Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games

Electronic data

  • 1-s2.0-S0167268117301269-main

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 139, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005

    Accepted author manuscript, 845 KB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: An Experimental Study

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>07/2017
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume139
Number of pages18
Pages (from-to)88-105
Publication statusPublished
Early online date8/05/17
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

We consider a model where two players compete for n items having different common values in a Blotto game. Players must decide how to allocate their common budgets across all n items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism which yields a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. We analyze behavior under two competing payoff objectives found in the Blotto games literature that have not been previously compared: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all n items. We report results from an experiment where subjects face both payoff objectives and we find support for the differing theoretical predictions.

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 139, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005