

1 **Remuneration of donors for cell and gene therapies: an update on the principles and**
2 **perspective of the World Marrow Donor Association**

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16 **Conflict of Interests**

17 Salmah Mahmood Ahmed has a volunteer position at the World Marrow Donor Association as

18 Chair of the Cellular Therapy Committee.

19 Eefke Van Eerden is the Project Coordinator Donor Care at the World Marrow Donor

20 Association.

21 Lina Hamad, Suzanna M van Walraven, and Laura Machin have no conflicts of interests to

22 declare.

23

24 **Background**

25 The field of cell and gene therapy (CGT) witnessed substantial progress over the past decade,
26 leading to the approval of over forty CGT products in different markets across the world (1).
27 CGT products include a vast range of innovative therapies of varying complexity. Cell-based
28 therapies encompass somatic cell therapies, stem cell lines, tissue engineered products and other
29 types of cells and tissues used for therapeutic indications (2-4). Gene therapy alters the
30 expression of a certain gene, or changes the genetic properties of cells (2, 3). Advanced therapy
31 medicinal products (ATMPs) are cell-based or tissue-based therapies whose processing
32 necessitates manipulation, resulting in an alteration of the biological properties of these cells or
33 tissues (2, 3). Globally, there is a major pipeline set in place to accelerate the development of
34 these products. In the United States, Europe, and Asia, expedited programs are available for
35 sponsors to fast-track regulatory approval for ATMPs treating serious and orphan conditions (5-
36 8).

37
38 Developments of CGT products initially targeted autologous applications aimed at treating
39 oncological and haematological diseases (9, 10). Recently, interest in allogeneic therapies
40 peaked, reflected by a 33% increase in allogeneic developments in 2022 compared to the
41 previous year (11). Developed using donor cells as uniform starting material, allogeneic sources
42 offer access to faster “off-the-shelf” products that can be used in multiple recipients, result in
43 more predictable manufacturing and performance, decrease production costs, and ultimately
44 increase patient access (12, 13). As such, there is increased reliance by the CGT industry on
45 various donor graft sources including cord blood, hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs) and other

46 marrow-derived cellular materials like mononuclear cells (MNCs), mesenchymal stem cells
47 (MSCs) and T-cells (hereinafter referred to as cellular materials).

48

49 One of the fundamental objectives of the World Marrow Donor Association (WMDA) is to
50 maintain the health and safety of volunteer donors while ensuring high-quality stem cell products
51 are available for all patients. In light of the remarkable advances in CGT and the increased
52 dependence on donor stem cell products for the development of CGT globally, the WMDA
53 established the Cellular Therapy Committee to identify the role WMDA can play in safeguarding
54 donors and patients in the CGT field. Recently, provision concerns within both the
55 transplantation and CGT communities have been raised with regards to how donor stem cells can
56 be sought, and a pipeline sustained for understanding around CGT to advance without
57 compromising the associated donation system for patient hematopoietic cell transplantation
58 (HCT). In addition, reliance on donor cells as starting materials for CGT development presents
59 new ethical dilemmas as the opportunity of financial gain becomes available for third parties
60 using donor cells (14). Whilst an important issue in the context of CGT development, the pricing
61 of ATMPs is beyond the scope of this article for two reasons. Firstly, the WMDA has no role in
62 the pricing strategies for these therapies and, secondly, there is a lack of transparent information
63 available on the pricing strategies agreed between the pharmaceutical company and the
64 healthcare sectors for approved commercial use.

65 In view of these issues, the topic of donor remuneration has gained traction once again. The
66 WMDA promotes the importance of providing safe, high-quality, and ethically sourced donor
67 stem cells to streamline CGT development and advance public health. At the same time, WMDA
68 recognizes CGT is an evolving field and pressure to adapt can result in shifts in practice

69 proceeding official regulatory guidance. The WMDA previously issued a statement on donor
70 remuneration, albeit primarily related to immediate, direct patient need as opposed to
71 circumstances in which there is no direct patient need (15). Accordingly, the WMDA Cellular
72 Therapy Committee reviewed the question on donor remuneration to arrive at an updated
73 statement that aids in the advancement of CGT globally. For the purposes of this paper,
74 discussions on remuneration will focus on HSCs and other marrow-derived cellular materials.
75 WMDA acknowledges the role of cord blood in CGT is critical, however, due to the unique
76 situation around the donation and collection of cord blood, this will be out of scope for this
77 paper.

