete, is the source domain. Although a target domain typically is an abstract concept, however, it is not always the case. For instance, as Charteris-Black (2005) shows in Churchill's personalisation metaphors, the target domains vary from abstract domains, freedom, to country and political groups. Similarly, as we see in the following chapters, the target domains in metaphors that Khomeini used vary from, country, war and abstract concepts (See Appendixes 3).

There are two types of conceptual metaphors: conventional and novel metaphors (Thibodeau and Durgin, 2011; Ng and Koller, 2013). Conventional metaphors are those well-established metaphors in a linguistic community. In contrast, novel metaphors are highly unique and uncommon for people in a society (Kövecses, 2002). However, they are concepts that can be used as both conventional and novel metaphors. For instance, journey metaphors are quintessential metaphors that can be used by speakers in both forms of conventional and novel. For instance, the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is a highly used conventional metaphor (Kövecses, 2002) while "My marriage was a roller-coaster ride from hell" is an unusual and novel way of saying that marriage is a journey (Gibbs, 2011, p.523).

Both conventional and novel metaphors can be discovered in Khomeini's discourse during the Iran-Iraq war. Brotherhood metaphors are typical examples of conventional metaphor in Khomeini's discourse. Indeed, brotherhood metaphors are the most dominant metaphors in Khomeini's corpus to the Iraqi people. The source domain of the brotherhood metaphors (Brother) is a religious one with its roots in the Quran and Islamic Hadiths (El-Sharif, 2011). Due to its Islamic roots, nowadays the use of brotherhood metaphors is conventionalised in Islamic countries.

Additionally, unconventional and novel metaphors also can be found in Khomeini's rhetoric. For example, in his speech in the third anniversary of the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini said: "If Islam triumphs in the war, all problems will be solved". In this quote Khomeini used an unconventional metaphor- RELIGION IS A COUNTRY - to convince the Iraqi people that war with

Iran is war with Islam.¹ If the use of the brotherhood metaphor is common in an Islamic country like Iran, the use of religion as a country is highly unconventional.

Adherents of CMA claim that by analysing both novel and conventional metaphors in a discourse, the belief system of the speaker can be revealed (Goatly, 2006, Chiang and Duann, 2007). Such an assumption is adduced by Lakoff and Johnson's words when they say, "metaphorical expressions are systematically motivated by underlining (or conceptual) metaphors" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p.9). Indeed, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that humankind's conceptual system is shaped with metaphorical thought. For instance, Lakoff (2002) uses CMT to examine the cognitive stature of liberal and conservative doctrines in the US. More recently, Lakoff (2017) analysed the metaphors that Trump used in his inauguration speech and concluded that President Donald Trump saw himself as a state rather than as a person who should serve the state. Put differently, the metaphorical map that Lakoff discovers in Trump's discourse is: THE PRESIDENT IS THE NATION. In this metaphorical map, Trump is the target domain, and the nation is the source domain. Hence, in Trump's mind, the nation, the US, should also like the president. In a similar vein, analysing Khomeini's discourse enables the author to discover Khomeini's ideological stand on matters such as Nationalism and sectarianism. For instance, by investigating the use of journey and brotherhood metaphors in Khomeini's discourse, it will become apparent that Khomeini was neither a nationalist nor a sectarian leader.

Although analysing metaphors could help us understand the ideological stances of politicians, one should not ignore the power of CMA in discovering the pragmatic reasons behind the use of metaphors by speakers. As Charteris-Black's (2004) argues "the cognitive semantic approach also needs to be complemented with an analysis of pragmatic factors as metaphors are always used within a specific communication context that governs their role. Therefore, their cognitive characteristics cannot be treated in isolation from their persuasive function in discourse" (p.9). Likewise, the use of metaphors by Khomeini during the war not only can show his ideological stance, but they can clarify the ways that Khomeini tried to normalise the continuation of the war for his audience. The use of metaphors by people to convince their audience to believe their story or to empower their narrative is called the persuasive power of metaphor (Charteris-

¹ See chapter five.

Black, 2006). This aspect of metaphors is in line with Aristotle's argument that "political style was merely a matter of persuasion: following Aristotle's Rhetoric, politicians had to adjust their performance according to their audience to be effective" (cited in Schoor, 2017, p.4). However, Lakoff (cited in Schoor, 2015, p.97) argues that persuasion germinates in the unconscious. However, Bronowski (1972, cited in Mio, 1997, p. 119) stresses the importance of metaphor in political thought, arguing that "the essential core of human thought and creativity ... to make a metaphor is also to make a political claim." For instance, the use of a natural disaster metaphor by right-wing parties to refer to immigrants can negatively introduce the immigrants (target domain) as natural disasters (source domain) such as a flood (Charteris-Black, 2006).

Additionally, metaphors can propel audiences towards a particular viewpoint and influence their thoughts on a specific matter (Bougher, 2012). Charteris-Black (2005) highlights how politicians such as Churchill, Martin Luther King Jr, Margaret Thatcher and Bill Clinton used metaphors for persuasive reasons. For instance, Charteris-Black (2005) argues that "the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher identified the disharmonious relation between the Labour Party and its traditional ally as an opportunity to exploit the conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS CONFLICT to activate another metaphor: INDUSTRIAL RELATION IS A BATTLE" (p. 92). In the case of Khomeini, it should be shown how Khomeini used religious metaphor to convince the Iranian people that the continuation of the war was a necessity.

As we can see, CMT is a useful theoretical tool to show the ideological stances of politicians as well as the ways that politicians, by using metaphors reinforce their ideology on people. For instance, the use of brotherhood metaphors by Khomeini can shed some light on Khomeini's views towards sectarianism.¹ Studying journey metaphors in Khomeini's discourse, as another example, could also help us understand Khomeini's views towards nationalism.²

However, as CDA needs CMT to be applied in this thesis, CMT also needs CDA as a complementary theory. CMT, unlike CDA, is not able to show the intertextuality relation between the political and religious texts. In Khomeini's speech, for example, CMT is not able to explain how and where the Khomeini's statement is related to Islamic texts such as the Quran. CMT also cannot signify the relationship between the two discourses. In other words, it cannot

¹See chapter five.

² See chapter six.

show how Khomeini merged the religious discourse with the war discourse to indicate that Iranian people should see the war as a holy war. Moreover, CMT is not able to show how politicians use labelling strategy for delegitimising their opponents. This is particularly important to see how by using various labels, Khomeini tried to represent Saddam and the Baath Party. Hence, to scrutinise Khomeini's ideology CDA and CMT, should be amalgamated and this is discussed in the next stage.

Stage four: The thesis' theoretical approach: A combination of CDA and CMT

In stage four, the theoretical framework of the thesis, a combination of CDA and CMT, is introduced. To use the benefits of both approaches, these two analytical tools should be amalgamated into one theoretical framework. Although the combination of CMT with CDA is relatively new, there are already a good number of scholarly works dedicated to the subject. For instance, by introducing critical metaphor analysis, Charteris-Black (2004) illustrates how the study of cognitive metaphor and CDA can be applied in the press, financial reporting and religious discourse. Similarly, Hart and Lukeš (2007) in their edited book, *Cognitive Linguistics in Critical Discourse Analysis: Application and Theory*, explain how CDA can combine cognitive linguistics. Hart and Lukeš (2007) argue that they "believe that critical discourse analysis must account for the cognitive realities involved in language use, discourse" (p.xi). Likewise, by drawing on Critical Discourse Studies in relation to the British miners' strike Hart (2017) indicates "how one particular metaphorical framing of the strike, which construed the strike as a war between the State and the National Union of Miners, persisted through the year-long period and consider the potential ideological functions of this framing in media strategies of (de)legitimation" (p.3).

However, the theoretical framework of this research should be distinguished from other work in the literature. In contrast with most studies that combine these two theories, this study mainly involves the political aspects of language rather than its linguist aspects. In other words, if Charteris-Black (2004, 2005) and Hart and Lukeš (2007) focus on the linguistic aspects of language, by drawing on CMT and CDA this thesis goes one step further and discovers how these two approaches can find the viewpoint of a political leader such as Khomeini in more explicitly political matters such as sectarianism and nationalism. Put differently, by applying CMT and CDA to Khomeini's discourse, this research, first, can identify metaphors and labels in his discourse but more importantly it can explain the political meaning of these metaphors and

labels. As a study in the fields of political theology and Iranian studies, we need to cover both steps. Based on the theoretical framework, we can develop a methodology with four pillars: intertextuality, interdiscursivity, metaphor analysis and prediction strategy. However, before studying these methodological tools in the next chapter, the use of CMT and CDA as two “western approaches” in a “non-western” case study, Khomeini’s ideology, should be justified in stage five.

Stage five: Justifying the use of Western theories in a non-Western world

Using Western theories and concepts in the Middle East can be challenging. On the one hand, as Mabon (2020) shows, there is an Orientalist debate that suggests, Western ideas such as democracy are incompatible with the non-Western cultures and Islam. On the other hand, some scholars and clerics call for dismantling all the Western social theories from Islamic societies. In the case of Iran, philosophers such as Fardid (2008) advocates for such a theoretical position. For Fardid (2008) the entrance of Western Philosophy, particularly ancient Greek philosophy, into the Islamic worlds was the main reason that Islamic countries diverged from its transcendental goal. However, the negative views of these two groups towards applying Western theories in non-Western cases are challenged by scholars like Soroush (1995) and Shabestari (2002) who are two of leading scholars in studying the relationship between Islam, knowledge and politics. For instance, Shabestari (2002) brought hermeneutics philosophy, as a Western theory, into the study of the Quran. Shabestari (2002) believes with the help of hermeneutic analysis, a new political-social understanding of the Quran can be reached, which is compatible with the modern world. Likewise, Soroush’s thought was explicitly under the influence of Karl Popper and his philosophy, particularly falsifiability, in shaping his political-religious ideology (Fletcher, 2005). Therefore, using CDA and CMT to analyse Khomeini’s corpus can be interpreted as another attempt to use Western theories to study the relationship between politics and Islam.

Additionally, there is nothing particularly Western about CDA and CMT as two theoretical frameworks. CMT and CDA both emphasise the importance of language as a social phenomenon and argue that language, like any other social phenomenon, should be studied and placed in context. This is the reason that the use of CMT and CDA has been not confined to Western case studies. Since the introduction of CMT and CDA, these two concepts have been applied to different non-Western concepts including, but not limited to Russian Politics (Anderson, 2001);

Egyptian Media (Attia, 2007); Chinese Political Discourse (Slingerland, et.al, 2007); and the prophetic tradition (E-Sharif, 2011s). Hence, the analysis of Khomeini's discourse during the war should be seen as another non-Western case study that uses CDA and/or CMT as a theoretical framework.

Finally, instead of focusing on the origin of a theoretical framework, researchers should think about the ontological and epistemological compatibility of their theories with their case studies and research questions. CMT and CDA both draw on a constructive/interpretative ontological and epistemological positions, and this is one of the reasons that these two theories, in contrast to a classic cognitive approach with a positivist presupposition, are suitable to be applied in analysing Khomeini's discourse during the war.

Conclusions

In this chapter, a combination of CDA and CMT was introduced as the theoretical framework of this thesis. The framework was studied in 4 stages, and the first stage presented the main three potential alternative approaches to CDA: cognitive approaches, constructivist discourse analysis and poststructuralist discourse analysis. However, as we have seen, cognitive approaches and poststructuralist discourse analysis cannot be applied to Khomeini's discourse due to their problematic ontological presuppositions. Constructivism ontologically is compatible with the constructive/interpretative ontological stance of this research; however, once constructivism comes to the study of discourse it cannot be more than a descriptive tool (Carta and Morin, 2014). This was the reason that stage 2 introduced CDA as one part of the theoretical framework.

CDA has an interpretative ontological presupposition and, in contrast to constructivism, it is equipped with linguistic tools that makes it able to analyse a discourse critically. Despite its advantages, CDA fails to recognise the importance of cognitive approaches (Chilton, 2005 and Koller, 2004). Therefore, to cover this lapse, stage 3 suggested that cognitive metaphor should be added to CDA as a complementary theory. Finally, stage four explained why using CDA and CMT as two "Western theories" in a non-Western case study, Khomeini's discourse, should not be seen as a problem. Although a combination of CDA and CMT per se is not new, the focus of our theoretical framework in this research is more on political aspects of language and this

distinguishes this thesis from other studies that used a combination of CDA and CMT as their theoretical framework.

As we develop our discussion in this research, the combination of CDA and CMT should help us understand Khomeini's views on matters such as nationalism (Chapters four and five). Additionally, such a combination can help us understand how by using religious language, Khomeini rejected the suggested peace deals (Chapter six). Moreover, the theoretical framework in this chapter prepares the ground for a methodology that will be introduced in the next chapter. A methodology with four pillars: intertextuality, interdiscursivity, predication strategy, and metaphor analysis. The first three methods: intertextuality and predication strategy are drawn from CDA while metaphor analysis is driven from CMT.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction

In the previous chapter, a combination of CDA and CMT was introduced as a theoretical framework to study Khomeini's discourse during the Iran-Iraq war. However, CDA and CMT often position themselves as both a theory and method (Sing, 2011). Between these two, CDA is quite diverse when it comes to methodology. In Van-Dijk's words:

“One widespread misunderstanding of CDA is that it is a special method of doing discourse analysis. There is no such method: in all methods of the cross-discipline of discourse studies, as well as other relevant methods in the humanities and social sciences, may be used” (2015, p.446).

Therefore, researchers can choose CDA methods that help them to answer their research question(s). Throughout this thesis, we discuss three questions:

- To what extent can Khomeini's ideology be seen as nationalistic or sectarian?
- How did Khomeini frame the war to the Iranian and Iraqi people?
- What were the key determining factors in Khomeini's decision to continue the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr, and how did he justify this decision to his audiences?

At the beginning of our journey, we argued why answering these questions is crucial for our endeavour in understanding Khomeini's ideology through the lenses of the Iran-Iraq war. Even now- more than forty years after the beginning of the revolution - the literature is divided on Khomeini's views on matters such as sectarianism and nationalism and the ways that he rejected the peace deal proposals.¹ Therefore, among all methodological tools that CDA offers us, we need to select methods that help us tackle these questions.

To do this, in this chapter, we need to develop a methodological approach with four dimensions: intertextuality, interdiscursivity, predication strategy, and metaphor analysis. The first three methods are adopted from CDA, while the fourth one is deployed from CMT.

¹ See chapter one.

As we have seen, intertextuality and interdiscursivity, as CDA tools, can show the link between ideology and language (Bloor and Bloor 2007). For instance, they can show us how by studying Khomeini's intertextual use of religious texts and events, one could identify his ideological stance on matters such as nationalism and sectarianism. These two methods are also able to identify persuasion strategies that are employed in rhetoric (Bloor and Bloor 2007). Thus, they can help us understand how Khomeini prolonged the war by referring to the previous texts and discourse.

Likewise, applying the predication strategy and discovering the labels that Khomeini used during the war will shed more light on Khomeini's ideology. Also, analysing such labels can show us how Khomeini normalised the war by using positive labels for the war and negative labels for peace proposals. Finally, analysing the metaphors that Khomeini used during the war will help us realise that Khomeini was not advocating a sectarian or nationalist policy. Also, examining these metaphors enable us to recognise the ways that he used to persuade his audience to participate in the war, regardless of the international attempts to end the war.

However, "methodology is more than methods" (Hesse-Biber, 2010, p.7) and it explains the strategy of research and data collection process. Moreover, a methodology should explain why implementing the selected methods and strategies is useful. In the following section, in research strategy, we can see why a quantitative corpus analysis of Khomeini's words should be created. This section also adds why a corpus-driven approach, not a corpus-based approach, is more useful to be implemented for the primary data of this research. Then, in corpus collection, it should be explained how the primary data of this thesis, Khomeini's words during the Iran-Iraq war, are collected and analysed. Finally, we should see how this primary data will be represented in this thesis.

Research strategy: A corpus-driven analysis of Khomeini's words during the war

Grimmer and Stewart (2013) stress the importance of texts and words, as primary data for research in politics and conflict studies. Additionally, the usage of written political speeches and rhetoric as primary data are familiar sources in CDA and CMT (Charteris-Black, 2005). However, scholars who have used texts as their primary source of data have diverse view on the size of their data sample. Some scholars (Fairclough, 1992; Abdul-Latif, 2011; Lawton; 2013; Wodak and Boukala, 2015) selected a small body of texts, whereas several other studies (Orpin, 2005;

Charteris-Black, 2006, Chiang and Duann, 2007; Musolff; 2016; Törnberg and Törnberg, 2016) applied CDA and CMT through corpus analysis. However, as CDA has been criticised for using a small number of texts and being selective and biased (Sriwimon and Zilli, 2017) researchers such as Hardt-Mautner (1995) and Baker et al., (2008) call for using a corpus-based critical discourse analysis.

Corpus is a Latin word which refers to a large body of text which can be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively (Johnstone, 2018). However, due to the interpretive ontological and epistemological stances of CDA and CMT, I chose qualitative corpus analysis for studying Khomeini's discourse. Moreover, as Hasko (2012) highlights, qualitative corpus analysis can examine "empirical data in depth" (p.2). Such a capability of qualitative corpus analysis in interpreting data is necessary for us when we want to study Khomeini's view towards matters such as nationalism and sectarianism.

Researchers who want to apply CDA in a corpus need to also choose between corpus-based and corpus-driven approaches (Subtirelu and Baker, 2017). While the corpus-driven approach tries to minimize its pre-assumption towards a corpus, the corpus-based approach considers "a corpus as a testing-ground for claims or theories about language derived through other means" (Subtirelu and Baker, 2017, p.125). One of the criticisms against CDA is that CDA has a presumption about a discourse before studying it. Hence, to tackle that problem, this thesis sticks with a corpus-driven approach.

Additionally, a corpus-based critical discourse analysis can be studied through both qualitative and quantitative approaches (Baker and Levon, 2015). However, as we, in this research, aim to quantitatively analyse Khomeini words during the war, we need to stick to a qualitative corpus-driven analysis of Khomeini's words during the war.

Corpus collection

There are several considerations to be taken into account when a researcher wants to select texts for a corpus (Subtirelu and Baker, 2017). To decide what data should be added to a corpus, researchers need to carefully consider all the available texts related to their studies (Subtirelu and Baker, 2017). Likewise, to build a corpus from Khomeini's words, the first task was choosing the relevant texts was. To that end, we must examine Khomeini's words, sermons, speeches, interviews, and letters in *Sahifeh-ye Imam*, a 21-volume collection of all of Khomeini's words

between 1933 and 1989. These volumes are ordered chronologically; the first volume contains Khomeini's words between 1933 and 1965, while volume 21 contains Khomeini's words between 1988 and 1989. *Sahifeh-ye Imam* volumes are available online in different websites such as Imam Khomeini (2018), Payghah Imam Ruhollah (n.d) and Sayte Jame Imam Khomeini (n.d). Among these three websites, Payghah Imam Ruhollah is the most user-friendly website, therefore, I selected the data from this website. For creating the thesis corpus, I started the selection process from volume 12 because it is in that volume, that for the first time on 8 April 1980, Khomeini sent a message asking the Iraqi people to topple Saddam and the Baath Party (See Appendix 1). Such a provocative message along with two other messages that he sent to the Iraqi people before the war should be seen as important factors in provoking Saddam to attack Iran in September 1980 (Afshari, 2014).¹ The selection process ends in volume 21, where Khomeini wrote a letter to Iranians to confirm that Iran officially accepted the ceasefire. This was the last time that Khomeini publicly addressed the Iranian people.

Not all of Khomeini's words between volumes 12 and 21 are about the war. In volume 12, for instance, there are a large number of Khomeini's letters and orders, which are not associated with the war (Khomeini, vol.12, 2010). To find relevant words, I applied content analysis to in the content of *Sahifeh-ye Imam* from volume 12 onwards. As Mayring highlights "the aim of content analysis is the systematic examination of communicative material" (2004: 266). Content analysis is used in different fields of social science including studying the rhetoric of politicians (Bryman, 2016). Content analysis helps us to find and compare particular keywords in texts (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Such an ability in content analysis makes it particularly suitable to find Khomeini's words that are related to the Iran-Iraq war. In doing this, I searched for the following terms in Farsi: war (*jang*), Saddam, Iraq, worries (*razmandegan*), army (*artesh*), martyr (*shahid*) and impair (*janbaz*). If a text includes any of these words, I must go through those texts to add it to the corpus to see if it is related to the Iran-Iraq war.

After applying content analysis, 79 texts, which contain 118,000 words were chosen from *Sahifeh-ye Imam* (Appendix 1). Approximately 30,000 words of Khomeini's corpus are his words to the Iraqi people during and before the war (Appendix 1). Before the war, Khomeini sent three different messages to the Iraqi people, and in all these messages, he asked the Iraqi

¹ Also see Appendix 1 and chapter five.

people to start a revolution against the Baath Regime. In one of these messages (text number 3 in Appendix 1) he directly addressed the Iraqi people and Iraqi generals, while in the two other messages, he addressed both the Iranian and Iraqi people. Khomeini also sent 14 messages to the Iraqi people during the war, and in all these messages, he asked the Iraqis to support Iran. In four of these texts, Khomeini directly talked with Iraqi dissidents in Iran (Texts 9, 12, 16 and 45 in Appendix 1), while other texts are the letters that Khomeini wrote to all the Iraqi people.

Also, 8,000 words of Khomeini's corpus are his words to international audiences (Appendix 1). The rest of Khomeini's corpus (80,000 words) is Khomeini's words to the Iranian people. Khomeini's corpus for the Iranian people contains his speeches and his messages for the Iranian people which were usually broadcasted by the Islamic Republic of Iranian Broadcasting (IRIB). Different strata of the Iranian society were invited to Jamaran - the place that Khomeini used to live - where Khomeini shared his thoughts with the Iranian people on matters such as war against Iraq. These speeches were recorded and broadcasted from IRIB several times. Even now - more than 30 years after his death - highlights of some these speeches are still broadcasted by IRIB.

Khomeini's words in *Sahifeh-ye Imam* are in HTML format. To make the coding process easier in Atlas.ti 8.2 (See below), I copied and pasted Khomeini's words related to the war to Microsoft Word. If Khomeini's words were for the Iraqi people, I added them to Khomeini's corpus for the Iraqi people and if Khomeini's words were directed to the Iranian people, they were added to Khomeini's corpus for the Iranian people. Hence, by adding Khomeini's words to Microsoft Word, I could classify all of Khomeini's words in three Microsoft Word files. One file contains Khomeini's words to the Iraqi people, one holds Khomeini's words to the Iranian people and the third one includes the Ayatollah's words to his international audiences. Organising the data based on the audience would help us analyse Khomeini's words more accurately. For instance, as chapter six seeks to discover the ways that Khomeini normalised the continuation of the war, the focus will be placed on Khomeini's corpus for the Iranian and international audiences. Likewise, as chapter five identifies whether Khomeini was a sectarian leader or not, Khomeini's words to Iraqi audiences will be the primary source for that chapter.

Atlas.ti 8.2- a computer program for qualitative coding of data- was chosen to analyse Khomeini's words. Two reasons shall justify the use of the program. First, this software is one of the rare text analysis software that supports Farsi language. Second, Atlas.ti allows users to do the coding

process both automatically and manually. The ability to code data manually is particularly crucial in analysing Khomeini's discourse strategies. In Farsi, like English, terms can be used in both figurative and literal senses. For example, In Farsi *del* (literally means the stomach) and *ghalb* (literally means the heart) can be used as container metaphors, while these two words in a different discourse can refer to body parts (Sharifian, 2011). Therefore, a manual observation through the reading of Khomeini's words can allow a researcher to discover when a word is used as a metaphor. Manually searching through Khomeini's corpus is also essential in determining the predication and intertextual strategies in Khomeini's discourse. For instance, it is just by a manual observation that one can find the intertextual use of the Quran and Islamic Hadiths in Khomeini's corpus.

However, after the data was coded manually, the automatic settings of Atlas.ti 8.2 can help a researcher to organise the data better. For instance, it can count the number of manually coded journey metaphors in the whole of the corpus. Atlas.ti can also indicate the place of these coded journey metaphors accurately. In Khomeini's discourse, for instance, it can demonstrate whether journey metaphors in Khomeini's discourse are used for the Iraqi people or for the Iranians. The automatic settings in the app can also show the numbers and the places of the coded intertextual and predication strategies. Such strategies and their importance for our research should be discussed in the next part.

Data Analysis

As we have seen, conceptual metaphor analysis, predication strategy, intertextual and interdiscursivity and predication strategy are four methodological tools that are used in the thesis.

Intertextuality and interdiscursivity

For the first time, Bakhtin explained how texts or utterances are influenced by previous texts (Johnstone 2018). In Bakhtin's view "our speech...is filled with others' words, varying degrees of otherness and varying degrees of 'our-own-ness,' varying degrees of awareness and detachment. These words of others carry with them their own expression, their own evaluation tone which we assimilate, rework, and reaccentuate" (cited in Fairclough 1992, p. 270). However, it was Kristeva who introduced Bakhtin's work to Western audiences (Johnstone 2018). Intertextual analysis can elucidate the ideological stance of a specific text by showing the textual linkages of a speech/text to another text. This ability of intertextuality is in the same line with CDA, which aims to discover the relationship between ideology and language. For instance, intertextuality can indicate how

Khomeini's words during the war are linked to Islamic texts such as the Quran and Islamic Hadiths. In other words, by adopting the approach of intertextuality on Khomeini's discourse, the influence of Quranic texts and the Islamic Hadiths on Khomeini will be revealed.

Interdiscursive analysis is another CDA method that is applied throughout this study. As Johnston (2018) explains, "texts can also be interdiscursively related to prior texts" (p.182). Hence, interdiscursive strategy refers to ways in which a discourse draws on a previous or a pre-existing discourse. Applying this method to the Ayatollah's words helps us to understand how Khomeini's discourse is connected with other discourses such as religion and history.

The Quran and Islamic Hadiths are the main intertextual references in Khomeini's corpus. Khomeini used these two Islamic sources in two ways. Sometimes Khomeini directly quoted from the Quran or a Hadith report in the Arabic language¹, but sometimes Khomeini just used a translated version of the Quran and/or Islamic Hadiths in his discourse. When Khomeini directly quoted a Quranic verse or Islamic Hadith in Arabic, a trace of intertextual strategy in his discourse is straightforward. For instance, in Text 1 Khomeini added a verse from the Quran (in Arabic) in the middle of his speech (in Persian). Therefore, if someone familiar with the Persian language read Text 1, they would immediately realise that there is an Arabic text in the middle of a Persian passage. These Arabic texts are referenced in *Sahifeh-ye Imam* volumes, hence, the sources easily can be traced.

Also, as noted above, sometimes Khomeini used a translated version of the Quran and/or Islamic Hadiths in his discourse. These instances are also recognisable as they are also cited in *Sahifeh-ye Imam* Volumes (For instances, See Appendix 2).

متن 1) آنان فوق تشکر امثال من هستند. آنان به یقین مورد تقدیر ناجی بشریت و برپا کننده عدل الهی در سراسر گیتی....
می باشند. آنان به آرم ما زَمَمْتِ إِذْرَمَمْتِ وَ لَكِنَّ اللَّهَ رَمَى مَفْخَرْتِ.

Text 1) They are beyond my appreciation. Surly, they are appreciated by the saviour of humanity and the founder of divine justice ... They are proud of the label of "**when you threw (a handful of dust), it was not your act, but Allah's**" (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16, p.257).

In all instances, for the sake of accuracy, the references made by *Sahifeh-ye Imam* are double checked against the Quran. To translate the Quranic references in Khomeini's discourse into

¹ The language of the Quran and the Islamic Hadiths

English, I used the translated version of the Quran by Ali (2015). Additionally, I checked the Persian translation of these verses with the Parsquran Website (n.d) that provides various translated versions of the Quran into Persian, including Kharramshahi's and Elahi-Ghomshei's translations.

To discover the use of interdiscursive strategy in Khomeini's discourse, I followed a similar method. Namely, I located the instances that Khomeini referred to other discourses, such as religious and historical discourses, in the middle of his speeches. For example, in Text 2 which is part of Khomeini's letter to the Iraqi people before the war, the Ayatollah compared the current situation in Iraq with the history of Iran before the revolution, to convince the Iraqi people to start a revolution against the Saddam.

Text 2) Oh my brothers! Oh, our beloved ones who have been expelled from your homelands! You have faced misery by the Baath regime in Iraq. In Iran, we, too, were plagued by an evil dictatorial regime [the Pahlavi dynasty]. What [the Shah] did with Iran was worse than the crimes that Mongols committed (Khomeini, 2010, vol.14, p.275).

In text 2 Khomeini also drew a historical link between what the Mongols did to Iran with the Shah's regime and the Baath Party activities in Iran and Iraq, respectively. However, it is important to notice that analysing intertextual references in Khomeini's words is just one of the methods that we use in this research, and to achieve a comprehensive understanding of Khomeini's thoughts, in the following sections, we need to study predication strategy and metaphor analysis.

Predication strategy

The Predication strategy is another methodological tool that will be applied to Khomeini's discourse. The strategy is defined as "labelling social actors more or less positively or negatively appreciatively" (Wodak, 2001 p. 73). Likewise, Mansouri et al. explain that "the predication strategy is an analysis of the traits, characteristics, features, and qualities attributed to the in-groups and out-groups through synecdoches and negative and positive qualities" (2017, p.4). Therefore, the predication strategy is about presentation and it is used in discourse to present social actors and activities positively and negatively. For instance, Khalid (2017) indicates how George W. Bush and Barack Obama used the predication strategy to vilify enemies or praise friends.

Similarly, discovering the labels that Khomeini used during the war will help us understand how he labelled his friends and enemies. For instance, Khomeini labelled Saddam as an infidel while he represented Ayatollah Sadr, his friend and Saddam's enemy, as a martyr, *Shahid* (Table 1).

Table 1 indicates some of the labels in Khomeini's discourse

The Target group (s) and person (s)	Attitude	Example
Saddam	Negative	Crazy, the enemy of God, <i>Aflaqi</i> (a person who supports Michael Aflaq) ¹ .
The Baath Party	Negative	A communist party, The <i>Aflaqi</i> Party
Then Iraqi Army	Negative	The army of Satan
The clerics who were against the war	Negative	<i>Akhund-e darbari</i> (court cleric)
The clerics who supported the war	Positive	<i>Martyrdom (Shahid)</i> , <i>Allamaye Islam (The Islamic Clerics)</i> ,
Peace and ceasefire	Negative	<i>An American ceasefire</i> <i>Saddami Peace (A peace that Saddam supports)</i>
The Iranian army	Positive	The warriors of Islam, The Army of God, The army of Islam.
Iran	Positive	The country of Islam The Country of Quran
The Iraqi people	Positive	The Muslim Iraqi people.
War	Positive	Defence The holy war

Additionally, by studying the labels that Khomeini used during the war, we can shed light on his ideology on matters such as nationalism and sectarianism. Finally, analysing the use of the

¹See chapter six to realise why Khomeini used such a label for Saddam.

predication strategy can demonstrate how Khomeini normalised the continuation of the war. For example, after the liberation of Khorramshahr, Khomeini rarely used the term war to describe Iran's operations in the Iraqi territories. Instead, to provide a positive image of Iran's activities in Iraq, the Ayatollah used the term 'defence' which has a more positive connotation than war (See Table 1).

As Wodak argues, predications strategy can be found in different forms such as

stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e. g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) adjectives by predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns, by collocations, by explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (2016: 371).

Taking this into consideration, I searched for the labels that Khomeini used during the war. As table 1 shows, Khomeini's labels are mainly evaluative attribution, adjective and simile. By doing this, I found 130 usages of the predication strategy in Khomeini's corpus. Based on the target groups, these 110 uses of the predication strategy, can be classified into 10 groups: labels for Saddam, labels for the Baath Party, labels for the Iraqi army, labels for the clerics who were against the war, labels for the clerics who supported the war, labels for describing the ceasefire suggestions with Saddam, labels for the Iranian army, labels for Iran, the labels for the Iran-Iraq war.

Conceptual Metaphor analysis

In this thesis, finding the metaphors that Khomeini used during the war was the last step of data analysis and such a step was conducted in two stages. First, I identified the metaphors that Khomeini used. To identify the metaphors in Khomeini's corpus I drew on a strategy which is called metaphor identification procedure (MIP). The approach is developed by the Pragglejaz Group (2007), and it can be summarised in three stages: 1) Examining all the words in a text for finding metaphors, 2) Establish the contextual and literal meaning of all the word in a text, 3) Decide whether the conceptual meaning of the word differs from the literal sense. To distinguish between the literal and metaphorical meanings, a researcher should resort to dictionaries (The Pragglejaz Group, 2007). As Khomeini's words are in the Persian language, Moein Persian to Persian dictionary was chosen to help discover the metaphors in Khomeini's corpus. Moein dictionary is recognised as one of the best dictionaries in the Persian language

(Shekoohi, 2017) and an online version of this dictionary is also available (Farhang Moein, n.d) which this makes it more accessible than other dictionaries.

In the following examples, we can see how the MIP with the help of Moein dictionary can identify a metaphor in Khomeini's discourse.

Text3) Due to their acts, God has sealed their **hearts** ...therefore, they are not amendable any more (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13, p.297).

Text 4) Perhaps those who until yesterday ...lunged their dagger from the back to the **heart** of the nation, are today acting as the proponents of war. (Khomeini, 2010, vol.21, p.95).

According to the MIP, looking at definition of heart in a dictionary was my first task. In Moein dictionary the word 'heart' has these meanings:

- 1) The muscle organ that is located on the left side of the chest, with a duty to transmit blood to all parts of the body.
- 2) Consciousness.
- 3) Knowledge.

Based on the second criteria of the MIP, I needed to decide which of these definitions are non-metaphorical. The first definition of heart in Moein Dictionary is a literal definition, while the second and third definitions are more metaphorical.

The third rule of the MIP requires a decision on whether the conceptual meaning of the word differs from the literal definition. In Text 3, Khomeini states that Saddam's and his supporters' hearts are sealed, and no one can help them. In other words, in Khomeini's reasoning, Saddam and his disciples, cannot be conscientious anymore due to the death of their spiritual hearts, and therefore they cannot change. In Text 3, the heart is used in a more metaphorical sense than a literal sense. Conversely, in Text 4, heart is used in a literal sense and cannot be considered as a metaphor. Indeed, the heart in the second example is used as a body part of a human being, which is attacked with a dagger. I applied the same method whenever I came across a word that I was not sure whether it is a metaphor or not. By applying the MIP in Khomeini's corpus, the metaphors that he used during the war can be discovered (See Appendix 3).

Although *Sahifeh-ye Imam* is already translated into English (For example, see, Khomeini, vol.18, 2008), I have collected my data from the original text in the Persian Language. Newmark (Cite in Dickins, 2017) states “whilst the central problem of translation is the overall choice of a translation method for a text, the most important particular problem is the translation of metaphor” (p. 229). Likewise, Massey and Ehrensberger-Dow (2017) address a similar issue when they highlight that metaphors in an original text can be lost in the translation process. Similarly, when we look at the translated version of *Sahifeh-ye Imam*, it can be seen that some of Khomeini’s metaphors are lost. For instance, Text 5 shows that the translation version of *Sahifeh-ye Imam* translated ‘their heart’ in Khomeini’s word as ‘their unconscious mind’. In this example, the heart metaphor is lost in Khomeini’s words. Therefore, to make sure that I am not missing Khomeini’s metaphors, I examined all of Khomeini’s words in the Persian language and then translated them to English¹.

متن 5) باید خودتان مراقبت خودتان را بکنید و وادار کنید کسانی از شما مراقبت کنند. و چه بسا باشد که این سپاه پاسداران و این سران فرماندهان سپاه پاسداران با همه جدیتی که می کنند، برای اینکه به اسلام خدمت بکنند، در باطن **قلبشان**، غیر خودآگاه از این خصیصه های شیطانی باشد)

Text 5) You should take care of yourselves and ask others to watch over you. Many a time the Sepah-e Pasdaran and their commanders, despite all the efforts they make to serve Islam, find that the Satanic features are lurking in their **unconscious mind** (Khomeini, 2008, p.397, volume 16).

Another point that should be clarified is the way that conceptual metaphors are reported in this thesis. Namely, I follow the conventional approach in capitalising conceptual metaphors (see for example Koller, 2004; Musolff, 2004; Goatly, 2006; Charteris-Black, 2014). Such a method is used “to emphasise that, at the most fundamental level, they are constituted by relationships among concepts, not by relationships between semantic units” (Ritchie and Zhu, 2015, p.119). For instances, the conceptual metaphor ISLAM IS A PATH can be found in this Khomeini metaphorical expression: “the nation that devotes everything on the path of Islam” (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13, p.365).

¹ The Persian transcripts can be found in Appendix 4.

Conclusions

This chapter explained how a corpus of 118,000 of Khomeini's words was built for this thesis. It also clarified how the data was analysed by the help of Atlas.ti 8.2. I also advanced a methodological approach with four parts: Intertextuality, interdiscursivity, predication strategy, and metaphor analysis. Khomeini's intertextuality used the Quran and Islamic Hadiths in both direct and indirect ways. When Khomeini quoted a verse from the Quran, as that verse is in Arabic, it is easily distinguishable from his other words in Persian. When Khomeini used a translation of a verse in his discourse, it needs more attention, although they can still be traced as they are cited by *Sahifeh-ye Imam* (Appendix 2). To discover the use of interdiscursive strategy in Khomeini's discourse, I looked at the instances that Khomeini referred to other discourses such as religious and historical discourses in his discourse.

To find the use of predication strategies in Khomeini's words, I drew on Wodak's (2001) definition of the predication strategies. By doing this, I found 130 usages of the predication strategy in 118,000 words from Khomeini's corpus. I also found that Khomeini's labels are mainly evaluative attribution, adjective and simile. To identify metaphors in Khomeini's corpus I drew on the MIP, which is developed by the Pragglejaz Group (2007). The MIP can help me to decide whether a word in Khomeini's discourse is used in a metaphorical expression or in a literal sense.

As we move forward, the methods that are used in this chapter will help us understand Khomeini's views on matters such as nationalism (chapter four), sectarianism (chapter five) and prolonging the war (chapter 6). Intertextuality and interdiscursivity, as two CDA tools, can show the link between ideology and language (Bloor and Bloor 2007). Hence, they can be useful methodological tools to show the link between Khomeini's ideology and other discourses. These two methods can also explain how Khomeini prolonged the war by referring to religious discourses and texts. Likewise, the predication strategy is also a useful tool to be applied in Khomeini's discourse during the war. For instance, by exploring the labels that Khomeini used during the war we can understand whether he was an advocator for nationalist and sectarian policies or not.

Furthermore, by analysing the labels that Khomeini used during the war, we can see how Khomeini described his friends and enemies. Finally, by analysing the metaphors that Khomeini

used during the war we can study the importance of Islam in Ayatollah's view. Also, the ways that he represents the battle for his audience.

Chapter 4: Khomeini and Nationalism

“O mankind! we created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted”. (The Quran, 49:13)

Introduction

While the Iran-Iraq war started in September 1980, the history of the conflict between the two countries reaches back further than that. In 1509, the Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, conquered Iraq and the Safavids ruled until 1534 when the Ottoman Empire conquered that country (Marr 1985 and Osman, 2014). That is the reason that one scholar reports the conflict as “the latest outbreak in an age-old struggle between the Persians and Arabs for domination of the Gulf and the rich Tigris and Euphrates Valley to its north” (Marr, cited in Karsh, 1990, p. 256). Therefore, both sides could frame the conflict as a nationalist struggle, as Saddam and the Baath Party did. The Baath Party portrayed the war as Saddam’s Qadisiyyah, referring to the battle of al- Qadisiyyah when Arabs in seventh-century defeated the Sassanid Persian Empire (Lewental, 2014). Conversely, Khomeini (2010, vol.21) mainly described the war in religious terms. Put another way, for Khomeini (2010, vol.13) Islam was superior to everything and nothing – including the idea of nationalism - was superior to it. Bazargan affirms such an understanding of Khomeini when he says: “I believe in the service of Iran by means of Islam while Khomeini believes in the service of Islam by means of Iran” (Cited in Ramazani, 1989: 206).

However, not all scholars agree with such an interpretation of Khomeini’s view about nationalism. Three main arguments on the relationship between Khomeini and nationalism can be found in the literature. The first group of scholars claims that Khomeini was a nationalist (Munson, 2003; Aburaiya, 2009 and Aghai, 2009; Adib-Moghaddam, 2018). They believe that although Islamists often condemn nationalism, they, nonetheless, are noticeably nationalistic (Munson, 2003; Aburaiya, 2009 and Aghai, 2009; Özdalga, 2009). In their view, Khomeini was not an exception, and he should also be seen as a nationalist Islamist leader (Munson, 2003; Aghai, 2009; Özdalga, 2009). For instance, by analysing just three texts of Khomeini, Munson (2003: 42) concludes that “all these fiery denunciations of the Western domination of “our

land” demonstrate that Khomeini was in fact an Iranian nationalist, although he would have rejected such a label. Like most Islamists”.

These scholars also focus on Khomeini’s words to show the nationalistic aspect of Khomeini’s discourse (Gieling, 1999 and Malešević, 2006). For instance, Malešević (2006) deduces that to gain legitimacy, Khomeini had a desire to use nationalistic terms such as ‘beloved Iran’, ‘our beloved country’, and ‘the beloved nation’. In Malešević’s words (2006: 132) “Ayatollah Khomeini, gives us a very different picture of reality while here too Islamic, principles are emphasised in culture, politics, economy and the social sphere, there is a particular twist to it, that is, they are largely couched in nationalist terms”. Likewise, Gieling (1999: 152) focuses on the word *millat* (nation) in Khomeini’s discourse and argues that “references to *millat* should be seen in the light of efforts to mobilise the Iranian people and give them moral support, especially by stressing Iran’s special relationship with God”.

The second group of scholars applies religious nationalism to Khomeini’s ideology (Juergensmeyer, 1996; Gieling, 1999; Farzaneh, 2007). These groups of scholars mention the importance of both Islam and Iran in Khomeini’s discourse. For instance, Grinberg (2017) refers to a selection of 4000 of Khomeini’s words during the war and concludes that as Khomeini used words such as *millat*, Iran and Islam, his discourse should be seen as both nationalist and religious. Juergensmeyer (1996: 4) introduces ethnical and ideological as two types of religious nationalism and claims that ideological religious nationalism is the type of nationalism that can be found in Khomeini ideology. Juergensmeyer (1996) defines ideological religious nationalism as a sort of nationalism that religionises politics and based on this definition, Juergensmeyer considers the Iranian revolution an archetypal ideological religious nationalism:

The Islamic revolution in Iran, for instance, was a classic example of ideological religious nationalism that turned ordinary politics upside down. Instead of the western ideal of a nonreligious political order providing space for religious activities, in Iran a religious authority has set the context for politics (1996, p.5).

However, Juergensmeyer (1996) does not explain what precisely nationalist is in such a type of nationalism. In other words, Juergensmeyer’s definition of ideological religious nationalism is closer to the definition of a theocracy that is defined as “governance in the name of God”

(Krämer, 2015: 126). This brings us to the argument of the third group of researchers that argues that applying nationalism and religious nationalism to Khomeini's nationalism is not accurate (Keddie, 1998; Razi, 1999). For instance, Keddie (1998) challenged such a link between nationalism and religion in Iran when he says that religious nationalism is expected to be seen in countries such as India and Israel, not in Iran where religious minorities have not had a strong voice. In India, for example, the Vishva Hindu Parishad, an Indian right-wing organisation, labels Muslims and Christians as foreign and hostile by religious nationalism discourses (Keddie, 1998). In Israel, as another example, "religiopolitics stresses control over disputed territories and denies Arab claims; and in Palestine religiopolitics calls for Muslim Arab control of all former Palestine" (Keddie, 1998: 711).

Conversely, in Iran during the revolution, it was ultimately Khomeini's Islamism discourse that could mobilise people, not nationalism (Keddie 1998). In a similar vein, Razi (1990: 85) is sceptical about the existence of a linear relationship between Islam and nationalism and highlights that "the relationship between nationalism and religion is complex and curvilinear. It may, therefore, be premature to rule out the viability of nationalism in favour of religious fundamentalism, despite the latter's recent achievement". Van Den Bos (2018) believes that religious-nationalism does exist in Iran, however, he argues that this kind of nationalism has dawned after Khomeini's death.

To sum up the debates, we should resort to the methodological tools that we have studied in the previous chapter. By applying conceptual metaphor analysis, prediction, and intertextuality in Khomeini's words, we can see why the first and the second group of scholars might have troubles in their understanding of Khomeini's view towards nationalism. However, before that, first, we need to define the concepts of nationalism and religious nationalism and their similarities, if any, with Khomeini's ideology. Then we need to study Khomeini's journey metaphors during the war and express how the use of these metaphors by Khomeini rejects the idea that Khomeini was a nationalist or religious nationalist. Also, analysing the labels that Khomeini used during the Iran-Iraq war helps us to have a better understanding of Khomeini's views towards nationalism. Finally, we conclude our discussion on the link between Khomeini's

ideology and nationalism by studying the use of intertextuality and interdiscursivity in Khomeini's words.

Nationalism and Religious nationalism and Khomeini's ideology

As Podoksik states, "nationalism is normally conceived as an ideology or movement aiming at attaining and maintaining political autonomy, mainly in the form of state sovereignty, for a group of people called nation" (2016, p.303). Therefore, nationalism is recognised as a common feature that keeps a group of people together as a nation (Omer and Springs, 2013). In the discussion about nationalism, civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism are seen as two types of nationalism (Altuntas 2010 and Podoksik, 2016). Ethnic nationalism seeks unity in society through emphasising a specific ethnic heritage, and therefore "the belonging to a nation is in this case defined by birth, blood and ethnicity" (Altuntas 2010, p.422). However, in civic nationalism, "community is defined primarily in political terms, civic virtues are more important than ethnicity and common culture" (Altuntas 2010, p.422).

It seems that there is a link between religious nationalism and ethnic nationalism, as religion has a tendency to be included in the category of ethnicity (Omer and Springs, 2013). However, religious nationalism mainly talks about "fusion of nationalism and religion such that they are inseparable" (Rieffer, 2003, p. 225). In this situation, both religion and nationalism are creating a cultural system for a society (Greenfeld, 1996). Therefore, scholars such as Friedland (2001) and Juergensmeyer (1993) argue that religious nationalism fundamentally differs from other types of nationalism. In Friedland's words:

Religious nationalism can be understood as one among the panoply of the apparently new social movements, defending identity as opposed to pursuing interest, a substitute or a stand-in for the redistributive material politics of class. Or it can be understood as a cultural refraction, or mediation, of underlying social grievances. These castings of politicized religion are both premised on distinguishing the social as an instrumental distributional system of things from the cultural as an expressive system of signs, on understanding the economy as a material institutional order, the paragon of the social, while civil society is a symbolic institutional order, the paragon of the cultural (2001, p.130).

As Islamists usually advocate their ideology for people in a particular landscape, scholars widely used the term 'religious nationalist' to describe Islamists and Islamic movements. (Friedland, 2001 Altuntas, 2010). For example, Altuntas argues that "after the collapse of

colonial rule and the establishment of the nation-states, Islamic thought has continued to advocate the Islamic state that is universal and ideological in the long term and based on the nation-state and micro-nationalism in the short term” (2010, p. 427). Similarly, Friedland (2002) suggests that even in Islamic countries such as Iran and Pakistan, Islamic movements never distance themselves from the modern idea of the nation-state. It is true that Islamists often endeavour to exercise their power in a particular nation-state, however, it is important for us to realise that such a position does not make them nationalist (Brubaker, 2012). Namely, as Asad argues

Because the modern nation-state seeks to regulate all aspects of individual life — even the most intimate, such as birth and death—no one, whether religious or otherwise, can avoid encountering its ambitious powers. It’s not only that the state intervenes directly in the social body for purposes of re-form; it’s that all social activity requires the consent of the law, and therefore of the nation-state (2003, p.199).

In the case of Khomeini, we can see that he accepted the modern concept of the nation-state, like most Islamists and nationalists. In *Kashfol al-Asrar*, and many years before Khomeini (1942) had become a political opponent, he accepted the importance of the modern concept of nation-state by implying that Iran needs a functional central government. However, Khomeini (1942, 2015) saw the existence of the nation-state necessary for establishing an Islamic society, not as an imaginary society that Iranian nationalists have depicted in their discourse on Iran.¹

Even after the revolution and when Khomeini introduced the idea of ‘exporting the revolution’, he explicitly mentioned that Iran did not want to rule in other countries and simply wanted to help them to topple their un-Islamic governments (Khomeini, 2010, vols.16 and 17). In other words, the concept of ‘exporting the revolution’ should be studied alongside the revolutionary aspect of the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*.² Such a doctrine found itself in sharp contrast with the Saudi model of government, a tribal monarchy, and the Iraqi model, a social and secular state (Rabi and Mueller, 2018).

¹ For a discussion of the Iranian nationalist on this matter see Delgosha and Imanpour, 2016).

² see chapter one.

The other reasons that Islamists are perceived as religious nationalist and nationalist are their views towards the West (Asad, 2003). In other words, some scholars believe that nationalists and Islamists both have developed negative views towards the West and its influence on non-Western countries (Asad, 2003). As nationalists in Iran have rather diverse views of the West, believing in such a conception is problematic. While someone like Taqizadeh claimed that “Iran must both in appearance and in reality, physically and spiritually, become Europeanized” (cited in Zia-Ebrahimi, p.125), Dariush Forouhar and his party, *hezbeh miliate Iran*¹, developed negative views towards the West (See Pourghanbar and Mehdizadeh, 2012).

More importantly, Khomeini and nationalists hold widely divergent opinions on their negative views towards the West. While Iranian nationalists blamed the Western countries for acting against Iran’s interests (See Pourghanbar and Mehdizadeh, 2012), Khomeini was mainly concerned about the penetration of Western values in Iran (Khomeini, vol.1). Also, Khomeini (2010, vols. 1 and 13) shows that he had a negative view towards both the US and the Soviet Union. He famously said that “the US is worse than England, England is worse than the US, and the Soviet Union is worse than both” (Khomeini, 2010, vol.1 p.420).

Altuntas (2010) argues that the concept of *ummah* - an Islamic community - is a reason that shows the tendency of Islamists to be drawn to religious nationalism:

Thus, the Islamist ideal that aims to create a powerful Muslim state and society against the West, proposes not only state-building but also society-building. However, this process is not a secular process. It is an “*ummah-building*” process which contains the two processes, nation and state-building, and takes its origin from the Koran and the Sunna (2010, p.430).

Of course, in Khomeini’s (2010, vol.21) discourse, there is an accentuation on the importance of unity between Islamic countries. However, the Ayatollah did call for establishing a universal Islamic *ummah*. In other words, Khomeini (2010, vol.16) accepted that different Islamic countries have different characteristics. Such an approach can project itself more clearly when we analyse his words during the Iran-Iraq war. As we shall discuss in Chapter 6, toppling Saddam was Khomeini’s ultimate goal in the war. However, even

¹ Nation Party of Iran.

during that time, Khomeini articulated that after toppling Saddam, Iran would support an Iraqi government in Iraq (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16). The link between Khomeini's thought and the ideas of nationalism and religious nationalism can become more apparent if we continue our journey by studying Khomeini's journey metaphors during the war.

War as a journey on the path of God

People usually perceive journeys as purposeful and goal-oriented, and thus they use journey metaphors in their everyday life (Charteris-Black, 2004). Likewise, Khomeini used journey metaphors during the war to show the war was a purposeful journey. Khomeini used journey metaphors 55 times in his corpus to the Iranian people. By studying these journey metaphors, further light can be shed on his views towards his ideology and more particularly his views towards nationalism. In relation to the debate on nationalism, one could argue that during the war Khomeini could use journey metaphors in three ways: 1) The war is a journey on the path of Iran, 2) The combat is a journey on the path of Iran and Islam and Iran, 3) The war is a journey on the path of Islam. These three potential usages of journey metaphors by Khomeini can be interpreted in three different scenarios. If Khomeini equally used Iran and Islam, we can argue that Khomeini was a religious nationalist. Conversely, if we realise that Iran is the main target domain of Khomeini's journey metaphors during the war, we can suggest that his ideology has a tendency towards a nationalist approach. Finally, if Islam was the main target domain in Khomeini's discourse, we can suggest that Khomeini was neither a nationalist nor a religious nationalist.

Interestingly, there is no instance where Khomeini used Iran merely as a target domain for his journey metaphors. Hence, the use of journey metaphors by Khomeini here does not support the first scenario; that if Khomeini was a nationalist, he had to choose Iran as the primary target domain for his journey metaphor (for example, he could say: THE WAR IS A JOURNEY ON THE PATH OF GLORIOUS IRAN).

A comparison between the use of journey metaphor in Khomeini's and the Pahlavis' discourses can shed more light on Khomeini's ideology on nationalism. The metaphorical mapping that Iran should move in a glorious path can be easily tracked in speeches of nationalists such as Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah. For example, in 1925 Reza Shah began his oath by saying: "I will, like the past, focus all my efforts towards putting our beloved nation on the path

of excellence and progress “(cited in Milani, 2011, p. 148). It shows that for Reza Shah, progress and excellence are two paths that Iran should join. Similarly, in a letter to the Iranian people, Mohammad Reza stated that “Iran may continue along [the] path of honour”. Put differently, the Pahlavi Kings, in contrast to Khomeini, did not say that the country should move on the path of Islam, but they implied that it should move towards an exemplary future. Both kings were nationalists (Adib-Moghadam, 2018). Therefore, one should not be surprised to see such a nationalist use of journey metaphor in their discourse.

The next scenario argues that if Khomeini was neither a religious nationalist nor a nationalist, he had to choose Islamic sources as the primary target domain for the journey metaphors (for example he could say: THE WAR IS A JOURNEY ON THE PATH OF ISLAM). Khomeini used Islam and Islamic sources as target domains for his journey metaphors in 53 different instances. It indicates the importance of Islam in Khomeini’s discourse. For instance, in Text 3 which is one of Khomeini’s messages for the Iranian people after the beginning of the war, Khomeini used a journey metaphor to indicate that the war is a purposeful journey on the path of God and that the Iranian people are at a crossroad. They could choose everlasting pride by partaking in jihad in the path of God and for the country of Islam, or they could stay at home and be disgraced by the enemy (See Text 1). Interestingly, in this message, Khomeini not only used God as a target domain for his journey metaphor, but he also used the country of Islam instead of Iran¹.

- 1) Now you, the great Islamic nation of Iran, are at a crossroad. [You can choose either] the path of prosperity and eternal pride in the glorious shadow of Jihad for God and the country of Islam [or] the path of eternal disgrace (2010.vol.13, p.271) (words inside the brackets are added)

Later, in the war, Khomeini continued to use the religious target domain for his journey metaphors. For instance, in Text 2, by the journey metaphor, THE WAR IS A JOURNEY ON THE PATH OF PROPHETS, Khomeini articulated that Iran and the Iranian people are on the same path as God’s prophets during the history.

- Text 2) Oh, Almighty God, do not allow these remarkable triumphs, that have come for us, our nation and Islam, make us proud of ourselves. [Do not allow] these triumphs to diverge

¹ This will be explored further in the next section.

us from ... the path of the prophets (2010, vol.20, p.16) (words in the brackets do not exist in the original text and they are added by me).

Likewise, in Text 3 Khomeini inferred that those Iranian people who were killed in the war were on the path of Imam Hussein, the third Imam in Twelver Shia Islam that was martyred in a tragic battle with Yazid on 10 October 680 AD. In Text 3, by using journey metaphor, Khomeini tried to persuade the Iranian people that if they die in the war with Iraq, they will be next to Imam Hussein, in the next world.

Text 3) What better than this for the martyrs on the way of Hussein's path, which is indeed the way of God, that they will be in the same heaven that the notable martyr (Imam Hussein) has been located (2010, vol.18, p.325) (words in the brackets do not exist in the original text and they are added by me).

The journey metaphor such as THE WAR IS A JOURNEY TOWARDS PURPOSE (Text 4), and THE WAR IS A JOURNEY TOWARDS GOD (Text 5) are other journey metaphors that can be identified in Khomeini's rhetoric. The journey metaphor THE WAR IS A JOURNEY TOWARDS PURPOSE is a common journey metaphor in Khomeini's discourse, and Khomeini (2010, vol16 and vol 18, vol 19) used the metaphor on several occasions. Although Khomeini did not clarify what he meant by 'the purpose' but based on our discussion of Khomeini's views on mysticism¹ we could suggest that the trace of such a metaphor can be found in his knowledge of mysticism. In Khomeini's mysticism, there are different stages that an *aref* (a seeker) needs pass through on his journey towards God, but the last stage is called *fana* (annihilation) "where the death of the ego translates into union with the beloved, or God" (Loon, 2016). Also, we need to remember that only perfect mankind, *insane kamel*, can reach such a level. Considering this point, and Khomeini's idea that Iranian martyrs are perfect mankind, we can understand why Khomeini stated that the Iranian soldiers are moving towards a purpose (Text 4). Khomeini's knowledge in mysticism can be one reason that can explain why journey metaphors are one of the most used metaphors in his discourse. As Ridgeon (2014) points out, a mystic is always on a journey towards God.

Text 4) My pen and words are incapable of expressing my gratitude and appreciation towards the devoted soldiers of Islam who have brought honour and pride for the Islamic

¹ See chapter one.

Republic and the grandness of God.... with endeavour and dedication on the way of purpose (2010, 18, p.332).

Also, Khomeini believed that after the revolution, Iran arrived on the path of the prophets and the grandees of God, and therefore the war was part of this journey. Such an understanding of Iran's situation in Khomeini's views has a similarity with his writing in *velayat-e faqih* (Khomeini, 2015). Therefore, in Text 4, Khomeini inferred that the Iranian martyrs arrived on the path of Islam and the path of God. In Text 5, Khomeini articulated that the Iranian youth are not afraid of dying because they see the war as killing on the path of God.

Text 5) [The enemy can] attack us with any power that they want; we will confront, and we are not afraid. The ultimate cost is that we would be martyred on the path of God, and this is the ambition of our youth (2010, vol.17, p.402) (words in the brackets do not exist in the original text and they are added by me).

As we have stated, if Khomeini was a religious nationalist, he had to use both Iran and Islam as target domains for his journey metaphors. For example, he could say: THE WAR IS A JOURNEY ON THE PATH OF ISLAM AND IRAN. In 118,000 words of Khomeini's corpus, he used both Islam and Iran together as target domains for his journey metaphors just on two occasions (Text 1 and Text 2). However, we should be careful not to jump to the conclusion that these examples can show that Khomeini was a religious nationalist. First, while Khomeini rarely used Iran and Islam as target domains, as we have seen, he often used Islamic sources as target domains, and it can show the importance of Islam in Khomeini's view. In other words, if the assertions that Islam and Iran were both critical in Khomeini's ideology (Juergensmeyer, 1993 and Gieling 1999) were true, one should see more examples of Iran and Islam together as the target domain in the metaphors that he used during the war.

Text 6) Solitude of God and the grandees of Islam upon the martyrs and their families and upon the fighters on the way of Islam and Iran (2010, vol.16, p. 151).

Text 7) Plus, the Million Army and public mobilization, which are equipped by people's own organisation, are ready to sacrifice on the path of Islam and the country (2010, vol. 13, p 211).

Second, if we observe discourse of religious nationalists and the frequency of the use of Iran and Islam together in their journey metaphors, it can shed more light on why the rare usages of Iran

and Islam together in Khomeini's journey metaphors would not necessarily make Khomeini a religious nationalist. The Council of Nationalist-Religious Activists of Iran and its leader Mehdi Bazargan were particular religious nationalists that we talked about in chapter one. For this group of political activists Iran and Islam are equally important (Peyman 2003). Therefore, the use of Islam and Iran together is ubiquitous in their discourses.

For instance, in his description of the war, Bazargan (2015; 2010) used Islam and Iran together as target domains for all his journey metaphors. For example, in one of his letters to Khomeini, he said that "throughout the war ... we with hope and confidence continued our strives. And [we hoped] that the policy of patience and striving on the path of Iran and Islam would not be ineffective" (Bazargan, 2015). In this letter, Bazargan says that THE WAR IS A JOURNEY ON THE PATH OF IRAN AND ISLAM. In this journey metaphor, Bazargan used Iran and Islam as target domains for the war as the source domain. Such a comparison between Bazargan's discourse and Khomeini's words, can show us that if the Ayatollah was a religious nationalist leader, he might have used both Iran and Islam together more for his journey metaphors.

Khomeini, Labels and Nationalism

As we have seen, the use of journey metaphors in Khomeini's discourse support the position of those scholars who argue that Khomeini was not a nationalist. However, Gieling (1999) and Grinberg (2017) challenge such a position by arguing that the use of the term '*millat*' in Khomeini's discourse is a sign that Khomeini was a nationalist leader. They reach such a conclusion by translating the term '*millat*' to nation in Khomeini's discourse (Gieling, 1999 and Grinberg, 2017). To respond to such a challenge, first, we need to define the term nation in nationalism, and then we need to draw a comparison between these definitions and the term '*millat*' in Khomeini's discourse.

