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Fitting attitudes and essentially contestable concepts

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>2012
<mark>Journal</mark>Filosofia Unisinos
Issue number2 Suppl
Volume13
Number of pages10
Pages (from-to)326-335
<mark>State</mark>Published
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

The issue of Fitting Attitudes inherit the much-discussed ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem (WKR) that afflicts some accounts. The problem remained to attempts to give an account of FA is to specify the right kinds of reasons, to specify the right notion of fittingness. A number of solutions have been proposed to solve WKR. ‘Conceptual thesis’ about attitude formation and the ‘psychological thesis’. The text discusses both of it, raising some questions about them, but also wish to emphasize that the understanding of FA that is supposed to lead to WKR is problematic. An important thing to be brought seems to be that, when applied to essentially contestable concepts, fitting attitude analyses, understood properly (i.e. without unwarranted presuppositions about the very value in dispute) will not result in WKR as conceived in the kinds of examples given earlier. Exploring the issue of Fitting Attitudes and giving to it an alternative account is the main goal of the present paper.