78

79 **Payment terminology**

80 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics, a UK-based independent charitable body that investigates
81 and reports on ethical issues raised by advancements in biology and medicine, defined the
82 following terms in relation to payments made for Substances of Human Origin (SoHO) (Figure
83 1)(16):

84

85 **Overview of the global regulatory environment in cell and gene therapy**

86 The manufacturing of CGT products poses complex logistical challenges and is subject to global
87 policies and regulations of variable, and sometimes, ambiguous nature (17). Similarly, donor
88 compensation guidelines are heterogenous, and practices vary worldwide. In the United States,
89 the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the authority responsible for
90 regulation of human cells, tissue, and cellular and tissue-based products (18). In 2011, the
91 decision made by the US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit made donor remuneration for

92 peripheral blood stem cell collection (PBSC) legal in states within the Ninth Circuit (19). This
93 decision was followed by a heated debate in the medical and legal communities, with advocates
94 arguing for payment as a necessary step to increase donations, while opponents believed the
95 decision to be unethical, leading to exploitation of vulnerable populations (20). The Department
96 of Health and Human Services (HHS) initially filed an appeal against the decision. Months later,
97 however, the HHS appeal was withdrawn, bringing the 9th Circuit Court's decision back into
98 effect (20).

99

100 In Europe, the European Union Tissues and Cells Directive (EUTCD) (2004/23/EC) regulates
101 the procurement and testing of tissues and cells intended for human use, and cells and tissues
102 regulated as ATMPs (21, 22). The current directive encourages Member States to ensure
103 voluntary and unpaid donation for human transplantation and allows compensation for expenses
104 and inconveniences incurred as a result of donation for human transplantation, donation for
105 research falls out of this scope. In such cases, the responsibility of determining the amount and
106 type of compensation is either tasked to national governments or entrusted to operators directly
107 (10, 23). It is noteworthy to mention that a new draft regulation on standards of quality and
108 safety for SoHO has been published by the European Commission to replace the current directive
109 (24). The new draft regulation plans to extend new protective measures to donors driven by
110 voluntary and unpaid donations, however this is still currently under discussion (25). Likewise,
111 the United Kingdom prohibits the commercial trading of tissues and cells for human
112 transplantation as the EUTCD is transposed into UK law, with the Human Tissue Authority
113 (HTA) as the governing body (4, 26). There are organisations who do market and sell donor
114 material for research and for use in cellular therapies, this current use of donor material is out

115 scope of the regulations (27, 28). The Asian perspective on donor remuneration is more rigorous
116 to that of Europe and the UK. For example, the Human Biomedical Research Act (HBRA) in
117 Singapore prohibits commercial trading of human tissue for use in research, therapy or any other
118 purpose and any advertisements of such trading (29).

119

120 **Inappropriate compensation**

121 Donor reimbursement is founded upon the premise that no financial incentive or disincentive
122 should influence a person's decision to become a donor, making the removal of disincentives
123 such as lost wages and care expenses permissible (30, 31). It is common practice for unrelated
124 stem cell donor registries (DRs) to recompense donors for travel expenses, subsistence, and loss
125 of earnings due to the donation process when sufficient evidence is available (15). In this
126 context, a robust stratified claims assessment procedure is required before compensation is
127 issued to accurately assess claims across the range of costs. These practices are not considered
128 remuneration for the purpose of this discussion. However, an amount of compensation that is
129 large enough to persuade potential donors to consent against their better judgment is an
130 unacceptable form of compensation (23). In that regard, some compensation practices by select
131 procurement organizations supplying donor cells for CGT constitute a financial incentive with
132 the potential to influence donors' decisions to donate. Examples of such practices include online
133 advertisements offering potential stem cell donors' monetary compensation for attending an
134 initial screening appointment, advertisements on social media offering repeated financial rewards
135 for referring others to donate, and compensation offers that go well and beyond the losses
136 incurred (32-34). According to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, to ascertain whether a
137 particular non-altruist-focused intervention is harmful, the welfare of donors, the welfare of other

138 closely concerned individuals (in this case, patients), the potential threat to the common good,
139 and the professional responsibilities of individuals and organizations involved should all be
140 closely scrutinized (16). In this paper, we discuss how remunerating volunteer donors of HSCs
141 and other marrow-derived cellular materials for CGT research and development has a negative
142 impact on all four elements in question and remains detrimental to both the clinical
143 transplantation community and the CGT community (Figure 2).

