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Research output: Working paper
Research output: Working paper
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue
T2 - Evidence from the Chinese Experiment
AU - Barbosa, Klenio
AU - De Silva, Dakshina
AU - Yang, Liyu
AU - Yoshimoto, Hisayuki
PY - 2019/6/18
Y1 - 2019/6/18
N2 - This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.
AB - This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.
KW - Treasury Security Auctions
KW - Discriminatory Auctions
KW - Uniform Auctions
KW - Revenue Equivalence
M3 - Working paper
T3 - Economics Working papers Series
BT - Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue
PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics
CY - Lancaster
ER -