Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Public Economics, 178, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065
Accepted author manuscript, 698 KB, PDF document
Available under license: CC BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization
AU - Bol, Damien
AU - Matakos, Konstantinos
AU - Troumpounis, Orestis
AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios
N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Public Economics, 178, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065
PY - 2019/10/1
Y1 - 2019/10/1
N2 - How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.
AB - How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.
KW - electoral systems
KW - proportional representation
KW - disproportionality
KW - strategic entry
KW - polarization
KW - laboratory experiment
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065
M3 - Journal article
VL - 178
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
SN - 0047-2727
M1 - 104065
ER -