Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 139, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005
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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games
T2 - An Experimental Study
AU - Duffy, John
AU - Matros, Alexander
N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 139, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005
PY - 2017/7
Y1 - 2017/7
N2 - We consider a model where two players compete for n items having different common values in a Blotto game. Players must decide how to allocate their common budgets across all n items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism which yields a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. We analyze behavior under two competing payoff objectives found in the Blotto games literature that have not been previously compared: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all n items. We report results from an experiment where subjects face both payoff objectives and we find support for the differing theoretical predictions.
AB - We consider a model where two players compete for n items having different common values in a Blotto game. Players must decide how to allocate their common budgets across all n items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism which yields a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. We analyze behavior under two competing payoff objectives found in the Blotto games literature that have not been previously compared: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all n items. We report results from an experiment where subjects face both payoff objectives and we find support for the differing theoretical predictions.
KW - Colonel Blotto game
KW - Contests
KW - ResourceAllocation
KW - Lotteries
KW - Electoral College
KW - Game Theory
KW - Political Theory
KW - Experimental Economics
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005
M3 - Journal article
VL - 139
SP - 88
EP - 105
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -