Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Corporate Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004
Accepted author manuscript, 1.43 MB, PDF document
Available under license: CC BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Leaders and followers in hot IPO markets
AU - Banerjee, Shantanu
AU - Gucbilmez, Ufuk
AU - Pawlina, Grzegorz
N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Corporate Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004
PY - 2016/4
Y1 - 2016/4
N2 - We model the dynamics of going public within an IPO wave. The model predicts that firms with better growth opportunities can find it optimal to go public early and accept underpricing of their issues to signal quality. Data supports this prediction as, on average, early movers underprice their issues significantly more and we show that leaders (early movers with high underpricing) obtain much higher valuations when going public than other IPO firms. Furthermore, after going public, leaders invest significantly more, their sales grow faster, and their profitability remains higher compared to other IPO firms.
AB - We model the dynamics of going public within an IPO wave. The model predicts that firms with better growth opportunities can find it optimal to go public early and accept underpricing of their issues to signal quality. Data supports this prediction as, on average, early movers underprice their issues significantly more and we show that leaders (early movers with high underpricing) obtain much higher valuations when going public than other IPO firms. Furthermore, after going public, leaders invest significantly more, their sales grow faster, and their profitability remains higher compared to other IPO firms.
KW - IPO cycles
KW - underpricing
KW - adverse selection
KW - signaling
U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.004
M3 - Journal article
VL - 37
SP - 309
EP - 334
JO - Journal of Corporate Finance
JF - Journal of Corporate Finance
SN - 0929-1199
ER -