In the discourse of nationalism, a nation is usually reduced to ethnicity and the citizen body (Podoksik, 2017). The former definition can usually be found at the discourse of ethnic nationalism, while the latter definition can be seen in the literature of civic nationalism (Podoksik, 2017). A thorough observation of Khomeini's discourse can show us that none of these definitions is applicable to his ideology. Khomeini vehemently refused to give any preference to any ethnicity and considered such an act as un-Islamic (Texts 8 and 9). Khomeini

believed that Islam treats Muslims equally, regardless of their ethnicity. This will be highlighted further in the following chapter where Khomeini's views towards sectarianism are discussed.

Text 8) I have repeatedly stated that race, language, ethnicity, group and district are not important in Islam. All Muslims-whether Sunni or Shiites-are brothers and equal and all enjoy all the benefits and Islamic rights (2010, vol.9, p.351).

Text 9) Islam has decreed that Muslims, from any tribes, are brothers. Arabs, Non-Arabs, Kurds, Turks, Fars, and others; all tribes, will enjoy their rights in Islam and the Islamic Republic (2010, vol.6, p.403).

Another definition of the term nation, the citizen body, can neither be used to define the term '*millat*' in Khomeini's discourse. In all 21 volumes of *Sahifeh-ye Imam*, not once did Khomeini use either the term citizen '*shahrvand*' or citizens '*Shahrvandan*'. Talking about citizenship rights in Iran is relatively new in Iran, and it was just recently that President Hassan Rouhani talked about the Charter of Citizen's Rights (2016) for the first time.¹

Therefore, it is important for us to know that in Khomeini's discourse, the term means people, not nation. Indeed, as Motahari (2017), one of the closest clerics to Khomeini, says: "'*millat*' in the Persian language does not refer to all strata in a society. The ruling stratum is called *hukumat* (state), and those who are ruled by the stratum of *hukumat* are called '*millat*' "(Motahari, 2017).

Similarly, in Khomeini's discourse, '*millat*' refers to those who are ruled by a state. That is the reason while Khomeini did not believe in the legitimacy of governments such as Iraq and the US, he thought *milatha* - the plural form of *millat* - in these countries are ready to support the Islamic Republic. As a result of this, in Khomeini's corpus, he represented nations such as Iraq and the US positively (Text 10 and Text 11). Hence, people became the primary target audience in Khomeini's discourse (Text 10 and Text 11). Such a positive representation of nations by Khomeini can also shed light on his representation of the Iraqi

¹ Centre for Human Right in Iran (2018) warns that such a chart is harmful distraction from the infraction of humans' right in Iran.

people. As we develop our discussion, we can see that in Khomeini's discourse for the Iraqi people, he clearly distinguished between the nation of Iraq and the Baath Party's leaders.¹

Text 10) the nation of America did not cause any harm to us. If the nation of America understands the story, if the nation of America understands the matter, they will agree with us, in accordance with their human conscience (2010, vol.11, p. 253).

Text 11) we want to reach out to the Iraqi people. This oppressed Iraqi nation which is being crushed under these ruthless people [the Baath Party], we want to help them (2010, vol.19, p 229) (words in the brackets do not exist in the original text and they are added by me).

Hitherto, we have established that the use of term '*millat*' should not be interpreted as a nationalist approach in Khomeini's discourse. Now we can slightly shift our direction, and study other labels that he used during the war: 'beloved Iran' and 'country of Islam'. The use of the term 'beloved Iran' led scholars to think that Khomeini was a nationalist leader (Malesevic, 2006). However, if we look closely at Khomeini's discourse, we can see that he used the term 'beloved' to describe different countries, including Iraq (Khomeini, 2010, vol, 19. P. 177), Algeria (Khomeini, 2010, vol, 10. P. 396), Lebanon (Khomeini, 2010, vol, 16. p 363) and Palestinian (Khomeini, 2010, vol, 15. P. 160). Therefore, the term 'beloved Iran' does not necessarily make Khomeini a nationalist.

For Khomeini, the Iranian people had chosen Islam. Hence, on different occasions, he referred to Iran as a country of Islam. During the war, he used the label 'the country of Islam' and 'Islam' for Iran. In Text 12, Khomeini promised all parties in Iran that Islam and the country of Islam would finally win the war. The label 'the country of Islam' was one of those labels that can make Khomeini's views towards nationalism and religious nationalism more transparent. In the first glance, we might think that the use of such a term by Khomeini would make him a religious nationalist, however, a careful observation of his discourse shows that this term should be interpreted alongside his political understanding of Islam (Khomeini, 1942).

¹ See chapter five.

12) You [the Iranian people and officials] should know that negligence is considered as a big sin by God and nation, and you should avoid its consequences. And I insure all the parties that the victory will be with Islam and the country of Islam and defeat will be with your enemies (2010, vol13, p.272) (words in the brackets do not exist in the original text and they are added by me).

Namely, in Khomeini's reading of Islam, there is a procedure for how an Islamic country should be run, and only if this procedure is applied to a country, then that country should be called the country of Islam (Khomeini, 1942). In Khomeini's earlier works before the revolution, the term 'the country of Islam' was the ideal country that was ruled by Islamic laws and supervised by *ulamah* (Khomeini, 1942). Therefore, when the revolution triumphed, and when *ulamah* started to rule the country, Khomeini used the label 'the country of Islam' for Iran (Text 12). However, it is important to notice that in Khomeini's (2010, vol.17) discourse, if other Islamic countries also behaved like Iran, they would become the country of Islam.

Put differently, in Khomeini's (2010, vol.17) view, the only thing that had made Iran 'the country of Islam' was the fact that Iran was ruled by Islamic laws. That was the reason that, in several occasions, Khomeini used Islam as a label for Iran. For instance, in Text 13 Khomeini stated that the focus should be on Islam, and the dignity of Islam, therefore, the Iranian people should put aside their disagreements and focus on the war. In Text 14, Khomeini said that if Islam-Iran- wins in the war, all problems would be solved. Finally, in Text 15, Khomeini argued that defending Islam is obligatory. Hence, the Iranian people should participate in the war and defend the country of Islam. Here Khomeini does not explain why it is obligatory for Muslims to defend their countries. However, in *Kashfol Asrar* he explained that in Islam there are two different military services: obligatory and voluntary (Khomeini, 1942). The voluntary service should be excised when an Islamic country is in peace situation, while the obligatory service is for the time when an Islamic society is at a war (Khomeini, 1942).

13) Today one should not consider their desires while Islam's pride is in danger (2010, vol. 16, p.276).

14) If the war terminates with the triumph of Islam, [then] the victory will heal all these problems (2010, vol.18, p. 130) (words in the brackets do not exist in the original text and they are added by me).

15) Defending Islam, the Islamic country and the honour of Muslims are intrinsically incumbent upon all Muslims (2010, vol. 18, p.332).

It was during the Qajar dynasty and in the midst of the war between Russia and Iran that for the first time the Grand Ayatollahs introduced the concept of '*hefze beyzeh-ye Islam*' - protecting the bastion of Islam - in their writings (Saidi, 2006). For instance, during the Russian-Persian War (1826–1828) Ayatollahs such as Ja'far Kashif al-Ghita and Sayad Ali Tabatabai issued fatwas and called for *hefze beyzeh-ye Islam* against the non-believers (Zakeri, 2001). Tabatabai and al-Ghita asked for defending the Islamic country of Iran when that Iran was threatened by a non-Muslim country like Russia. However, during the war, Khomeini argued that the Iranian people should defend Islam while Iran was at war with an Islamic country. More importantly, Ayatollahs such as Sayad Ali Tabatabai believed that Jihad should be limited to defence, and that attacking other countries (to expand Islam) should be limited to the time of the prophet and Shia Imams (Zakeri, 2001). However, as text 16 indicates, Khomeini sought to legitimise Iran's entrance to Iraq, albeit he said it is not in Basra to rule but merely to defend itself.

16) We did not enter Iraq to occupy Iraq or Basra. Our land is not Basra or the Levant. Our country is Islam. We are following the Islamic laws. Islam does not allow us to dominate an Islamic country; we do not consider that... we are defending ourselves (2010, vol.16, p.392).

Such positions and labels by Khomeini put him at odds with religious nationalists that consider a specific feature for Iran when it comes to comparison between Iran and other Islamic countries. For instance, for the first time, Shariati (2002) introduces the concept of 'Iranian-Islamic state', stressing the Importance of both the Iranian nationality and Islam in shaping Iranian identities. Likewise, Sahabi (2015) claims that the history of Iran before and after Islam are both parts of Iranian identity, and for this reason he uses the term 'Islamic-Iranian state' to describe the ideal form of the government in Iran. Sahabi (2015) was a religious nationalist. Therefore, we should not be surprised that he did use such a term in his discourse.

Additionally, Khomeini's labels for Iran would distinguish Khomeini from nationalists. In general, labels that nationalists have used to describe Iran are more related to Iran's "glorious past" rather than its relationship with Islam (Ghods, 1991 and Adib-Moghaddam, 2018). For instance, Aref Qazvini - a famous poet and former staunch support of Reza Shah and his nationalist agenda - described Iran as the country of Cyrus when he said: "As long as the mullahs, and the Qajars remain, who knows what dishonour will befall the country of Cyrus" (Cited in Ghods, 1991 p. 42). Similarly, in 1971 in his speech the Shah of Iran directly addressed Cyrus and stated that "your country" Iran "during these 25 centuries experienced the most difficult situations...., and yet, this nation never did surrender to these big difficulties" (The Shah, 2016). As we should see in the next part, analysing intertextuality in Khomeini's discourse helps us shed more light on the differences between Khomeini and religious nationalists and nationalists.

[Khomeini, nationalism and referring to history](#)

Speakers can reinforce their ideology by using intertextuality and interdiscursivity (Bloor and Bloor, 2007). In other words, by mapping the intertextual and interdiscursive uses of a speaker, the central ideology of that speaker can be identified. Wodak and Boukala (2015) use this ability of intertextuality to describe nationalism in Europe, particularly after the economic crisis since 2008. For instance, they show how Geert Wilders, a right-wing Dutch politician, used "the intertextually significant nomination of non-Western civilians as 'barbarians', through the prism of historical reality, [which] leads to a distinction between Westerners and non-Westerners/barbarians and thus the creation of in-groups and out-groups" (Wodak and Boukala, 2015, p. 99). Similarly, studying the intertextual usages of Iran's history in the discourse of nationalists and religious nationalists and then making a comparison with the way Khomeini referred to history, can elucidate Khomeini's ideology.

The Pahlavi Shahs referred to the history of Iran before Islam to introduce Iranians to their glorious past. Such a focus on Iran's pre-Islamic history was also part of their nationalist attempt to create an image of Iran, which was different from its Arab neighbours (Adib-Moghaddam, 2018). In Bolourchi's words, this nationalist policy "advances the prowess of one alleged race, Persian (Aryan), over another, Arab (Semite)" (2018, p. 10). It was the reason that in 1973, the Shah called himself the King of Kings and the son of the Aryan Race (Dabashi, 2017). However, such a nationalist discourse was seriously challenged by the 1979 revolution and Khomeini. In Khomeini's (2010, vol.10) discourse, Iran's history before Islam was not a source of pride. By

contrast, it was a past that was full of unjust events and kings. For Khomeini (2010, vol.19) what made Iranians great was their strong belief in Islam. In Text17, for instance, in one of his speeches during the last days of the war, Khomeini besmirched Anushiravan (an Iranian king in Sasanian Empire) who claimed that the birth of Prophet Mohammad was coincident with some extraordinary occurrences, including the natural collapse of some parts of Taq-e-Kasra, a palace built by the Sasanian dynasty.

17) The point that I like to state today is that some occurrences had happened on the birthday of the Prophet, rare occurrences.... including the collapse of Taq-e-Kasra and fourteen of its archers. [simultaneously], Zoroastrian fire temples in Frās [Persia] were extinguished. Also, idols fell on the ground. The collapse of Taq-e-Kasra might be an allusion to this [fact] that, during the time of this great prophet, the arches of oppression, and most specifically, Taq-e-Kasra, would be broken. Because Taq-e-Kasra was the centre of the tyranny of Anushiravan. The poets, those who work in that palace and Zoroastrian priests distorted the historical events. This [distortion] was one of their oppressions of Sassanid (2010, vol.19, p.433) (words in the brackets do not exist in the original text and they are added by me).

Likewise, in Text 18, Khomeini argues that Iran's 2500 years of history was a history full of Kings and Sultans who all had little mercy on the Iranian people. Such a description of the history of Iran by Khomeini, put him at odds with those who have long considered a relationship between Shi'ism and Iran's history, such as orientalists and religious nationalists. For instance, by introducing the concept of "Iranian Islam", French Orientalist Henry Corbin (1903-1978) asserts that Shia Islam in Iran is a combination of spirituality and the pre-Islamic past (Algar, 1980). As Algar suggests "Certainly a reading of Corbin's works leaves the reader with the impression that Imam Khomeini either failed to grasp the true essence of Shi'ism or has wilfully transgressed against it" (1980, p. 90).

18) O God! I said. I said to these gentlemen what I understand. I said to the Iranian society, and I am not responsible. The story is not a joke. This is about a nation that had been dominated by oppressive kings. Over the course of the past 2,500 years, Iran was under the domination of the sultans, which all were alike. Even the righteousness ones were evils. Even Anushiravan was evil (2010, vol4. p.239).

While in texts 17 and 18 Khomeini ridicules Anushiravan and labels him as a cruel king, for nationalists such as Akhondzadeh and Kermani, Anushiravan was a just king, and they introduce a positive view of him (Delgosha and Imanpour, 2016). Such a positive attitude towards Iran's pre-Islam history could also be seen in the Qajar Kings (Delgosha and Imanpour, 2016). Additionally, Taq-e-Kasra was the symbol of Sassanid's empire and the fact that Taq-e-Kasra was the era that Arabs defeated the Iranians in the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah it makes this place more important for Iranians (Akbarzadeh, 2018).

In Iran's modern history, to diminish the role of religion throughout the country, and to remind the people about their glorious past before Islam, Reza Shah introduced Taq-e Kasra as a unique example of Iranian architecture (Akbarzadeh, 2018). Also, it was in this era that postal stamps depicting Taq-e-Kasra were printed and Taq-e-Kasra inspired the architecture of the National Museum of Iran (Akbarzadeh, 2018).

In a sharp contrast with Reza Shah's policy, Khomeini said Taq-e-Kasra was a place of tyranny that displays the cruelty of Sassanid Empire. Khomeini's discourse was not only at odds with Iranian nationalists, but it was also in contrast with Saddam's nationalist discourse during the war. For instance, during the war, the nationalist ideology became the dominant doctrine of Saddam and the Baath Party (Abdi, 2008). In Abdi's words:

The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 was an opportunity for the Ba'ath regime to further bolster Iraqi nationalist sentiments. In the meantime, Mr Hussein was engaged in formulating a new ideology to promote his cult of personality as the leader of the Iraqi nation (and ultimately the Arab world). This tendency reached its height during the Iran-Iraq War and continued till Mr Hussein's downfall (2008, p.6).

For example, Babylon - the most famous city from ancient Mesopotamia - was used by Saddam and the Baath Party for pan-Arab nationalism. In their nationalist discourse over Babylon, "Iran (as the embodiment of the Aryan menace) was therefore, explicitly or implicitly depicted as Iraq's arch-enemy" (Abdi, 2008, p.21).

Additionally, Saddam reported the Iran-Iraq war was a war between Majus (fire worshippers) and Arabs (Adib-Moghaddam, 2007). This intertextual use of the term Majus by Saddam was an attempt to frame Arabs as superior to the Iranian race. Also, the Baath party used the label Saddam's Qadisiyyah to refer to the war between Iran and Iraq as, referring to the battle of al-

Qadisiyyah when Arabs defeated the Sassanid Persian Empire in the seventh century (Lewental, 2014). Such an interdiscursive use of history by the Baath Party projects their tendency towards Arab nationalism (Adib-Moghaddam, 2007). Asad reflected on the use of history by Arab nationalists when he says that “for nationalism the history of Islam is important because it reflects the early unification and triumph of the Arab nation; in that discourse, the “Arabian Prophet” is regarded as its spiritual hero” (2003, p. 196).

However, Khomeini never countered Saddam’s pro-Arabism discourse with a Persian nationalism. Instead, the history of the onset of Islam was the discourse that Khomeini chose to negate Saddam’s nationalism (Khomeini, 2010, vols.13 and 16). In other words, while Saddam compared the Iran-Iraq war with the al- Qadisiyyah battle, Khomeini constantly compared the war with the battles at the onset of Islam where Muslims were fighting infidels:

19) Number [of soldiers] are not vital in the war. The important thing is humankind. The same power, which in the onset of Islam, with the reliance on God, destroyed lots of enemies with a small number. Although we are small in terms of a number, thanks to God, our nations,with reliance on the Holy Essence of Almighty God can defeat huge number of armies and huge crowds (2010, vol.13, p.234).

By comparing the wars at the onset of Islam with the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini concluded that believing in God is the determinative factor for triumph in war (Text 19). Hence, if at the beginning of Islam, the warriors could destroy their enemies with a small army, Iran could also defeat the large Iraqi army with a less equipped army (Text 19). Likewise, Khomeini made a comparison between Iran’s situation after the revolution and the prophet’s position and asked the Iranian army to be strong and brave like the Prophet Mohammad:

20) Be strong, be brave and never be afraid of the fuss of the world. These issues did exist from the onset of Islam. These are the same commotions and problems that the opponents of Islam lead at the onset of Islam. In the time of the Prophet himself and later, this has always been the case. (2010, vol.18, p.439).

Such a comparison shows that for Khomeini the war was a conflict between an Islamic government which was ruled according to the Quran – Iran - and a secular-socialist government - Iraq. One should not be surprised to see that comparison in Khomeini’s discourse, as his ideology of *velayat-e faqih* highlighted that an Islamic regime under the supervision of *velayat-e*

faqih is a state that is ruled based on the Quran the Prophet Mouhammad's rules (Khomeini, 2015).

Khomeini's interdiscursive argument in Text 21 that Iranians should be united for the sake of Islam is another reason that leads us to think that Khomeini was not a nationalist leader. In Text 21, Khomeini did not say that Iran's enemies are planning to destroy Iran. Instead, he said that the enemies are aiming to destroy Islam. Hence, it is obligatory for the Iranian to defend Islam.

Put in other words, for Khomeini what mobilised the Iranian was their belief in Islam, and therefore, this is a reason that he claimed that Iran's enemies have decided to destroy Islam (Text 21). The Ayatollah then emphasised that the security of Islam is even more important than Islamic rules. Such an argument reinforced the point that for Khomeini, Iran was an important country because it was hosting the Islamic Republic. In other words, for Khomeini keeping the security of the Islamic Republic was equal with keeping Islam safe.

It was the reason that Khomeini (2010, vol.17) stressed the importance of *Ahkam-e- Sanaviyah* (the secondary rules) in Islam. *Ahkam-e-Avaliyah* (the primary rules) are those Islamic rules that are primarily part of sharia laws. However, *Ahkam-e-Sanaviyah* are those rules that are established by an Islamic ruler to revoke *Ahkam-e-Avaliyah* temporarily (Yazdi, 1999). For example, in Islam eating the meat of dead animals is forbidden (a primary rule). However, when the life of a Muslim is in danger, they can eat from that meat (a secondary rule) (Behdad, 1994). By politicising this jurisprudential rule, Khomeini (2010, vol.20) introduced the ideology of *velayat-e mutlaq faqih*- the absolute guardianship of the jurist.

By equating the security of Islam with the security of the Islamic Republic, *velayat-e mutlaq faqih* infers that in the occasions that the security of the Islamic Republic is in danger, *vali-e faqih* can suspend the primary Islamic rules such as the Hajj (Khomeini, 2010, vol.20). In comparison with *velayat-e faqih*, the doctrine of *velayat-e mutlaq faqih* puts the emphases on the security of the Islamic republic, while the former stresses on establishing an Islamic government which is ruled by the *vali-e faqih* (Kadivar, 2000). Therefore, to make sure that the *vali-e faqih* has enough power in his hand to secure the existence of the Islamic Republic, the *velayat-e mutlaq faqih* gives the absolute power to the supreme leader (See also, Text 21).

21) The issue of unity between you [officials], and the unity of all different strata of Iran is an important matter. This is important for protecting Islam. And it is obligatory for all of us, to defend Islam in any way to do whatever we can to protect Islam... They will eliminate the basis of Islam, because they saw that Islam can work and stand against them. And this is a duty for all of us. Protecting Islam is the most important duty. Protecting Islam is superior to protecting the rules of Islam. [Protecting] the basis of Islam is the first [duty]. [Protecting] the Islamic laws are the next duty. And all of us, and all of you, should do all we can in the sacred defence (2010, vol.20. p.76) (words in the brackets do not exist in the original text and they are added by me).

While hitherto we have seen that analysing the usage of Iran's history suggests that Khomeini was not a nationalist leader, it is important that such a use of history differs in the discourse of religious nationalist in Iran, due to the importance of both the history of Iran and Islam in their dialogue. As a religious nationalist, Sahabi (2015) talked about the history of Iran positively and claimed that it is just in Iran that due to Zoroastrianism people always practised monotheism. Sahabi (2015) suggests that the history of Iran before, and after Islam is both important and for this reason he talks about the 'Islamic-Iranian state' versus an Islamic state. Likewise, Bazargan focuses on the importance of Islam and Iran in his speech for Iran's armed forces by arguing that there is no difference between patriotism and godliness. He even argues that there is no difference between Iran and Islam:

There is no difference between worshiping God and serving people. And this is like worship God, if [you] serve people for the sake of God and on the path of God. This is that [you] can see why patriotism and godliness are synonym. There is no difference between Iran and Islam.... Protecting the borders, the nation and the revolution are exactly the same as serving God (2010, p.175).

For religious nationalists, Iran's interest is the defining factor in decision-making. Therefore, they have a softer view of the west and the USA. This was the reason that Bazargan's government, after the revolution, tried to maintain Iran's good relationships with the West and the US, in constant to Khomeini (Karimifard, 2015). Therefore, when the students occupied the US embassy in Tehran, Bazargan, resigned to show his dissatisfaction, while Khomeini (2010, vol.10) supported it and claimed that if the US does not deport the Shah, a bigger revolution than the first revolution would happen in Iran. He also threatened other Western countries such

as the UK by saying that if the UK would not change its behaviour towards Iran¹, the Iranian people would act the same and would occupy their Embassy in Tehran (Khomeini, 2010, vol.10). In other words, the Ayatollah's mind was preoccupied with how to change these states rather than seeking unity with them. As earlier mentioned, Khomeini believed the Islamic Republic should invest in *millatha*, people, rather than sates (Montazeri, 2011). In other words, he targeted the hearts of downtrodden people. He wanted to convince the people to rise against their government and to establish an Islamic government similar to the Iranian regime in their own countries. It was only after that he could call for an Islamic *ummah*.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have seen that Khomeini's discourse during the war was driven by neither nationalist language nor religious nationalism. In doing this, first, we have studied the concept of nationalism and religious nationalism and explained why such a concept could not be applied to Khomeini's ideology. It is true that Khomeini (1942-2010) accepted the modern concept of the nation-state, but such an act should not be interpreted as his tendency toward either nationalism or religious nationalism.

Khomeini accepted the concept of modern nation-state because this concept was in the boundary of his doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*.² Khomeini (2015) in *velayat-e faqih* explains that such a doctrine should not be read as a rejection to the idea of the nation-state, but it seeks to run a nation-state according to Islamic rules and under the supervision of an Islamic jurist: faqih. As Abrahamian (1993) stresses, Khomeini "both implicitly and explicitly accepted the existence of the territorial nation-state" (p.15). This was the reason that in his letter to Iraqi people, Khomeini (2010, vol.16) insisted that Iran would not want to rule in Iraq, but it would help the Iraqi people to establish an Islamic and Iraqi government. Therefore, Khomeini's discourse shows that exporting the revolution was not either an attempt to abolish the boundary between the Islamic country or a call for establishing an Iranian revolution in the rest of the Islamic countries. This understanding of nation-state should distinguish Khomeini from nationalists and religious nationalists in Iran that have seen Iran as a distinct and imaginary community (See Sahabi, 2015; Delgosha and Imanpour, 2016).

¹ Khomeini did not directly mention how the UK should exactly change its behaviour towards Iran.

² see chapter one.

The use of journey metaphors in Khomeini's discourse also helped us to have a better understanding of Khomeini's views of nationalism and religious nationalism. As we have seen, the target domains in most of Khomeini's journey metaphors were Islamic sources and Khomeini never used Iran merely as a target domain¹.

The labels that Khomeini used during the war can also help us develop a better understanding of Khomeini's views on matters such as nationalism and religious nationalism. In the discourse of nationalism, the nation has usually been defined as ethnicity and the citizen body (Podoksik, 2017). The former definition can be usually found in discourse of ethnic nationalism, while the latter definition can be seen in the literature of civic nationalism (Podoksik, 2017). None of these definitions is related to his ideology. Khomeini refused to give any preference to any ethnicity and considered such an act as un-Islamic. For Khomeini, Islam treats Muslims equality, regardless of their ethnicity.

Also, Khomeini (2010) never used the term civic, *shahrvand*, to describe the Iranian people. Therefore, in Khomeini's discourse the term nation should be defined as 'people'. Put differently, *millat* in Khomeini's discourse should be seen as a term that he used to refer to those people who live under the rule of a specific state, *hukumat*. That was the reason that Khomeini (2010, vol.11) used the term to distinguish between the US government and the people of the US. Also, the label 'our beloved nation' that Khomeini used for Iran also should not be interpreted as a nationalistic attempt by Khomeini, as he used such term for countries such as Iraq, Algeria and Lebanon (See Khomeini, vols. 10,16 and 19).

Khomeini's interdiscursive use of the history of Islam and Iran also can shed some light on his views on matters such as nationalism and religious nationalism. While Saddam referred to the history of Islam for nationalistic reasons, Khomeini compared the war between Iran and Iraq to wars at the onset of Islam to show that the war was a war between Islam and *Kufr*- infidelity. Also, drawing a comparison between the discourse of Khomeini and religious nationalists in Iran can show us that while for religious nationalists Iran and Islam are both important, Islam and the history of Islam is the central part of the Ayatollah's discourse. Needless to say, this also put

¹ By analysing journey metaphors in Khomeini's discourse, chapter six will also help us understand how the Ayatollah prolonged the war.

Khomeini in sharp contrast with Iranian nationalists that have tried to glorify Iran's history before the Islam.

As Mabon (2018) states "Khomeini's religious views were enshrined and protected within the concept of velayat-e faqih" (2018, p.49). Such a religious aspect of Khomeini helps us to understand his view towards the concepts of nation and nationalism. Such a concept alongside other examples of Khomeini political and religious thought will benefit us as we continue our discussions on Khomeini's views on matters such as sectarianism and prolonging the war. For instance, as should we see in the next chapter, while the Iranian nationalists and Saddam did not hesitate to use sectarian language, Khomeini refused to use any sectarian language against the Iraqi people.

Chapter 5: Khomeini's words to the Iraqi people

Introduction

Thanks to his time in Najaf and the network that he built there, after the revolution of 1979, Khomeini saw Iraq as a land ready to be cultivated with the seeds of the new revolution. He might have thought that as the Iranian revolution inspired some of his disciples in Iraq - Sadr and his group - it can also mobilise all the Iraqi people against Saddam's regime. The Ayatollah talked to the Iraqi people before and after the war on thirteen occasions. Before the war, Khomeini sent three different messages to the Iraqi people, and in all of these messages he asked the Iraqi people to start a revolution against the Baath Regime. Although Iraq started the war, Khomeini's provocative words should be seen as important factors in provoking Saddam to attack Iran in September 1980 (Afshari, 2014). In other words, while Khomeini was privy to Iraq's plan to attack Iran, he did not attempt to stop it (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). Instead, by sending letters to the Iraqi people, Khomeini (2010, vols. 12 and 13) asked them to rise against the Baath Party.

Khomeini also sent ten messages to Iraqi people during the war and asked the Iraqis to support the Iranian armed forces in the war. Six of these messages were sent in the first month of the war, however, after that, Khomeini addressed the Iraqi people on just three occasions. The first occasion was Khomeini's speech for the Iraqi militants inside Iran on the anniversary of Sadr's death, 9 April 1981. The next one was on 14 July 1982 when Iran was in the middle of the Ramadan Operation inside Iraqi territories. Khomeini's final message for the Iraqi people was on 18 June 1983, when the Baath Party killed six disciples of Ayatollah Hakim.

Although these messages were written originally in Farsi, they were translated and distributed among the Iraqi people and armed forces (Afshari, 2014). During the war, Iranian fighter aircrafts usually dropped Khomeini's leaflet for the Iraqi people (Tasnim, 2018). Leaving propaganda messages near the Iraqi trenches on the front lines was another common strategy by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war (Bahmani, 2015) Additionally, Iran's Arab radio continually broadcasted Khomeini's words and passed Khomeini's orders for the Arabic speaking people in the region (Esposito, 1990).

Analysing Khomeini's words also help us understand his view towards sectarianism. During the war, fifty-five per cent of the Iraqi people were Shia Muslims (CIA, 1984). Therefore, Khomeini

could have used sectarian language¹ to mobilise this majority. However, as we will see in this chapter, Khomeini never used sectarian language to mobilise the Iraqi people.

However, scholarship on Khomeini's attitude towards sectarianism is divided. Scholars such as Nasr (2004) and Cohen (2018) argue that Khomeini tried to expand Shia Islam in the Islamic World. Nasr (2004) highlights that Khomeini openly supported Shia political groups in Pakistan and Syria. Likewise, Cohen (2018) argues that Khomeini's "religious-political interest was to enhance Shi'a dominance" (p. 36). In the case of the Iran-Iraq war, Terrill asserts that:

Throughout this conflict, the Iranian government under Ayatollah Khomeini attempts to convince the Shia Iraqis to join with the Iranians to join with the Iranians in opposing Saddam. In doing this, the Iranians attempted to play on their sense of grievances against the Sunni Government in Baghdad which they characterized as 'atheist' and even 'a puppet of Satan'. Since Iran is over 90 percent Shi'ite Muslim, questions of Arabism and Iraqi nationalism verses Shi'ite solidarity became matters of regime survival (2003, p.8)

In a similar vein, Farzaneh (2000) argues that Khomeini wanted to establish a Shia government in Iraq. However, there are scholars (Rahnema, 2014; Sabet, 2014; Enayat, 2015) who claim that there is nothing sectarian about Khomeini's ideology. For instance, Enayat (2015) and Sabet (2014) infer that by introducing the ideology of *velayat-e faqih* Khomeini contradicted the conventional approach of the Shia seminaries and moved closer to the Sunni school of thought.