144

145 **Welfare of donors**

146 The decision to donate SoHO should be arrived at without any pressure or undue inducement for
147 it to be considered voluntary (35, 36). This principle is imperative as the act of donation entails
148 subjecting a donor to a medical procedure for which no direct benefit can be derived. Although
149 non-stimulated collection are lower in risk than mobilized peripheral blood stem cell collection
150 (PBSC) using stimulating medications, both methods can result in harmful side effects which
151 should be reported via the Serious (Product) Events and Adverse Reactions (S(P)EAR) reporting
152 tool (37, 38). Informed volunteer donors, nonetheless, consent to this procedure knowing this
153 risk will not be offset by any consequent personal benefits. The introduction of financial
154 incentives places donors' safety at risk as some donors may be driven to assume the short-term
155 financial benefits outweigh the risks associated with the donation procedure. Subsequently, some
156 donors may reluctantly consent to donate solely based on the possibility of financial reward.
157 When the amount of compensation for stem cell donation becomes proportional to the level of
158 risk donors agree to, concerns over undue inducement intensify.

159 It is imperative to recognise that the role of stem cell donors in CGT is evolving and any
160 subsequent implications are likely to clarify over time and experience. Regardless of the purpose

161 of donation, however, respect for human dignity should always govern donation practices to
162 ensure the intrinsic value of the human body remains protected. In that regard, multiple appeals
163 can be found in the literature for the establishment of longitudinal governance structures between
164 procurement organizations and donors of SoHO that go beyond informed consent (39). These
165 appeals are based on concerns over the ability of consent as a tool to adequately protect the
166 dignity of donors, particularly when there is potential for financial gain by third parties using
167 donor cells (14). Remunerating donors could exacerbate these concerns as the potential for undue
168 inducement deepens amid increasing international concerns over the commodification of SoHO
169 (40). Non-remuneration, therefore, remains the best approach to advance the field of CGT while
170 ensuring respect for the fundamental principle of human dignity.

171 **Welfare of patients**

172 Harm to patients as a result of donor remuneration was extensively discussed in the previous
173 statement and the premise of that discussion remains valid here as well. The possibility of
174 remuneration may prompt potential donors to withhold information that can result in their
175 deferral for fear of missing out on financial reward (15). An intervention that has the potential to
176 jeopardize the screening and evaluation process of donors may risk transmission of diseases from
177 the donor to the recipient. This can have detrimental effects on patients, especially in the context
178 of CGT, where therapies developed using a single donor have the potential to be used in the
179 treatment of multiple recipients (12). While global regulations on quality control and safety of
180 ATMPs under development exist, and robust screening mechanisms are rapidly advancing, the
181 risks imposed on patients by a remunerating system cannot be fully eliminated.

182

183 Furthermore, there is a significant body of literature on unproven stem cell-based interventions
184 and the proliferation of unregulated stem cell clinics offering patients unauthorized cell therapies
185 (41-43). Initially considered a public health problem constricted to countries with insufficient
186 regulatory oversight, this trend has now been observed worldwide, including the USA and
187 Europe (44-46). Reports of patients suffering from serious and sometimes fatal side effects
188 following the use of unproven and unregulated cell-based therapies exist (45), and while most
189 businesses were reported to have been marketing autologous cell-based interventions, some
190 allogeneic interventions have also been reported (43). Donor remuneration could indirectly
191 sustain the operation of these clinics and increase access to unapproved therapies, causing more
192 harm to patients.

193

194 **Potential threat to the common good**

195 Remuneration advocates may argue that donation for CGT might not carry the same altruistic
196 sentiment as donation for direct patient treatment. Monetary incentives could, therefore,
197 encourage more individuals to donate for CGT. Currently, there is no evidence to support the
198 notion that donors are less likely to donate for CGT compared to direct patient treatment.

