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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Tucker, F. (2016), Developing Autonomy and Transitional Paternalism. Bioethics, 30: 759–766. doi:10.1111/bioe.12280 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bioe.12280/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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Developing autonomy and transitional paternalism

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>11/2016
<mark>Journal</mark>Bioethics
Issue number9
Volume30
Number of pages8
Pages (from-to)759-766
Publication statusPublished
Early online date15/09/16
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

Adolescents, in many jurisdictions, have the power to consent to life saving treatment but not necessarily the power to refuse it. A recent defence of this asymmetry is Neil Manson's theory of ‘transitional paternalism’. Transitional paternalism holds that such asymmetries are by-products of sharing normative powers. However, sharing normative powers by itself does not entail an asymmetry because transitional paternalism can be implemented in two ways. Manson defends the asymmetry-generating version of transitional paternalism in the clinical context, arguing that it maximizes respect for adolescent autonomy. This article offers an alternative argument in favour of the asymmetry-generating form of transitional paternalism, one that makes appeal to obligations that individuals have to develop self-governance in others. We should share normative powers asymmetrically in the clinical context for three reasons. First, the asymmetric version of transitional paternalism takes seriously duties to support adolescents’ developing autonomy, alongside other duties that adults have to young people. It does so by enabling young people to be involved in important decisions that they would otherwise be excluded from. This is of value because participation of this sort is central to the cultivation of their self-governance. Second, only the asymmetric version gives young people a voice in respect of all clinical actions, and only the asymmetric version leaves open the possibility that the coarse lines of legislation might be ‘fine-tuned’ in individual cases. Third, the asymmetric sharing of normative powers is consistent with the kind of social arrangements that best support autonomy.

Bibliographic note

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Tucker, F. (2016), Developing Autonomy and Transitional Paternalism. Bioethics, 30: 759–766. doi:10.1111/bioe.12280 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bioe.12280/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.