Also, leaders in the Middle East were not sure how to approach the new regime in Iran. Yasser Arafat, Former Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, hailed the fall of the Shah and described the revolution in Iran as a new era in the Middle East (The Washington Post, 1979). Likewise, Syria under Hafez Assad welcomed the new revolution in Iran and considered the Islamic Republic as a new and reliable ally (Ataie, 2013). By contrast, the Saudis who were afraid that Khomeini would provoke the Shia population in the eastern provinces reacted to the revolution in Iran with caution (Mabon, 2018). As a member of the Saudi royal family said in an interview "ideally, Saudi Arabia would welcome any Islamic rule anywhere. However, if we have a regime, like that in Iran, which starts differentiating between Sunni and Shiite Moslems, then we

¹ Defining terms such as sectarian and sectarianism are not easy task and as Haddad (2010) explains, such terms can simply refer to the existence of different sects in a state, or more negatively they can be defined as hate and discrimination between different sects. In this thesis, I use the second definition. By sectarian langue I mean a language that promotes hate and discrimination based on differences in Shia and Sunni Islam.

have a problem” (New York Times, 1979). Saddam was anxious about the influence of the revolution on Iraq’s Shia populations and described his attack as a pre-emptive war against Shiite subversion in Iran (Chubin and Tripp, 1988).

In the previous chapter, we have seen how Khomeini’s words to the Iranian people can shed some light on his ideology towards nationalism and religious nationalism. In this chapter, by analysing Khomeini’s words to the Iraqi people during the war, we can see how Khomeini’s discourse is distinguished from Arab nationalists’ discourse such as Saddam and Michel Aflaq. Moreover, to have a better understanding of Khomeini’s words to the Iraqi people, we need to refer to two of Khomeini’s views: *taqiyah modarati* and *velayat-e faqih*. The doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* and its revolutionary aspect can show Khomeini’s inflammatory approaches towards Saddam and the Baath Party, before and after the war. Additionally, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the *velayat-e faqih* ideology is a non-sectarian ideology. Therefore, in this chapter, we can see how, during the war, by using a non-sectarian language during the war, Khomeini tried to encourage the Iraqi people to start a new revolution against the Baath Party.

To that end, Khomeini’s metaphors, the labels that he used during the war, and intertextual strategies are analysed in the following sections. For instance, demonising metaphors, brotherhood metaphors and war with Islam are the central metaphors in Khomeini's discourse when addressing the Iraqi people. Despite a significant use of demonising metaphors, he never used these metaphors for sectarian purposes. Additionally, by the metaphor war within Islam, Khomeini used Islam as a metaphor for Iran. We then should see how this metaphor is related to Khomeini's *velayat-e faqih* ideology. It will also be shown how Khomeini used this metaphor in a non-sectarian way. This chapter also analyses how Khomeini used predication strategy to label his enemies, Saddam and the Baath party, and his friend, Ayatollah Sadr. Also, we need to study the link between this labelling strategy and the *velayat-e faqih* ideology. In the last part of this chapter, we will study the use of historical events and the Quran in Khomeini’s discourse. In that part, we should see how in his intertextual use of the Islamic sources and interdiscursivity with the Quran, Khomeini avoided using any sectarian language. Meanwhile, it will be seen how by these three strategies Khomeini tried to convince the Iraqi people to support Iran in the war.

Using metaphors to influence the Iraqi people

The 'yellow wind' or 'yellow storm' were two metaphors that Saddam coined to describe the Iranian people (Bengio, 2002). Saddam famously said, "the Iraqi people are the guardians of the eastern gateway of the Arab world to stand up to this yellow wind, just as our forefathers had stood up against the incursions of Persians and Tatars for hundred years" (Cited in Bengio, 2002, p. 142). The adjective yellow was historically used to describe Mongols to conjure up the image of evil or yellow peril, but Saddam during the war used these metaphors to depict Iranians as the descendants of Mongols and to create an image of the Iranian people as 'others' and 'non-Arabs' (Bengio, 2002). In contrast to such a racist and sectarian metaphor, Khomeini used brotherhood metaphors for describing the Iraqi people. In his messages for the Iraqi people, Khomeini used different types of brotherhood metaphors 23 times, and this makes that metaphor the most dominant in Khomeini's discourse when addressing the Iraqi people (Appendix 3). Among them, the metaphor IRANIANS AND IRAQIS ARE BROTHERS, is the most prevalent one. As Text 1 shows, Khomeini did not degrade the Iraqi people, but instead he called them brothers.

The source domain of brotherhood metaphors (brothers) is a religious one within the Quran and Islamic Hadiths. For instance, in the Quran (49:1) says: "believers are indeed brothers". Similarly, the prophet says, "A Muslim is a Muslim's brother, he does not wrong him or abandon him. If anyone cares for his brother's need, God will care for his need" (Cited in El-Sharif, 2011). Based on this concept, Khomeini said that Iranians and Iraqis are brothers because they both belong to the Muslim community. Once again, this use of brotherhood metaphors rejects the idea that Khomeini was a sectarian leader. By brotherhood metaphors, Khomeini showed his intention in calling unity between the Iranian people and Iraqis.

- 1) The Iraqi nation should know that we do not want to harm them. However, it is Saddam Hussain, who is provoked by the USA, has attacked us. And if we counter him, this should not be seen as a response to the Iraqi people, who are our brothers (Khomeini, 2010, p.231)

Calling the Iraqi people brothers was not only in contrast with the way that Saddam describes the Iranian people, but also it was at odds with the sectarian discourse of Iranian nationalists (See Kia 1998 and Algar, 1973). For instance, Jalal od-Din Mirza, who was one of the first Iranian writers who glorified Iran's history before Islam called for purging all the Arabic words from the Persian language (Kia, 1998). Akhondzadeh, another important Iranian thinker, who was inspired by Mirza's ideology wrote to him that: "your Excellency has freed our tongue from the domination of

the Arabic language; I am now attempting to free our people from the Arabic spirit" (Cited in Algar, 1973, p.92). In Text 2, at odds with such sectarian and racist discourse, by the brotherhood metaphor, THE IRAQI PEOPLE ARE OUR BROTHERS, Khomeini implied that Iranian and Iraqi people are equal. Indeed, as Boxer, (2002, cited in A'Beckett, 2012, p. 172) indicates, in a religious society, brotherhood metaphors are usually used to describe the equity between believers. Hence, Khomeini did not see any differences between the Iraqi and Iranian people, as long as they are Muslim.

- 2) Saddam...wants to distract our Islamic brothers from himself and his degenerate regime with scenes to continue his crimes for a few more hours.! Our Arab brother should know that your enemies, at the head of which is the cursed Baath Party, are the enemies of our nation. [And] your friends are our friends. (Khomeini, 2010, vol.12, p. 235).

A critical point that should be addressed is that although Khomeini used these brotherhood metaphors in his message for the Iraqi people, the original words were in the Persian language, and they were also distributed among the Iranian people as well. Hence, Khomeini knew that the Iranian people also were aware of these messages. However, he decided to glorify the Iraqi people alongside Iranians. Encouraging the Iraqi people to support Iran in the war was another implication of using brotherhood metaphors in Khomeini's discourse. For instance, in Text 1, Khomeini tried to encourage the Iraqi people to support the Iranian regime in the war, by highlighting the fact that Iranians and Iraqis are brothers.

Demonising metaphors are other metaphors that Khomeini used during the war, and by studying them, we can see that the Ayatollah used them in a non-sectarian way. For instance, cancer metaphors (Text 5), parasite metaphors (Text 3) and Satan metaphors (Text 4) are three types of demonising metaphor that can be discovered in Khomeini's speeches when addressing the Iraqi people. Parasites are organisms that unwelcomely live within the body of a host and get their nutrition from the same host (Musolff, 2014). Thus, by calling Saddam a parasite Khomeini was trying to indicate that Saddam does not belong to Iraq's society. Although Khomeini used parasite as a metaphor to describe Saddam, he never used such a metaphor against the Iraqi people.

Using parasite as a metaphor is not new in political disputes, and other politicians also have used parasite as a metaphor. Indeed, as Musolff (2014, p.218) explains: "for two centuries it has been routinely used for racial and socio-political stigmatization." For instance, Hitler uses this metaphor to describe his anti-Semitic idea: "the Jew of all times has lived in the states of other people . . . a

parasite in the body of other nations and states” (cited in Chilton, 2005, p. 28). Namely, Hitler, via this metaphor, indicates his belief system that Jews have been living in a territory that did not belong to them, and they have gained benefits from their host, Germany. Hawkins infers that for Hitler, Jews “maintain life within their bodies by sucking life-sustaining nutrients out of some other body” (cited in Musolff, 2014, p.222).

It is important to note that in Text 3 Khomeini did not use this metaphor against a religious group inside Iraq. However, he used this metaphor to suggest that the heads of states in Egypt, Iraq and Iran (before the revolution) are living in Islamic societies that do not belong to them. For that reason, Khomeini described Saddam, Sadat - the former President of Egypt- and the Shah as parasites. In Khomeini's view, Saddam was a secular politician getting benefits from the body of the Islamic society that he does not belong to him. The parasite metaphor implies that if Iraqi people want to have a healthy community, they should get rid of Saddam.

3) We hope that the destruction of the servants [of USA] like Sadat and Saddam will be done soon. And the noble Islamic nations will do the same with these parasites as our nation did with the Shah (Khomeini, 2010, vol.12, p. 233).

This use of the parasite metaphor by Khomeini should be analysed alongside his *velayat-e faqih* discourse (Chapter 1). In Khomeini's doctrine, a *faqih* should run Islamic governments. Therefore, when a secular politician like Saddam is running the government in an Islamic country, Iraq, Khomeini saw this relationship as a parasitic.

Satan(s) is another demonising metaphor that Khomeini applied in his speeches when talking with the Iraqi people. In Islam, Satan (Devils) and the Devil (the Iblis or the Satan) are distinct (Makarem-Shirazi., 2001). The Iblis or Satan refers to the one who was thrown out of heaven, while there are different Satans that all are the followers of the Iblis (Makarem-Shirazi., 2001). To this end, in the Quran, the Iblis is used as a singular word, while Satan is used in both singular and plural types (Askari, 2010). Similarly, in Khomeini's rhetoric, two kinds of Satans can be distinguished: great Satan and lesser Satans. Great Satan is a metaphor that Khomeini used to describe the US (Great Satan) and lesser Satan is a metaphor which he used against his other enemies, including the Shah, Saddam and the Baath Party. For example, in Text 4, Khomeini asked the Iraqi armed forces to emulate the Iranian path in defeating the evil power of great powers. Namely, in Khomeini's views, the Iranian people were role models for the Iraqi people because they fought against the Shah (a lesser Satan) and the US (the Great Satan).

He then stressed that in this path, the Iraqi army should not be frightened of Great Satan (the US) and lesser Satan (Baath Party and Saddam). THE BAATH PARTY IS THE SMALL SATAN is the metaphor that Khomeini applied to the Baath Party (Text 4). In other words, if for Khomeini the US was the great Satan, the Shah and Saddam, were lesser Satans because they were following the path of the Great Satan (Khomeini, vols. 10 and 13, also see Text 4).

4) You army and non-army brothers and all of the armed forces learn from the Iranian nation who with an empty hand defeated the evil power of superpowers. And do not be afraid of the great and the lesser Satan and rise to defend Islam and the Islamic countries (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13, p.231).

Satan metaphors also have a Quranic root when the Quran (58:19) says, "Satan has overcome them and made them forget the remembrance of Allah. Those are the party of Satan. Unquestionably, the party of Satan - they will be the losers". Likewise, in Text 5, Khomeini metaphorically used the Party of Satan for the Baath Party and the Party of God for Iran and then he asked the Iraqi students and youths to rise against the party of Satan because, in his view, the Party of God would defeat the Satan party (Text 5). Interestingly, the conclusion that Khomeini reached is the conclusion of the Quran (58:19), and Khomeini's words avowed that the party of Satan should be defeated.

5) Oh, young college and university students, save Islam and your countries and rise up heroically. Your triumph is close. And God's party will defeat the Satan party (Khomeini, 2010, vol13, p.269).

Alongside Satan metaphors, disease metaphors were other demonising metaphors that Khomeini used against Saddam and the Baath party in his corpus when he talked to Iraqi people (Text 6). Politicians usually use disease metaphors for predictive purposes (Charteris-Black, 2014). In other words, disease metaphors demonise enemies and make it easier for soldiers to fight against a demonised enemy (Charteris-Black, 2014). Similarly, Khomeini called the Baath party leaders as cancerous tumours, which should be killed. If leaders in the Iraqi government were cancerous tumours, the Iraqi people should destroy them before they kill them (Text 6).

6) Rise. And conquer the enemies of Islam with the inspiration of great Islam ... expel these cancerous tumours from the heart of an Islamic country (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16. p.376).

In Khomeini's discourse, cancer and paradise metaphors (Text 3) both have similar implication, suggesting that the Baath Party is unwelcomed and hazardous guests in the body of the Iraqi Islamic society. Additionally, none of the demonising metaphors in Khomeini's discourse were used for sectarian motivations. In other words, such metaphors demonstrate Khomeini's (2010, vols. 13 and 17) ideology that the Baath Party is a socialist (*ishteraki*) party that does not believe in Islam.

It is important for us to note that metaphors in Khomeini's discourse not only can shed some light on his ideology of sectarianism, but they can also help us understand how he tried to convince the Iraqi people to support Iran in the war. Also, from the metaphor THE WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR WITH ISLAM we can understand how the Ayatollah tried to convince the Iraqi people to support Iran in the war. As we have seen, in his rhetoric for the Iranian people, Khomeini used Islam as a label to describe Iran on several occasions. Also, 'the country of Islam' and 'the Islamic country' were two labels that Khomeini used to represent Iran. It was also argued that these labels indicate that Khomeini was not a nationalist leader. Likewise, when Khomeini talked to the Iraqi people, he used Islam as a metaphor for Iran. However, the use of Islam as a metaphor in Khomeini's discourse for the Iraqi people specifies his attempts to deter the Iraqi people from participating in the war. Namely, by the metaphor THE WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR WITH ISLAM Khomeini indicated that if the Iraqi people and the Iraqi armed forces participate in the war; they join at war against Islam (Text 5).

7) I do recommend them, the Iraqi army, to raise up against this person and destroy him, if they can. Themselves [should] replace him, and we approve them. And if it is impossible, they [should] run away and do not fight with Islam (Khomeini, vol.13, p.236).

In Text 7, Khomeini, first, asked the Iraqi army to fight against Saddam, but later he said if it is impossible for them, they should run away because if they stay and partake in the war with Iran, they would be fighting against Islam. Khomeini indicates that if the Iraqi soldiers participated in the battle against Iran, they engage in war against the Prophet Mohammad, the Quran and Islam. In Text 8 by using three different source domains, Khomeini accentuated that the war against Iran is religiously unacceptable. For this reason, he stated: "the Almighty God does not forgive that".

8) The soldiers and the personnel in the Iraqi army should know that the war again Iran is a war against Islam. It is a war against the Quran, and it is a war against the Prophet Mohammad. And

it is one of the biggest sins that the Almighty God does not forgive (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13, p.236).

The metaphor WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR WITH ISLAM was also used by Khomeini to remind the Iraqi people about the negative ramifications of Iran's defeat in the war. For instance, in his message to the Iraqi people on 24 September 1980, Khomeini forewarned the Iraqi people that the failure of Iran in the war would be equated with the defeat of Islam (Text 9). Also, by applying such a metaphor, Khomeini asserted that those who are fighting in Iran's side were fighting for the sake of God (Text 8).

Conversely, Khomeini contended that those who are fighting against Iran are fighting for the sake of the Baath Party and Saddam, not God. Because if they aim to make Islam powerful, they need to join Islam's army, which is Iran's army (Text 9).

9) You are giving up your life for non-God. What is your intention? The motive of our powers is that we fight for God. God has given us everything. We are from God and we will return to God. This is the motive of the army of Islam. That was the motive in the early days of Islam. That is our motivation right now. What is your motive? Do you defy Islam for the sake of God? Do you challenge the Quran for God's sake or Saddam's sake? If it is for God, you have no way. You have no way of saying it is for God. Is it your intention to make Islam powerful? Well, Islam is already here [Iran], and it is powerful (Khomeini, vol.13, p.237).

10) The nation of Iraq should know that today the war is between Islam and infidelity, and all Muslims must defend Islam. If this person defeat Iran and the Islamic Republic, although it is an impossible assumption, its [negative] reaction should be seen in all the Islamic countries. They [enemies] tend to see no Islamic countries (Khomeini, vol.13, p.239).

By such a metaphor, Khomeini also tried to spur other states to support Iran in the war. In his message to the Iraqi people and the Iraqi army on 24 September 1980 Khomeini said that the fight against Iran is a war with Islam and the Quran; therefore, the Iraqi people and all the Muslims across the world must support Iran (See Text 9). Despite Khomeini's attempts to encourage Muslim people to fight on Iran's side, it was Saddam that could recruit more Muslim mercenaries. It is said that Egyptian and Jordanian soldiers were fighting against Iran alongside the Iraqi army (Kohnavard, 2018). The Afghan Mujahideen Following Imam Khomeini, *mujahidin afghanistani peyrow Imam Khomeini*, where the only Muslim mercenary group that fought next

to Iran in the war (Defa press, 2015). These warriors later established the Fatemiyoun Division, *Lashkar Fatemiyoun*, which now is fighting in Syria (Defa Press, 2015).

11) You know that the war between Iran and the Baath party in Iraq is a war between Islam and infidelity. [It is a war between] Quran and heresy. Therefore, all of you and us Muslims in the world need to defend the beloved Islam and the Holy Quran. And send these traitors to Hell (Khomeini, vol.13, p.230).

Also, as Iran saw the war as an attempt to expand the revolution, Iraq gained more support from Gulf States and the US (Mabon, 2018). However, Syria remained the only supporter of Iran in the region, and to show his full support on 8 April 1982, Hafez-Al Assad closed the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). Iraq found such an act devastating, which had lost a major outlet for its oil and consequently a crucial part of its income (Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). In October 1983, Iraq signed a contract with Turkey to build a new pipeline to the Mediterranean (Drysdale, 1992). Saudi Arabia also agreed to connect Iraq's pipeline network with its own pipelines "which links oilfields near the Persian Gulf with Yanbu on the Red Sea (and so bypasses the straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab)". (Drysdale, 1992, p.351).

It is important to note that the metaphor WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR WITH ISLAM is not a war metaphor: it is a religious metaphor. War metaphors are ubiquitous and conventional metaphors, which are used in different circumstances from the battle over poverty to the war against drugs (Flusberg et al., 2018). In war metaphors, war is used as a metaphor to "express an urgent, negatively valenced emotional tone that captures attention and motivates action" (Flusberg et al., 2018, p. 1). For instance, in the war on drugs, drugs are depicted as a danger that should be fought. However, in Khomeini's metaphor, WAR WITH IRAN IS WAR WITH ISLAM; Islam is a novel metaphor for Iran. In our discussion on conceptual metaphors in chapter two, we argued that both novel and conventional metaphors can be found in Khomeini's discourse, and this metaphor is one of the novel metaphors in his corpus. As Comanducci says:

Eventually, the creation of a novel metaphor implies an original expressive and conceptual configuration. As a direct consequence, a novel metaphor must oppose some previous conventional conceptualization, otherwise it must be considered only as an extension. So ... to

create a new metaphorical structure, it is the interaction between the domains that has to be non-conventional (2010, p.26).

Similarly, if in Khomeini's discourse brotherhood and demonising metaphors were conventional, WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR ISLAM is non-conventional because it used Iran as a non-conventional target domain for Islam as a source domain. In other words, such a novel metaphor equates a country – Iran - as a religion - Islam. To realise why Khomeini used such a novel metaphor, we need again to resort to the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*. Khomeini (2015) argued that the Prophet Muhammad established an Islamic state, and in this Islamic state, he taught people how they should behave. Khomeini (2015) added that the Prophet had introduced a Khalifeh after himself because God wanted to see the continuation of the Prophet's legacy after his death. Then, Khomeini (2015) argued that establishing an Islamic state should be seen as an Islamic duty for all Muslims. During the war on several occasions, Khomeini used Islam as a metaphor for Iran. In Khomeini's view after the revolution Iran resembled Islam entirely. Therefore, he interpreted the act of harming Iran as a harm to Islam.

Also, war with Islam should not be confused with the war within Islam. While the metaphor war with Islam can be depicted for sectarian purposes – for instance, it can depict a war between two Islamic countries - the Metaphor WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR WITH ISLAM portrayed the war as a war between Islam and *kufir* (2010, vol16). Put differently, in his use of the war with Islam, Khomeini never targeted the Shia communities in Iraq. For instance, Khomeini never used this metaphor: THE WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR AGAINST SHIA ISLAM. In other words, the target domain in the war with Islam metaphor is Islam, not Shia Islam. Khomeini did not consider states such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia as Islamic states (Rabi and Mueller, 2018), therefore, for Khomeini (2010, vol16), the war between Iran and Iraq was a war between *kufir* and Islam, not a conflict between an Islamic country with another Islamic state (Khomeini, 2010, vol16). Such a dichotomy was also an important reason that Khomeini rejected the peace suggestions offered by Islamic countries, which asked Iran to end the war between two countries.¹

[Khomeini, labels, and his ideology](#)

By analysing the metaphors that Khomeini used in his rhetoric to the Iraqi people, we could shed some light on his ideology and his attempt to reinforce it. Likewise, the labels that

¹ See chapter six.

Khomeini gave to Sadr - and Saddam illustrate his belief system and his endeavour to persuade the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam.

We have seen that in his discourse to the Iranian people, Khomeini avoided using nationalist language to respond to Saddam's nationalist claims. A similar approach can be found in Khomeini's discourse to the Iraqi people when trying to convince Iraqis to support Iran in the war. For instance, in his letter to Iraqi people before the war on 4 April 1980, Khomeini criticised Saddam's nationalist approach and labelled him as a person who has turned his back on Islam and a politician that prefers Arabism to Islam (Text 12). The Ayatollah presented Saddam as a person who does not care about Islam. Likewise, in another inflammatory message to the Iraqi people before the war, Khomeini called Saddam an 'Anti-Quran' and an 'Anti-Islam' person and asked the Iraqi army not to support him (Text 13).

12) [Saddam], who in his mind prefers Arabism to Islam, has turned his back on Islam. By doing that he presumes that he can attract the Arabs. It is unaware that the beloved Arab nations are protecting Islam like their sweet lives. (2010, vol.12, pp, 235-236).

13) Oh, the army of Iraq! Do not obey this anti-Islam and the anti-Quran guy (2010, vol.13, p, 231).

Calling Saddam an 'Anti-Islam' person can be related to Khomeini's experience in living in Iraq. In one of his speeches, Khomeini (2010, vol.16. p. 489) claimed that he recalled that when he used to live in Najaf, the Iraqi people considered Saddam as an 'Anti-Islam' and a cruel person. Thus, once again we can see the influence of Najaf on Khomeini but this time not on developing his ideology¹ but on the way that Khomeini (2010, vol16) labelled Saddam.

Labelling Saddam as a person who is against Islam can also be seen in Khomeini's speeches after the breakout of the war. During that time, Khomeini's labels had various implications including reversing the labels that Saddam used during the war, giving a negative image of Saddam and the Baath Party and putting pressure on the Iraqi people. For instance, when Khomeini was dubbed as Magus -Zoroastrian priest- by Saddam (Halliday, 2011), Khomeini labelled himself and Iran as the advocator of the Quran and Islam, endeavouring to counteract Saddam's label (Text 14). By doing this, Khomeini refuted Saddam's allegation of being Magus - a Magus does not care about Islam (Text 14). However, in his speech, Khomeini not only exonerated himself

¹ See chapter one.

from being a Magus but labelled Saddam as a person that is against Islam and as a person who is more dangerous to Iraqi people than Iranians. Therefore, Khomeini not only strived to counteract Saddam's label but also, he gave a positive image of Iran and himself (Text 14).

14) This man [Saddam] calls us Magus, we who are promoting the Quran. In our country, opposite to the past, we are implementing the Islamic laws. And they call themselves, who are against Islam and Muslims, the supporters of Ali ibn Abi Talib ... the Iraqi people should know that this man is a dangerous man, he is dangerous for Iraqi people and his danger is more for the Iraqi people rather than us because he cannot harm us (2010, vol.13, p, 225).

Some labels were used by Khomeini to put pressure on the Iraqi people. For instance, in his message to the Iraqi and Iranian people on 22 September 1980, Khomeini articulated that Iraqis are Muslims and the followers of the Quran. Therefore, they should not favour Saddam (Text 15). Khomeini claimed Saddam is an infidel. Therefore, he could not rule the Iraqi Muslims, and Khomeini urged the Iraqi people to stop supporting Saddam (Text 15 and Text 16). Once again, we can see that Khomeini used such a label in a non-sectarian way. Khomeini did not argue that the Iraqi people need to defy Saddam because he is a Sunni leader or because they are Shia and Saddam is a Sunni leader, but he argued that as the Iraqi people are Muslims, they should rise against their infidel leader: Saddam (Texts 15 and 16).

15) The Iraqi people never agree with Saddam. Even for one day. They agree with Islam. A person [an Iraqi person] who agrees with Islam and Quran. A person whose Qibla is Kaaba, a person whose book is the Quran, cannot live with an infidel [Saddam] who is in the refuge of the infidels: Karter and those who are similar to Karter. They cannot follow him [Saddam] (Khomeini, vol.13, p.226).

16) Do not follow an infidel, a heretic who himself and his ideology are both heretics. Do not support him. Follow a doctrine that advocates Islam. Do follow the Prophet, no Saddam. Leave them (Khomeini, vol.13, p.238).

For criticising Saddam and the Baath party's ideology, Khomeini used a unique label for Saddam, *Aflaqi*, which means followers of Michel Aflaq. In Farsi 'i' (ی) is an adjective suffix which adds to the end of a noun and converts that noun to an adjective. For instance, by adding this suffix to Islam, as a noun, we will have an adjective, *Islami* (Islamic). Likewise, by adding 'i' to the end of Aflaq, Khomeini called Saddam *Aflaqi* (عقلقی). Michel Aflaq- a Syrian philosopher who was born in a Greek Orthodox family, was one of the principal founders of the Baath Party in Syria (Hasanov,

2008). In Aflaq's view, secular Arab nationalism was a remedy to all problems in the Arab world (Beriont, n.d). Scholars have studied Aflaq's ideology of nationalism from different angles (Babikian, 1977; Zisser, 1999; Aldoughi, 2017) and as Aldoughi explains "Aflaq's militant conception of nationalism is best examined through deconstructing the national concepts and language in his iconic work *Fī Sabīl al-Ba'th* (Towards the Resurrection)" (2017, p.83).

Aflaq saw "Islam as a civilization rather than a religion, which permitted him to minimize its role in society and the state" (Zisser, 1999, p.49). Aflaq's secular views towards religion and Islam and his nationalist approaches were probably the main reason that made him unlikable for someone like Khomeini. In other words, such a secular view towards religion was the reason that Khomeini (2010, vols.12 and 13) labelled Aflaq, an infidel. We already have studied Khomeini's views towards nationalism in our discussions in this thesis, and ¹therefore one should not be surprised that Khomeini developed such a negative view towards Aflaq.

In July 1968, an annexe of the Baath party that had a close relationship with Aflaq sized power in Baghdad (Lund, 2014). Saddam as the central figure in this new regime was regarded as Aflaq's protégé. Perhaps that was the reason that Khomeini used the label Aflaqi for Saddam.

Aflaq and the Syrian regime were at odds. Therefore, Aflaq in 1988 took asylum in Iraq whose Baath regime was a bitter rival of the Baath regime in Syria (Devlin, 1991). Aflaq died in 1989, however, in his last two decades of life, he lived in isolation and was not involved in politics. However, Khomeini considered Aflaq as the leading figure in the Baath policy and used him as a negative label against Saddam and the Baath regime in Iraq. For instance, during the war and when Iran was in the midst of the Ramadan Operation and when Iran was in Iraq's territories, Khomeini sent a letter to the Iraqi people asking the Iraqi people to support Iran's armed forces in their attempts against *Aflaqi Saddam* who killed Ayatollah Sadr and his sister (Text 17). Also, after the execution of six disciples of Ayatollah Hakim², Khomeini (2010, vol.18) wrote another letter and argued that six followers of Ayatollah Hakim were martyred by *Aflaqi Saddam*. In other words, as Saddam was a champion of Aflaq, and as Aflaq was an infidel, therefore, neither Saddam nor the Baath Party care about the life of Muslim people like Ayatollah Sadr and the followers of Ayatollah Hakim (Texts 17 and 18). Khomeini articulated that since Saddam and his

¹ See chapters one and four.

² A prominent Shia cleric who supported Khomeini.

party were disciples of Michel Aflaq, they were against Islam, and therefore, the Iraqi people should overthrow Saddam and his party (Text 19).

17) Ayatollah Sadr and his honourable sister were lost their lives under the torture of *Aflaqi* Saddam (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16. p.375)

18) The very sad and shocking news of martyrdom of these six personnel of the house of the late Ayatollah Hakim by the criminal hands of *Aflaqi* Saddam ... make any conscientious person sad and sorry (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 17.p.500)

19) They are the followers of Michel Aflaq. Does Michel Aflaq care about Islam? Michel Aflaq considers Islam as a barrier to achieve his goals. This Baath party considers Islam as a barrier to their goals. The Iraqi nation should wake up. They should rise. They should revolt (Khomeini, 2010, vol13, p.239).

In the above examples by using different labels Khomeini endeavoured to create a negative image of Saddam for the Iraqi people. However, it is crucial to know that some of the labels in Khomeini's discourse were used to produce positive images for his supporters. For instance, on 22 April 1980, once Khomeini realised that the Baath party had killed Sadr and his sister, he wrote a provocative letter against Saddam and the Baath Party and labelled Sadr and his sister - Bint al-Huda al-Sadr- positively as *Shahid* (martyr). As *Shahid*, they were not just political dissidents executed by a tyrannical regime, but they were martyrs who fought for Islam. In other words, *Shahid* was a sacred honour that was conferred on Ayatollah Sadr and Bint al-Huda by Khomeini.

