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On the detection of side-channel attacks

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Publication date4/12/2018
Host publication2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC)
Number of pages2
ISBN (electronic)9781538657003
ISBN (print)9781538657010
<mark>Original language</mark>English


Threats posed by side-channel and covert-channel attacks exploiting the CPU cache to compromise the confidentiality of a system raise serious security concerns. This applies especially to systems offering shared hardware or resources to their customers. As eradicating this threat is practically impeded due to performance implications or financial cost of the current mitigation approaches, a detection mechanism might enhance the security of such systems. In the course of this work, we propose an approach towards side-channel attacks detection, considering the specificity of cache-based SCAs and their implementations.