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  • Dasgupta Li Wang 2017 RFS (2)

    Rights statement: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Financial Studies following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Xi Li, Albert Y Wang; Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 11, 1 November 2018, Pages 4187–4231, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx129 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/31/11/4187/4708265

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Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

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Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover. / Dasgupta, Sudipto; Li, Xi; Wang, Albert.

In: Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 31, No. 11, 01.11.2018, p. 4187-4231.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Dasgupta, S, Li, X & Wang, A 2018, 'Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover', Review of Financial Studies, vol. 31, no. 11, pp. 4187-4231. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx129

APA

Vancouver

Author

Dasgupta, Sudipto ; Li, Xi ; Wang, Albert. / Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover. In: Review of Financial Studies. 2018 ; Vol. 31, No. 11. pp. 4187-4231.

Bibtex

@article{90cdd954be224ea8b86faaf286ee11e1,
title = "Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover",
abstract = "We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase. These effects are stronger for firms exposed to greater predation risk and with products more similar to those of other firms. CEOs are more likely to be forced out in weak governance firms; however, in good governance firms, CEOs are offered higher incentive pay. New outside CEOs receive higher incentive pay and come from firms with lower cost structures and higher asset sales. Performance and productivity improve after forced turnover.",
author = "Sudipto Dasgupta and Xi Li and Albert Wang",
note = "This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Financial Studies following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Xi Li, Albert Y Wang; Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 11, 1 November 2018, Pages 4187–4231, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx129 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/31/11/4187/4708265",
year = "2018",
month = nov,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/rfs/hhx129",
language = "English",
volume = "31",
pages = "4187--4231",
journal = "Review of Financial Studies",
issn = "0893-9454",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "11",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

AU - Li, Xi

AU - Wang, Albert

N1 - This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Financial Studies following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Xi Li, Albert Y Wang; Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 11, 1 November 2018, Pages 4187–4231, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx129 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/31/11/4187/4708265

PY - 2018/11/1

Y1 - 2018/11/1

N2 - We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase. These effects are stronger for firms exposed to greater predation risk and with products more similar to those of other firms. CEOs are more likely to be forced out in weak governance firms; however, in good governance firms, CEOs are offered higher incentive pay. New outside CEOs receive higher incentive pay and come from firms with lower cost structures and higher asset sales. Performance and productivity improve after forced turnover.

AB - We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase. These effects are stronger for firms exposed to greater predation risk and with products more similar to those of other firms. CEOs are more likely to be forced out in weak governance firms; however, in good governance firms, CEOs are offered higher incentive pay. New outside CEOs receive higher incentive pay and come from firms with lower cost structures and higher asset sales. Performance and productivity improve after forced turnover.

U2 - 10.1093/rfs/hhx129

DO - 10.1093/rfs/hhx129

M3 - Journal article

VL - 31

SP - 4187

EP - 4231

JO - Review of Financial Studies

JF - Review of Financial Studies

SN - 0893-9454

IS - 11

ER -