199 Although studies on the effect of financial rewards in incentivising donations of other SoHO
200 demonstrate inconsistent results across different populations (47-49), preliminary evidence in
201 Canada and the UK suggests an overwhelming willingness among registered prospective donors
202 to voluntarily donate stem cells and other types of tissues for CGT (50, 51). Participants viewed
203 donations for CGT as an opportunity for them to benefit the wider good by helping multiple
204 recipients as opposed to one (52).

205

206 Remuneration or fixed rate-compensation where permissible and culturally acceptable, can be
207 seen in other donation settings such as plasma donation or donation of small blood volumes.
208 Although this practice does not seem to cause potential harm to donor safety and welfare, there is
209 insufficient evidence to assess its impact on the quality of the blood provided (53). Moreover,
210 evidence suggests blood donors remain significantly committed to non-remunerated blood
211 donation, even when remuneration may be possible (49). DRs have a unique asset which is a
212 committed donor base, with whom regular contact is made through various mediums, be it social
213 media or via email. During these contact efforts, the importance of their commitment and the
214 link to helping patient lives is reinforced. We acknowledge current developments in the CGT
215 field could act as another opportunity for donors to participate in helping patients, their donated
216 material can help advance science to develop the next generation of therapies that will cure
217 patients. At this stage, however, we do not have sufficient data to draw from a firm conclusion
218 that an offer of remuneration will not interfere with donor commitment, and by extension,
219 altruistic donations. This is the case for blood donation as well (47, 49, 54). More research on
220 donor behavior is therefore needed to explore the possible positive and negative outcomes that
221 might result from donor remuneration.

222

223 Remuneration may also be morally problematic given its potential to attract financially
224 disadvantaged persons. This argument was previously challenged by PBSC remuneration
225 advocates, arguing that the low human leukocyte antigen (HLA) matching odds associated with
226 the HCT donation system blunt the coercive nature of a paid market on financially disadvantaged
227 individuals (20). HLA matching in allogeneic cell therapies remains crucial to ensure the best
228 possible outcome for patients, yet the specific uses of donor stem cells in CGT development

229 make repeated donations from a single donor a possibility. This effectively means the coercive
230 nature of a paid donation market cannot be entirely eliminated by low matching odds and
231 remains a concern for CGT as it is for HCT. Moreover, a remunerating system can
232 disproportionately select donors due to its potential to attract marginalised individuals. As a
233 consequence, the burden of donation and its associated risks will unfairly concentrate within
234 economically disadvantaged groups, jeopardizing the principle of justice.

235

236

237 **Responsibilities of organizations involved**

238 Within the field of HCT, the chance of a donor undergoing a subsequent donation for the same
239 recipient is approximately 5-10% (55), whereas the chance of matching with a second recipient
240 after donation is <1% (56). Despite these low odds, limits exist on the number of donations a
241 single donor can make regardless of the method of collection (PBSC or bone marrow collection).
242 DRs set these limits because they have a responsibility to protect the rights of donors and ensure
243 their welfare and safety (36, 57-59). However, as the demand for donor materials in CGT rises,
244 donation requests from a single donor are also likely to increase. Donors may have to sit for
245 longer and multiple collection sessions. This could have a negative impact on donors' physical
246 and mental health. Frequent donations from a single donor could consequently increase the
247 burden of donation on donors (60). Moreover, in the event a donor has a negative donation
248 experience, subsequent requests may lead them into feeling coerced to participate again, placing
249 their commitment at risk (60). The potential for coercion is augmented when limits on the
250 maximum number of times a donor can be recalled are not defined. A non-remunerating system

251 continues to be the best approach to ensure donors' safety and maintain donors' trust in DRs
252 when practices are constantly developing, and risks are not completely understood.

