Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization

Electronic data

  • main

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Public Economics, 178, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

    Accepted author manuscript, 697 KB, PDF document

    Embargo ends: 28/09/21

    Available under license: CC BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
Close
Article number104065
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1/10/2019
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Public Economics
Volume178
Number of pages12
Publication statusPublished
Early online date28/09/19
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Public Economics, 178, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065