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Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

<mark>Journal publication date</mark>02/2008
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Applied Philosophy
Issue number1
Number of pages16
Pages (from-to)19-34
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English


Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein's recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.