Rights statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science on 09/03/2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Fundamentalism
T2 - examining the role of public reason in ‘non-liberal’ approaches to ‘unreasonable’ doctrines
AU - Johnson, Matthew Thomas
AU - Mabon, Simon Paul
N1 - This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science on 09/03/2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - In this article, we examine ways in which critics of liberalism come to adopt, without acknowledgement, ‘liberal’ forms of public reason in responding to homogenising tendencies of fundamentalist doctrines. We focus on the divergent approaches of John Gray and Slavoj Žižek, arguing that the former upholds a comprehensive form of liberalism, while the latter upholds a political form popular among policy makers who endorse a ‘fundamentalism’/‘extremism’ dichotomy. We argue that the latter fails to recognise that ‘philosophical’ unreasonableness often translates into political unreasonableness. Examining these non-liberal approaches not only indicates the apparent value of reason as reciprocity, it also supports a long-held charge against liberalism: that it is not able to uphold its promise of accommodating radical forms of diversity.
AB - In this article, we examine ways in which critics of liberalism come to adopt, without acknowledgement, ‘liberal’ forms of public reason in responding to homogenising tendencies of fundamentalist doctrines. We focus on the divergent approaches of John Gray and Slavoj Žižek, arguing that the former upholds a comprehensive form of liberalism, while the latter upholds a political form popular among policy makers who endorse a ‘fundamentalism’/‘extremism’ dichotomy. We argue that the latter fails to recognise that ‘philosophical’ unreasonableness often translates into political unreasonableness. Examining these non-liberal approaches not only indicates the apparent value of reason as reciprocity, it also supports a long-held charge against liberalism: that it is not able to uphold its promise of accommodating radical forms of diversity.
KW - Fundamentalism
KW - extremism
KW - liberalism
KW - public reason
U2 - 10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548
DO - 10.1080/10361146.2018.1447548
M3 - Journal article
VL - 53
SP - 195
EP - 210
JO - Australian Journal of Political Science
JF - Australian Journal of Political Science
SN - 1036-1146
IS - 2
ER -