Text 20) Unfortunately Ayatollah Sayed Muhammad-Baqir Sadr and his sister....has been martyred by the depraved Baath regime of Iraq. (Khomeini, 2010, vol12, p.253).

In Islamic tradition, "*Shahid* is used to talk about a Muslim killed in a battle against non-Muslims" (Habib 2014, p. 393). In contrast to this tradition, Khomeini used this label, *Shahid*, for two Shia clerics who were killed by an Islamic country: Iraq. As Fox and Sandler (2004) argue, Iraq during Saddam Hussein's era was "an officially Islamic state" (p.96). However, due to the secular nature of the Baath Party in Iraq, Khomeini did not hesitate to consider the Baath Regime as un-Islamic (See next chapter). Therefore, in Khomeini's discourse those who were killed by Saddam and the Baath Party were martyrs (Text 20). Moreover, Sadr was a believer in

velayat-e faqih and this for Khomeini meant that Sadr died in his attempt to establish an Islamic government.

Khomeini and referring to history and the Quran

To convince the Iraqi people to topple the Baath Party and Saddam, Khomeini also referred to historical occasions (Texts 21, 22 and 23) and the Quran (Texts 24, 25 and 26). Such intertextual use of the Quran and history can also describe Khomeini's ideology. After all, to reinforce their ideology, people use intertextual and interdiscursive examples in their discourse (Bloor and Bloor, 2007).

For instance, in his message to the Iraqi people before the beginning of the war, Khomeini merged the discourse of Iraq's history with the discourse of the contemporary political situation in Iraq. He enunciated that the Iraqi people were the sons of those who expelled the United Kingdom from Iraq. Hence, they had to do what their ancestor did and expel the invader: Saddam and the Baath Party (Text 21). In other words, Khomeini equated Saddam's regime with the United Kingdom's presence in Iraq in the past and concluded that Saddam's government was an unwelcome government in Iraq which had to be toppled. By referring to the history of Iraq, Khomeini stressed his ideology that the Baath Regime had to go (Text 21).

Text 21) The noble nation of Iraq! You are the sons of those who expelled the United Kingdom from Iraq. Get up! expel him [Saddam] from your Islamic country before he could snatch away everything of yours. Oh, the tribes of Euphrates and Tigris. Get united with the nation (Khomeini, 2010, vol12, p.234).

In his message, Khomeini also equated obedience to Saddam as an act of wrongdoing that will be punished by fire (*Nar*) in the next life (Text 21). This argument is an amalgamation of two discourses: the discourse of punishment in Islam with the discourse of obedience in politics. He said if the Iraqi people obey Saddam, they would commit a sin, and therefore they would be punished in the next world with fire (*Nar*). Indeed, the word *Nar* is used more than 140 times in the Quran, and it is mostly used to describe sufferings in the next life that are the consequence of wrongdoing(s) in this world (Ghaempanah, 2008). This use of *Nar* by Khomeini indicates his attempt to persuade Iraqi people to topple Saddam. As an ayatollah, he uses a Qur'anic term to describe the punishment of those who obey Saddam. As we already have seen, Khomeini (2015) believed that *fuqaha* – plural for *faqih*- should rule the Islamic nations. Hence, in his text, he

inferred that if the Iraqi people do not rise against the Baath Party and Saddam, they would be punished by *Nar*.

Sometimes Khomeini referred to history to make a comparison between the previous government in Iran (the Shah's regime) and the Baath party in Iraq (Texts 22 and 23). By doing this, Khomeini inferred that the Iranian people before the revolution were in the same situation as the Iraqi people now (Text 22). However, Khomeini claimed that no one can call the Iranian people as oppressed people anymore, because they had toppled the Shah's regime and had stabilised an Islamic regime (Text 23). Therefore, if the Iraqi people also wanted to be free from oppression, they had no choice but to establish an Islamic government via revolution (Texts 22 and 23). By such a link to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Khomeini unveiled his inclination to export the revolution into Iraq.

Text 22) Oh my brothers! Oh, our beloved ones who have been expelled from your homelands! You have faced misery by the Baath regime in Iraq. In Iran, we, too, were plagued by an evil dictatorial regime [the Pahlavi dynasty]. What [the Shah] did with Iran was worse than the crimes that Mongols committed (Khomeini, 2010, vol.14, p.275).

Text 23) However, the Iranian nation was able to exterminate this corrupt and vicious dynasty of kings who have been the guiltiest of human beings throughout history. [Instead] they replace it with the Islamic Republic. Iraq has no choice but to do the same. Nations must move, rise, and save themselves from evil (Khomeini, 2010, vol.14, p.277).

Quoting from the Quran is another strategy that can be seen in Khomeini's discourse when addressing the Iraqi people (Texts 24, 25 and 26). In one of his messages to the Iraqi people, Khomeini used this phrase from the Quran: "Allah has the power over all things". This phrase is reiterated in the Quran several times, and it means that God can do anything (Tabatabai, 1983). By using this Quranic phrase, Khomeini wished that God, who can do everything, would help the Iraqi people to get rid of their enemies (Text 24). Another important point that we should consider here is that in his use of the Quran, Khomeini called Iraq 'the nation of Islam and the Quran'. In our discussion of Khomeini's view towards nationalism, we argued that Khomeini's usage of the term "the country of Islam" for Iran in his discourse should not be seen as a religious-nationalist attempt. This note once again projects itself in Khomeini's discourse in Text 24 when the Ayatollah used the term 'the country of Islam' for Iraq.

Text 24) Due to my religious and national duties, I need to say something to the Iraqi army and also to notable, oppressed and Muslims people of Iraq. My almighty God considers them and saves the nation of Islam and Quran from their reputable and profitable enemies. **“Allah has the power over all things”** (Khomeini, 2010, vol13, p.267).

Another usage of intertextuality can be found in Text 25 when Khomeini used a verse from the Quran (47:7) that says: "O you who believe! If you will aid (the cause of) Allah, He will aid you, and plant your feet firmly". This verse is used in the Quran to encourage Muslims to participate in jihad (Tabatabai, 1983). Therefore, the Quran says that if Muslims partake in Jihad for the sake of God, they will be supported by God (Tabatabai, 1983). Similarly, after encouraging the Iraqi people to rise against the Baath party and Saddam, Khomeini used this Quranic verse to imply that if they would fight for God, they would be supported by Almighty God. In other words, it seems that for Khomeini, fighting against Saddam was like fighting for the sake of God.

Text 25) You Iraqi army and non-army brothers ... raise up to defend Islam and Islamic countries. God is with you. **“If ye help Allah, He will help you, and he will make your footholds firm”** (Khomeini, 2010, vol13, p.231).

The way that Khomeini references the Quran is also important. Khomeini, sometimes in his intertextual use of the Quran, acts very selectively. For instance, in Text 26, Khomeini started his speech to the Iraqi people in Tehran with a verse from the Quran: "And fight the infidels all together" (Text 26). This Quranic text is just a small part of verse 36 in Surah Repentance when the Quran says:

"The number of months in the sight of Allah is twelve (in a year) - so ordained by Him the day. He created the heavens and the earth; of them, four are sacred: that is the straight usage. So, do not wrong yourselves therein, and fight the Pagans all together as they fight you all together But know that Allah is with those who restrain themselves" (The Quran, 9:36).

However, in his speech Khomeini just quoted one part of this verse:

Text 26) **“And fight the Pagans all together as they fight you all along”**. God willing, the Almighty God give you the power to expel this dirty person [Saddam] form your country. God is with you, and you will be the winner, and this government will be gone (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16. p. 260).

As can be seen, in this verse, the Quran first talks about the sacred months and the prohibition of war in these months. In the Islamic calendar, fighting is traditionally forbidden during four

months: Dhul Qi'dah, Dhul Hijjah, Muharram and Rajab (Tabataba'i, 1983). Interestingly, Khomeini communicated this speech to the Iraqi people in one of the sacred months, *Dhul Qi'dah*, in which war is forbidden. Khomeini deliberately recited one part of the verse which calls for a fight against infidels but removed the first part of the verse that forbids fighting in the sacred month. In other words, Khomeini knew that if he had recited the whole verse, his argument - for a fight against infidels, Saddam and the Baath Party - would not have held water.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani (2006) refers to this point when he explains that according to the Quran war in the sacred month is forbidden. However, Khomeini by using *ijtihad* legitimised the continuation of the war in these months. In Shia Islam, the sources of *ijtihad* (the process of making an Islamic law) are the Quran, Sunnah (the Hadith literature), *Ijma* (consensus between *maraje*) and reasoning (Esfandiari, 2013). These four sources for *ijtihad* allow *ulamah* to produce new intellectual extensions from the sharia law. As Mavani explains:

Twelver Shi'is adopt some aspects of the Mu'tazilis' rationalist-naturalist theology which accords to reason the capacity to discover universal moral and ethical values. In addition, they regard the spheres of reason and revelation not as mutually exclusive, but as overlapping. Thus, they are better situated to engage in robust *ijtihād* (fresh intellectual exertion) to deduce legal/ethical decisions via reliance on reason-based deliberation and on the revelatory texts' general principles, instead of opting to err on the side of caution and thus prohibit new technologies (2014, pp.264-265).

An observation of Khomeini's theological creeds shows that he used *ijtihad* for political necessities (Yusefi-Fakhr, 2007). In our discussion on the ideology of *velayat-e mutlaq faqih* we discussed that Khomeini (2010, vol.2) believed that the *vali faqih* can suspend *Ahkam-e-Avaliyah* if he realises that the essence of the Islamic Republic is in danger. Likewise, during the war, by using *ijtihad*, Khomeini suspended the Islamic rule that forbids fighting during the sacred months.

The final point that should be highlighted here is that Khomeini's discourse to the Iraqi people never referred to Shia discourses or texts. As we can see, in his messages to Iraqi people, Khomeini never alluded to a Shia Hadith report, and the Quran was the only intertextual source when he was addressing the Iraqi people. In other words, it seems that for Khomeini, the target group was the whole Islamic society not the majority Shia people in Iraq. It is important for us to know that in all of his 30,000 words to the Iraqi people, Khomeini never used the terms such as

Shiism or Shia Islam. This might be related to the theory of *taqiyah modarati* (Khomeini, 1965) that he developed during his time in Najaf where he called for unity between Sunnis and Shias.

Khomeini's failure in convincing the Iraqi People

As we have seen, Khomeini never addressed the Shia Iraqi people directly, instead he preferred to address all Muslim communities in Iraq. However, as Chubin and Tripp (1988) articulate, all of Khomeini's plan to persuade the Iraqi people came to nought (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). We can name two reasons for such a failure. Although during the war fifty-five per cent of Iraq's population was Shia (CIA, 1984) it does not mean that the Shia community in Iraq was a self-conscious and distinct community (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). In other words, their political identity was not defined by being Shia, but kinship and tribal custom proved as more important factors (Chubin and Tripp, 1988).

Also, after the revolution of 1979, Iran attempted to make Qom the centre of Shia studies, and therefore a rivalry arose between seminaries in Qom and Iran. Wastnidge (2018) articulates such a point when he states:

Having abandoned the active export of the Islamic revolution in the 1980s, Iran went on to invest in building its diplomatic and religious infrastructure, expanding its religious outreach activities across the Shi'a world, drawing on its position as something of a Shi'a metropole in a demonstration of its growing soft power. This, in combination with the repression of Iraqi Shi'a until the removal of Saddam Hussein, meant that Iranian centres of religious learning, most notably Qom, came to rival and in some cases overtake the traditional Shi'a centre of Najaf in Iraq, though the balance has been redressed somewhat in recent years

In addition, a rivalry in different theological understandings of the role of Islam in politics by *ulamah* in Najaf also caused some disarray between the seminaries of Qom and Najaf. For instance, during the Iran-Iraq war, Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Khoei refused to take a side, and allocated *Khums* money – money that a Shia *Marja* collects from his followers and then distribute to those who are in need - to refugees on both sides of the borders (Al-Khoei, 1999). Moreover, Khomeini and his political ideology were not popular among the leading Shia cleric community in Iraq. The followers of Khomeini in Iraq, Sadr and The Da'wah Party, were in a similar situation and senior ayatollahs in Iraq were unhappy with their political activities (Tripp, 2007). Therefore, Khomeini's understanding of Islam was not

popular among the Shia Iraqi elites, and that was an important reason that Shia people in Iraq did not support Iran and its Shia government during the war.

Also, against all odds, Saddam built a strong support among the Shia community in Iraq by giving Shias prominent positions in the Baath Party and government (CIA, 1984).

Additionally, during the presidency of Saddam, Shias, for the first time, rose to high ranks in Iraq's armed forces (CIA, 1984). All these measurements by Saddam, helped him deter a major Shia insurrection in Iraq.

Conclusions

Although Khomeini used Shia Hadith reports to prove the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*, it was not against Sunni Islam. We saw such an aspect of Khomeini's ideology when we studied his words to the Iraqi people in this chapter. Another aspect of Khomeini's ideology that reflects itself in this chapter was his ideology of *taqiyah modarati*. When Khomeini (1965) developed this ideology, he argued that Shias should seek unity with other Muslims and become united against the enemy of Islam. The ayatollah stayed loyal to his ideology during the war by not using sectarian language in the war. Therefore, Khomeini's words during the war complement the argument of those scholars that argue that there is nothing sectarian about Khomeini's ideology (Enayat, 2015, Rahnema, 2014; Sabet, 2014).

Moreover, by analysing Khomeini's words during the war, we can see how he tried to persuade the Iraqi people to support Iran in the war. A similar approach can be seen in Khomeini's words to the Iranian people and international audiences when we study these words in the next chapter. Once again, such an approach shows the revolutionary aspect of Khomeini's ideology.¹

Brotherhood metaphors, demonising metaphors and the war with Islam metaphors were metaphors that Khomeini used to convince the Iraqi people to topple Saddam. However, as we saw, Khomeini used these metaphors in non-sectarian ways. For instance, in his use of the war with Islam metaphor Khomeini never targeted the Shia communities in Iraq. For instance, Khomeini never used this metaphor: THE WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR AGAINST SHIA ISLAM. Khomeini did not consider the states such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia as Islamic states (Rabi and Mueller, 2018). Therefore, Khomeini (2010, vol16) presented the war between Iran and Iraq as a

¹ See also chapter one.

war between *kufra* and Islam, not a conflict between an Islamic country and another Islamic state (Khomeini, 2010, vol16).

Also, by applying negative labels for Saddam and the Baath Party, Khomeini endeavoured to produce a negative image of Saddam and the Baath Party. Alluding to the Quran and the Islamic sources was another method that Khomeini used to persuade the Iraqi people to topple Saddam. We studied how Khomeini selectively quoted from the Quran to persuade the Iraqi people to support Iran in the war (Text 26). Such an approach will become more evident when we study Khomeini's selective quotation from the Quran to normalise the continuation of the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr.

Although Khomeini tried hard to gain the support of the Iraqi people, his attempts came to nought as the Iraqi people stayed loyal to their own state (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). Theological differences between the seminaries of Qom and Najaf and the diverse Shia community in Iraq were two reasons that prevented Khomeini from becoming an influential figure in Iraq. Besides, as we have seen in his political speeches to Iraq, Khomeini never directly targeted the Shia population. Iraqi Muslim people were the main audience of Khomeini. Also, Khomeini (2010, vol13) saw the revolution as a unifying factor that can bring all Muslims together, so he never focused on Shiism when addressing the Iraqi people.

Chapter 6: Khomeini and prolonging and normalising the Iran-Iraq war

The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: so, make peace and reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that you may receive Mercy (The Quran, 49:10)

If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, you make peace between them: but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then you (all) fight against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; but if it complies, then make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair (and just) (The Quran, 49:9).

Introduction

On 22 May 1982, Khorramshahr was liberated 575 days after its fall. This was a turning point in the war as Saddam proclaimed readiness to end the war just less than a month after the recapturing of the city (HDRDC, 2012, vol20). Many Islamic countries saw the event as a good opportunity to end the conflict between Iran and Iraq. For instance, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) from 1979 to 1984, Habib Chatty, called the war between Iran and Iraq a conflict between two Islamic countries and suggested that the Islamic countries should find a path to end the war (HDRDC, 2010, vol21). Inside of Iran, some Grand Ayatollahs had the same view towards the conflict and therefore asked Khomeini to stop the war. For instance, Grand Ayatollah Hassan Tabatabaei Qomi issued a *fatwa* announcing that after the liberation of Khorramshahr the continuation of the war is *haram* - forbidden. He then urged Khomeini to call for a ceasefire (Mossavi, 1985).

However, unclassified documents (HDRDC, 2012, vol20; HDRDC, 2010 vol21; HDRD, 2015, vol.39) reveal that toppling Saddam and exporting the revolution to Iraq's territories became Iran's primary goals in the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr and after Saddam voluntarily withdrew his army from Iran. Such documents were published by the Holy Defence Research and Documentation Centre (HDRDC) in a series of books under the

title of 'the war timeline'. The books include records of Iranian officials' meetings, daily news releases of the Islamic Republic News Agency, newspapers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Intelligence, foreign newspapers and foreign radio and TV channels (see HDRDC, 2012, vol20; HDRDC, 2010 vol21; HDRD, 2015, vol.39).

However, if Iran wanted to continue the war, Khomeini needed to find a way to persuade Iranians that the continuation of the war was necessary. To that end, Khomeini (2010, vol.18) resorted to the Quran as well as to the wars between Muslim people at the onset of Islam. By doing this, Khomeini endeavoured to convince the Iranian people that the continuation of the war was according to Islamic tradition.

After the liberation of Khorramshahr, Khomeini rarely used words such as 'conflict' or 'war' to describe the war between Iran and Iraq. Instead, on most occasions, Khomeini called the conflict between Iran and Iraq as a 'defence'. This label helped him to reject all calls for peace between Iran and Iraq. Also, by introducing terms such as 'Islamic Peace' and 'Saddami peace' – A peace that Saddam likes - the Ayatollah labelled the peace proposals as un-Islamic peace. In Khomeini's view, an Islamic peace proposal had to call for the punishment of Saddam. Khomeini (2010, vol.16 and vol17) argued that as Saddam killed Iraqi and Iranian people as well as Iraqi clerics, Iran needed to take vengeance against their killers, Saddam and the Baath Party.

Finally, journey and body metaphors were metaphors that Khomeini used to normalise the continuation of the war with Iraq. By using journey metaphors, speakers can convince their audiences to bear the difficulties in their journey towards their goal because journeys sometimes can be arduous (Charteris-Black, 2004). Likewise, Khomeini used the journey metaphors to ask Iranians to bear difficulties during the war. The use of body metaphors such as heart metaphors in Khomeini's discourse can show the influence of mysticism.¹ The Ayatollah metaphorically argued that the heart of Saddam is dead, and therefore he could not change his behaviour. As we will see, in Khomeini's mystical argument, if someone's spiritual heart is dead, no one can do anything to help them.

Wars can be legitimate or illegitimate (Chilton, 2004). They can also be unjust or just (Walzer, 2015). However, our discussion in this chapter is not to discover if the continuation

¹ See chapter one.

of the conflict between Iran and Iraq after the liberation of Khorramshahr was legitimate or just. Instead, we should seek to understand how and why Iran and more specifically Khomeini normalised the continuation of the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr.

As we have seen, in the preceding chapters, based on Khomeini's words to the Iranian and Iraqi people, it is not possible to label him as a nationalist or sectarian leader. Likewise, our discussion in this chapter complements these findings and designates that to normalise the war Khomeini resorted to religious language, which was neither nationalist nor sectarian. Instead, Khomeini's language advocates his revolutionary approach. Khomeini (2010, vol12) even before the beginning of the war, wished to expand the revolution into Iraq. Therefore, when the war started, Khomeini saw it as an opportunity to use the war as a tool to topple the Baath Party and extend the revolution into Iraq. In one of his speeches at the onset of the war, Khomeini announced that Iran would not accept any peace with Iraq and would continue the war until the Baath Party and Saddam were toppled (Khomeini, 1980). The removal of Saddam from power alongside regaining control over its own territories became Iran's war aims in the first years of the conflict (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 16 and vol. 17), and such an approach is identifiable in the documents that the HDRDC published.

[Iran and prolonging the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr](#)

After the liberation of Khorramshahr on 24 May 1982, Iraq had realised that it could not achieve its goals in the war. Therefore, Iraqi officials declared that they are ready to finish the war. However, the Islamic Republic and Khomeini persistently stressed that the war should continue until Saddam's regime is toppled (Chubin and Tripp, 1988; Farrokh, 2011, HDRDC, vol.20). For the next six years, Iraq welcomed international attempts to finish the war, while Iran firmly rejected them (HDRDC, 2008, 2010, 2012). The documents that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps published designate Jun 1982 as Saddam's first attempt to end the war, when he ordered a unilateral ceasefire and instructed the Iraqi army to leave Iran's territories (HDRDC, 2012, vol20). The Non-Aligned Movement, which was striving to end the war between its two members, described Saddam's move as a positive gesture and asked Iran to do the same by accepting the ceasefire (HDRDC, 2010, vol21). In response, policymakers in Iran announced that Saddam's moves were not satisfactory, and Iraq's regime should be punished (HDRDC, 2010 vol21). In a speech, Khomeini (2010, vol.16) declared that the war should continue until the Baath regime, and Saddam are both

toppled. On 12 July 1982, the UN Security Council passed resolution 514 and asked Iran and Iraq to agree to a ceasefire. The Iraqi government welcomed the decision and hailed it as a necessary step towards peace (HDRDC, 2010 vol21). Iraq's foreign ministry released a statement requesting the UN to send its peacekeeper forces to the Iran-Iraq borders, to demonstrate its support for the resolution (HDRDC, 2010 vol21).

In contrast, Rajai-Khorasani, Iran's permanent ambassador to the UN, rejected the resolution and called it a biased attempt which supported Iraq. Mir-Hussein Mousavi, then Iran's Prime Minister, described the resolution as an American plot which aimed to halt the expansion of the revolution (HDRDC, 2010 vol21). Iran also accused Iraq of acting dishonestly and stated that Iraq did not return to its border voluntarily, but that it was Iran that forced them out (HDRDC, 2010 vol21). Iranian officials also argued that Iraq did not leave Iran's territories entirely and that some parts of Mehran and Qasr-e-Shirin were still under the control of the Iraqi army (HDRDC, 2010 vol.21). In an interview with *Le Monde*, Saddam responded to Iran's accusations and said that Iraq seized just 1 or 2 kilometres of these lands to protect itself, while Iran already occupied 5 kilometres of Iraq's territories (HDRDC, 2010, vol.21). He added that Iraq already asked the UN to place its peacekeeper forces on the borders between Iran and Iraq to show its zeal for peace (HDRDC, 2010, vol.21). Saddam also emphasised that Iraq will accept the 1975 Algiers Agreement if Iran ends interfering in Iraq's internal policy (HDRDC, 2010, vol.21). Saddam's endorsement of the Algiers Agreement could be seen as a significant step towards peace, because when in September 1980 Saddam attacked Iran, one of his reasons was the unfairness of Algiers Agreement (Hiro, 1990). However, even before the war, Khomeini had refused to accept the Algiers Agreement. Therefore, he rejected Saddam's proposal and one more time he called for the continuation of the war (HDRDC, 2010, vol.21). In July 1982, Algeria attempted to make peace between the two countries. Iraq welcomed Algeria's mediation and said Iraq would support any endeavour for peace (HDRDC, 2012, vol.20). Conversely, Iran reiterated its refusal to compromise its previous requests. (HDRDC, 2012, vol.20).

Subsequently, Iraq and international organisations put pressure on Iran to accept the ceasefire proposals. In September 1983, James Callaghan, the British former Prime Minister, asked international organisations to put more pressure on Iran because it is the only way that Iran would accept to start peace negotiations with Iraq (HDRD, 2018, vol.27). On 23

September 1983. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, then speaker of parliament and the chief decision-maker in the war after Khomeini, declared that Iran, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, would not compromise with Saddam. He then introduced three prerequisites for any ceasefire: 1) Iraq should be punished, 2) the aggressor should pay compensations, and 3) Iraq should leave Iran's territories (HDRD, 2018, vol.27).

On 31 October 1983, the UN Security Council passed resolution 540, and asked for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq (HDRD, 2018, vol.27). Iraq immediately accepted the recommendation and announced it was ready to give a sufficient guarantee that Iraq will not break the truce between two countries (HDRD, 2000, vol.33). However, Iran stated that it would never accept such a one-sided resolution (HDRDC, 2012, vol.28). On 22 December 1984, in an interview, Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated that "Saddam and Iran's enemy are looking for a ceasefire while we are looking for peace, and Iran believes this peace will be achieved only by Saddam's removal from power" (HDRD, 2018, vol.33, p.54). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was another international organisation which tried to convince Iran and Iraq to end the war (HDRD, 2015, vol.39). Iraq embraced the proposal and said that Iraq was ready to conclude the battle with Iran and act based on International law (HDRD, 2015, vol.39). Iran welcomed GCC's attempt to improve their relationship with Iran. However, officials in Tehran reiterated that this should not be interpreted as Iran's willingness to cease the war with Iraq (HDRD, 2015, vol.39). Ali Akbar Velayati, then Iran's foreign minister (1981-97), indicated that relationships against Islamic countries are priorities for Iran, however, he also added that Iran would continue the war with Iraq until Saddam is overthrown (HDRD, 2015 vol.39).

On 2 February 1986, United Nations Security Council Resolution 582 was unanimously adopted by the UN, and it called upon Iran and Iraq to immediately accept a ceasefire. As expected, Iran rejected the recommendation while Iraq welcomed the UN's attempt to end the war. Six months later, Saddam wrote an open letter to Iranian policymakers and told them that Iranians have no choice but to accept an end to the war (HDRD, 2010a, vol43). In this letter, Saddam said that both countries should get back to their borders and sign a peace treaty (HDRD, 2010a, vol43). Khamenei, then Iran's president, said that Saddam wrote this letter because Iraq is in a weaker position than Iran in the war. He added that

Iran wanted to punish the aggressor. Hence, the war must be continued (HDRD, 2010a, vol43).

Different international organisations and countries tried to convince both countries to accept a ceasefire. In a speech at the UN, Saud Al Faisal, Saudi Arabia's former Foreign Minister, highlighted that the war is a threat to the security of the world and the region. He then acknowledged Iraq's attempts for peace and asked Iran to end the war (HDRD, 2010b, vol44). Italy's foreign minister, Giulio Andreotti, emphasised that the war should be ceased as soon as possible, underscoring that Italy was willing to help the UN to find a solution to end the war (HDRD, 2010b, vol44). On 6th of October 1986, GCC members suggested that both countries should return to their borders and accept a ceasefire (HDRD, 2010b, vol44). Two days later, based on this suggestion, Resolution 588 was passed by the United Nations Security Council. This resolution asked Iraq and Iran to accept the previous Security Council resolution, 582, and also demanded that both sides start peace talks (HDRD, 2010b, vol44). Iraq praised the UN for passing the legislation, while Iran accentuated that the war should be continued until Saddam was overthrown (HDRD, 2010b, vol44).

The next resolution, 598, was updated by the United Nations Security Council on 13 July 1987. For the first time, the resolution considered punitive measures for the party that rejects the ceasefire. According to articles 39 and 40, if either country rejects the resolution, they would expect a substantial international sanction (HDRD, 2008, vol49). The resolution did not introduce Iraq as responsible starting the war. However, it called for an impartial body to investigate who was responsible for the war (HDRD, 2008, vol.49 and HDRD, 2008a, vol.50). Ismat T. Kittani, representative of Iraq to the United Nations, welcomed the resolution and announced the readiness of Iraq for peace talks (HDRD, 2008, vol49). Iran did not directly reject the resolution. However, Iranian officials labelled it as another attempt by the US to support Iraq (HDRD, 2008, vol.50). Velayati said that although there were several positive aspects to this resolution, it suffered from serious flaws (HDRD, 200a, vol50). In a message on 28 July 1987 Ayatollah Khomeini rejected the resolution and said Iraq's weaknesses are the main reason that Saddam was talking about peace now (HDRD, 2008a, vol50). On 11 August 1987, Iran officially responded to UN 598 resolution and highlighted that regardless of the advantages of this resolution compared to the previous ones, Iran could consider it as a just resolution (HDRD, 2008a, vol50).

Meanwhile, Iraq was militarily strong while Iran was at its worst situation regarding access to military equipment and just before accepting the ceasefire the Iranian army experienced its worst defeat throughout the war in Dehloran (Farrokh, 2011). Besides, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council were supporting UN Resolution 598. China was even ready to impose new sanctions on Iran if Iran persisted in continuation of the war (Shipler, 1987). That would be a nightmare for Iran as China was a major arms supplier to Iran. Therefore, Khomeini was at a crossroad: either accept the deal or continue to fight in holy jihad that might jeopardise the essence of the Islamic Republic. As we have seen, for Khomeini, the security of the revolution was the most critical affair. By accepting the resolution, he chose the former option. However, it was not an easy decision for Khomeini, and in his letter to the Iranian people on 20 July 1988, Khomeini labelled the UN Resolution 598 as a poisoned chalice that he drank for the sake of God (Khomeini, 1988).

[Khomeini, Intellectuality and prolonging the war](#)

If Khomeini wanted to continue the war until the Baath Party was toppled, he needed to legitimise it for his audiences. To do so, Khomeini cited selectively from the Quran and referred to some battles in the history of Islam, when addressing the Iranian people and international officials. In Khomeini's (vols. 13 and 19) discourse, citation from the Quran can be seen more when he addressed some officials of Islamic countries (vols. 13 and 19). In such instances, Khomeini ironically cited four times the verse in the Quran (49:9) that calls for peace between Muslims:

“If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, you make peace between them: but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then you (all) fight against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; but if it complies, then make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair (and just)” (the Quran, 49:9).

However, in none of these instances did the Ayatollah report this verse fully. For example, in his speech to the ambassadors of Islamic countries in Iran (Text 1), Khomeini asked why the Islamic countries were defying the Quran (49:9) when it says: “you (all) fight against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah”. Khomeini did not mention the first and second parts of the verse when it calls for peace after the aggressive party changed its behaviour (See Text 1). If Khomeini had quoted the verse fully one could

criticise him for not acting based on the Quran because after the liberation of Khorramshahr, Iraq – as a party that had started the war - by withdrawing its soldiers from Iran and calling for ceasefire changed its behaviour. Therefore, based on the Quran (49:9) Iran also had to accept the peace offer and halt the war. However, Khomeini just quoted one part of the verse and blamed the Islamic countries for not supporting Iran in the war (Text 1).

