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Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information. / Slechten, Aurelie.
In: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 7, No. 3, 31.05.2020, p. 455-481.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Slechten, A 2020, 'Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information', Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 455-481. https://doi.org/10.1086/707653

APA

Slechten, A. (2020). Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 7(3), 455-481. https://doi.org/10.1086/707653

Vancouver

Slechten A. Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. 2020 May 31;7(3):455-481. Epub 2020 Mar 5. doi: 10.1086/707653

Author

Slechten, Aurelie. / Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information. In: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. 2020 ; Vol. 7, No. 3. pp. 455-481.

Bibtex

@article{4f60380ce3714888a05d321b7d451073,
title = "Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information",
abstract = "In a two-country model, I investigate the role of a pre-negotiation phase as an information-sharing and certification device to restore the feasibility of an efficient environmental agreement when countries' abatement costs are private information and participation is voluntary. When uncertainty regarding abatement costs is high, the welfare gains of reducing information asymmetries and reaching the first-best agreement will be sufficiently large to design budget-balanced transfers that compensate both countries for the loss of the information rent they could obtain by staying privately informed. Both countries then accept to share and certify their abatement costs during the pre-negotiation phase.",
keywords = "environmental agreements, asymmetric information, certification, information exchange",
author = "Aurelie Slechten",
year = "2020",
month = may,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1086/707653",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "455--481",
journal = "Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists",
issn = "2333-5955",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information

AU - Slechten, Aurelie

PY - 2020/5/31

Y1 - 2020/5/31

N2 - In a two-country model, I investigate the role of a pre-negotiation phase as an information-sharing and certification device to restore the feasibility of an efficient environmental agreement when countries' abatement costs are private information and participation is voluntary. When uncertainty regarding abatement costs is high, the welfare gains of reducing information asymmetries and reaching the first-best agreement will be sufficiently large to design budget-balanced transfers that compensate both countries for the loss of the information rent they could obtain by staying privately informed. Both countries then accept to share and certify their abatement costs during the pre-negotiation phase.

AB - In a two-country model, I investigate the role of a pre-negotiation phase as an information-sharing and certification device to restore the feasibility of an efficient environmental agreement when countries' abatement costs are private information and participation is voluntary. When uncertainty regarding abatement costs is high, the welfare gains of reducing information asymmetries and reaching the first-best agreement will be sufficiently large to design budget-balanced transfers that compensate both countries for the loss of the information rent they could obtain by staying privately informed. Both countries then accept to share and certify their abatement costs during the pre-negotiation phase.

KW - environmental agreements

KW - asymmetric information

KW - certification

KW - information exchange

U2 - 10.1086/707653

DO - 10.1086/707653

M3 - Journal article

VL - 7

SP - 455

EP - 481

JO - Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

JF - Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

SN - 2333-5955

IS - 3

ER -