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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Corporate Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004

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Leaders and followers in hot IPO markets

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Leaders and followers in hot IPO markets. / Banerjee, Shantanu; Gucbilmez, Ufuk; Pawlina, Grzegorz.

In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 37, 04.2016, p. 309-334.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Banerjee, S, Gucbilmez, U & Pawlina, G 2016, 'Leaders and followers in hot IPO markets', Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 37, pp. 309-334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004

APA

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Author

Banerjee, Shantanu ; Gucbilmez, Ufuk ; Pawlina, Grzegorz. / Leaders and followers in hot IPO markets. In: Journal of Corporate Finance. 2016 ; Vol. 37. pp. 309-334.

Bibtex

@article{753bb4b1ac3d4347957be260e951c7b8,
title = "Leaders and followers in hot IPO markets",
abstract = "We model the dynamics of going public within an IPO wave. The model predicts that firms with better growth opportunities can find it optimal to go public early and accept underpricing of their issues to signal quality. Data supports this prediction as, on average, early movers underprice their issues significantly more and we show that leaders (early movers with high underpricing) obtain much higher valuations when going public than other IPO firms. Furthermore, after going public, leaders invest significantly more, their sales grow faster, and their profitability remains higher compared to other IPO firms.",
keywords = "IPO cycles, underpricing, adverse selection, signaling",
author = "Shantanu Banerjee and Ufuk Gucbilmez and Grzegorz Pawlina",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Corporate Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004",
year = "2016",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "309--334",
journal = "Journal of Corporate Finance",
issn = "0929-1199",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Leaders and followers in hot IPO markets

AU - Banerjee, Shantanu

AU - Gucbilmez, Ufuk

AU - Pawlina, Grzegorz

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Corporate Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004

PY - 2016/4

Y1 - 2016/4

N2 - We model the dynamics of going public within an IPO wave. The model predicts that firms with better growth opportunities can find it optimal to go public early and accept underpricing of their issues to signal quality. Data supports this prediction as, on average, early movers underprice their issues significantly more and we show that leaders (early movers with high underpricing) obtain much higher valuations when going public than other IPO firms. Furthermore, after going public, leaders invest significantly more, their sales grow faster, and their profitability remains higher compared to other IPO firms.

AB - We model the dynamics of going public within an IPO wave. The model predicts that firms with better growth opportunities can find it optimal to go public early and accept underpricing of their issues to signal quality. Data supports this prediction as, on average, early movers underprice their issues significantly more and we show that leaders (early movers with high underpricing) obtain much higher valuations when going public than other IPO firms. Furthermore, after going public, leaders invest significantly more, their sales grow faster, and their profitability remains higher compared to other IPO firms.

KW - IPO cycles

KW - underpricing

KW - adverse selection

KW - signaling

U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 37

SP - 309

EP - 334

JO - Journal of Corporate Finance

JF - Journal of Corporate Finance

SN - 0929-1199

ER -