Rights statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 15/04/2019, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02699931.2019.1605977
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Folk beliefs about the relationships anger and disgust have with moral disapproval
AU - Piazza, Jared Raymond
AU - Landy, Justin
N1 - This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 15/04/2019, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02699931.2019.1605977
PY - 2020/2/29
Y1 - 2020/2/29
N2 - Theories that view emotions as being related in some way to moral judgments suggest that condemning moral emotions should, at a minimum, be understood by laypeople to coincide with judgments of moral disapproval. Seven studies (total N = 826) tested the extent to which anger and disgust align with this criterion. We observed that while anger is understood to be strongly related to moral disapproval of people’s actions and character, disgust is not (Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3), and that, in contexts where disgust expressions are thought to coincide somewhat with moral disapproval, part of the reason is that the expression is perceived as anger (Study 4). Expressions of sadness are also construed as communicating anger in such contexts (Study 5). We discuss our findings in terms of rethinking how we should consider disgust as a moral emotion.
AB - Theories that view emotions as being related in some way to moral judgments suggest that condemning moral emotions should, at a minimum, be understood by laypeople to coincide with judgments of moral disapproval. Seven studies (total N = 826) tested the extent to which anger and disgust align with this criterion. We observed that while anger is understood to be strongly related to moral disapproval of people’s actions and character, disgust is not (Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3), and that, in contexts where disgust expressions are thought to coincide somewhat with moral disapproval, part of the reason is that the expression is perceived as anger (Study 4). Expressions of sadness are also construed as communicating anger in such contexts (Study 5). We discuss our findings in terms of rethinking how we should consider disgust as a moral emotion.
KW - Anger
KW - disgust
KW - moral judgment
KW - emotions
KW - expressions
U2 - 10.1080/02699931.2019.1605977
DO - 10.1080/02699931.2019.1605977
M3 - Journal article
VL - 34
SP - 229
EP - 241
JO - Cognition and Emotion
JF - Cognition and Emotion
SN - 0269-9931
IS - 2
M1 - 13
ER -