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    Rights statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science on 09/03/2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548

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Fundamentalism: examining the role of public reason in ‘non-liberal’ approaches to ‘unreasonable’ doctrines

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Fundamentalism : examining the role of public reason in ‘non-liberal’ approaches to ‘unreasonable’ doctrines. / Johnson, Matthew Thomas; Mabon, Simon Paul.

In: Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2018, p. 195-210.

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@article{5706c060ec664fa380b30e800bd63ea5,
title = "Fundamentalism: examining the role of public reason in {\textquoteleft}non-liberal{\textquoteright} approaches to {\textquoteleft}unreasonable{\textquoteright} doctrines",
abstract = "In this article, we examine ways in which critics of liberalism come to adopt, without acknowledgement, {\textquoteleft}liberal{\textquoteright} forms of public reason in responding to homogenising tendencies of fundamentalist doctrines. We focus on the divergent approaches of John Gray and Slavoj {\v Z}i{\v z}ek, arguing that the former upholds a comprehensive form of liberalism, while the latter upholds a political form popular among policy makers who endorse a {\textquoteleft}fundamentalism{\textquoteright}/{\textquoteleft}extremism{\textquoteright} dichotomy. We argue that the latter fails to recognise that {\textquoteleft}philosophical{\textquoteright} unreasonableness often translates into political unreasonableness. Examining these non-liberal approaches not only indicates the apparent value of reason as reciprocity, it also supports a long-held charge against liberalism: that it is not able to uphold its promise of accommodating radical forms of diversity.",
keywords = "Fundamentalism, extremism, liberalism, public reason",
author = "Johnson, {Matthew Thomas} and Mabon, {Simon Paul}",
note = "This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science on 09/03/2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548",
language = "English",
volume = "53",
pages = "195--210",
journal = "Australian Journal of Political Science",
issn = "1036-1146",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fundamentalism

T2 - examining the role of public reason in ‘non-liberal’ approaches to ‘unreasonable’ doctrines

AU - Johnson, Matthew Thomas

AU - Mabon, Simon Paul

N1 - This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science on 09/03/2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - In this article, we examine ways in which critics of liberalism come to adopt, without acknowledgement, ‘liberal’ forms of public reason in responding to homogenising tendencies of fundamentalist doctrines. We focus on the divergent approaches of John Gray and Slavoj Žižek, arguing that the former upholds a comprehensive form of liberalism, while the latter upholds a political form popular among policy makers who endorse a ‘fundamentalism’/‘extremism’ dichotomy. We argue that the latter fails to recognise that ‘philosophical’ unreasonableness often translates into political unreasonableness. Examining these non-liberal approaches not only indicates the apparent value of reason as reciprocity, it also supports a long-held charge against liberalism: that it is not able to uphold its promise of accommodating radical forms of diversity.

AB - In this article, we examine ways in which critics of liberalism come to adopt, without acknowledgement, ‘liberal’ forms of public reason in responding to homogenising tendencies of fundamentalist doctrines. We focus on the divergent approaches of John Gray and Slavoj Žižek, arguing that the former upholds a comprehensive form of liberalism, while the latter upholds a political form popular among policy makers who endorse a ‘fundamentalism’/‘extremism’ dichotomy. We argue that the latter fails to recognise that ‘philosophical’ unreasonableness often translates into political unreasonableness. Examining these non-liberal approaches not only indicates the apparent value of reason as reciprocity, it also supports a long-held charge against liberalism: that it is not able to uphold its promise of accommodating radical forms of diversity.

KW - Fundamentalism

KW - extremism

KW - liberalism

KW - public reason

U2 - 10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548

DO - 10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548

M3 - Journal article

VL - 53

SP - 195

EP - 210

JO - Australian Journal of Political Science

JF - Australian Journal of Political Science

SN - 1036-1146

IS - 2

ER -