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How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1/01/2017
<mark>Journal</mark>Ethics
Issue number2
Volume127
Number of pages15
Pages (from-to)415-429
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter’s partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a “deal breaker” fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty’s negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.

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© 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.