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How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex. / Manson, Neil Campbell.
In: Ethics, Vol. 127, No. 2, 01.01.2017, p. 415-429.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Manson, NC 2017, 'How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex', Ethics, vol. 127, no. 2, pp. 415-429. https://doi.org/10.1086/688743

APA

Manson, N. C. (2017). How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex. Ethics, 127(2), 415-429. https://doi.org/10.1086/688743

Vancouver

Manson NC. How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex. Ethics. 2017 Jan 1;127(2):415-429. doi: 10.1086/688743

Author

Manson, Neil Campbell. / How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex. In: Ethics. 2017 ; Vol. 127, No. 2. pp. 415-429.

Bibtex

@article{b04b74cb5d0b4a008561f3ea3ef8a3de,
title = "How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex",
abstract = "It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter{\textquoteright}s partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a “deal breaker” fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty{\textquoteright}s negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.",
keywords = "consent, deception",
author = "Manson, {Neil Campbell}",
note = "{\textcopyright} 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.",
year = "2017",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1086/688743",
language = "English",
volume = "127",
pages = "415--429",
journal = "Ethics",
issn = "0014-1704",
publisher = "University of Chicago",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex

AU - Manson, Neil Campbell

N1 - © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter’s partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a “deal breaker” fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty’s negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.

AB - It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter’s partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a “deal breaker” fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty’s negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.

KW - consent

KW - deception

U2 - 10.1086/688743

DO - 10.1086/688743

M3 - Journal article

VL - 127

SP - 415

EP - 429

JO - Ethics

JF - Ethics

SN - 0014-1704

IS - 2

ER -