TY - JOUR

T1 - The relative nature of perception

T2 - a response to Canal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015)

AU - Linkenauger, Sally

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, i-Perception, 6 (5), 2015, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the i-Perception page: http://ipe.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/

PY - 2015/10

Y1 - 2015/10

N2 - Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015) present an argument about the incommensurate relationship between affordance perception and spatial perception in a criticism of Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013)’s phenotypic approach to perception. Many of their criticisms are based on a difference in the interpretation of the core ideas underlying the phenotypic approach. The most important of these differences in interpretations concern fundamental assumptions about the nature of the perceptions of size and distance themselves. Extent perception must be relative to the organism; therefore, there can be no veridical perception of space. Also, we argue in the phenotypic approach that space perception is an emergent property of affordance perception; they are not different types of perceptions as Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp presume. Thirdly, affordance perception need not be perfectly accurate, just good enough. Additionally, affordance perception need not be dichotomous; this presumption likely originates in the methodology typically employed to study affordance perception. Finally, I agree with Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp that joint research efforts will clarify and improve our understanding of these issues.

AB - Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015) present an argument about the incommensurate relationship between affordance perception and spatial perception in a criticism of Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013)’s phenotypic approach to perception. Many of their criticisms are based on a difference in the interpretation of the core ideas underlying the phenotypic approach. The most important of these differences in interpretations concern fundamental assumptions about the nature of the perceptions of size and distance themselves. Extent perception must be relative to the organism; therefore, there can be no veridical perception of space. Also, we argue in the phenotypic approach that space perception is an emergent property of affordance perception; they are not different types of perceptions as Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp presume. Thirdly, affordance perception need not be perfectly accurate, just good enough. Additionally, affordance perception need not be dichotomous; this presumption likely originates in the methodology typically employed to study affordance perception. Finally, I agree with Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp that joint research efforts will clarify and improve our understanding of these issues.

KW - visual perception

KW - affordance

KW - ecological

KW - distance perception

KW - size perception

U2 - 10.1177/2041669515599898

DO - 10.1177/2041669515599898

M3 - Journal article

VL - 6

JO - i-Perception

JF - i-Perception

SN - 2041-6695

IS - 5

ER -