Rights statement: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Financial Studies following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Xi Li, Albert Y Wang; Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 11, 1 November 2018, Pages 4187–4231, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx129 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/31/11/4187/4708265
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover
AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto
AU - Li, Xi
AU - Wang, Albert
N1 - This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Financial Studies following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Xi Li, Albert Y Wang; Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 11, 1 November 2018, Pages 4187–4231, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx129 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/31/11/4187/4708265
PY - 2018/11/1
Y1 - 2018/11/1
N2 - We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase. These effects are stronger for firms exposed to greater predation risk and with products more similar to those of other firms. CEOs are more likely to be forced out in weak governance firms; however, in good governance firms, CEOs are offered higher incentive pay. New outside CEOs receive higher incentive pay and come from firms with lower cost structures and higher asset sales. Performance and productivity improve after forced turnover.
AB - We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase. These effects are stronger for firms exposed to greater predation risk and with products more similar to those of other firms. CEOs are more likely to be forced out in weak governance firms; however, in good governance firms, CEOs are offered higher incentive pay. New outside CEOs receive higher incentive pay and come from firms with lower cost structures and higher asset sales. Performance and productivity improve after forced turnover.
U2 - 10.1093/rfs/hhx129
DO - 10.1093/rfs/hhx129
M3 - Journal article
VL - 31
SP - 4187
EP - 4231
JO - Review of Financial Studies
JF - Review of Financial Studies
SN - 0893-9454
IS - 11
ER -