Text 1) Why the Islamic countries do not act based on this precious verse that says: **you (all) fight against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah** (2010, vol13, p. 276).

However, in the last text by citing a verse from the Quran that talks about war between two Muslim groups Khomeini implicitly accepted that Iraq under Saddam was an Islamic country, even though there are several instances where he completely denied that Iraq was an Islamic country, and that is why he treated the Iraqi government as non-Islamic. For example, in Text 2, Khomeini quoted from the Quran (2:193) that “And fight them on until there is no more sedition”. By doing this, Khomeini argued that God instructed the Muslim people to continue the war until there is no sedition in the world.

2) The Quran states: **“And fight them on until there is no more sedition”**. [The Quran] invites all humankind to fight for destroying sedition. Namely, war, war until there is no sedition in the world. This differs from what we are saying. We just grab a small part of it. Well because we are only a tiny part of this world, and we say, ‘war until victory’. Moreover, we mean victory over Saddam’s infidelity.... Those who are following the Quran should know that they should continue their war until the sedition is eliminated from the earth. Therefore, one should not misuse the Quran. Those who are disagreed with our regime say: this [the war] is the opposite of the Qur'an. Or, *Akhundhay-e Darbari* (palace’s clerics say): This [war] is against the Quran. Or, those clerics who are worse than palace’s clerics say: this [war] is against the Quran. No! [the continuation of the war] is according to the Quran. And that is against the Quran if anyone says that do not fight against the corrupt one. It is against the Quran if anyone says: do not resolve the sedition by war (Khomeini, 2010, vol19, p.116).

Khomeini used this verse to normalise the continuation of the war, arguing that the Quran called for ‘war, war until there is no sedition’. The slogan ‘war, war until victory’ became Khomeini’s motto, and in his discourse, he repeated the very same slogan nine times

(Khomeini, 2010, vols. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19). Later, it became an official slogan, based on which Iran rejected all calls for peace (Darvishi, 2012). Yet, Khomeini acknowledged Iran's limitation and argued that Iran would not continue the war until the world is empty from infidelity (sedition), but the war should continue until the banishment of Saddam's treachery (Text 2).

Although Khomeini defined the term 'sedition' as infidelity in the world (See Text 2), Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husain Tabatabai argues that this verse refers to those *Mushrikeen*, infidels, who expelled the prophet Mohammad from Mecca (Tabatabai, 1983). Bazargan's interpretation of this verse also differed from Khomeini's reading. In his unclassified letter to Khomeini, Bazargan (2014) used the same verse that Khomeini used in Text 2, but he argued that the verse refers to a situation that infidels attack an Islamic country, not when two Islamic countries are fighting with each other. In this letter, he also challenged the slogan "war, war until victory" and argued that this slogan had not achieved anything for Iran. Thus, Iran should stop the war as soon as possible.

If we recall our discussion in chapter one, exporting the revolution was one aspect of Khomeini's ideology that he developed after the revolution. Therefore, even from the beginning of the war, Khomeini (2010, vol.13) opposed any peace talks between Iran and Iraq. Such an aspect of Khomeini's ideology makes him distinct from other Muslims such as Tabatabai and Bazargan. Put differently, Khomeini interpreted the verse in a way that legitimised the continuation of the war.

Also, in Text 2, Khomeini attempted to reinforce the revolutionary aspect of his ideology when he omitted the second part of verse where it says: "if they change their behaviour, there would be no hostility against anyone except the unjust" (The Quran 2:193). As the last part of the verse requests for an end to hostility after the hostile side has changed their behaviour. As we have seen, Iraq announced its readiness for peace talks after June 1982, and therefore his argument over the necessity of the continuation of the war would be challenged if he had quoted the verse fully.

Khomeini also quoted this part of the verse to infer that it is the greatest blessing when the Quran (2:193) says "And fight them on until there is no more sedition" (See Text 3). Based on Khomeini's interpretation of the Quran, it is mercy for infidels and the arrogant leaders

around the world to be killed as soon as possible (Text 3). Khomeini inferred, if they stay alive, they would commit more crimes. Therefore, they would face more punishment in the other world.

3) If an infidel is left to commit corruption until his death, the severity of his punishment [in the afterword] will be higher than someone who is halted and is killed. It is useful for a corrupt person who is busy with his corruption to be captured and killed, It is better for these arrogant heads of states to die now than ten years later. If someone is distributing corruption on the earth, it is merciful for himself to be killed. In the sense that he is a deceiver, it is not contrary to mercy... This is the greatest blessing of mankind when [the Quran] says, **“fight them on until there is no more sedition”** (Khomeini, 2010, vol19, p.119).

We can see that in all the texts above, Khomeini selectively cites from the Quran. Such selective citation from the Quran exemplifies that:

“intertextuality necessarily involves some degree of conscious or unconscious exclusion of elements from the source text, followed by a transformation of the chosen elements to fit the target text” (Abdul-Latif, 2006, p. 61).

It is important for us to recognise that such a particular intertextual transformation in citing a Quranic verse does not just belong to Khomeini, but other politicians in the Islamic world have done the same.¹ However, Khomeini also referred to Imam Ali’s² battles to legitimise the continuation of the war for those that argue against the continuation of the war (Text 4). Imam Ali participated in three wars during his caliphate: Battles of the Camel, Siffin and Nahrawan (Qadrddan-Qaramaleki, 2007). In Text 5, Khomeini stated that if some clerics liked to criticise him for insisting on continuation of the war, they should also criticise Imam Ali because he also fought against other Muslims (Text 4). For Shias, the Prophet Mohammad, Fatimah, and the Twelve Shia Imams are infallible. Therefore, everything that they did was correct. By juxtaposing Imam Ali’s fights with the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini argued that as an

¹ For instance, in his speech for the Egyptians after the popular uprising in 1977, Sadat, the third President of Egypt, selectively used a Quranic verse and transformed that verse from "a conditional sentence into a simple declarative one" (Abdul-Latif, 2006, p. 62).

² The First Imam for Shias and the Fourth Caliph for Sunnis.

infallible man such as Imam Ali had fought against other Muslims, Iran also can fight against other Muslims.

4) This is not a Shia matter. This is an Islamic matter. All Islamic school of thoughts are in danger now.... At the time [of Imam Ali], there were three wars [Battles of the Camel, Siffin and Nahrawan] and all three wars were against those who were well-known Muslims. They were saying and shouting that we are Muslims. These wars were against Muslims. Now you are asking: Shall Muslims fight against Muslims? Thus, you have objections against Imam Ali, because all of these three wars were against Muslims (Khomeini, 2010, vol.20, p.23).

Imam Hassan's Peace Treaty and the Battle of Karbala were two other interdiscursive examples that can be seen in Khomeini's (2010, vols.13, 14 and 20) discourse. After the death of Imam Ali, some Muslims in Kufa - a city in current Iraq - had sworn an oath of allegiance to Imam Hassan, the son of Imam Ali and the second Imam of Shias (Jafri, 2002). Having previously fought against Ali in Siffin, Muawiyah refused Hassan's caliphate and prepared his army for a battle against Hassan (Jafri, 2002). Hassan first prepared a considerable army to battle against Muawiyah. However, after the heads of his army showed a disinclination for a fight, he was forced to accept a peace deal with Muawiyah and declared Muawiyah as the new caliph (Jafri, 2002). In Text 5, by referring to this story, Khomeini stated that those who are trying to force Iran to accept peace with Iraq are like those that forced Imam Hassan to accept peace with Muawiyah. He added that Iran learned from Hassan's Peace Treaty and would not allow people to lead Iran to an imposed peace.

Text 5) That imposed peace in the era of Imam Hassan, that imposed arbitration at the time of Imam Ali, both of which were crafted by sly individuals, leads us to go neither under the burden of imposed peace nor under the rule of arbitration. We should act based on our own opinion and the opinion of our nation. As all the nation now says that we must continue this war. (Khomeini, 2010, vol.20, p.118).

Indeed, for Khomeini, the war was more like the Battle of Karbala than Hassan's Peace Treaty.¹ If Imam Hasan chose peace rather than war, Hussein, the brother of Hasan and the

¹ Imam Hassan's Peace Treaty and the tragedy of Karbala have become the two primary sources of rationalisation for the Islamic Republic policymakers when they are in a dilemma of decision making between peace and war. As mentioned earlier, Shias consider all their 12 Shia Imams infallible. Therefore, they cannot question Imam's Hasan's decision for peace or Imam Hassan's fight with Yazid. Instead, they argue that both

third Shia Imam of Shias, unlike to his brother, fought against Yazid, the Son of Muawiyah. Imam Hussein and most of his family were tragically killed in the battle of Karbala and since then Imam Hussein and Karbala became a symbol of resistance among Shias. As Mabon (2017) explains, “many hold that Hussain sought martyrdom at Karbala, believing that the only way he could bring about a return to a more pious form of Islam was by sacrificing himself” (p. 12). Khomeini’s discourse during the war shows that he was one of those people (Nasr, 2004). Therefore, in Khomeini’s views, Iran should act like Imam Hussain and continue the fight against Iraq, even though the war was a humanitarian disaster and many people were losing their lives.

Although Khomeini alluded to Shia discourses in his rhetoric, we should not see such interdiscursive allusions as sectarian.¹ For instance, in Text 4, at the beginning of his speech, Khomeini clearly articulated that the Iran-Iraq war was not driving sectarian animosity and that Saddam was threatening all sects of Islam. Second, as Van Ess (2001) and Faruqi (2011) argue Sunni scholars do not take a side in Imam Ali’s battles, and argue that Ali and his opponents practised *ijtihad* when they confronted with each other, and *ijtihad* always allows for a mistake. Third, Text 5 is part of Khomeini’s speech on 24 August 1985 when he was talking to the Iranian people, and as we have seen in the previous chapter, Khomeini never referred to a particular Shia event in his discourse to the Iraqi people.

acts were righteous choices, and Shias should analyse these two discourses in their contexts. In other words, if Imam Hasan had been in the situation of Imam Hussein, he would have done the same and vice versa. However, what is important is that in the Islamic Republic those who have a more moderate political view usually refer to Imam Hassan’s peace treaty as a political act, while hardliners like Khomeini argue that the peace was imposed onto Imam Hassan otherwise if Imam Hassan was in an identical situation, he would have acted similar to Imam Hussein. A more recent example of a use of Imam Hassan Peace treaty in normalising Iran’s foreign policy is Hassan Rouhani’s, the Iranian President, use of this discourse to normalise the compromise that his government made with powerful countries over Iran’s nuclear programme in July 2015. Rouhani in a speech indicated that “I believe that heroic flexibility is harder than heroic jihad. And Imam Hassan, the bigger grandson of the prophet chose this heroic and braveness. We should follow the way of Imam Hassan” (Rouhani, 2015, cited in Mashregh news, 2015). In contrast, Hamid Razaee, a hardliner and a former Iranian MP, told Hassan Rouhani that Imam Hassan was forced to accept the peace and Imam Hassan’s preference was not to compromise with Muawiyah (Mashregh News, 2015). Hardliners in Iran, including Khomeini, believe that an Islamic country should not allow unjust and powerful states to force Iran to accept their orders.

¹ See chapter five.

Khomeini, Labels and Peace

The labels that Khomeini used during the wars also can shed light on Khomeini's method to normalise the continuation of the war and his vision. At the beginning of the war, terms such as 'the holy jihad' were the labels that Khomeini was using to describe the battle. In text 6, which is one of Khomeini's first speeches after the beginning of the war, he ordered Iranians that if a call for a holy jihad was announced the Iranian people should immediately join the battlefield to protect their Islamic country.

6) If God forbidden, the need for public mobilisation was announced and if the order for the sacred jihad was decreed, [people should] immediately go to the battlefield and defend the religion of God and Islamic countries. (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13, p.267).

However, after the liberation of Khorramshahr, Khomeini rarely used the terms 'war' and 'jihad' to describe the war between Iran and Iraq, and these words were replaced by the term 'defence'. By using the word 'defence', Khomeini (2010, vol.16) could infer that Iran is not fighting with Iraq and it is just defending itself. Even when during the war, Iran had arrived in Iraq's territories, Khomeini still used the term 'defence' to describe the battle between Iran and Iraq (Text 6). However, this time, Khomeini (2010, vol.20) argued that Iran entered in Iraq's territories to defend the Muslim people of Iraq and Iran's position in the war. In Khomeini's (2010, vols.16 and 20) discourse, Iran was not at war with Iraq, but it was just simply defending itself. If Iran was not at war with Iraq, there is no reason for officials in Iran to start a peace talks with Iraq (Khomeini, 2010 vol.20).

7) And today we arrived in Iraq's territories for defending our country and ourselves. And to hinder them in attacking Abadan and Ahvaz every day. And to [protect ourselves] from their long-range guns and missiles. We want to get them to the point where they cannot attack us. This is a defence (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16, p.390) .

8) We must be brothers with all; we should all be brothers with all Muslims and stand against infidels. We should not fight against Muslims. Well, we have to defend now. We have not taken a single step for war so far. These are all defences. Now that we have entered Iraq, it is for defence, not for anything else (Khomeini, 2010, vol.20, p.25) .

Additionally, by labelling the war as a defence, Khomeini was able to religiously legitimise Iran's insistence on the continuation of the war. Shia clerics argue that there are two different types of *jihad*s: primary and defensive (Ghoreyshi-Karin, 2009). Primary *jihad*

refers to the time that Muslims start a war against non-believers, while defensive *jihad* allude to a war that Muslims should participate in to defend themselves against a war that is imposed on them (Ghoreyshi-Karin, 2009). According to Shia Islam, Muslims can participate in a primary *jihad* only if they have a permission from an infallible Imam. However, they do not need such a permission for participating in a defensive *jihad*, and in such a circumstance it is their duties to defend their Islamic country (Ghoreyshi-Karin, 2009). Hence, by calling the Iran-Iraq war as a 'defence' Khomeini presented it as a religiously legitimised conflict that should be continued. Khomeini said that it is God that made defence obligatory, and defence should be continued until the sedition - the Baath Party - was eliminated (Texts 9-11).

9) We and our country never wanted to attack a country. However, after we were attacked, based on Sharia and wisdom, it is obligatory to defend ourselves. We are in a defensive position now. (Khomeini, 2010, vol.17, p.390).

10) Even now, we are defending. We do not want to fight. With whom we are at war? We are defending now. The Iraqi army wanted to attack Islam (Iran) from Al-Faw. Well, they (the Iranian army) went there and captured Al-Faw. They defended themselves. Moreover, defending the Iraqi people is defending Islam. This is defending Muslims. The Iraqi people do not agree with this evil [person]. There are few [people] who agree with him, and these [people] are in power (Khomeini, 2010, vol.20, p.25).

11) God is the one who has made defence obligatorily. To eliminate the sedition, God has made war obligatory. And God is the commander-in-chief, and you should rely on him (Khomeini, 2010, vol.19, p.467).

In his corpus, Khomeini not only insisted that the battle between Iran and Iraq is a defence, but he used labels such as 'American peace' and 'Saddami ceasefire' - a ceasefire which is created by Saddam - to describe the peace proposal by the UN and other international organisations (Texts 12-14). Instead, Khomeini introduced 'Islamic peace' as an alternative peace to 'Saddami peace' (Text 12 and Text 13), and he argued that this peace can be only achieved if Saddam and the Baath Party withdrew from power (Text 14). Seeking *Qisas*- an Islamic retaliation - for Saddam was an important part of 'Islamic peace' (Khomeini, 2010, vol18). Khomeini directly said that he did not accept the proposed peace accords because Iran needed to get revenge from Saddam

(Text 14). He added that as Saddam killed the Islamic clerics in Iraq, Iran is looking for *Qisas*. For Khomeini, this was an Islamic peace, and consequently, any peace that accepted Saddam's rule in Iraq was an 'American peace' (Text 14).

12) Also, peace should be like that. The guilty side should be known. Is this the definition of ceasefire? This is a *Saddami* ceasefire (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16, p.311).

13) This is your (Iranian officials) peace, which is the Islamic one, and you really want peace. From the first day that we have been attacked, and we were defending ourselves, officials in this country have asked for peace. However, [they] did not want *Saddami* Peace, [they] wanted divine peace and the human Peace (Khomeini, 2010, vol.17, p.22).

14) The peace that they (Iraqi regime) are seeking is an American peace, and the peace that we are seeking is an Islamic peace. According to Islamic laws, we want to get revenge on the one who attacked the Muslims, shed the blood of Muslims in our land and in his own land and martyred the scholars of Islam in his own land. We are looking for *Qisas*. We want to cut off his hand. And we want to see that this Aflaqi party to be destroyed. [We want to see] that Iraq is ruled by the Iraq people themselves (Khomeini, 2010, vol.18, p.69).

Khomeini denounced the call of those Ayatollahs that requested peace between the two Islamic countries and questioned Khomeini's view of the war (Texts 15 and Text 16). As Luyckx and Janssens (2016) argue, predication strategy is used for de-legitimation purposes. Likewise, Khomeini used different labels to castigate the clerics who disagreed with him on the continuation of the war. For instance, Grand Ayatollah Qomi, in a *fatwa* announced that after the liberation of Khorramshahr, participating in the war was *haram* and he urged Khomeini to call for a ceasefire in the conflict (Mossavi, 1985). In response to such requests, Khomeini derided these Ayatollahs by labelling them as *Akhundhay-e Darbari* - Palace's Clerics (Texts 15 and Text 16). By doing this, Khomeini challenged the legitimacy of these clerics, because in his words, a cleric should know that the war with Iraq was a necessity for Islam (Text 15). It was not the first time that Khomeini used this label for his opponents. For instance, several years before the revolution and during the Reza Shah period, he framed Sangelaji, a Shia cleric, as the *Akhund-e Darbari*, a cleric who is under the

control of Reza Shah and who gets orders from the palace¹ (text 15 and Text 16) (Rahnema, 2016). Sangelaji called for reforms in Islam, and this was enough for Khomeini to use such a label for the cleric. Also, in his lectures on *velayat-e faqih*, he asked for purging the Shia seminaries from those clerics who do not believe in such an ideology. In general, for Khomeini, clerics should believe in establishing Islamic governments.² Therefore, one should not be surprised to see that Khomeini labelled clerics such as Qomi and Sangelaji as *Akhund-e Darbari*.

15) Some of these *Akhundhay-e Darbari* invite us to Islam. They do not know what Islam is.... If they knew Islam, they should know that this person is not Muslim, and this Aflaqi party is not an Islamic party. (Khomeini, 2010, vol.13, p.98).

16) Or, *Akhundhay- Darbari* (palace's clerics say): This [war] is against the Quran. Or, those clerics who are worse than palace's clerics say: this [war] is against the Quran. No! [The continuation of the war] is according to the Quran. And that is against the Quran if anyone says that do not fight against the corrupt one. It is against the Quran if anyone says: do not resolve the sedition by war (Khomeini, 2010, vol19, p.116). (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16, p.116).

As we have seen, Khomeini always reiterated his refusal to compromise with Saddam. Therefore, when Iran finally accepted UN Resolution 598, he said that accepting the peace for him was like drinking from a poisoned chalice (Texts 17 and 18).

17) I drunk the poisoned chalice and felt ashamed of greatness and sacrifice of this great nation. And shame upon those who did not support this caravan. Shame upon those who have been silent, indifferent or critical ...in this great war (Khomeini, 2010, vol.21, p.93).

Khomeini's acceptance of the ceasefire is compatible with his political and religious thoughts that we have studied in this thesis. Khomeini knew that implication of Islamic laws without an Islamic state was not possible. Therefore, for him, nothing was more important than keeping this revolutionary state thriving. However, Khomeini's pragmatism was guided

¹ In Khomeini's discourse, palace (*darbar*) was a symbol of non-legitimate power.

² See chapters one and five.

by his Islamic and revolutionary principles. Therefore, in his letter, he said he accepted the ceasefire just for the sake of God (Text 18).

18) I say again that for me, accepting this matter [peace] is deadlier than poison. But for the sake of my God, I drunk this drink. (Khomeini, 2010, vol.21, p.95).

In other words, in Khomeini's ideology, acting against the security of the Islamic government is the biggest sin, and it should be avoided. Such a religiously motivated pragmatism was exactly what he advocated in *velayat-e mutlaq faqih* when keeping the Islamic Republic alive became Khomeini's (2010, vol.20) main attempt.

[Prolonging the war with the help of metaphors](#)

Khomeini's corpus shows that he used different metaphors to normalise the Iran-Iraq War. Metaphors have an essential role in normalising wars. For instance, Gavriely-Nuri (2009, p.153) talks about the way that Israeli politicians use metaphors "for framing the war as part of human nature and normal life". Gavriely-Nuri (2009) shows how Israeli politicians through metaphors such as WAR IS A GAME; WAR IS SPORT, or WAR IS BUSINESS endeavour to introduce war as a normal phenomenon. In Khomeini's discourse, journey and body metaphors were the most common metaphors when he intended to show that the conflict between Iran and Iraq and its continuation are normal phenomena (See Appendix 3).

Charteris-Black explains that journey metaphors can be used to "encourage followers to accept short-term suffering for worthwhile long-term objectives" (2005, P.46). Similarly, Khomeini used the journey metaphor to encourage the Iranian people to endure the difficulties during the war because enduring problems for Islam and God is neither hard nor strange. For example, by using the journey metaphors, Khomeini told the Iranian people that maim, martyrdom and difficulties along the path of God are common, and that through history, the grand prophets and the grandees of God also suffered from these problems (Text 19). Therefore, as the grandees of God were not frightened by the predicaments in their mission, the Iranian people should also do the same and keep fighting Iraq (Text 20-Text 21). Indeed, by using journey metaphors, Khomeini inferred that the martyrdom on the path of God was an enjoyable experience for believers (Text 19 and Text 20).

19) On the path of God, martyrdom, maim and difficulties are not important. And These were what the grandees of God and the grant prophets had experienced from

the onset of the creation... However, they did not frighten and went forward. You (the Iranian people) are powerful today, and your reputation has travelled around the world. (Khomeini, 2010, vol18. p.440).

20) Brothers and sisters! We walked in a way which is the path of the prophets. And as history shows the prophets have faced difficulties. [Prophets] came always from deprived backgrounds and they had always difficulties. Their problems were overwhelming (Khomeini, vol17, p.417).

21) When it comes to the divine destination, the more difficult it is; it should be easier to endure; because it is the divine destination. In some narratives it is said that Hussein ibn Ali, peace be upon on him, became happier as he got closer to the noon of Ashura. He was happy because he knew that it was jihad in the path of God (Khomeini, vol17, p.414).

For instance, Khomeini concluded that Imam Hussein was happier when he reached his time of death because *jihad* and death in the path of God were not difficult for him (Text 20). Such a usage of journey metaphor reveals his attempt to normalise the war and his intention to persuade the Iranian people to participate in the war. In other words, if the war is a journey along the path of God, and all God's grandees had faced difficulties on that path, the Iranian people as Muslim people should do the same and endure the plight of the war.

As we have seen, Khomeini used body metaphors to normalise the continuation of the war. In Khomeini's discourse *qalb* - the heart - and *del*- literality means abdomen and metaphorically means heart - are constantly used as metaphors. The metaphorical use of *del* and *qalb* in Persian literature is widespread (Sharifian, 2011). Besides, these two body parts are also widespread in mystics, where the heart has the quality to be corrupt or pure (Nurbakhsh, 1992 cited in Sharifian, 2011). Therefore, mystics always strive to purify their hearts on the path of God (Sharifian, 2011). We know that Khomeini wrote a great deal of prose and poems on mysticism (Sharifian, 2011 and Loon, 2016). However, during the war, he used mystical terms to normalise the war. For instance, Khomeini asked the Iranian soldiers to clear their heart because the final victory is near (Texts 22 and 23). Likewise, Khomeini asked the Iranian armed forces to purify their hearts for God because, in his words, it would help them to achieve victory (Text 24).

22) With a clear heart and intentions, you should be determined to reach the final victory, and the ultimate victory is yours (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 16, p.199).

23) With a heart assured of divine mercy and spiritual power, ... we look at the end of the war which is near (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 16, p.269).

24) You endeavour to clear your heart from all belongings. It will be influential in your victory, if you pure [your heart] for God (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 18, p.134).

The heart has been also used as a container metaphor (El-Sharif, 2011, Sharifian, 2011). In Islamic discourse the heart is a container for emotion and mercy. For instance, the Prophet criticises a person who treats his children poorly by saying: "I cannot help you since God has withdrawn mercy from your heart" (El-Sharif, 2011, p.112). Similarly, the Quran (2:7) says: "Allah has set a seal on their hearts and their hearing, and on their eyes is a veil; great is the penalty they (incur)". Likewise, Khomeini used the heart as a container metaphor to argue that his enemy in the war, Saddam, was not an amendable person because his heart is withdrawn (See Text 25, Text 26, Text 27). For instance, in one of his first speeches after the war, on 28 October 1980, Khomeini said that Iran is not looking for peace because Saddam's heart is sealed, and therefore he cannot change. In other words, Khomeini compares Saddam's heart to a container which is sealed, and therefore its nature cannot change (Text 25).

25) But God due to their acts has sealed their hearts ...Therefore; they are not amendable anymore (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 13, p.297).

By using the container metaphor, Khomeini implies that SADDAM'S HEART IS A MERCILESS HEART (Text 26). If he was a person with a merciless heart, then he was a dangerous person and Iran should destroy him.

26) [Saddam] in a recent interview ...said that we have received something from Islam and religion that other did not. Our (Iraq's) understanding is that we must not invade another country. You see... what a heart should have this person to dare to say such things. (Khomeini, 2010, vol.17, p.17)

To have a better understanding of the concept of heart metaphors in the Ayatollah's discourse, we need to study Khomeini's (2009) mystical writing in *Shrhe hadithe jonoode aghl va jahl*, a book that was originally written in 1928. In this book, Khomeini

(2009) distinguished between the heart and the wisdom. In Khomeini's (2009) view, while wisdom can discover the existence of God, it is just the heart, however, that can fully perceive the facts that wisdom has received. Therefore, only those who cleared their hearts (the Iranian soldiers) could fully understand God, but people with dark hearts (Saddam and the leader of the Baath Party) were not amendable (Text 25, Text 26, Text 27).

In another speech, Khomeini refers to Jesus Christ's miracle and argued that even Jesus, who could raise dead people, could not do anything for Saddam. Khomeini added that if someone's heart is dead, no one can help this person, and even if people can help this person, they should not do that (Text 26). Hence, in Khomeini's mystical reasoning, due to the death of Saddam's spiritual heart, he is doomed to be destroyed (Text 27).

27) Jesus Christ resurrected the normal dead people. However,...even Jesus Christ cannot do anything for a dead person whose heart is dead, a dead person whose dignity is destroyed. Therefore, what are going to do for [him]? (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16, p.281)

Khomeini's (2010, vol19) understanding of Jesus can help us conclude our discussion in this chapter. In response to those who claim that Jesus was a peaceful prophet, Khomeini (2010, vol19) argues that the only reason that Jesus Christ did not participate in any war was that he had a short life, otherwise he also would establish a state. In Khomeini's (2010, vol19) view, if Jesus had established a state, he would have fought with his enemies in wars. Khomeini acquiesces (2010, vol19) that prophets did not like war, but they had to participate in wars for the sake of people and improve the world's situation. Therefore, Iran needed to continue the war for the sake of Iranian and Iraqi people (Khomeini, vols. 13, 16 and 20)

Conclusions

The primary purpose of Khomeini's persistence in the continuation of the war was removing Saddam from power. As we have seen, the HDRDC documents indicate Khomeini's insistence on toppling Saddam prolonged the war for eight years. The experience that Khomeini had got from living in Iraq and the resentment that he had developed for Saddam, made him remarkably persistent that the Baath Party should leave Iraq. Khomeini witnessed the willingness of some Islamic clerics like Sadr, to accept his ideology, *velayat-e faqih*. That

is why, after the start of the war, he was confident that he could export the revolution into Iraq. Therefore, when Saddam executed Sadr, Khomeini called for retaliation.

To normalise the continuation of the war, he used religious language. For instance, to show that prolonging the war is an Islamic tradition, Khomeini selectively quoted from the Quran. Interestingly, in his discourse, Khomeini used the verses that call for peace between Muslims, but by quoting these verses incompletely, Khomeini (2010, vol.13) argued that the war was legitimised by the Quran. Additionally, Khomeini's intertextual use of the Quran shows how his ideological stand differed from other Muslims such as Tabatabai and Bazaragan. For instance, Khomeini (2010, vol19, p.116) quoted from the Quran (2:193) to argue that this is the Quran that calls for "war, war, until victory". While as we have seen, Bazaragan (2014) argued that this verse refers to the time when *Mushrikeen* invaded an Islamic country. In a similar vein, Tabatabai (1983) says that the verse implicitly refers to those *Mushrikeen* who expelled the Prophet from Mecca.

Also, to normalise war between the two Islamic countries, Khomeini referred to the three wars that Imam Ali fought against other Muslims, thus drawing on history to support his argument. Additionally, Khomeini interdiscursively referred to Imam Hassan's Peace Treaty with Muawiyah and argued that the peace was imposed on Imam Hassan; otherwise, Imam Hassan preferred war. By arguing this, Khomeini inferred that war is preferable to peace.

Moreover, Khomeini used heart and journey metaphors to normalise the continuation of the war between Iran and Iraq. Through journey metaphors, Khomeini argued that the war was a journey on the path of God. Therefore, the Iranian people should bear the difficulties of such a journey. The Ayatollah also suggested that the Iranian soldiers were on the path of God's grandees and prophets. Therefore, they had to act like such honourable people and endure the difficulties of the war. By using heart metaphors, the Ayatollah reiterated his rejection of peace with Saddam. As we have seen, Khomeini (2009) distinguished between wisdom and heart. Khomeini (2009) believed that although wisdom can help people to find God, it is the heart that can fully feel the existence of God. Khomeini argued that as the heart of Saddam was sealed, he cannot change, and therefore the Ayatollah concluded that continuation of the war was necessary.

To prolong the war, Khomeini also used different labels, including using negative labels for peace and those who support peace. For instance, he labelled peace proposals as 'un-Islamic peace' and argued that an 'Islamic peace' would only be achieved if Saddam was toppled. Khomeini (2010, vol.13) ridiculed those clerics that called for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq by labelling them as *Akhundhay-e Darbari*.

Conclusions: Iran-Iraq war as a lens to understand Khomeini

We do not repent, nor are we sorry for even a single moment for our performance during the war. Have we forgotten that we fought to fulfil our religious duty and that the result is a marginal issue? (Khomeini, 2010, vol. 21. P 284).

