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A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

<mark>Journal publication date</mark>06/2006
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Corporate Finance
Issue number3
Number of pages15
Pages (from-to)645-659
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English


Why do firms allow their executives to accept outsidedirectorships? Are firms acting in the best interests of their shareholders by allowing them to do so? We develop a theoretical model where accepting an outsidedirectorship alters the CEO's effect on the value of the home firm. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than is optimal for the home firm. Our theoretical model is consistent with other recent empirical finance research on the effects of external directorships.