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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Public Economics, 178, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

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Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization

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Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization. / Bol, Damien; Matakos, Konstantinos; Troumpounis, Orestis et al.
In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 178, 104065, 01.10.2019.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Bol, D, Matakos, K, Troumpounis, O & Xefteris, D 2019, 'Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 178, 104065. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

APA

Bol, D., Matakos, K., Troumpounis, O., & Xefteris, D. (2019). Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization. Journal of Public Economics, 178, Article 104065. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

Vancouver

Bol D, Matakos K, Troumpounis O, Xefteris D. Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization. Journal of Public Economics. 2019 Oct 1;178:104065. Epub 2019 Sept 28. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

Author

Bol, Damien ; Matakos, Konstantinos ; Troumpounis, Orestis et al. / Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2019 ; Vol. 178.

Bibtex

@article{d3707657894c41ebb05e6c58cdee6de8,
title = "Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization",
abstract = "How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.",
keywords = "electoral systems, proportional representation, disproportionality, strategic entry, polarization, laboratory experiment",
author = "Damien Bol and Konstantinos Matakos and Orestis Troumpounis and Dimitrios Xefteris",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Public Economics, 178, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065",
language = "English",
volume = "178",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization

AU - Bol, Damien

AU - Matakos, Konstantinos

AU - Troumpounis, Orestis

AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Public Economics, 178, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

PY - 2019/10/1

Y1 - 2019/10/1

N2 - How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.

AB - How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.

KW - electoral systems

KW - proportional representation

KW - disproportionality

KW - strategic entry

KW - polarization

KW - laboratory experiment

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

M3 - Journal article

VL - 178

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

M1 - 104065

ER -