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  • Anger_and_Disgust_R2_Feb_26_FINAL

    Rights statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 15/04/2019, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02699931.2019.1605977

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Folk beliefs about the relationships anger and disgust have with moral disapproval

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
Article number13
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>29/02/2020
<mark>Journal</mark>Cognition and Emotion
Issue number2
Volume34
Pages (from-to)229-241
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date15/04/19
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

Theories that view emotions as being related in some way to moral judgments suggest that condemning moral emotions should, at a minimum, be understood by laypeople to coincide with judgments of moral disapproval. Seven studies (total N = 826) tested the extent to which anger and disgust align with this criterion. We observed that while anger is understood to be strongly related to moral disapproval of people’s actions and character, disgust is not (Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3), and that, in contexts where disgust expressions are thought to coincide somewhat with moral disapproval, part of the reason is that the expression is perceived as anger (Study 4). Expressions of sadness are also construed as communicating anger in such contexts (Study 5). We discuss our findings in terms of rethinking how we should consider disgust as a moral emotion.

Bibliographic note

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 15/04/2019, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02699931.2019.1605977