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Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

Research output: Working paper

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Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment. / Barbosa, Klenio; De Silva, Dakshina; Yang, Liyu et al.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2019. (Economics Working papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Barbosa, K, De Silva, D, Yang, L & Yoshimoto, H 2019 'Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment' Economics Working papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Barbosa, K., De Silva, D., Yang, L., & Yoshimoto, H. (2019). Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment. (Economics Working papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Barbosa K, De Silva D, Yang L, Yoshimoto H. Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2019 Jun 18. (Economics Working papers Series).

Author

Barbosa, Klenio ; De Silva, Dakshina ; Yang, Liyu et al. / Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue : Evidence from the Chinese Experiment. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2019. (Economics Working papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{b2c9b80550e048a7831158032e7e2ef9,
title = "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment",
abstract = "This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.",
keywords = "Treasury Security Auctions, Discriminatory Auctions, Uniform Auctions, Revenue Equivalence",
author = "Klenio Barbosa and {De Silva}, Dakshina and Liyu Yang and Hisayuki Yoshimoto",
year = "2019",
month = jun,
day = "18",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue

T2 - Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

AU - Barbosa, Klenio

AU - De Silva, Dakshina

AU - Yang, Liyu

AU - Yoshimoto, Hisayuki

PY - 2019/6/18

Y1 - 2019/6/18

N2 - This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.

AB - This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.

KW - Treasury Security Auctions

KW - Discriminatory Auctions

KW - Uniform Auctions

KW - Revenue Equivalence

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working papers Series

BT - Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -