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A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships. / Conyon, Martin; Read, L.

In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, No. 3, 06.2006, p. 645-659.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Conyon, M & Read, L 2006, 'A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships', Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 645-659. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.004

APA

Vancouver

Author

Conyon, Martin ; Read, L. / A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships. In: Journal of Corporate Finance. 2006 ; Vol. 12, No. 3. pp. 645-659.

Bibtex

@article{f2b5e84c30ca43fd9aeca9dc5ec6d104,
title = "A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships",
abstract = "Why do firms allow their executives to accept outsidedirectorships? Are firms acting in the best interests of their shareholders by allowing them to do so? We develop a theoretical model where accepting an outsidedirectorship alters the CEO's effect on the value of the home firm. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than is optimal for the home firm. Our theoretical model is consistent with other recent empirical finance research on the effects of external directorships.",
keywords = "Corporate governance , Firm performance , Boards of directors",
author = "Martin Conyon and L Read",
year = "2006",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.004",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "645--659",
journal = "Journal of Corporate Finance",
issn = "0929-1199",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - Read, L

PY - 2006/6

Y1 - 2006/6

N2 - Why do firms allow their executives to accept outsidedirectorships? Are firms acting in the best interests of their shareholders by allowing them to do so? We develop a theoretical model where accepting an outsidedirectorship alters the CEO's effect on the value of the home firm. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than is optimal for the home firm. Our theoretical model is consistent with other recent empirical finance research on the effects of external directorships.

AB - Why do firms allow their executives to accept outsidedirectorships? Are firms acting in the best interests of their shareholders by allowing them to do so? We develop a theoretical model where accepting an outsidedirectorship alters the CEO's effect on the value of the home firm. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than is optimal for the home firm. Our theoretical model is consistent with other recent empirical finance research on the effects of external directorships.

KW - Corporate governance

KW - Firm performance

KW - Boards of directors

U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 12

SP - 645

EP - 659

JO - Journal of Corporate Finance

JF - Journal of Corporate Finance

SN - 0929-1199

IS - 3

ER -