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Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis. / Klumpes, P J M.

Lancaster University : The Department of Accounting and Finance, 1998. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Klumpes, PJM 1998 'Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis' Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series, The Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University.

APA

Klumpes, P. J. M. (1998). Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series). Lancaster University: The Department of Accounting and Finance.

Vancouver

Klumpes PJM. Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis. Lancaster University: The Department of Accounting and Finance. 1998. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Author

Klumpes, P J M. / Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis. Lancaster University : The Department of Accounting and Finance, 1998. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{02ef0695f35c42c2a6af612126df16eb,
title = "Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis",
abstract = "This paper develops a property rights analysis of competion among accounting standard setters. The takings decision is costly as it imposes some form of compensation to be paid to a national accounting standard setter whose property rights to issue accounting standards are taken away and conferred instead on a competing standard setting body, the IASC. Applying a scenario developed by Giammarino and Nosal (1994), a political-game play model is presented which assumes four participants: (a) IOSCO; (b) a national-based regulatory authority; and (c) a national-based accounting standard setting body and the IASC who compete for the right to set international-GAAP. The optimal linear compensation rule for the takings decision is found to depend upon with which interest group the regulatory authority s preferences coincide.",
keywords = "property rights, accounting standards, compensation.",
author = "Klumpes, {P J M}",
year = "1998",
language = "English",
series = "Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series",
publisher = "The Department of Accounting and Finance",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Accounting and Finance",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis

AU - Klumpes, P J M

PY - 1998

Y1 - 1998

N2 - This paper develops a property rights analysis of competion among accounting standard setters. The takings decision is costly as it imposes some form of compensation to be paid to a national accounting standard setter whose property rights to issue accounting standards are taken away and conferred instead on a competing standard setting body, the IASC. Applying a scenario developed by Giammarino and Nosal (1994), a political-game play model is presented which assumes four participants: (a) IOSCO; (b) a national-based regulatory authority; and (c) a national-based accounting standard setting body and the IASC who compete for the right to set international-GAAP. The optimal linear compensation rule for the takings decision is found to depend upon with which interest group the regulatory authority s preferences coincide.

AB - This paper develops a property rights analysis of competion among accounting standard setters. The takings decision is costly as it imposes some form of compensation to be paid to a national accounting standard setter whose property rights to issue accounting standards are taken away and conferred instead on a competing standard setting body, the IASC. Applying a scenario developed by Giammarino and Nosal (1994), a political-game play model is presented which assumes four participants: (a) IOSCO; (b) a national-based regulatory authority; and (c) a national-based accounting standard setting body and the IASC who compete for the right to set international-GAAP. The optimal linear compensation rule for the takings decision is found to depend upon with which interest group the regulatory authority s preferences coincide.

KW - property rights

KW - accounting standards

KW - compensation.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series

BT - Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis

PB - The Department of Accounting and Finance

CY - Lancaster University

ER -