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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex
AU - Manson, Neil Campbell
N1 - © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter’s partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a “deal breaker” fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty’s negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.
AB - It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter’s partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a “deal breaker” fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty’s negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.
KW - consent
KW - deception
U2 - 10.1086/688743
DO - 10.1086/688743
M3 - Journal article
VL - 127
SP - 415
EP - 429
JO - Ethics
JF - Ethics
SN - 0014-1704
IS - 2
ER -