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Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

Research output: Working paper

Publication date18/06/2019
Place of PublicationLancaster
PublisherLancaster University, Department of Economics
Original languageEnglish

Publication series

NameEconomics Working papers Series


This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.