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Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership

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Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership. / Archard, David.
In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 1, 02.2008, p. 19-34.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Archard, D 2008, 'Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership', Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 19-34. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2008.00394.x

APA

Vancouver

Archard D. Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 2008 Feb;25(1):19-34. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2008.00394.x

Author

Archard, David. / Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership. In: Journal of Applied Philosophy. 2008 ; Vol. 25, No. 1. pp. 19-34.

Bibtex

@article{d6fd083bb931451ab186a16098ab5993,
title = "Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership",
abstract = "Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to {\textquoteleft}critical life choices{\textquoteright}. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein's recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.",
author = "David Archard",
year = "2008",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-5930.2008.00394.x",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
pages = "19--34",
journal = "Journal of Applied Philosophy",
issn = "1468-5930",
publisher = "Carfax Publishing Ltd.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership

AU - Archard, David

PY - 2008/2

Y1 - 2008/2

N2 - Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein's recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.

AB - Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein's recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2008.00394.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2008.00394.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 25

SP - 19

EP - 34

JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy

JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy

SN - 1468-5930

IS - 1

ER -