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On the detection of side-channel attacks

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On the detection of side-channel attacks. / Vateva-Gurova, T.; Suri, Neeraj.
2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC). IEEE, 2018. p. 185-186.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review

Harvard

Vateva-Gurova, T & Suri, N 2018, On the detection of side-channel attacks. in 2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC). IEEE, pp. 185-186. https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2018.00031

APA

Vateva-Gurova, T., & Suri, N. (2018). On the detection of side-channel attacks. In 2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC) (pp. 185-186). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2018.00031

Vancouver

Vateva-Gurova T, Suri N. On the detection of side-channel attacks. In 2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC). IEEE. 2018. p. 185-186 doi: 10.1109/PRDC.2018.00031

Author

Vateva-Gurova, T. ; Suri, Neeraj. / On the detection of side-channel attacks. 2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC). IEEE, 2018. pp. 185-186

Bibtex

@inproceedings{173378691497473eb925f8d380faf5ef,
title = "On the detection of side-channel attacks",
abstract = "Threats posed by side-channel and covert-channel attacks exploiting the CPU cache to compromise the confidentiality of a system raise serious security concerns. This applies especially to systems offering shared hardware or resources to their customers. As eradicating this threat is practically impeded due to performance implications or financial cost of the current mitigation approaches, a detection mechanism might enhance the security of such systems. In the course of this work, we propose an approach towards side-channel attacks detection, considering the specificity of cache-based SCAs and their implementations.",
keywords = "Anomalies, Covert-Channel Attacks, Detection, Feasibility, Side-Channel Attacks, Computer programming, Computer science, Error detection, Covert channels, Detection mechanism, Financial costs, Side-channel, Side channel attack",
author = "T. Vateva-Gurova and Neeraj Suri",
year = "2018",
month = dec,
day = "4",
doi = "10.1109/PRDC.2018.00031",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781538657010",
pages = "185--186",
booktitle = "2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC)",
publisher = "IEEE",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - On the detection of side-channel attacks

AU - Vateva-Gurova, T.

AU - Suri, Neeraj

PY - 2018/12/4

Y1 - 2018/12/4

N2 - Threats posed by side-channel and covert-channel attacks exploiting the CPU cache to compromise the confidentiality of a system raise serious security concerns. This applies especially to systems offering shared hardware or resources to their customers. As eradicating this threat is practically impeded due to performance implications or financial cost of the current mitigation approaches, a detection mechanism might enhance the security of such systems. In the course of this work, we propose an approach towards side-channel attacks detection, considering the specificity of cache-based SCAs and their implementations.

AB - Threats posed by side-channel and covert-channel attacks exploiting the CPU cache to compromise the confidentiality of a system raise serious security concerns. This applies especially to systems offering shared hardware or resources to their customers. As eradicating this threat is practically impeded due to performance implications or financial cost of the current mitigation approaches, a detection mechanism might enhance the security of such systems. In the course of this work, we propose an approach towards side-channel attacks detection, considering the specificity of cache-based SCAs and their implementations.

KW - Anomalies

KW - Covert-Channel Attacks

KW - Detection

KW - Feasibility

KW - Side-Channel Attacks

KW - Computer programming

KW - Computer science

KW - Error detection

KW - Covert channels

KW - Detection mechanism

KW - Financial costs

KW - Side-channel

KW - Side channel attack

U2 - 10.1109/PRDC.2018.00031

DO - 10.1109/PRDC.2018.00031

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SN - 9781538657010

SP - 185

EP - 186

BT - 2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC)

PB - IEEE

ER -