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Competition among accounting standard setters: a property rights analysis

Research output: Working paper

Publication date1998
Place of PublicationLancaster University
PublisherThe Department of Accounting and Finance
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Publication series

NameAccounting and Finance Working Paper Series


This paper develops a property rights analysis of competion among accounting standard setters. The takings decision is costly as it imposes some form of compensation to be paid to a national accounting standard setter whose property rights to issue accounting standards are taken away and conferred instead on a competing standard setting body, the IASC. Applying a scenario developed by Giammarino and Nosal (1994), a political-game play model is presented which assumes four participants: (a) IOSCO; (b) a national-based regulatory authority; and (c) a national-based accounting standard setting body and the IASC who compete for the right to set international-GAAP. The optimal linear compensation rule for the takings decision is found to depend upon with which interest group the regulatory authority s preferences coincide.