Myriad studies have already studied the Iran-Iraq war and Khomeini's ideology (for instance see: Hiro, 1990; Willett, 2003; Bakhash, 2004; Harmon and Todd, 2009; Moin, 2009 Razouxand and Elliott, 2015). However, few studies investigated Khomeini's ideology through the lens of the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, by analysing Khomeini's words during the Iran-Iraq war, this thesis addressed this gap in the literature. Additionally, such an investigation helped us to shed light on Khomeini's views on matters such as nationalism, sectarianism and continuation of the war. In other words, this thesis addressed the following questions:

- To what extent can Khomeini's ideology be seen as nationalistic or sectarian?
- How did Khomeini frame the war to the Iranian and Iraqi people?
- What were the key determining factors in Khomeini's decision to continue the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr, and how did he justify this decision to his audiences?

Addressing the first question helped us to understand that Khomeini neither used sectarian nor nationalist language during the war. We studied Khomeini's view towards nationalism in chapter four where we discussed that during the war his discourse was driven neither by nationalism nor religious nationalism. As we have seen, the war between Iran and Iraq was a conflict between a country with a majority Arab population – Iraq - and a country that most of its pupations are non-Arabs. Therefore, both sides could portray the war as a conflict between Arabs and Persians and this was exactly the strategy that Saddam applied, and introduced the war as Saddam's Qadisiyyah. By contrast, by using brotherhood metaphors, Khomeini (2010, vol13) called the Iraqi people 'our Arab brothers'. Also, Khomeini's journey metaphors elucidated his view towards nationalism. As we have seen, the target domains in most of Khomeini's journey metaphors were Islamic sources and he never used Iran merely

as a target domain. Such a use of journey metaphors distinguished him from nationalists and religious nationalists in Iran. While Iran and Islam were both used as target domains in journey metaphors of religious nationalists in Iran, Iran was the main target domain in the discourse of the Iranian nationalists, such as the Pahlavi Kings.

Studying the labels that Khomeini used during the Iran-Iraq war also helped us to develop a better understanding of Khomeini's view towards nationalism and religious nationalism. The use of the term *millat* by Khomeini was one of the reasons that scholars infer that Khomeini was a nationalist leader. Such scholars define *millat* as nation and then argued that since Khomeini used such a term, he must be a nationalist leader. As we studied, the term nation is defined as ethnicity and the citizen body (Podoksik, 2017). The former definition usually can be found in the discourse of ethnic nationalists that consider a particular nationality superior to other nationalities (Podoksik, 2017). The later definition of nation is used by those nationalists that believed in civic nationalism (Podoksik, 2017).

However, none of these definitions can be related to Khomeini's ideology. He refused to give preference to any ethnicities and considered such an act as un-Islamic. Also, Khomeini (2010) never used the term civic to describe the Iranian people. Therefore, as we have seen, in Khomeini's discourse, the term *millat* should be defined as 'people'. Put differently, *millat* in Khomeini's discourse should be seen as a term that he used to refer to those people who live under the rule of a *hukumat*. That was the reason that Khomeini (2010, vol.11) used the term to distinguish between the US government and the American people - *millat Amrica*. Also, the label 'our beloved nation' that Khomeini used for Iran should not be interpreted as a nationalistic attempt by Khomeini, as he used such term for countries such as Iraq, Algeria and Lebanon (See Khomeini, vols. 10,16 and 19).

As we have seen, while Saddam referred to the history of Islam for nationalistic reasons (Boukala, 2015), Khomeini referred to the history of Islam to argue that the war between Iran and Iraq was similar to the wars in Islam. In such a scenario, Iran represented Islam's army while the Iraqi army was a symbol of those who fought against the prophet and other Muslims. In other words, if Saddam referred to the history of Islam to advocate pan-Arabism, Khomeini alluded to Islam and its history to say that fighting in the war is an Islamic duty for the Iranian people.

Also, by drawing a comparison between the discourse of Khomeini and religious nationalists in Iran, we could see that for religious nationalists Iran and Islam are both important, whereas Islam was the central part of the Ayatollah's discourse. Khomeini (2010, vol.19) did not have a positive view of the history of Iran and portrayed such a period rather negatively. This also put Khomeini in sharp contrast with Iranian nationalists that always have tried to glorify Iran's history before Islam.

We examined the second part of question one - Khomeini's view towards sectarianism - in chapter five where by studying Khomeini's words to the Iraqi people we concluded that during the Iran-Iraq war he did not use sectarian language. Brotherhood metaphors, war with Islam metaphors and demonising metaphors were three main dominant metaphors in Khomeini's discourse when addressing the Iraqi people. However, Khomeini never used such metaphors for sectarian purposes. For instance, he did not say that the Iraqi Shias are brothers with the Iranians, but he articulated that all Iraqi Muslims are brothers with the Iranian people. Similarly, he never used demonising metaphors for a particular group in Iraq. Instead he used such metaphors against leaders of the Baath Party. More interestingly, in all his words to the Iraqi people not even once did he refer to Shiism and its discourse. Instead, all of Khomeini's intertextual uses were from the Quran.

Unlike question one that was mainly addressed in two specific chapters, the second question was discussed in three different chapters (four, five and six). For instance, in chapter four we have seen that Khomeini (2010, vols.13, 14 and 16) presented the Iran-Iraq war for the Iranian people as a war between *Kufr* and Islam, and he constantly compared Iranians with the disciples of Imam Hussein and the Prophet Mohammad. He also compared Iran's situation after the 1979 revolution with the followers of the Prophet situation at the onset of Islam, claiming that in both cases believers endured many difficulties (Khomeini, 2010, vols. 13 and 16). Khomeini addressed the Iranian soldiers as the 'warriors of the Quran and Islam' who were fighting against 'the infidel Baath party' (Khomeini, 2010, vols.13, 14 and 15). Likewise, as we have seen in chapter five, Khomeini tried hard to convince the Iraqi people to support Iran in the war. The metaphor WAR WITH IRAN IS A WAR WITH ISLAM was a metaphor that he used to tell the Iraqi people that fighting against Iran is equal to fighting against Islam (Khomeini, 2010, vols13, 14 and 15). He also tried to create a rift between the Iraqi people and the Baath Party, arguing that as the Iraqi people

are Muslims, they should not be ruled by an infidel government (Khomeini, 2010, vols.13 and 16). Instead, he suggested that Iraqi people should try to follow the Iranian people by starting a revolution against Saddam's regime (Khomeini, 2010, vol.16). In other words, by comparing the Baath regime to the Pahlavi dynasty, Khomeini wanted to inspire the Iraqi people that just as the Iranian people toppled the Shah's regime, they should also overthrow the Baath Party and Saddam.

Although, Khomeini did not target the Shia community in Iraq, they also did not support Iran in the war. The first reason was that *ulamah* in Najaf did not fully support Ayatollah Khomeini and his political understanding of Islam. In Najaf Grand Ayatollah Khomeini refused to choose a side in the war and helped refugees from both sides (Al-Khoei, 1999). Moreover, Khomeini's ideology and his followers in Iraq - Sadr and his party - were quite unpopular among the Shia community in Iraq (Tripp, 2007). Therefore, they could not gain substantial support from such a community. Also, to reduce the level of dissatisfaction among the Shia community, Saddam placed Shias in prominent positions in the government and army (CIA, 1984). Such circumstances led to a situation that made Khomeini and his ideology unpopular among the Shia population in Iraq.

In chapter six we not only explicitly explained how Khomeini presented the war for his audiences, but we implicitly showed how and why Khomeini tried to normalise the continuation of the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr (the third research question). In May 1982 Iran recaptured Khorramshahr. Subsequently, Saddam called for a ceasefire and unilaterally withdrew the Iraqi soldiers from Iran's territories (HDRDC, 2008, 2010, 2012). However, Khomeini (2010, vols.15 and 16) proclaimed that the war should continue until Saddam was toppled. Such a proclamation became Iran's official position for the rest of the war (HDRDC, 2008, 2010, 2012). However, if Iran wanted to continue the fight, Khomeini needed to find ways to persuade his audiences that the prolongation of the war was necessary. To that end, Khomeini (2010, vol.18) resorted to the Quran as well as the conflicts between Muslim people at the onset of Islam. Put differently, Khomeini's intertextuality endeavoured to persuade his audiences that his insistence in continuation of the war was compatible with Islamic tradition.

Also, after the liberation of Khorramshahr, Khomeini mostly used the term 'defence' to describe the conflict between Iran and Iraq. Khomeini (2010, vols.15, 18, 20) used such a

label to claim that negotiations for peace should be held in war times, while in his discourse Iran was not at war in Iraq; it was a defence. Therefore, in Khomeini's (2010, vol.18 and 20) discourse, talking about peace with Iraq while Iran was defending itself was unnecessary. In Khomeini's (2010, vol16 and 17) corpus those suggestions that asked for peace proposals with Saddam are labelled as '*Saddami peace*' and '*American peace*', while for him an '*Islamic peace*' would only come about if Saddam was toppled. Khomeini (2010, vols. 16 and 17) argued that an '*Islamic peace*' should seek for *Qisas* because Saddam had killed Iraqi and Iranian people as well as Iraqi clerics.

To convince his audiences that the war should continue, Khomeini (2010, vol 15, 18 and 21) also used journey and body metaphors. Journey metaphors are usually used by politicians to convince people to endure difficulties in their path, because sometimes journeys can be arduous (Charteris-Black, 2004). Likewise, Khomeini used the journey metaphors to ask Iranians to bear the difficulties during the war. In other words, by journey metaphor, Khomeini argued that the war is a journey on the path of God. Therefore, the Iranian people should bear the difficulties of such a journey. The Ayatollah also suggested that the Iranian soldiers were on the path of God's *grande*s and prophets, and so, they should act like such honourable people and endure the difficulties of the war (Khomeini, 2010, vols.13, 14 and 18).

Also, by using heart metaphors, Khomeini represented Saddam as a person that could not change his behaviour. Therefore, Iran should continue the war until the Baath Party was toppled. In Khomeini's mystical argument (2009 and 2016) the heart is the main source of perceiving God. Hence, if someone's heart is sealed then that person cannot comprehend Allah. For Khomeini (2010, vol13), Saddam reached such a level and his heart was sealed and therefore he could not repent, and he should be toppled. On the other hand, by using heart metaphors, Khomeini (2010, vols 19 and 20) asked the Iranian people to purify their hearts for the sake of God, because when they do it would help them to win the war more readily.

Theoretical reflections

It is important to notice that it was impossible to address the research questions without suitable theoretical framework and methodology. Therefore, in chapters two and three we

studied the theoretical and methodological tools of this research. In other words, although supported by Khomeini's words during the war as primary data, this thesis was driven by a combined theoretical framework with two pillars: CDA and CMT. We studied such a framework in five stages. The first stage offered some explanations on why alternative approaches to CDA - cognitive approach, constructivist discourse analysis and poststructuralist discourse analysis- could not be applied in this thesis. Although cognitive approaches are used to describe the political stance of elites, these approaches have a positivist epistemology (Larsen, 1997). It would be problematic to apply them in non-positivist research.

Constructivist discourse analysis (Larsen, 1997 and Hansen, 2006) and poststructuralist discourse analysis (Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Hansen, 2006) were two other alternatives that could be used to analyse Khomeini's discourse. However, poststructuralist discourse analysis has an anti-essentialist ontological and an anti-foundationalism epistemology. Therefore, it stands against the idea that a research needs a rigid methodology (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2013). However, as we have seen, to analyse Khomeini's words during the war we needed to have a solid methodology. Therefore, poststructuralism could not be a useful theory to be applied to understand Khomeini's discourse. Constructivism ontologically consists with the constructive/interpretative ontological stance of our research; however, once constructivism comes into the study of discourse it could not be more than a descriptive tool (Carta and Morin, 2014). That was the reason that in stage two of our theoretical framework we introduced CDA as one of the theoretical frameworks that should be used to study Khomeini's corpus. CDA has an interpretative ontological presupposition and, in contrast with constructivism, it is equipped with linguistic tools. Therefore, it can analyse a discourse critically. Despite all its advantages, CDA fails to recognise the importance of cognitive approaches (Chilton, 2005 and Koller, 2004). Therefore, to cover such a lapse, stage three suggested that cognitive metaphor should be added to CDA as a complementary theory. Stage four, introduced the theoretical framework of the research: a combination of the CDA and CMT. Finally, stage five justifies using CDA and CMT as two "Western theories" in a non-Western case study: Khomeini's discourse.

Although a combination of CDA and CMT per se is not new, the way that it was applied in this thesis distinguishes it from other studies. Unlike other studies that combine CDA and

CMT (Charteris-Black, 2005), the theory that we applied in this thesis was more concerned with the political aspect of language. In other words, while the current literature mainly uses this combined theory to focus on the linguistic elements of discourse, our research intended to use CMT and CDA to identify the political aspects of Khomeini's ideology. In other words, this thesis used such a combination to discover the political, not linguistic, features of Khomeini's discourse. In addition, based on the thesis' theoretical framework, our research developed a methodological tool with four pillars: Intertextuality, Intertextuality, interdiscursivity, predication strategy, and metaphor analysis. Such a methodology was one of the contributions of the thesis.

Contributions

This thesis made three contributions to the literature on Iran and Khomeini. Firstly, by putting the Iran-Iraq war at the centre of understanding of Khomeini's ideology, this thesis could clarify Khomeini's views on nationalism, sectarianism and peace and war. Secondly, by making comparisons between Khomeini's thoughts before and after the revolution with his words during the Iran-Iraq war, we could see how his discourse during the conflict was shaped by such thoughts. Also, such a comparison helped us understand the complexities of Khomeini's doctrines and its evolvments. Thirdly, by making a new synthesis of methodological tools¹ this thesis introduced a new way to study political leaders in Iran.

In doing this, first, we studied the development of Khomeini's ideology before the revolution. Khomeini actively got involved with politics after the death of Ayatollah Haeri and Ayatollah Borujerdi and when the Shah started his political and social reforms. After the death of these two Grand Ayatollahs, Khomeini became a *Marja-e Taqlid*, which allowed him to act more freely. Also, the Shah's decision for the White Revolution made Khomeini a staunch opponent of the Pahlavi regime, inasmuch as the Shah was forced to send Khomeini to exile, first to Turkey and then to Iraq and France. As we have seen, Iraq and more specifically Najaf played an important role in developing Khomeini's ideology. It was in Najaf that Khomeini introduced two of his important doctrine: *taqiyah modarati* and *velayat-e faqih*.

¹ Including intertextuality, metaphor analysis and predication strategy.

The ideology of *taqiyah modarati* helped us to understand Khomeini's view towards Sunni Islam. Khomeini talked about this ideology in 1958 in a book called *Al-Rasael* (MoradKhani and Mohsenzadeh, 2011). According to *taqiyah modarati*, instead of hostility, Shias should seek to unify with Sunni Muslims (Lankarani, 1993). In Khomeini's words, the purpose of this kind of *taqiyah* is unity between Muslims countries against infidels (MoradKhani and Mohsenzadeh, 2011). Therefore, we can understand why Khomeini never used sectarian language when addressing the Iraqi people. Likewise, he never used such language for mobilising the Iranian people.

Velayat-e faqih was another important ideology of Khomeini that we examined in this thesis. In *velayat-e faqih* (2015), Khomeini challenged the tradition of quietism in the Shia seminaries by asking *ulamah* to rule the Islamic countries. Such a doctrine does not reject the idea of the nation-state, but it advocates running Islamic countries according to the Islamic laws. Accepting the idea of the nation-state should not be interpreted as a tendency towards nationalism. As Asad (2003) articulates tendency towards the modern nation-state is inevitable and people, regardless of their religious belief, need to accept such a concept.

In this thesis we identified another complicated aspect of the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*. We have seen that although this ideology accepts the modern concept of nation-building and does not call for removal of the borders between Islamic countries, it does not deny the fact that this doctrine¹ believes that the political system in Iran is the ideal Islamic system and it could be applied in other Islamic countries. In other words, this ideology accepts that different countries should run separately, but Khomeini (2010, vol.20 and 2015) believed that the Islamic revolution and its principles could be exported to other Islamic countries. Such aspect of Khomeini ideology was evident in his words to Iraqi people when he told them that Iran would not want to rule in Iraq but simply wanted to help them establish an Islamic government (2010, vol.16).

Also, we have seen that Khomeini (2015) referred to Shia Hadiths to validate *velayat-e faqih*. However, such an ideology narrowed the gaps between Shia and Sunni Islam by considering Knowledge and justice as two preconditions for the *vali-e-faqih*. Therefore, we should be careful not to read *velayat-e faqih* as a doctrine against Sunni Islam. Instead, as we have

¹ At least in Khomeini's views

seen, Khomeini (2015) called for purging those Shia clerics who advocated separation between politics and Islam. '*Akhundhay-e Darbari*' was the label that Khomeini used against those Shia clerics who were against him or his ideology.

In this thesis we also studied the importance of mysticism in shaping Khomeini's words during the war. We know that Khomeini (2009 and 2016) wrote a great deal of prose and poetry on mysticism, and the flow of such a knowledge can be traced in Khomeini's discourse during the war. In our investigation of Khomeini's thoughts, we could identify two places that such an influence was evident. The omnipresence of journey metaphors in Khomeini's discourse and the way that he used them was the first place that we could see the effect of mysticism on his ideology. As Appendix 3 shows, journey metaphors were the most dominant metaphors in Khomeini's discourse when addressing the Iranian people, and this might have a direct connection with Khomeini's mystical thoughts. In Khomeini's (2016) mystical writing an, *aref* is in a constant journey towards God. Similarly, he described the endeavours of the Iranian soldiers as a journey on the path of God and the Prophet Mohammad.

In Khomeini's work on mysticism, the journey has three levels and the last stage of this journey is called *fana* (Loon, 2016). However, it is only just the *insane kamel* that can reach such a prestigious position. Interestingly, Khomeini described the Iranian martyrs as *insane kamel*. As we have seen, the use of heart metaphors is another place that can show us the influence of mysticism in Khomeini's discourse. By using heart metaphors, Khomeini explained that Saddam was an unchangeable person. Therefore, there was no point to negotiate with him¹.

In this research we not only investigated Khomeini's views on matters such as nationalism, sectarianism and peace and war, and their links to his theological thoughts such as *taqiyah modarati*, *velayat-e faqih* and mysticism, but we also examined the development of these thoughts in his discourse. For instance, we examined that the young Khomeini (1942) did not hesitate to use sectarian language in *Kashfol al-Asrar*, when he constantly criticised the first three *Khalifa* in Sunni Islam. However, such sectarian language cannot be seen in

¹ For more explanation see the first part of this chapter and also chapter six.

Khomeini's later works before and after the war. In fact, by developing *taqiyah modarati*, Khomeini distanced himself from sectarian ideology.

The doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* also evolved significantly in Khomeini's discourse. It was in *Kashfol al-Asrar* that Khomeini for the first time talked about the role of *ulamah* in government. However, in *Kashfol al-Asrar* Khomeini (1942) called for establishing a council of *ulamah* to monitor the process of passing legislations in Iran, making sure that they are according to the Islamic principles. However, Khomeini in his lectures in Najaf argued that an Islamic country like Iran should be ruled by a *faqih* and directly called for changing the political system in the country. Khomeini (2010, vol.20) developed this ideology more when he talked about the ideology of *velayat-e mutlaq faqih*. If for *velayat-e faqih* establishing an Islamic government was the main aim, the main aim of *velayat-e mutlaq faqih* was to keep the new regime in Iran alive. Therefore, by giving the absolute power to the *vali-e-faqih*, the doctrine of *velayat-e mutlaq faqih* allows the *vali-e-faqih* to use *ijtihad* do whatever is necessary to keep the Islamic republic thriving. Such limitless power allows the *vali-e-faqih* to temporary call for the suspension of the Hajj or closing a mosque (Khomeini, 2010, vol.20). During the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini used *ijtihad* and permitted war in the sacred months, while according to the Quran, in these months, fights are forbidden (Hashemi-Rafsanjani, 2006).

Further research

In this thesis, we studied different aspects of Khomeini's ideology, and in pursuing this goal, our research has raised some new questions that need to be investigated in future research. For instance, in chapter one, it was argued that Khomeini's thoughts were heavily influenced by the ideology of Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri. It was during the constitutional revolution that for the first time Sheikh Fazlollah introduced the idea that a council of *ulamah* should always monitor the rules that Iran's parliament should pass in the future (Martin, 1987). Similar suggestion can be seen in Khomeini's (1942) writing when he explained the importance of *ulamah* in monitoring Iran's rules. Additionally, in *Sahifeh-ye*, in several occasions, Khomeini (2010, vols. 2, 3, 13 and 16) positively talked about Sheikh Fazlollah and said that westernised intellectuals executed him because he was advocating Islam. He also compared the clerics of the revolution with the clerics of Sheikh Fazlollah, arguing that both were acting against Islam. However, to have a better understanding of the

influence of Sheikh Fazlollah on Khomeini's thoughts, we need to study Fazlollah's thoughts and ideology meticulously and then compare them with Khomeini's.

In our investigation of Khomeini's view towards nationalism, we have seen that some scholars argue that Islamists are usually nationalist, and so based on that they conclude that Khomeini was also a nationalist. As March (2015) articulated "the chief theorists of the more conservative, utopian strain of political Islam (Banna, Mawdudi, Qutb) were all autodidacts rather than classically trained scholars, but so have been many of the left-leaning or even liberal Islamists". However, March (2015) himself emphasised that in the case of Iran Islamists such as Khomeini and Motahari were religious scholars. Therefore, he said that scholars should not paint all Islamists with the same brush. Therefore, a comparison between the ideology of Khomeini as a *faqih* with the Islamists who were not classically trained scholars would help us understand the differences between the ideologies of these two group of thinkers.

Finally, drawing a comparison with the ideology of Khomeini and current politicians in Iran would help us understand whether current policymakers in Iran still have the same views towards nationalism and sectarianism or not. For example, Muhamad Javad Zarif - Iran's foreign minister - recently claimed that "the aim of the enemy [is] neither Iran nor Rouhani's government, [their target] is Iran. This is Iran that impedes some aims and desire. [They] want to destroy Iran" (Cited in Hamshahrionline, 2018). In other words, if for Khomeini, the Iranian people should participate in the war with Iraq because the essence of Islam was in danger, Zarif with a more nationalist language highlight that the imposed sanctions by the US administration on the country are targeting neither the Islamic Republic nor Rouhani's government, but they are aiming to destroy Iran. However, further research is needed if we want to understand the potential distance between Khomeini's ideology and current officials in Iran.

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Appendix 1: Khomeini Corpus

	Date	Event	Audience
1.	8 April 1980	Message to the Iranian and Iraqi people	The Iranian and Iraqi people
2.	9 April 1980	Message for the Iranian and Iraqi people on the expel of the Iranian people from Iraq	The Iranian and Iraqi people
3.	22 April 1980	Message to Iraqi people due to the death of Ayatollah Sadr	The Iraqi people and The Iraqi Army
4.	22 September 1980	Radio and TV Broadcast message	The Iranian People
5.	24 September 1980	Message to the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi People	The Iraqi people and The Iraqi Army
6.	25 September 1980	Radio and TV Broadcast message	The Iranian and Iraqi people
7.	26 September 1980	Radio and TV Broadcast message	The Iranian people and the Iranian army The Iraqi people and the Iraqi army
8.	4 October 1980	Message to Iraqi people and the Iraqi army	Iraqi people and the Iraqi army
9.	8 October 1980	Speech for the Revolutionary Iraqi youth	The Iraqi people
10.	16 October 1980	Letter to the Iraqi people and army	Iraqi people and the Iraqi army
11.	19 October 1980	Eid al-Adha's speech	The Iranian people and Iran's armed forces
12.	21 October 1980	Speech for the Iraqi clerics in Iran	The Iraqi people
13.	28 October 1980	Speech for Iran's officials	The Iranian people
14.	5 November 1980	Speech for preachers before Muharram	The Iranian people
15.	17 December 1980	Speech for Pasdaran (the revolutionary guard forces)	The Iranian people and Iran's armed forces
16.	18 February 1981	Speech for families of martyrs of Islamic countries	Families of martyrs of Islamic countries

17.	9 April 1981	Speech for the Iraqi dissidents in Iran	The Iraqi people
18.	1 March 1981	Explaining the situation of the war for officials from the Islamic countries	International audience
19.	27 August 1981	Message to the Muslim people around the World of the world and pilgrims of the Holy Prophet	International audience
20.	10 January 1982	Speech for the Iranian people and international audiences	The Iranian people and international audience
21.	10 February 1982	Speak for foreign guests in the anniversary of the revolution	International audience
22.	3 April 1982	Speech for the Iranian officials	The Iranian people and Iran's officials
23.	17 April 1982	Speech for Iran's armed forces and Students	Students and Iran's armed forces
24.	18 April 1982	Message to Iranian people and Iran's army on army's day.	Iranian people and Iran's army
25.	16 May 1982	Speeches to the members of the Supreme Islamic Council	The Iranian people and Iran's officials
26.	24 May 1982	Message for congratulating the liberation Khorramshahr	The Iranian people
27.	25 May 1982	Speech for Friday Prayer Imams in Kerman Province	The Iranian people
28.	27 May 1982	Message to Iranian people on Pasdaran's day	The Iranian people and Iran's armed forces
29.	1 June 1982	Speech for Iranian officials	The Iran people
30.	2 June 1982	Message to Iranians for rebuilding the war-torn places	The Iranian people
31.	3 June 1982	Speech to the families of martyrs and Revolutionary Guard commanders	The families of martyrs
32.	5 June 1982	Message to the Iranian people	The Iranian people
33.	12 June 1982	Speech at Army Commanders Summit	The Iran's Army
34.	14 July 1982	Message to Iraqi people and inviting them to uprising against the Baath Regime	To the Iraqi people
35.	25 July 1982	Speech for Iranian officials	Iranian officials and the Iranian people
36.	7 August 1982	Speech for Iranian officials	Iranian officials and the Iranian people
37.	22 Agues 1982	Speech to the officials of Hajj caravans	The Iranian people
38.	31 August 1982	Speeches to the officials of the country	Iran's officials
39.	22 September 1982	Message to the Iranian nation on the anniversary of the beginning of the imposed war	The Iranian people

40.	3 October 1982	Speech to the students of Officer Academy	The Iranian people The Iranian army
41.	17 October 1982	Speech to the clerics of Qom, Azerbaijan and Tehran	clerics and the Iranian people
42.	16 November 1982	Message to the People of Isfahan	The families of martyrs
43.	24 November 1982	Speech to the General Army and the family of martyrs	The families of martyrs and Iran's armed forces
44.	26 December 1982	Message to the Iranian soldiers	The Iranian soldiers
45.	6 January 1983	Speech for the General of the Army and the Revolutionary Guard	The Iran's military officer
46.	24 January 1983	Khomeini's speech for the members of Parliament	Iranian officials
47.	10 April 1983	Speech for the members of Committees of Islamic Revolution	The Iranian people
48.	4 May 1983	Speech on the Imam Mohammad Taqi's birthday	The Iranian people
49.	11 June 1983	Speech for Friday Prayer Imams in the provinces of Khorasan, Bakhtaran.	The Iranian people
50.	18 June 1983	Speech on martyrdom of Ayatollah Hakim	The Iraqi People
51.	10 August 1983	Speech for the Minister of Revolutionary Guard and his deputies	The Iran armed forces
52.	11 August 1983	Speech for Iranian officials	The Iranian people and officials
53.	23 August 1983	Speech at the Naval and Air Force Personnel	The Iranian armed forces
54.	28 August 1983	Message to the Iranian people	The Iranian people
55.	19 September 1983	Speeches to the members of the committee to hold the anniversary of the war	The Iranian people
56.	20 September 1983	Speeches to the members of the Supreme Council of the Iraq Islamic Revolution	
57.	20 September 1983	Speeches to the members of the Supreme Council of the Iraq Islamic Revolution	The Iraqi people
58.	5 October 1983	Speech for the preachers before the month Muharram.	The Iranian people
59.	7 December 1983	Speech to Iranian officials	The Iranian people
60.	7 February 1984	Speech to ambassadors and staff of foreign countries	International audiences
61.	8 February 1984	Speech to the families of martyrs	The families of martyrs

62.	11 February 1984	Message to the Iranian people on the fifth anniversary of the victor revolution	The Iranian people
63.	28 February 1984	Speeches for Iran's officials	The Iranian people
64.	20 May 1984	Speech for the Iranian armed forces	the Iranian armed forces
65.	1 July 1984	Speeches for Iran's officials	The Iranian people and Iran's officials
66.	9 August 1984	Speeches for Iran's officials	The Iranian people and Iran's officials
67.	27 August 1984	Message to the Iran's armed forces	Iran's officials
68.	11 December 1984	Speeches for Iran's officials	Iran's officials
69.	29 January 1986	Speeches for Iran's officials	The Iranian people and Iran's officials
70.	21 March 1986	Radio and TV message to the Iranian people at the beginning of the Year	The Iranian people
71.	24 March 1986	Speech to Iran's officials	Iran's officials
72.	28 April 1986	Message to the families of martyrs	families of martyrs
73.	19 July 1986	Speech to the Generals in the Revolutionary Guard and the army	The Iranian armed forces
74.	24 August 1986	Speech in front of the authorities on Eid al-Ghadir	Iran's officials and the Iranian people
75.	29 May 1987	Speech to Iran's officials	Iran's officials and the Iranian people
76.	22 September 1987	Message to the Iranian people for war's week	The Iranian people
77.	8 February 1988	Speech on the eve of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday and Imam birthday	The Iranian people and Iran's officials
78.	17 March 1988	Letter to the leader of the Revolutionary Guard	The Revolutionary Guard
79.	20 July 1988	Message to Iranian people and accepting the ceasefire	The Iranian people

Appendix 2: A example of how *Sahifeh-ye Imam* cited an indirect quote of the Quran by Khomeini

حضور باشکوه روحانی و ارتشی و پاسدار در جبهه‌های جنگ

این قدرتی که الآن در ایران هست که همه رویش حساب دارند می‌کنند، همه کشورها رویش حساب می‌کنند و بدون جهت، بسیاری از کشورها هم ترسیده‌اند، این یک قدرتی است که خدا داده است این یک چیزی نیست که ما بتوانیم تحصیلش بکنیم، این چیزی است که خدا به ما عنایت فرموده است. بنابراین، ما باید روی همین مسئله همیشه تکیه بکنیم، روی این مسئله که ما خودمان چیزی نیستیم و هرچه هست مبدأ غیبی دارد و آن مبدأ غیبی است که ما را کمک می‌کند. آقا، شوخی نیست که یک جمعیت کثیری با زحمتهایی یک دژی برای خودشان - به آن دژهای محکم - درست بکنند و در پناه آن دژ باشند و یک جمعیت کمی از بیابان به آنها حمله بکنند و تسلیم بشوند آنها. تسلیم برای این است که می‌ترسند. ترس را که در آنها ایجاد کرده است؟ ما که جمعیتمان به اندازه آنها نبود. ما که در بیابان بودیم و در معرض اینکه آسیب ببینیم، و آنها در پناهگاهها بودند و در دژهایی که درست کرده بودند و این خوف را هم نداشتند. این یک خوفی بود که خدای تبارک و تعالی در قرآن هم از آن اطلاع داده است (۱) که در صدر اسلام

(۱)- اشاره است به آیه ۲۶، سوره احزاب.