253
254 One of the fundamental objectives leading to the establishment of DRs is the facilitation of life
255 saving transplantations via altruistic donations. DRs have a responsibility to ensure this objective
256 is reflected in their practices. Commercialising SoHO without appropriate limits on the potential
257 financial benefits generated from these cells could threaten the altruistic donation system and
258 jeopardize trust in the organisation. In view of these concerns, it is essential to clarify some DRs
259 charge slightly more margin than the cost of the donation process to cover the entire operational
260 cost of maintaining a donor registry. The DR then reinvests to fund research and improve
261 services and operations, which ultimately benefits donors and patients. Nevertheless, DRs have a
262 duty towards donors to establish governance systems based on transparency. Procurement fees
263 charged by DRs should therefore be within reasonable boundaries to ensure altruistic donations
264 are not transformed into profit-driven enterprises (61). This is a fundamental requirement if
265 prospective donors are to develop the trust needed for them to consider donation to begin with. It
266 is possible that some donors might question the integrity of the DR and its principal mission if
267 donor remuneration is permissible, especially when transparency is absent. When the values of a
268 DR are in question, many prospective donors might choose to back out from donation. This will
269 be catastrophic for both the transplantation and the CGT communities.

270

271 **Impact on global marketability**

272

273 A remunerating system can compromise the global marketability of CGT. As previously

274 discussed, guidelines on donor compensation can be ambiguous and may differ considerably

275 between countries. Inequities in global patient access to cell and gene therapies have already
276 manifested due to the high cost of the treatments resulting in withdrawal of the treatment due to
277 regional healthcare providers' inability to reach payment deals with the therapy manufacturers. A
278 worthwhile topic for further discussion but out of scope for this publication (62, 63).
279 CGT developers seeking marketing authorization across multiple markets are encouraged to use
280 ethically sourced, safe, and quality controlled starting material from nonremunerated donors.
281 Voluntary unpaid donation remains the best approach moving forward to guarantee donor
282 protection, ensure patients are not exposed to harm, and maintain the sustainability of healthcare
283 systems by avoiding further inequities in access.

284

285 **Recommendations**

286 The World Marrow Donor Association (WMDA) strives for a world where access to life-saving
287 cellular therapies for all patients is assured and donor rights and safety are protected (64). We are
288 proud of our efforts to ensure the rights and safety of donors are promoted and protected. The
289 rapid pace of developments in the CGT field necessitates innovative thinking to enable
290 progression. The approval of the first allogeneic cell therapy for use in patients is a significant
291 milestone for the field (65). Several additional allogeneic products requiring the donation of
292 starting material from a donor are in the pipeline (66). This is a remarkable achievement and
293 highlights the potential benefits that these therapies, and the sourced donations relied upon, can
294 bring to patients.

295

296 This publication serves as a follow-up to the WMDA's 2011 position paper on the remuneration
297 of hematopoietic stem cell donors (15). The development of CGT has reinstated this discussion

298 in a different setting, as there is now the possibility of financial profit for third parties that will be
299 using donor cells as starting material. Whilst there may be diverging views on the remuneration
300 of donors for their contributions, the WMDA remains committed at this time to advocating for
301 the non-remuneration of volunteer donors for all types of donations, including for stem cell
302 transplants and cell and gene therapy based on the current evidence.

303

304 We acknowledge that the issue of remuneration is complex and can depend on various factors,
305 including cultural and societal norms. However, the WMDA Cellular Therapy Committee has
306 provided recommendations based on expert views that support non-remuneration as the best way
307 to ensure the safety and well-being of donors and patients alike. We recognize that the
308 supporting regulations and guidance for cell and gene therapies are constantly evolving, and we
309 will review our recommendations as the field advances and practices develop. Nevertheless, we
310 believe that to achieve our goal of advancing the field while ensuring the protection of donors'
311 rights and well-being, the safety of patients, non-remunerated donation is the way forward for
312 now, for stem cell and cell and gene therapy.

313

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323 Deutschland (ZKRD).

324

325 **Author Contributions**

326 Lina Hamad: Lina led data curation, investigation, and authored the original draft. She also
327 participated in reviewing and editing the final manuscript.

328 Salmah Mahmood Ahmed: Salmah conceived the study, supervised investigations, and
329 contributed to methodology. She participated in the review and editing of the final manuscript.

330 Eefke van Eerden: Eefke conducted investigations, curated data, and contributed to the final
331 manuscript review and editing.

332 Suzanna M van Walraven: Suzanna contributed to study conceptualization, investigations, and
333 methodology. She was involved in supervising and improving the final manuscript.

334 Laura Machin: Laura contributed to study conceptualization, investigations, and methodology.
335 She also contributed to supervising and enhancing the final manuscript.

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