Appendix 3:

Some of the metaphors that Khomeini used during the war when he was addressing Iraqi people

Metaphor	Frequently	Example
Brotherhood metaphors	21 times	THE IRANAINA AND IRAQI PEOPLE ARE BROTHERS
Demonising Metaphor	9 times	SADDAM IS A CANCER
War with Islam Metaphor	17 times	WAR WITH IRAN IS WAR WITH ISLAM.

Some of the metaphor that Khomeini used during the war when he was addressing the Iranian people

Metaphor	Frequently	Example
Journey Metaphor	55 times	THE WAR IS A JOURNEY ON THE PATH OF GOD.
Light Metaphor	17 times	THE REVOLUTION WAS A LIGHT
Demonising Metaphor	30 times	THE IRAQI ARMY IS THE ARMY OF SATAN
Heart Metaphor	33 times	SADDAM HEART IS SEALED

Appendix 4:

Chapter 3

(Text 2) برادرهای من، عزیزان ما که از اوطان خودتان آواره شدید، در این گرفتاریهای شما در طول حکومت بعث، ما هم مبتلا بودیم در ایران، و شما در عراق. ما در ایران گرفتار یک حکومت دیکتاتور خبیث [بودیم] که با ملت ما آن کرد که مغول آنطور نکرد.

Chapter 4

(Text 1) اکنون، شما ای ملت بزرگ اسلامی ایران، بر سر دوراهی می باشید؛ راه سعادت و افتخار ابدی در سایه پرافتخار جهاد برای خدا و دفاع از کشور اسلام، و راه ذلت و ننگ ابدی؛.

(Text 2) خداوند! این پیروزیهای چشمگیری که برای ما و ملت ما و برای اسلام حاصل شده است، طوری کن که در قلوب ما تأثیر سوء نگذارد و ما را مغرور نکند. ما را از آن راهی که انبیا... داشتند منحرف نکنند

(Text 3) چه مژده ای برای شهیدان در راه مرام حسین... که همان سبیل الله است، از این بالاتر که در جنتی که آن بزرگوار شهید فی سبیل الله وارد می شود.

(Text 4) قلم و بیان اینجانب عاجز است از قدردانی و شکرگزاری از مجاهدین فداکار اسلام که با مجاهدت و جانبازی در راه هدف موجب افتخار و سرافرازی جمهوری اسلام و اولیای خدا شدند.

(Text 5) با هر قدرتی که بخواهد هجمه بکند بر ما، مقابله می کنیم و هیچ هراس نداریم؛ غایت امر این است که ما در راه خدا شهید می شویم و این غایت آمال جوانهای ماست.

(Text 6) سلام خدا و بزرگان دین بر شهدا و خاندانشان و بر رزمندگان در راه اسلام و ایران.

(Text 7) علاوه [بر این]، ارتش میلیونی و بسیج عمومی که با سازماندهی خود ملت مجهز می شوند، آماده فداکاری در راه اسلام و کشور

(Text 8) من مکرر اعلام کرده ام که در اسلام نژاد، زبان، قومیت و گروه و ناحیه مطرح نیست. تمام مسلمین - چه اهل سنت و چه شیعی - برادر و برابر و همه برخوردار از همه مزایا و حقوق اسلامی هستند. از جمله جنایتهایی که بدخواهان به اسلام مرتکب شده اند ایجاد اختلاف بین برادران سنی و شیعی است. من از همه برادران اهل سنت تقاضا دارم که این شایعات را محکوم و شایعه سازان را به جزای اعمالشان برسانند.

(Text 9) اسلام امر فرموده که مسلمین از هر طایفه ای هستند برادرند؛ عرب و عجم و کرد و ترک و فارس و غیر آن مطرح نیست؛ تمام طوایف در اسلام و جمهوری اسلامی به حقوق حقه خود خواهند رسید.

(Text 10) ملت امریکا که به ما کاری نکرده. ملت امریکا اگر بفهمد مطلب را، اگر بفهمد مطلب را ملت امریکا، به حسب وجدان انسانی اش، با ما موافق است

Text 11) این ملت عراق مظلوم که دارد خرد می‌شود زیر پای این ظالم و ظالمها، ما می‌خواهیم به درد اینها برسیم.

Text 12) بدانند که مسامحه در این امر نزد خداوند و ملت گناهی نابخشودنی است و از عواقب آن بر حذر باشند. و به‌همهٔ جناحها اطمینان می‌دهم که پیروزی با اسلام و کشور اسلامی است و شکست خذلان نصیب دشمنان شما است.

Text 13) امروز نباید انسان امیال خودش را در نظر بگیرد. یک‌روزی که گرفتاری اسلام و حیثیت اسلام در میان است و می‌بینید که همهٔ قدرتمندها و همهٔ تبلیغات بر ضد همه هست و از اول هم بر ضد همه و خصوص پاسدار عزیز بوده‌است، باید انسان تمام امیال خودش را فدای میل اسلام، حکم و احکام اسلام بکند.

Text 14) اگر جنگ با پیروزی اسلام تمام شد تمام این مصیبت‌ها با پیروزی ترمیم می‌شود.

Text 15) مسئلهٔ دفاع از اسلام و کشور اسلامی و اموال و نوامیس مسلمین از واجبات کفایی است

Text 16) وارد شدن ما در عراق نه برای این بوده است که ما عراق را می‌خواهیم تصاحب کنیم یا بصره را. ما وطنمان بصره و شام نیست، ما وطنمان اسلام است. ما تابع احکام اسلام هستیم. اسلام به ما اجازه نمی‌دهد که یک کشور مسلمی را ما تحت سلطه قرار بدهیم و مانخواهیم [خواست] هیچ وقت؛ توجه به این نخواهیم... ما در حال دفاع هستیم

Text 17) آن چیزی که می‌خواستیم امروز عرض کنم این است که در ولادت حضرت رسول... قضایای واقع شده است، قضایای نادری شده... از جمله قضیه شکست خوردن طاق کسری [1] و فرو ریختن چهارده کنگره از آن قصر و از آن جمله خاموش شدن آتشکده‌های فارس و ریختن بتها به روی زمین [2]. قضیه شکست طاق کسری شاید اشاره به این باشد که در عهد این پیغمبر بزرگ، طاق ظلم، طاقتهای ظلم می‌شکند و مخصوصاً طاق کسری شکسته شد برای اینکه آن وقت این طاق کسری مرکز ظلم انوشیروان بود. تحریف نمودن قضایای تاریخی انوشیروان به خلاف آن چیزهایی که به واسطهٔ شعرا و به واسطهٔ درباریهای آن وقت و موبدان درباری آن وقت درست کردند، یکی از ظالمهای ساسانیان است،

Text 18) خدایا! من گفتم. من آن چیزی را که می‌فهمم گفتم به آقایان؛ گفتم به جامعه ایران؛ و من تقصیر ندارم. مطلب یک مطلب شوخی نیست. مطلبی است که یک ملتی که در طول تاریخ زیر سلطه سلاطین جور بوده؛ در طول تاریخ 2500 سال زیر سلطه سلاطینی بوده است که همه‌اش جور بوده، حتی آن عادل‌هایشان هم خبیث بودند، حتی آن انوشیروان عادلش هم از خبیثها بوده.

Text 19) آن چیزی که مطرح است در جنگ، عدد نیست. آن چیزی که مطرح هست آن انسان هست. همان قدرتی که با اتکال به خدا در صدر اسلام، یک عدهٔ کیشان لشکرهای زیاد را به هم می‌زد، و اوضاعشان را به هم می‌زد. بحمدالله در مملکت ما هم با اینکه عدد کم است... با این اتکال به ذات مقدس حق تعالی، می‌تواند که آن

لشکرهای زیاد را و آن جمعیت‌های زیاد را شکست بدهد.

Text 20) قوی باشید، برومند باشید و از هیاهوی دنیا هیچ وقت به خودتان هراس راه ندهید. این مسائل در صدر اسلام هم بوده است. این هیاهوها و بساطی که مخالفین اسلام در صدر اسلام راه می انداختند در زمان خود پیغمبر اکرم و بعدها همیشه بوده است.

Text 21) این مسئله، مسئله مهمی است، مسئله وحدت بین شما و وحدت همه قشرهای مختلف ایرانی یک امر مهمی است برای حفظ کیان اسلام که واجب است بر همه ما، چنانچه بر همه ما واجب است که به هر طور می توانیم دفاع کنیم از اسلام. آنها اساس اسلام را از بین می برند؛ برای اینکه دیدند اسلام است که می تواند کار بکند و در مقابل بایستد. و این یک فریضه ای است بر همه ما، از اهم فرایض است حفظ اسلام؛ یعنی، حفظ اسلام از حفظ احکام اسلام بالاتر است؛ اساس اسلام اول است، دنبال او اساس احکام اسلام است. و بر همه ما، بر همه شما به مقداری که قدرت داشته باشیم، به مقداری که توانایی داشته باشیم واجب است که جدیت کنیم در اینکه این دفاع مقدس را ما به طور شایسته عمل بکنیم

Chapter 5

Text 1) برای ملت عراق معلوم باشد که ما با آنها هیچ کار نداریم، بلکه این صدام حسین است که به واسطه تحریک امریکا به ما تجاوز کرده است و ما اگر جوابی به او بدهیم، هرگز به ملت عراق، که برادر ما هستند، مربوط نیست.

Text 2) صدام... میخواهد با صحنه سازیها اذهان برادران اسلامی ما را از خود و رژیم منحط خود منحرف کند تا چند صباح دیگر به جنایات خود ادامه دهد.... برادران عرب ما بدانند که ملت عزیز ما با دشمنان آنان - که در رأس آنها رژیم منحوس بعث است - دشمن و با دوستان آنان دوستند.

Text 3) امیدواریم که نابودی سرسپردگانی مثل سادات و صدام حسین به زودی انجام گیرد و ملت‌های شریف اسلامی به این انگل‌های خائن آن کنند که ملت ما با محمدرضا خائن کرد.

Text 4) شما برادران ارتشی و غیر ارتشی و همه قوای مسلح از عمل ملت ایران که با دست خالی قدرت شیطانی ابرقدرتها را در هم شکست، عبرت بگیرید و از شیطان بزرگ و کوچک نهراسید، و برای دفاع از اسلام و کشورهای اسلامی بپا خیزید.

Text 5) ای جوانان دانشگاهی، ای دانشجویان عزیز، به فریاد کشور و اسلام و ملت خودتان برسید و قهرمانانه قیام کنید که فرج شما نزدیک و حزب خدا بر حزب شیطان غلبه می‌کند.

Text 6) قیام کنید. و با الهام از اسلام بزرگ بر دشمنان اسلام بتازید ...، این غده‌های سرطانی را از قلب یک کشور اسلامی بیرون ریخته.

Text 7) من به آنها سفارش می‌کنم به ارتش عراق که اگر می‌توانند قیام کنند بر ضد این آدم و این آدم را از بین ببرند و خودشان جانشین او بشوند و ما هم تأییدتان می‌کنیم و اگر این برایشان میسر نیست، فرار کنند و جنگ با اسلام نکنند.

Text 8) سربازهای ارتش عراق و صاحب منصبهای ارتش عراق باید بدانند که جنگ با ایران، جنگ با اسلام است، جنگ با قرآن است، جنگ با رسول الله است و این از اعظم محرماتی است که خدای تبارک و تعالی نمی‌گذرد از او

Text 9) شما دارید در غیر راه خدا خون خودتان را می‌دهید. انگیزه شما چی است؟ انگیزه قدرتهایی که ما داریم، انگیزه این است که ما برای خدا جنگ می‌کنیم. خدا به ما همه چیز داده. ما از او هستیم و به او هم تحویل می‌دهیم. این انگیزه لشکر اسلام است. در صدر اسلام هم همین انگیزه بوده. الآن هم همین انگیزه است. شما انگیزه‌تان چیست؟ شما برای خدا با اسلام مخالفت می‌کنید؟! برای خدا با قرآن مخالفت می‌کنید یا برای صدام حسین؟ اگر برای خداست که راهی ندارید شما. راهی ندارید که بگویید برای خداست. پس برای صدام حسین است. انگیزه‌تان هم این است که اسلام قدرت پیدا نکند؟! خوب اینجا اسلام است، قدرت هم دارد.

Text 10) این مطلب را باید ملت عراق بدانند که امروز جنگ بین اسلام و کفر است، و بر همه مسلمین واجب است که دفاع کنند از اسلام. اگر این آدم به فرض محال غلبه پیدا کند بر ایران و جمهوری اسلامی را ازین ببرد، این عکس العملش در همه کشورهای اسلامی می‌شود. اینها مایلند که اصل کشور اسلامی نباشد.

Text 11) شما می‌دانید که این جنگ بین ایران و بعثیهای عراق، جنگ بین اسلام و کفر و قرآن کریم و الحاد است. از این جهت، بر همه شما و ما مسلمانان جهان لازم است از اسلام عزیز و قرآن کریم دفاع کنیم و این خیانتکاران را به جهنم بفرستیم.

Text 12) آنکه به خیال خود عروبت را از اسلام والاتر می‌داند و به اسلام پشت کرده به زعم آنکه ملت‌های عرب را به خود متوجه کند، غافل است که ملت عزیز عرب از اسلام چون جان شیرین حفاظت میکند.

Text 13) ای ارتش عراق! اطاعت از این مخالف اسلام و قرآن نکنید.

Text 14) ما که داریم در مملکتان قرآن را ترویج می‌کنیم، در مملکتان احکام اسلام را داریم ترویج می‌کنیم و پیاده می‌کنیم به جای آن احکامی که در سابق بوده است، این آقا ما را مجوس می‌داند و خودش که بر ضد اسلام و بر ضد مسلمین هستند، خودشان را طرفدار علی بن ابی طالب ... باید ملت عراق بدانند که این آدم، آدم خطرناکی است برای

ملت عراق و خطرش بر ملت عراق زیاد است والا به ملت ما، او که نمی تواند صدمه ای بزند. او بر ملت عراق خطرناک است.

Text 15) ملت عراق هرگز با صدام حسین موافق نیست. یک روز هم موافقت ندارد. ملت عراق با اسلام موافق است. کسی که با اسلام موافق است، کسی که کتاب او «قرآن» است، کسی که کعبه قبله اوست، نمی شود با یک آدم کافری که در پناه کفار دارد زندگی می کند و در پناه کارتر و امثال کارتر دارد به حیات خودش ادامه می دهد، نمی شود با این همراهی بکنید.

Text 16) دنبال یک کافر، یک ملحد که هم مسلکش الحادی است و هم خودش ملحد است، دنبال این نروید. دنبال یک مسلکی بروید که می گوید من اسلام مسلکم است. دنبال رسول خدا شما باشید، نه دنبال صدام، رها کنید اینها را.

Text 17) آیت الله صدر و خواهر بزرگوارش که در تحت شکنجه دژخیمان صدام عقلی جان خودشان را فدا کردند.

Text 18) خبر بسیار آسف انگیز و حیرتبار شهادت شش شخصیت از بیت مرحوم آیت الله حکیم. رحمة الله علیه. به دست جنایتکار ددمنش دهر، صدام عقلی ... هر انسان با وجدانی را که از فطرت انسانی منحرف نشده است متأسف و ناراحت می کند.

Text 19) اینها تابع میشل عفلق هستند. میشل عفلق به اسلام کار دارد؟! میشل عفلق اسلام را منافی با مقاصد خودش می داند. این حزب بعث، اسلام را منافی می دانند با مقاصدی که دارند. ملت عراق باید بیدار بشوند. باید قیام کنند ... باید انقلاب کنند.

Text 20) با کمال تأسف مرحوم آیت الله شهید سیدمحمد باقر صدر و همشیره مکرمه مظلومه او... - به دست رژیم منحط بعث عراق با وضع دلخراشی به درجه رفیعه شهادت رسیده اند.

Text 21) ملت شریف عراق! شما اخلاف آنان هستید که انگلیس را از عراق راندند؛ بپا خیزید و قبل از آنکه این رژیم فاسد همه چیز شما را تباه کند، دست جنایتکار او را از کشور اسلامی خود قطع کنید. ای عشایر فرات و دجله! همه با هم و با همه ملت اتحاد کنید و این ریشه فساد را قبل از آنکه فرصت از دست برود، قلع و قمع نمایید، و برای خدا دفاع از کشور اسلامی خود و از اسلام مقدس نمایید که خدا با شماست. ای ارتش عراق! اطاعت از این مخالف اسلام و قرآن نکنید و به ملت بگرایید و دست امریکا را که از آستین صدام بیرون آمده است قطع کنید و بدانید اطاعت از این سفاک، مخالفت با خدای متعال است و جزای آن عار و ناراست.

Text 22) برادرهای من، عزیزان ما که از اوطان خودتان آواره شدید، در این گرفتاریهای شما در طول حکومت بعث، ما هم مبتلا بودیم در ایران، و شما در عراق. ما در ایران گرفتار یک حکومت دیکتاتور خبیث [بودیم] که با ملت ما آن کرد که مغول آنطور نکرد.

Text 23) مع ذلک، ملت ایران توانست با اینکه سلاح نداشت این جرثومه فساد و این سلسله خبیث سلاطین را که در طول تاریخ مجرمت‌ترین افراد انسانها بودند، منقرض کند و به جای او جمهوری اسلامی را مستقر نماید؛ عراق هم چاره‌ای جز این ندارد. این ملتها هستند که باید نهضت کنند، قیام کنند و خودشان را از دست اشرار نجات بدهند.

Text 24) اینجانب به حسب وظیفه شرعی و عقلیه ناچارم مطالبی را به قوای مسلح و به ملت شریف و مظلوم و مسلم عراق تذکر دهم. شاید خداوند تبارک و تعالی آنان را متذکر نماید و ملت اسلام و قرآن کریم را از شر دشمنان شهرت طلب و اربابان سودجوی آنان نجات دهد. انّه علی کل شیءٍ قدیر.

Text 25) شما برادران ارتشی و غیر ارتشی... برای دفاع از اسلام و کشورهای اسلامی بپاخیزید. خداوند با شما است. انّ تَنْصُرُوا اللَّهَ يَنْصُرْكُمْ وَ يُبَدِّلْ اَفْئَامَكُمْ.

Text 26) وَ قَاتِلُوا الْمُشْرِكِينَ كَافَّةً ان شاء الله خداوند تبارک و تعالی به شما قدرت بدهد و این شخص کثیف را از مملکت خودتان دور کنید. خداوند با شماست و شما پیروز هستید و این حکومت رفتنی است، ان شاء الله.

Chapter 6

Text 1) چرا ممالک اسلامی به آیه شریفه ای که می فرماید که فَقاتِلُوا الّٰتِي تَبغِي حَتّٰى تَفِي ءِ اِلىٰ اَمْرِ اللّٰهِ چرا عمل نمی کنند؟

Text 2) قرآن می فرماید: قَاتِلُوهُمْ حَتّٰى لَا تَكُوْنَ فِتْنَةً، [1] همه بشر را دعوت می کند به مقاتله برای رفع فتنه؛ یعنی «جنگ جنگ تا رفع فتنه در عالم»، این غیر از آنی است که ما می گوئیم، ما یک جزء کوچکش را گرفته ایم، برای این که خوب! مایک دایره خیلی کوچکی از این دایره عظیم واقع هستیم و می گوئیم که: «جنگ تا پیروزی». مقصودمان هم پیروزی بر کفر صدامی است.... کسانی که تبعیت از قرآن می کنند، در نظر داشته باشند که باید تا آن جایی که قدرت دارند ادامه به نبردشان بدهند تا این که فتنه از عالم برداشته بشود... بنا بر این، نباید از قرآن سوء استفاده کرد و آنهایی که با رژیم ما مخالف هستند، بگویند: این مخالف قرآن است؛ یا آخوندهای درباری بگویند: این مخالف قرآن است؛ یا آخوندهای بدتر از آخوندهای درباری بگویند: این مخالف قرآن است. خیر! این موافق قرآن است. و اگر کسی بگوید که: با فاسد جنگ نکنید، مخالف قرآن است؛ اگر کسی بگوید: فتنه را با جنگ رفع نکنید، مخالف قرآن است.

Text 3) اگر یک کافری را سر خود بگذارند تا آخر عمر فساد بکند، آن شدت آن عذابی که برای او پیدا می کند، بسیار بالاتر است از آن کسی که جلوی رابگیرند و همین حال بکشندش. اگر یک نفر فاسد که مشغول فساد است بگیرند و بکشند، به صلاح خودش است، اگر امروز، این سران استکباری بمیرند، برای خودش بهتر است از این که ده سال دیگر بمیرند. اگر امروز، یک کسی که فساد در ارض می کند کشته بشود، برای خودش رحمتی است، به خیال این که به

صورت یک تأدیب، نه این است که این یک چیزی باشد که برخلاف رحمت باشد. ... این که می فرماید که: قَاتِلُوهُمْ حَتَّى لَا تَكُونَ فِئْتَةً بَرْگَتَرِينَ رحمت است بر بشر .

(Text 4) مسئله، مسئله تشیع نیست، مسئله اسلام است، مسئله مذهب نیست. همه مذاهب الآن در معرض خطرند. الآن که قدرتهای بزرگ احساس این معنا کردند که اسلام یک همچو قدرتی دارد که می تواند یک جمعیت چهل و چند میلیونی را در مقابل همه وادار کند و بایستد و بگوید نه این و نه او، حالایی که فهمیدند این قدرت، قدرت اسلام است نه آن وقت هم سه تا جنگی که شد، [5] سه تا جنگ با کسانی بود که اظهار اسلام می کردند، کسانی بودند که می گفتند فریاد می زدند ما مسلمانیم. جنگها با مسلمانها بود. حالا شما می گوید مسلمان با مسلمان مگر جنگ؟ پس شما اعتراض به حضرت امیر هم دارید، برای اینکه جنگ حضرت امیر سه تا جنگشان هر سه با مسلمانها بود.

(Text 5) بعد از اینکه صلح کردند، به حسب روایت، به حسب نقل، معاویه به منبر رفت و گفت که تمام حرفهایی که گفتم، من قرار دادم، زیر پایم؛ مثل پاره کردن این مردیکه آن قراردادها را. آن صلح تحمیلی که در عصر امام حسن واقع شد، آن حکمیت تحمیلی که در زمان امیرالمؤمنین واقع شد و هر دوییش به دست اشخاص حیلہ گر درست شد، این ما را هدایت می کند به اینکه نه زیر بار صلح تحمیلی برویم و نه زیر بار حکمیت تحمیلی. ما باید خودمان به حسب رأی خودمان، به حسب رأی ملتمان، آن طوری که آآن همه ملت دارند می گویند، ما باید این جنگ را ادامه بدهیم.

(Text 6) که اگر خدای نخواستہ محتاج به بسیج عمومی شد و امر به جهاد مقدس عمومی داده شد، فوراً به میدان رفته و از دین خدا و کشور اسلامی دفاع نمایند.

(Text 7) و امروز که ما باز برای دفاع از کشور خودمان و دفاع از ملت مظلوم خودمان وارد شدیم در عراق، برای اینکه نگذاریم هر روز آبادان و اهواز و اینجاها مورد حمله آنها واقع بشود و مورد توپهای دوربرد آنها و موشکهای آنها باشد و می خواهیم اینها را به حدی برسانیم که نتوانند این کار را بکنند. این یک دفاعی است که ما می کنیم.

(Text 8) و ما باید با همه برادر باشیم؛ با همه، همه مسلمین برادر باشیم و در مقابل کفار بایستیم، نه اینکه ما در مقابل مسلمین بایستیم. خوب، ما ناچاریم الآن، دفاع داریم می کنیم. مatakنون یک قدم برای جنگ برداشته ایم؛ اینها همه دفاع است. الآن هم که ما وارد شده ایم در خاک عراق، برای دفاع است، نه برای چیز دیگر.

(Text 9) ما و کشور ما هیچ وقت بنا نداشتیم و نداریم که به یک کشوری هجوم کنیم، لکن بعد از آن که به ما هجوم کردند، دفاع یک امری است که هم شرعاً واجب است بر همه و هم عقلاً. ما حال دفاعی داریم.

(Text 10) ما هم که الان دفاع است، ما اصلاً جنگی نداریم، ما با کی جنگ داریم؟ ما الآن داریم دفاع می کنیم. «فاو» مرکز این بود که بریزند و از آنجا به اسلام صدمه بزنند. خوب! اینها رفتند «فاو» را گرفتند دفاع کردند. علاوه دفاع از ملت عراق، دفاع از اسلام است، دفاع از مسلمین است. ملت عراق با این خبیث موافق نیستند، این عده ای هستند با او و قدرت هم دستشان است .

Text 11) اوست که دفاع را واجب کرده است برای رفع فتنه، مقاتله را واجب کرده است، امر کرده است و او است که فرمانده کلّ قواست و شما باید متکی به او باشید

Text 12) آن وقت هم صلح همین طوری نباید بشود. مجرم باید معلوم شود کی است.... معنای آتش بس این است؟ همان آتش بس صدامی است .

Text 13) صلح شماست که اسلامی است و واقعاً صلح را می خواهید. ما از روز اولی که به ما هجوم شده است و ما به دفاع برخاسته ایم، یک افرادی در مملکت ما زمامدار بودند که اینها همه صلح را می خواستند، لکن نه صلح صدامی را صلح انسانی را، صلح الهی را.

Text 14) لکن صلحی که آنها می خواهند صلح امریکایی می خواهند و ما صلح اسلامی می خواهیم. ما می خواهیم آن کسی که تعدی کرده است به مسلمان ها و آن اشخاصی که خون مسلمان ها را در بلاد ما و بلاد خودش ریخته است و علمای اسلام را در بلاد خودش شهید کرده است، ما می خواهیم به حکم اسلام از او انتقام بگیریم؛ ما می خواهیم قصاص کنیم، ما می خواهیم دست او را قطع کنیم، و ما می خواهیم که این حزب منحوس و این حزب علفی از بین برود و کشور عراق به دست خود عراقی ها، به دست مردم و ملت خود عراق اداره بشود

Text 15) بعضی از این آخوندهای درباری که ما را نصیحت می کنند که بیاید به اسلام برگردید. اینها اسلام را نمی دانند چه است. اینها اسلام را جز خوردن چیزی نمی دانند. همان مسائل حیوانی. اگر اینها اسلام را می دانستند، اینها که می دانند که مردک، این حزب علفی مسلمان نیست

Text 16) یا آخوندهای درباری بگویند: این مخالف قرآن است؛ یا آخوندهای بدتر از آخوندهای درباری بگویند: این مخالف قرآن است. خیر! این موافق قرآن است. و اگر کسی بگوید که: با فاسد جنگ نکنید، مخالف قرآن است؛ اگر کسی بگوید: فتنه را با جنگ رفع نکنید، مخالف قرآن است .

Text 17) جام زهرآلود قبول قطعنامه را سر کشیده ام، و در برابر عظمت و فداکاری این ملت بزرگ احساس شرمساری می کنم. و بدا به حال آنانی که در این قافله نبودند! بدا به حال آنهایی که از کنار این معرکه بزرگ جنگ و شهادت و امتحان عظیم الهی تا به حال ساکت و بی تفاوت و یا انتقاد کننده و پرخاشگر گذشتند

Text 18) من باز می گویم که قبول این مسئله برای من از زهر کشنده تر است؛ ولی راضی به رضای خدایم و برای رضایت او این جرعه را نوشیدم.

Text 19) در راه خدا نه شهادت و نه نقص عضو و نه گرفتاری هیچ یک از اینها اشکال ندارد. این چیزی بوده است که اولیای خدا از اولی که خلقت تحقق پیدا کرده است، انبیای عظام در طول تاریخ مبتلا به آن بودند و ترسیدند و جلو رفتند و شما امروز قدرتمندانی هستید که در دنیا آواز شما پیچیده است

(Text 20) برادران و خواهران! ما در راهی وارد شدیم که آن راه، راه انبیاست؛ و تاریخ تا آنجا که نشان می دهد انبیا با مشکلات روبرو بودند. همیشه قشر محروم بودند ... مشکلاتی که برای آنها حاصل بوده است بسیار زیاد بوده است، طاقتفرسا بوده.

(Text 21) وقتی مقصد الهی شد راه هرچه مشکل باشد چون مقصد الهی است باید به نظر آسان باشد. می بینید که در بعض روایات هست که حسین بن علی . سلام الله علیه . هرچه به ظهر عاشورا نزدیکتر می شد فروخته روتر می شد، رویش فروخته تر می شد [1] برای اینکه می دید که جهاد در راه خداست و برای خداست.

(Text 22) دل صاف و نیت خالص و عزم مصمم و رسیدن به پیروزی نهایی می روید و پیروزی نهایی از آن شماست.

(Text 23) با دل مطمئن به الطاف الهی و قدرت معنوی و ...، آخر جنگ را که نزدیک است نظاره می کنیم .

(Text 24) شما مجاهده کنید تا هر چه در دل دارید زود شود، که اگر برای خدا خالص شدید در پیروزیتان موثر است.

(Text 25) اما خدا همچو قلبهای اینها را. در آن . مُهر زده است ... به واسطه اعمال خودشان، که اینها دیگر قابل اصلاح نیستند. هیچ قابل نیستند

(Text 26) در مصاحبه ای که اخیراً کرده است ...، یکی از حرفهایش این است که ما از اسلام و دین و دنیای اسلامی دریافتی کردیم که دیگران نکردند؛ دریافت ما این است که باید تجاوز نکنیم به کشور دیگر شما ببینید ... چه قلبی باید در باطن یک همچو آدم باشد که جرأت کند یک همچو حرفی را بزند

(Text 27) حضرت عیسی مرده های طبیعی را زنده می کرد، لکن مرده ای که قلبش مرده است، ، حیثیتش از بین رفته است حضرت عیسی هم همچو کاری را نه نمی کند و نه می تواند. بنابراین، اینها می خواهند چه بکنند؟